YEMEN: ON THE BRINK OF SECTARIAN WAR

Shi’ite Insurgency in Washington’s Strategic Red Sea Ally

by Mohamed Al-Azaki, WW4 REPORT

He heard the military helicopters coming, Dr. Ali al-Wadiee told reporters in Al-Ruzamat, a small village situated amid the volcanic mountains of Yemen’s remote north, near the border with Saudi Arabia.

“There were several loud explosions,” he said, but the doctor wasn’t aware of how many helicopters dropped their payloads in al-Naqa’ah, just on the Yemeni side of the border.

In Saada province, 240 kilometers north of the capital Sana’a, nearly 700 people have been killed as fighting re-ignited in late January between Yemen’s army and Zaidi Shiite insurgents. Formed by tribal chief and Zaidi cleric Hussein Badr al-Din al-Houthi, killed in combat with government forces in 2004, the rebel group is known as al-Shabab al-Moumin (the Youthful Believers). Their rebellion has flared even as the government has started to pacify the Sunni insurgency elsewhere in the country. Earlier this year they threatened to kill members of the small Jewish community in Saada if they did not leave the country within 10 days.

Al-Wadiee was present in a small government medical center with four health workers, when more than 100 dead were received in a period of three days March 5-7. “About 90 of the dead were in the Yemeni army, and the others were in the Shiite insurgents,” he said.

At the outskirts of al-Ruzamat, some 10 kilometers south of al-Naqa’ah, in this same region of northern Yemen, a metal sign hanging from a shiny new chain reads: “Warning: Access to this area is forbidden for security reasons. The Yemeni Army.”

The current conflict represents the third government crackdown in Saada province since 2004, where the Shiite rebellion started out as a small protest movement. Rebel clerics have denounced the government’s ties with the United States and demanded an end to its gradual shift to Western-style social and democratic reforms.

Government forces seem to have emerged victorious from the latest fighting, having crushed the main rebel strongholds in the Razih and Al-Shagaf areas of Al-Naqa’ah. But Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, the new leader of the Shiite insurgency and brother of the slain founder, threatens to widen the circle of armed confrontations to areas outside of Saada. He is said to have hundreds of armed rebels under his command, and pledges to continue fighting the government if it doesn’t cut its alliance with America.

Just across the Gulf of Aden from Somalia and astride the Red Sea’s strategic Bab-el-Mandeb choke-point, Yemen has received strong US military support for counter-terrorism programs in recent years. Al-Thawra, the government newspaper in Sana’a, reported on Sept. 26, 2006 that US Ambassador Thomas C. Krajeski declared Washington’s support for the Yemeni government in its confrontation with al-Houthi’s insurgency.

The rebel group was formed three years ago, when Hussein Badr al-Din al-Houthi took up arms under the slogan: “God the Greatest… Death to America and Israel…Victory for Islam and Muslims.”

The government is determined to crush the uprising. But observers fear it may not be able to overcome al-Houthi’s group, which aims to install an Iranian-style Islamic theocracy and many compare to Lebanon’s Hezbollah.

“They refused all offers by the government to disarm and form a political party to live in peace,” says Abdullah al-Faqih, a professor at Sana’a University. “I think the rebels have this time lost all grounds for negotiations with the government.” To isolate the rebels, says al-Faqih, Yemeni authorities have blocked communications including mobile phone services in the restive northern province.

There are also fears of renewed targeting of Western interests in the country. In March, the Interior Ministry temporarily tightened security around foreign embassies against possible terror attacks.

“Here in Yemen, tribe, religion and weapons are the most dangerous things in the hands of tribesmen against the government,” said Abdul-Elah Haidar, a researcher on terrorism issues at the Saba News Agency and a regular columnist for the London-based Al-Quds Al-Arabi. “And when a group combines the three, it can easily become a substantial political force.”

Iran Seeking Proxies?

This escalation of violence has been a frightening setback for the Yemeni government, which had beat back the threats from al Qaeda and was beginning to benefit from the cautious return of tourists and foreign investors.

Lacking large oil reserves or any modern manufacturing facilities, Yemen has nonetheless drawn terrorist attacks: the September 2006 bombing of American- and French-owned oil facilities in the eastern provinces of Marib and Hadarmout; the October 2000 bombing of the USS Cole in Aden; and the October 2002 bombing of the French supertanker Limburg. These have cost the government millions as insurance premiums for ship owners have soared, causing many of them to refuse to dock at Yemen’s ports.

The attacks have also frightened off thousands of mainly European tourists who come to admire the country’s unique ancient mud-brick cities and amazing landscape.

Most Yemenis believe that Iran backs the Shiite Muslim rebels in the north of the Sunni-dominated country. The Zaidi sect makes up about a fifth of the Yemen’s population. Also known as “Fiver Shia,” it is actually a small offshoot of the Ismaili schism. The Zaidis recognize only five imams from Imam Ali, Prophet Mohammed’s grandson, while the mainline Shia of Iran’s mullahs recognizes 12.

President Ali Abdullah Saleh said in January that some countries were supplying al-Houthi’s group with weapons and financial support, but did not name them.

Tariq al-Shami, spokesman for President Saleh’s ruling party, the General People’s Congress (GPC), says Iranian security officials have told Yemen that some Iranian religious institutions were supporting the rebels, but they added that al-Houthi’s group was not backed by the Tehran government. “There are Iranian religious institutions which are providing support to the Shiite insurgency in Yemen,” Shami recently posited on the GPC’s Web site.

In March 2006, Yemen freed more than 600 Zaidi rebels as part of an amnesty to end two years of clashes that had killed several hundred soldiers and rebels alike. But “the Houthis have used a period of truce with the state to buy heavy weapons using foreign support money,” Shami charges.

The clashes in Saada are causing great hardship for the local inhabitants. “Many houses have already been destroyed, students no longer go to school, agricultural farms have been damaged and work has come to a standstill,” said Khalid al-Anesi, director of Yemen’s non-governmental National Organization for Defending Freedoms and Rights.

Military sources say that al-Houthi’s three-year fight against the government has cost the country an estimated $800 million, with extensive damage to property.

But the greatest threat is that the Shi’ite revolt could re-ignite conflicts among other sectors of the populace. Many in Yemen refuse to operate within a political system that they see as invalid, says Haidar, leaving the potential for factional warfare. “Al-Houthi’s group is trying to copy Iraq’s sectarian strife in Yemen,” he warns.

Jihad Materials Thrive in Markets

Sunni Muslims are a majority in Yemen, a nation of 19 million, and it is the ancestral homeland of al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden. It is radical Sunnis who are circulating gruesome videos depicting murdering and mutilating “infidels” as part of a recruiting drive.

At one roadside stand, a video salesman hawked jihadi movies as radical songs blared out from speakers, with such lyrics as: “We will make jihad against the pigs”—meaning Jews.

The long-bearded buyers thronging his stall on the sidelines of a sunset prayer’s sermon in the Yemeni capital Sana’a were part of a gathering organized by the radical Sunni wing of the Yemen Reform Group, also known as Islah, a powerful opposition party.

“Here is the latest movie of the beheadings,” the salesman told his customers, as they peered into titles including “Slaughter of American Soldiers in Iraq,” “Al Qaeda Victories in Fallujah in Iraq” and “Killing of Traitors in Afghanistan.”

In Yemen, compelled to join the US-led global war on terrorism after 9-11, anger has risen over what many clerics see as an attempt by the America and the West to repress Muslims in Iraq, Afghanistan and around the world.

But that is only part of the story. Yemen also faces a battle with its own demons, as militant attacks and sectarian violence have killed thousands since 9-11.

On March 26, four people were injured in a riot in the Yemeni port city of Belhaf, allegedly after a French engineer from the Total oil company desecrated a copy of the Koran by throwing it on the floor.

That same day, at the other north end of the country in restive Saada, a French and a British student, both Muslims, were killed and several others wounded in an attack by Shi’ite rebels on a Sunni religious school.

Yemen has come under increasing pressure from the US to take harsher action against the illicit trade in weapons, with experts warning the country is becoming a key transfer point for militant groups throughout the Middle East and Horn of Africa.

Mohammed Kuhaly, political analyst and lead researcher of the local NGO Political Development Program, says there is “no haze or cloudiness” about who the figures are behind the booming arms traffic. “They are al-Qaeda’s sympathizers of the political Islamist Islah party.”

President Saleh has banned several radical religious schools linked to Islah. But militant literature—even how-to manuals on guerilla war—continue to be widely available. One Islamist bookshop owner in Sana’a said such material could always be arranged to trusted customers.

It is certainly not difficult to find the words of one of Yemen’s most radical voices. His message of extremist Islam can be heard outside a number of well-known mosques.

Sheikh Hazza Al-Maswary, a key representative of the Islah party, has kept a low profile recently because of pressure from Yemen’s security apparatus, despite having a seat in the national parliament. But outside Mujahid mosque in Sana’a, his recorded voice blares out from speakers among the shops selling perfumes, head caps, religious books, cassettes and films after Friday prayers.

“Curse on the Christian Americans and Jews… They are killers, and we will make jihad against them, we will rob them of their peace,” legislator Al-Maswary thunders. “Muslims must not follow the Christians and Jews, as God says he will not accept anyone but Muslims.”

Not all Yemeni preachers are spreading messages of jihad. Some are actively opposing radicalism among their followers. Many exert efforts to bring a negotiated end to armed tribal conflicts, and help to bring a measure of peace to restive areas.

Yemen’s Sunni insurgency in the remote interior provinces of Abyan and Marib opened in late 2001, when tribal leaders refused to hand al-Qaeda suspects over to the government. President Bush subsequently ordered some 200 military advisors to the country, and in November 2002 a CIA drone-launched missile attack killed six al-Qaeda suspects traveling in a car in Marib. Since then the insurgency has died out, but observers now fear the new Shi’ite militancy may upset the fragile political balance, and bring sectarian war to this mountainous and strategic Arab country.

—

Mohamed Al-Azaki is an independent Yemeni journalist and researcher at the SABA Center for Strategic Studies, based in Sana’a.

From our weblog:

Iranian drone shot down in Yemen?
WW4 REPORT, March 29, 2007
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SUFISM: THE MIDWAY BETWEEN EXTREMISMS

Indigenous North Africa Between Jihad and Imperialism

by Toufik Amayas Mostefaou

My heart
Has become capable
Of taking all sorts of forms,
It is
Pastures
For gazelles
And Monastery for the monk,
Temple of idols
And
Kaaba for the pilgrim.
It is the tables of the Torah
And
The Book of the Koran.
It professes the religion of love
Whatever the place
Toward which
Its caravans wend.
And love
Is
My law
And love
Is
My faith.
—Ibn Arabi, of Andalusia and North Africa, 1165-1240 CE, Sufi

Questions relating to “modernity” and “tradition” have occupied Muslim thinkers—people such as Jamal Addin Al-Afghani, Rashid Ridha, Abd Arrahman Al-Qawakibi, etc.—for the good part of the twentieth century. They continue to exert a considerable force on contemporary Islamic discourse, especially in questions relating to citizenship, forms of government and economic and social organization.

At the beginning of the 21st century, societies with a strong Islamic heritage are facing tough choices between modernity, tradition, democracy, absolute monarchy, Islamism, secularism, imperialism and nationalism (Amazigh, Arabic, Kurdish, etc)…

These struggles are ubiquitous throughout the Muslim world. Whether one goes to Saudi Arabia with its absolute monarchy or Turkey with its official secularism, or to the Indian subcontinent with its millennia-old traditions, questions about “Islamic tradition” (with whatever that may imply), modernity and democracy keep resurfacing to the fore of academic and public discourses. The Islamic world is a geographically vast area that straddles more than two continents, and it will be difficult to address any issues related to it without being trapped in some form or another of analytical reductionism. But even with such a huge structural constraint facing anyone writing about history, there is a lot one can discern from an account of how the past has shaped the present and how the present informs the future.

It is in this context that I write about the history of Sufism in Kabylia, the mountain homeland of Algeria’s largest group of indigenous Imazighen (Berbers), and about how Sufism can provide us with a normative framework in the twenty-first century to transcend the clash of ideologies—especially when one sees the world being reduced cartoonistically into two opposing sides: Western hegemonic imperialism and Islamic fundamentalism.

For some ideologists and politicians the choice is exclusive, either the Imperialist side or the Wahhabist one and the submission to the dictates of Sharia. From this direct and frontal opposition will result the Clash of Civilizations, a new cold war, a new confrontation of interests. The world can’t contain two belligerent ideologies that exclude each other, that want to dominate the entire planet and submit it to its own rule and culture.

But the relationship between “imperialists” and “Islamists” has been quite complex and their recent clash is more of an ephemeral episode in a world shaped and reshaped by the interplay of different factors—among which ideology is not necessarily the dominant one. To prove this point one may point to many events in recent history, the most illustrative of which is the war in Afghanistan that occurred in the aftermath of Russian invasion of 1979. At that time, “jihadists” were portrayed as freedom fighters in Western media, and they were an ally for Western countries allied against communist threat.

As a direct consequence of this opposition, Muslims found themselves trapped in a tornado of dilemmas and conflicting interests: aspiration for democracy and social justice attracts them to occidental values; the Wahhabis threaten them with hudud (penalties prescribed by sharia law) and divine punishments if they don’t obey and come back to the orthodox way. This complex situation can be worse in the extreme for religious and ethnic minorities living in large Muslim majority—such as the Amazighs in North Africa.

The beginning of the 21st century has been torn by extreme violence and hardening positions in the two antagonist visions of the world: imperialism, the rule of free markets and military dominance from the occidental side; Islamism and religious extremism in the Middle East, Far East and some African countries. The battlefield has extended to the Internet, media and mosques. The polarization is so serious that some Muslims born in occidental countries are being alienated and join extremist movements. They no longer believe in the occidental values—for them, Europe and the USA are only about money, and are oppressing Muslims and Arabs. For many young Muslims, religion is now more about having personal identity and fighting against oppressors and infidels than about spirituality and personal evolution.

These inflammatory discourses make some Muslims feel that they are before a hard choice: either join religious extremism and save their Nation from the devilish imperialism, or uproot themselves from their Islamic values and jump into the welcoming hands of libertine and oppressive imperialism.

Our interest will be focused on the native Amazigh ethnicity in North Africa to show the potentialities that Sufism has to adapt and to survive in a very resistive culture where orthodox Islam failed to take root. We will also explore the hope that Sufism brings for the existence of a tolerant and spiritual Islam, in harmony with what we can call modern values.

Because of its strategic location between three continents, North Africa has been the target of many invasions throughout its history, and its native Amazigh people (Imazighen in the plural) have become very effective warriors as a result. The last military struggle was that undertaken against French colonialism that spanned the years from 1830 to 1962. But in contrast to all the invading forces that stayed for short or prolonged periods and then left, the Arabs who invaded the region in the 7th century stayed.

In contrast to the typical image of this invasion drawn by Arabs, the Imazighen did not receive Arabs as liberators. The process of Islamization in North Africa was not momentous, but has taken many centuries, and in some respects it is still taking place today.

All the invading powers that tried, to different degrees, to annex North Africa politically or religiously have generally had very little success. Phoenicians appropriated the Amazigh goddess Tanit. Saturn, conceived as an African god, dethroned Jupiter in the local Roman Pantheon. And in the Christian era, Amazighs opposed St Paul’s version of Christianity and adopted Arian monotheism.

Arius (c. 250-336 CE, of Alexandria) was an early Amazigh Christian theologian, who taught that the Son of God was not eternal, and was subordinate to God the Father (a view known generally as Arianism). Theologically, Arius’ view of creation shared strong parallels to both neo-Platonism and Gnosticism. He taught that God did not create matter directly, but via the Logos, thus giving Christ the unique status as the only being created directly by God, yet subject to the Father. Gnosticism, in nearly all of its forms, taught some form of dualism, that matter is inherently evil, and the spirit inherently good. Therefore there had to be a mediating process through which God created that world, because good cannot create evil. This distinct view of transcendence is one of the foundational presuppositions of Arius’ thought.

The Arians were opposed to St Augustine’s Church and created an African one under the leadership of St Donate. This resistance to foreign religious subjugation is quite indicative of the attachment of Imazighen to their ancestral beliefs (cults of ancestors and leaders, a Spirit living and appearing on a daily basis to humans, personified trees, Earth and Mother Godesses, et cetera). Although he attracted considerable support at the time (and since), Arius’ views were declared heretical at the Council of Nicaea, leading to the formation of the Nicene Creed.

Upon its arrival in their midst, Islam faced serious resistance from Imazighen. Muslims took power by force and imposed the monarchy of Mo’awiya ibnu Abi Sofian, the, governor of Syria who was dispached by Caliph Umar to conquer North Africa. His reign was marked by suppression of any opposition to his diktat. He sent his armies to other countries to make futuh’at (campaigns of conquest, literally “opening”) and jihad in the name of God to give legitimacy to his rule.

Almost one century after the first invasion, most of the cities were submitted to the new rulers, but the mountains and the rural areas remained independent and faithful to their earlier religions (paganism, Christianity or Judaism). Shortly after the fall of the Amazigh land under Islamic rule, the jizya fiscal system was introduced, impsoing special taxes on non-Muslims. In order to avoid paying this huge amount of money to the Umayyad Caliphate’s central government in Damascus, a large part of Amazighs chose the conversion to the new religion. Surprisingly, Umayyad kings refused to suppress these taxes even after conversion of Amazighs. This led to defections to Kharijite sect, and the Berber Revolt of 740-43 CE. The key Amazigh victory at the Battle of the Nobles (Ma’rakatu al Ashraf), turned the tide, and Arab rulers were driven out of North Africa. Amazigh land got its independence from the Islamic Caliphate and was called by Arabs al Maghrib al Islami (Muslim occident) in contrast to al Maghrib al Masih’i (Christian occident).

As dynastic struggles shook the Islamic world, local rulers might be formally loyal to the Abbasid Caliphate in Baghdad, the displaced Umayyad Caliphate in Iberia or the Fatimid Caliphate in Egypt. But the Amazigh really ruled themselves, and changed sides according to their interests. The Amazigh dynasties of the Almohads and the Almoravides eventaully proclaimed their own Caliphate in Iberia.

The succession struggles following the death of the fourth caliph, Ali, in 661 led to a profusion of schisms in Islam. To oppose the Sunni diktat and to make a definitive clear cut with Arab imperialism and the oppressive Umayyad regime, Amazighs adopted Kharijism and later the Ismaili Shi’ism of the Fatimid Caliphate, a more tolerant branch of Islam. There was also a more radical answer among Amazighs: the creation of an Amazigh religion where God is Amazigh, speaks Amazigh and speaks to Amazighs only—the Barghawata heresy, which held sway on the Atlantic coast of Morocco from the Berber Revolt through the 11th century. Apostasy and revolts against Islam were frequent to the point that The Muqaddimah of Ibn Khaldun, the great North African historian, reported twelve apostasies of Amazighs.

Islam never managed to penetrate by force into Kabylia. It was only in the 10th century that Islam started to penetrate peacefully into Kabylian Mountains thanks to Shi’a missionaries. This led to the adoption of Shi’a Islam by the Kutama, one of the principal Amazigh tribes of Kabylia Mountains, and the creation of the unique Shi’a Caliphate: the Fatimid Dynasty. Sunni extremists wanted to uproot the previous faith and replace it with a hostile Arabian version of Islam incompatible with Kabylian traditions. Shi’a Islam, holding that Caliph Ali inherited the esoteric explanation of Islam from the Prophet Muhammad, spread naturally all over Kabylia—to the point that even today we can find traces of the Shi’a Islam in Kabylia. Ali is singled among the followers and companions of the Prophet Muhammad, and Ashura festivals are observed under the name of Taachurt. These commemorations include “un-Islamic” traditions, like kids wearing masks and going from one house to an other collecting sweets and cakes. Later in the day there is a visit to the village mausoleum for a short pilgrimage

The Shi’a period was short in Kabylia, but it led to a peaceful cohabitation of a spiritual Islam with the original traditions of the natives. In the 11th century, Almohads, an occidental Amazigh dynasty, conquered much of North Africa and imposed a new version of Sunni Islam with a strong Amazigh signature but with a strict, rigorist and authoritarian stamp. They swept away several other kingdoms and completed the homogenization and total conversion of most of the Amazighs to Sunni Islam. The Almohads’ arrival was the end of the Barghawata dynasty and the fall of Shi’ism in the Amazigh lands. Ibadites (descendants of the Kharajites), Christians, Jews and pagans survived only in very small communities.

But the Almohads’ conquest of power coincided with the diffusion of a highly spiritual Islam: Sufism. Most Sufi tariqas (paths or brotherhoods) claim Ali their first master, and that was initiated into esoteric Islam from Prophet Muhammad. To some extent, both branches of Islam (Sunni and Shi’ite) recognize Sufis as saints and devoted Muslims. But there are exceptions—the Hanbalites (a rigorist Sunni school) and extremists who see Sufis as deviants, heretics and kafirs (unbelievers). The history of Islam is full of executions and excommunications of Sufis—the most famous case being the public execution of Mansur Hallaj in Bagdad in 922.

Even if puritan dynasties managed to get rid of the Barghawata kingdom and to convert the last Jewish and Christian tribes, the austerity of official Sunni Islam had little appeal outside the mosques and schools of the cities. Rural cults survived the triumph of orthodoxy in the twelfth century despite the efforts of the Almoravids and Almohads to stamp them out. This survival is quite impressive and astonishing.

Sufism spread in cities but even more quickly in rural areas. So, in the countryside, Sufis and wandering marabouts, or holy people, drew a large and devoted following. These men and women were believed to possess baraka (divine and special grace), or to be able to channel it to others. In life, marabouts offered spiritual guidance, arbitrated disputes, and often wielded political power. After death, their followers erected domed tombs that became sites of pilgrimage.

There are many such Sufi shrines in Algeria. In most cases, these sites have a sacred tree, a rock, a totem or a geological formation that increase their power in the eyes of North Africans (both Amazigh and Arab). The sacralisation of natural phenomena is in complete harmony with the Amazigh pre-Islamic faith and beliefs that have survived Arab invasion. In fact, some mausoleums of Sufi saints are pre-Islamic sacred sites. They can be graves of village founders. In some cases, after the Sufi’s death, the baraka might be transmitted to an object. The care of this totem is handled by descendants of that wali (saint), or is shared among the oldest families of the village.

As in the other parts of the Muslim world, Sufism was opposed in North Africa by both reformist movements such as the Islah, which advocated for the rights of Algerians under the French colonization, and extremists such as the Salafiya and Wahabiya movements. The Islah movement, initiated by a group of Islamic scholars or ulema (‘Abd al-Hamid b. Badis, Bashir al-Ibrahimi), won the support of secular reformists and agitated against both French rule and Sufi brotherhoods in the 1930s. After independence in 1962, the Algerian state imposed its own nationalist ideology and barred Sufis from religious power. Nevertheless, most of the Sufi brotherhoods quietly continued practicing their rituals.

The ’80s were more favorable to Sufis. Some zawiyas (local headquarters of the brotherhoods) resumed open activity; regional branches of brotherhoods re-established contact with each other. Some which had been accused in state propaganda of collaboration with French had their reputation officially rehabilitated, lauded for their role in the diffusion of Islam in the region. The new recognition of Sufism by the state was attested by the 1991 establishment of a the National Association of the Zawiyas.

The official view of Sufism in Algerian society changed under the threat from Islamism—the Salafists, inspired by the Wahhabis of Arabia. While the ’30s witnessed a condemnation of mysticism in the name of reason, in the ’80s the state became tolerant of Sufism to show that they were not against Islam, and to encourage an alternative that was non-violent and distinctly Algerian. Intellectuals who sympathized with this religious trend were legitimized.

In the ’90s, a wave of Islamist violence and terrorism, and consequent government repression, claimed many thousands of lives in Algeria. But in the Kabylia Mountains, Salafi Islam won very little support, and Islamist political parties gained almost no ground. There were several reactions to the shock of the ’90s Islamist explosions. Some in Kabylia simply rejected Islam and everything that has linked the Amazigh to the Arabs (Islam and Arabic language); a few converted to Christianity. Others came back to Sufism as an indigenous cultural reference, or just because of the tolerance and the spiritual dimension of this mystical Islam.

Aspirations to a better life, modernity and freedom, inevitably raise the question of Islam’s compatibility with these values. Modernity, as imperialism sees it, is taking our world to the edge of destruction. In the name of democracy and free trade, countries are being attacked, elected governments overthrown and local economies destroyed. The effects of industrialization and savage misuse of natural resources have not only been an economically unbalanced world (with extremely rich capitalists and an extremely poor underprivileged class). This conception of modernity ultimately threatens human existence. For the first time, the human race has to decide on its own existence! Do we want to exist, or do we decide to destroy our planet and its ecological balance.

The race for material wealth, immediate pleasures and the accumulation of commodities is exhausting our planet. Imperialism has become a threat to civilization and human existence, not just national sovereignty. If Islamic terrorism threatens a number of governments, and violates human rights in many areas, imperialism in its contemporary face is a threat not only to the whole of humanity, but also to trees, rivers, animals… Our ecosystem is victim of an imperialism unleashed as never before, that refuses to recognize its role in the climate changes our planet is experiencing. We can clearly say: Modernity no longer means the reign of reason, but the gratification of needs and the satiation of desires. Imperialism and capitalism are turning back against two pillars of modernity and their own existence: reason and science. In the same way, Islamic extremism is turning against its own roots and source: spirituality and mercy.

This simple observation makes us say that Islamism on the one hand, and globalization and imperialism on the other are identical from the point of view of mechanism and principle. Both want to dominate the world and submit humanity to their sole law: their proper and extremist view of religion and God, or the reign of the sacred trio capital-market-free trade.

Opposing or resisting the Islamists’ fight for a new caliphate is a clear sign, for them, of heresy or idolatry. Extremists’ fatwas make it licit to kill every opponent, even if they are innocent civilians. Their argument in such a cases is that innocent victims will go directly to paradise and the kafir will burn for eternity in hell fire.

This dichotomy of “with us or against us” is not unique to the Islamists, but it is shared with the imperialists, as shown in George Bush’s infamous pronouncement after the attacks of September 11: “You are with us or with the terrorists.” Effectively, the imperialists’ forces were unleashed and sent to fight against their alter ego “Islamists” in different part of the world. All this is done in the name of Justice and the spread of Democracy and Freedom. Exactly as Islamists kill in the name of Divine justice and the spread of the Good way of life (under the shari’a law).

Astonishingly, this comparison between these two extremisms reveals the same basis and goals behind their mutual atrocities and arrogance: material gains and physical pleasures. For imperialism and capitalism the sole God is Capital. All means to defend “free markets” are acceptable and justifiable. Stability and social order are necessary for the growth of trade and capital. For this pragmatic reason, dictators and authoritarian regimes are obstacles to “international order” if they assert national control of their natural resources, but if they offer access they became allies.

The Islamists’ God offers them cities of gold and silver with a harem of 72 virgins each in Paradise, the only condition being to follow sharia law (as interpreted in the fatwas of the sheikhs and mullahs) and to die for it as a mujahid. Unfortunately, the way to this paradise is paved with the bodies of innocent civilians and naive Muslims. They see the divine reward and their struggle (terrorist activities) as a business transaction with God. A well known adage is: “Isn’t trading with God the best trade?”

Finally, it all comes down to selling and buying. Capitalists and Islamists have the same goal: maximum gains. For the first category, the reward is earthly; for the second it is an afterlife reward.

The Kabyles adopted Sufi Islam while keeping their identity and tradition. For centuries, these Muslims of the Kabylia Mountains lived their lives as farmers, working their ancestral lands, making jewelry, harvesting wheat and collecting fruits. They lived also their lives as Muslims devoted to the One God of Islam. They made a distance between themselves and the religious clergy, forbidding them from interfering in their earthly life. As the Amazigh saying goes: Igenni n Rebbi, ma t-tamurt n vav-is (Heaven belongs to God, Earth belongs to those who cultivate it). They kept their reverence for their Mother, the land that gave birth to all beings, and where they shall all return. They had a balance between their faith in Islam and their ancestral identity. They were peaceful as long as they were not attacked.

Maybe this is the way, not only for Amazigh of Kabylia, but for all the inhabitants of North Africa.

———

See also:

SUFISM AND THE STRUGGLE WITHIN ISLAM
Paradoxical Legacies of the Militant Mystics
by Khaleb Khazari-El
WW4 REPORT #123, July 2006
/node/2151

ALGERIA’S AMNESTY AND THE KABYLIA QUESTION
Berber Boycott in Restive Region Signals Continued Struggle
by Zighen Ayml
WW4 REPORT #113, November 2005
/node/1235

From our weblog:

NYT: North Africa “staging ground for terror”
WW4 REPORT, Feb. 21, 2007
/node/3197

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Special to WORLD WAR 4 REPORT, March 1, 2007
Reprinting permissible with attribution

Continue ReadingSUFISM: THE MIDWAY BETWEEN EXTREMISMS 

IRAN: THE LEFT OPPOSITION SPEAKS

An Interview with Bina Darabzand of Salam Democrat
Against Bush, Against Ahmadinejad, For Oaxaca

by Bill Weinberg, WW4 REPORT

On December 12, 2006, as the Holocaust revisionism conference called by President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad opened in Tehran, small but angry groups of students held protests—against both the conference and Ahmadinejad, burning his picture and chanting “down with the dictator.” Scores of students marched at the Amir Kabir University of Technology (formerly Tehran Polytechnic), Tehran University and Sanandaj University in Kordistan province.

Among the organizers of the protests was Bina Darabzand, a leftist thinker and longtime veteran of Iran’s student movement. Born into what he calls a “left-oriented political family” in Tehran in 1957, Darabzand was involved in protest movements against the Shah from his youth. In 1978, he returned home from studies in the US and UK—where he was a representative abroad of the Confederation of Iranian Students—to participate in the Iranian revolution. After Ayatollah Khomeini took power, he was forced into exile, but returned to Iran again in 1986, and has since been working to build a radical left opposition. Since 1997, when the election of President Mohammad Khatami brought a supposedly more open atmosphere, he has been arrested four times—most recently in July 2004, when he was imprisoned for two years on fabricated charges of slandering governmental officials and organizing underground cells.

By the time of his release six months ago, the hard-liner Ahmadinejad was in power for just over a year. But Darabzand has immediately resumed his political activities, creating the website Salam Democrat as a voice for radical left ideas and news from movements in the outside world in Farsi. It has recently launched a page with updates on the struggle in Oaxaca, Mexico.

On February 13, Bina Darabzand spoke by telephone from Tehran with WW4 REPORT Editor Bill Weinberg over the airwaves of New York’s WBAI Radio.

BW: Bina, welcome aboard. For starters, what’s the name of your organization?

BD: Well, actually, there are no organization right now, because of the repression that we are facing here. Since the so-called Revolution, which was really the victory of the anti-revolution forces in 1979, we’ve lost five or six thousand of our comrades—executed, or imprisoned, and thousands more who left the country. So we have had very little chance to organize ourselves. However, in the past couple of years the social movements have been arising again and we’ve been able to come out from the underground, slowly finding each other and trying to organize ourselves into groups. But, as you know, for the left movement it is not as easy as for the liberals to get together. Because we have to unite on a revolutionary agenda. And right now we are working towards that.

BW: Well, you have an organization called Salam Democrat…

BD: Salam Democrat actually is a website. A group of people have gathered together to facilitate expressing these ideas. Then we can formalize them as an agenda that our movement needs right now to unite around.

BW: You make reference on your website to the “Iranian radical-left young student movement”…

BD: As a tendency, made up of intellectuals and elements of the student movement, you can consider it the revolutionary left—as opposed to the social democratic way of working, or the reactionary so-called left such as Fidel, Chavez and so forth. We are faithful to the Marxist-Leninist line, we are for the revolutionary change of society into a government of direct democracy by the people. So there is a very young and energetic tendency within the student movement which calls itself the radical left, which is a part of this revolutionary current.

BW: What are the various points of unity and divergence within the general student movement?

BD: You have to consider that the student movement is a mass movement and there are few specific organizations or ideologies. But the parties and organizations influence the student unions. The most important influences right now on the student movement that did the action against Ahmadinejad at the Polytechnic University and Tehran University, and which continues to protest, are the radical left and the radical liberals, who are the followers of people like [Akbar] Ganji and [Ali] Afshari and so on, who want to change the structure of the government.

BW: Can you tell us more about these figures?

BD: Ganji was an imprisoned journalist who right now is travelling in Europe and the United States. And Afshari was a student until a couple of years ago, and he of course is also now in the United States.

BW: Does the radical left tendency also have visible leaders?

BD: As for the radical left movement, we don’t really have faces we can present. We are basically all at the same level of theoretical and organizational capabilities. Everybody right now is a leader and cadre. However, one of our most famous leaders is Dr. Naser Zarafshan, who has won many international prizes for his activities and writings. But he has been in prison for the last four years.

BW: On what charge?

BD: He was the lawyer in the Chain Murder case [series of assassinations and disappearances of dissident intellectuals]. He charged the Iranian security police with murders of the opposition in 1999, ’98. And since he was very serious in doing his job, they made up some charges, such as carrying a handgun illegally, spreading lies, releasing secret information, and things like that.

BW: So he is an attorney as well as a political thinker and theorist…

BD: Yes, he has a law degree.

BW: So is there any party or organization, even in exile, which you adhere to?

BD: No, there is no organization abroad that has our line. We are Marxist-Leninist, and we are trying to follow the Leninist line that was followed in the Russian Revolution. We are trying to follow models such as the Soviet government of the first decade before Stalin dissolved the soviets. This is basically our goal.

BW: How freely are you able to operate? I imagine its a pretty repressive atmosphere.

BD: There is no freedom whatsoever. Those of us who are known to the security forces are picked up from time to time, and imprisoned for months in solitary, or for years in political blocs. The last time I was picked up was July 2004, and I was released two years later, just last summer. I spent the first two months of my confinement in solitary, blindfolded. Every week, one of us is picked up, for no apparent reason, with no formal charges. You can say we are just kidnapped—beaten, tortured. But this is the cost that we have to pay.

BW: Well, when you were picked up in the summer of 2004, what was the ostensible charge? Was there any kind of formal legal process?

BD: The legal process is a sham. The judge is ordered by the security forces what judgement to make. There is no legal representation. Nothing. Five minutes in court, and you are convicted.

Of course, that is if they want to keep you more than a few months. If they just keep you a few months in solitary—which happens to one of us ever year—there are no formal charges. They let us go when they are tired of trying to get information out of us.

The last time, when they held me for two years, they charged me with organizing underground cells and publishing lies about the government. Of course, they were both fabricated.

BW: Is there much of a confluence between the student movement and the labor struggles, the fight for women’s rights and free expression generally?

BD: For the first 25 years after the 1979 fall of the revolution, social movements were at a stand-still. We were just a bunch of intellectuals fighting for freedom of expression and assembly and so on. But in the past two years, the student movement, the feminist movement and the labor movement are arising again, which has given us a chance to come out from the underground.

However, the labor movement right now is at the guild stages and not very political. We are present in the feminist movement, but the leadership of that movement is still in the hands of the liberals. We are most deeply rooted and have the most influence and positions of leadership in the student, youth and intellectual movements right now. And we have gained this position because of the historical credibility of the left and the martyrs that we have given for the emancipation of our people.

BW: How are you able to get your ideas across? Do you have your own newspapers, or access to the radio waves?

BD: We are not allowed to have newspapers. There is some student literature, but as soon as they cross the red line, they are closed down and the people involved thrown in prison. We have the Internet, and that’s just about it.

Some of the leaders abroad have good access to the international media, satellite TV and so forth, but they don’t share it with us. They just rely on us for us reports to give themselves some credibility and show they are linked to the student movement here. We do not want any connection with the liberal groups in exile, although with the leftists we do have connections. But they haven’t given us much help.

BW: I note that you make reference to the “fall of the revolution in 1979.” Do you believe there was a legitimate revolution which took place between the fall of the Shah and the establishment of the ayatollah state?

BD: Of course. There was a revolution that started in 1974 and continued on until 1979. Just a few days ago we had the ceremony for the 22nd of Bahman [Feb. 11], commemorating the Islamic Revolution, which was actually the victory of the counter-revolution. So we had five years of revolution before the reactionary forces, in agreement with the Americans an the other Western countries, suppressed the revolution.

BW: Well, certainly the perception is that Khomeini’s revolution, whatever else you want to say about it, was opposed to the West. There was the whole hostage crisis in 1979-80…

BD: Not at all, at first. At first, it wasn’t so. As you recall, at that time we had two blocs, the Soviet bloc and the American bloc, two imperialists ruling the world, “superpowers” as they were called then. The American government, and all the Western governments, met in Guadeloupe [emergency G7 summit, January 1979]. The liberals in Iran got the United States government and the Western powers to support the Khomeini forces, because the other option would have been the left movement, which was very strong. And, as they convinced the West, that would have meant Soviet influence in Iran. So at first there was cooperation between the Western powers and the Iranian liberals and the reactionary Islamists.

But after the take-over the embassy and the position that the Iranian government at that time took—because it had to, otherwise it would have lost the masses that it had gathered—went towards anti-Americanism. The atmosphere changed. I believe that Carter and Reagan made a hell of a mistake by making an enemy of these people and not understanding their position in this situation.

But their anti-Americanism wasn’t in the sense of wanting to keep America out—they just didn’t want to sell themselves too cheap. And this still is going on. The Iranian government is a capitalist government, very much interested in to get involved in the capitalist world and globalization. However, it does not want to sell itself as cheap as the Shah sold himself, and that’s the only problem. The Americans want a puppet government like the Shah, but these people want to be treated as equal partners. That is the only thing that is keeping them apart from each other.

BW: Let’s talk about the current situation and the showdown over the nuclear development issue. How do you view this whole crisis?

BD: Well, it was the United States government during the Shah’s time that allowed the Iranian nuclear facilities to be built. However, with the problems that they have with this government, the US and the West are worried that Iran will develop an atomic bomb.

As far as the left is concerned, we are for peace and against weapons of mass destruction. We believe that our people have more immediate needs than atomic bombs. And at the same time we believe in the “zero alternative” and global disarmament, rather than new countries getting nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction.

However, we believe in the right of our people to gain the knowledge and techniques of nuclear physics and nuclear energy. And we don’t think that the US—which is the only government to have used an atomic bomb, twice, without any concern over the human lives that were lost, and still continues with all kinds of weapons of mass destruction programs, and has been continuously at war in different parts of the world since World War II—is in the place of ethical authority on this subject. We consider the anti-war movement of the United States more acceptable to us than the position of the United States government on this subject.

BW: Putting aside the question of weapons, how do you feel about the pursuit of nuclear power in Iran—or anywhere, for that matter?

BD: Nuclear power is our right. And definitely, if there is a leftist government, we will continue with the energy program.

BW: Well here in New York City, some of us have been struggling for many years to get our own local nuclear plant at a place called Indian Point closed down, because we consider that it poses an unacceptable risk—not only in terms of an accident, but the ongoing contamination from routine emissions, nuclear waste and so on. So I wonder if there’s a perception that maybe nuclear power just isn’t the way to go.

BD: We do understand that. But we have to gain the knowledge and techniques of nuclear physics. Because many other branches of science and technology arise from the knowledge of nuclear physics. As far as building the plants is concerned, we are for the environment, and we will not use nuclear energy unless it is absolutely necessary to do so. We don’t have that much hydro-electric power here because we don’t have that much water. Of course, we do have potential for wind power. But I am not right now in the position to know all the details about our capabilities, and whether we should continue with our few nuclear power plants.

BW: Let’s talk about the protests against Ahmadinejad’s conference on the Holocaust. Israel’s exploitation of the Holocaust for propaganda purposes makes this a complicated issue for many. I’d like to hear your perspective.

BD: The people of the United States should know that the government in Iran and the personalities of this government are not representing the Iranian people and their views. The Holocaust was a genocide that should be condemned by all humanity. And definitely it was an historical fact, and there is no doubt about it. This is the view of the majority—and, I would say, almost all—of the Iranian people who are at all familiar with the world and the history of World War II. Ahmadinejad’s position on the Holocaust is definitely not ours.

And meddling in the international political sphere such as the Israel-Palestinian conflict, Lebanon and other parts of the world—we don’t think this is our place. We think the Israel-Palestinian conflict is their own concern, and it seems that they will reach an agreement if the Iranian government doesn’t meddle by supporting Islamic Jihad and so on. It is not our position to tell them what to do and what not to do. The Israelis and Palestinians should work it out themselves. The same thing with Lebanon. The various sectors of Lebanese society have shown that they can live in peace. It seems that it is Iranian and Syrian agitation that is causing these conflicts that they have to flare up into armed conflicts.

We are for unity and peace in the Middle East and all over the world. This is not only the position of the left, but the position of the liberals as well and the position of the whole people of Iran. So the Iranian government is not actually representing the Iranian view on this matter.

BW: Moving the question much closer to the borders of your own country—what about the US occupation of Iraq? The White House is accusing Iran of supporting the insurgents in Iraq. And I certainly hope not, but there seems to be an imminent threat of armed US aggression against your country.

BD: We don’t believe there is much threat of armed US aggression, even though we have seen what they have done without the acceptance of their own people in other parts of the world. The rhetoric of “no options are out of consideration”—well, I heard that during Reagan’s time too. We do not think that the United States is in the position to do this.

The United States government is after political and economic domination in the region for the benefit of the US ruling class, and the Iranian government is also after a good share of the market of the area. But the Iranian government is not going to push the conflict to the point of actually having to face the American military. Eventually they will come to some understanding. And since the interest of the US government in the region is dominance and not democracy or terrorism, if the Iranian government shows some sign of actually trying to work it out with the United States, I don’t believe the United States will stick to its position…

BW: So you are optimistic…

BD: Following American politics, we see that even the most die-hard Republicans that were for the Iraqi war are actually disassociating themselves from that line. And from the Iranian government’s point of view, they know that any military confrontation with the United States will mean their fall. So they’re not going to take it to that point. Eventually, they’re going to come some agreement. That’s what we think.

If we believed that the United States government was really after the fight against terrorism and for democracy, we might not be so sure they will reach an agreement! But this is not the point. Anybody who has any understanding of the United States’ actions knows that this is only rhetoric.

BW: What are your views of the struggle which is underway in Iraq at the moment?

BD: Unfortunately, we don’t see a progressive line in Iraq. Of course, we oppose the war and we condemn aggression against any country. We do not think the United States should have attacked Iraq, or Afghanistan for that matter, and they should leave immediately. We have the same position as the American peace movement, and we hope the American peace movement will be effective enough to force a withdrawal on the United States ruling class.

BW: Do you see any progressive forces in Iraq at all that we can support?

BD: I don’t see any. I don’t see any progressive forces that have been able to be seriously counted.

BW: You are aware of the Iraq Freedom Congress and the Organization of Women’s Freedom in Iraq?

BD: I don’t believe they have the power of ruling. I don’t see the potential for that now. However, the Iraqi situation being so acute right now, its very dynamic. It is possible that some of the progressive forces will be able to come up the ranks and form an alternative for their country.

BW: I think on the left here in the United States there is some suspicion that the protest movements in Iran are co-opted by the CIA or State Department or George Soros. So I’m curious whether the tone in the anti-Ahmadinejad protests was generally anti-imperialist.

BD: As far as the Iranian revolutionary and radical left is concerned—the growing left movement in Iran which has organized anti-government and anti-Ahmadinejad protests—we are all anti-imperialist. We are opposed to the United States and all imperialism. We are against neoliberal policies—which, of course, the Iranian government is also following. They are actually implementing all the neoliberal policies of the IMF and the World Bank, which we are totally against. We see the result within Iranian society, so the working class is very much against these neoliberal polcies.

So I don’t consider the Iranian left to be co-opted. However, some of the radical liberals that were also involved in anti-Ahmadinejad protests are pro-American. Yet, since they know the mood of the people, they are not openly for America. For instance, we see Mr. Ganji, who is one of their leaders, comes to the United States but does not meet—openly, of course—with United States officials. Or Mr. Afshari—he’s living in the United States. When the Iranian opposition in the United States, mostly monarchists and Reza Pahlavi’s people, go to the meetings with the State Department, Afshari does not go. Simply because the mood in Iran is totally anti-imperialism. And if they are seen to be dealing with the United States, that would be political suicide. But they are after the peaceful revolutions or the “color” revolutions of the Yugoslavia model or the ex-Soviet republics model—which of course is impossible in Iran, because it is a military regime. There is a military force which is in the core of the ruling class in Iran, and they are not going to stand aside and allow a power change.

BW: So what strategy could work in Iran?

BD: Only a mass revolution. Which is what we are after. We are organizing in the feminist movement, the workers’ movements, the student movements, to that goal. It has to come from within.

BW: Let’s talk about yours views on Latin America. How did you find out about the struggle in Oaxaca?

BD: The Industrial Workers of the World sent a communique out, one of their members [Eric Larson] was surrounded in Oaxaca. So we supported them with a message on our website. But as we found out more about the situation in Oaxaca we became very much interested.

There are two important reasons that we are monitoring Oaxaca and all of Latin America. First of all, we believe that their fight is our fight. They are in the same boat as Iranians. Even though the Iranian regime does not want to sell itself cheap, it is a capitalist state and would like very much to be part of global capitalism. They are implementing all of the IMF and World Bank recommendations—privatization, no control over prices or wages, open borders for imports, and so on. So we are facing the same problems from the same sources. That is why we believe that we are fighting the same war on different fronts. This is the most important reason.

The second reason is that—whether the Oaxacan people are conscious of this fact or not—by creating APPO [the Popular People’s Assembly of Oaxaca], they have re-introduced the model of the Athens democratic republic of 2,500 years ago, as the Paris Commune did, and as the Russian soviets did in the first decade of the Revolution. We would like to study this carefully as a living model. The Paris Commune, the soviets and the Athens republic are to us only theoretical, we can only read about it and think about it. However, in Oaxaca we are actually monitoring a living model of the kind of alternative government that we are going to be proposing to our people. And we are learning a lot about it.

For instance, today we got the information that APPO has decided not to take sides with any political party in the Mexican electoral system. And they have decided that any representative of theirs who decides to run for office has to resign as a representative of APPO. Now we believe that if the soviets in 1917 Russia would have taken this same position, then the Stalin clique couldn’t have gained power within the soviets to dissolve them later on.

So we are trying to learn from the movement of popular assemblies in Oaxaca to inform our own proposals to the Iranian people.

BW: Well, there’s one very obvious contradiction as far as Latin America and the struggle against US dominance there is concerned for the struggle in Iran. And that is the very pro-Iran stance of Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, and the whole bloc which is emerging around him, which now also includes Evo Morales in Bolivia and so on…

BD: Well, this does give the liberals a good propaganda tool. However, for the revolutionary left in Iran and the radical left of the student movement, we consider people like Fidel Castro and Chavez and Morales as a reactionary force using Marxist ideology the same way the Iranian government uses Islam to fool the people and to gain control. We do not consider them as leftists or Marxist-Leninists in a revolutionary sense. And we disassociate ourselves from them. This is what we take to the Iranian people, and we explain to them, they understand.

If you actually look into what Chavez and Morales are doing, they are actually implementing the liberal course in their own countries. As far as the form of government is concerned, they are not going for assemblies, like the soviets, as Marxist-Leninists should. They are maintaining the form and hierarchy of a liberal government. We consider them as representatives of the capitalists, and not the working class.

BW: And yet they have made moves to nationalize resources and fund social programs…

BD: Nationalization is not Marxist-Leninist! Socialization is Marxist-Leninist. Nationalization, as under Stalin, will only end up in state capitalism, as we have in Iran. Only through assemblies becoming the government, and the sole government of the land, can nationalization be socialization. When the people of one country have control over their resources and the means of production—and not a few politicians in the liberal sense of government—only then can you have socialism.

BW: How have you been able to follow the struggle in Oaxaca? Is it covered at all in the newspapers in Iran?

BD: Not at all. The only source of information is the Salam Democrat site. Nobody is presenting information or analysis about Oaxaca except Salam Democrat and our group.

BW: I assume you are aware of the Zapatista movement in Chiapas.

BD: Of course. We think they have grown to be a very deep-rooted and effective force in Mexican politics. In their “Other Campaign,” they went all across the Mexican country trying to identify the different movements they can unite with, and this was very effective. We believe they had a lot to do with propagating the assembly model throughout Mexico.

Of course, it comes from the Indian culture, and they might think that they are actually trying to go back to the origins of their culture. However, this is the same thing that landlords of the 13th and 14th century in England thought—that they were trying to go back to the old feudal laws. But in actuality, they were pushing capitalism and the power of the bourgeoisie. Similarly, the indigenous people in Mexico—the Zapatistas and Oaxacans and the rest of them—they might think they are going back to their cultural origins through these assemblies, but in actuality they are moving towards socialism.

BW: I think they understand that it is actually a confluence of the two tendencies.

BD: That is perfect! Because what is lacking in all the world is the self-consciousness of the people, knowing what power they have and knowing that they can rule themselves—this is the main issue of the left all around the world. To bring this self-confidence and self-realization within the people.

BW: What kind of solidarity or unity would you like to build with radical left forces here in the United States?

BD: The unity of the international left comes from the unity of the working class of the world. We feel much closer to the United States left and progressive groups than we feel towards the Iranian capitalists and their organizations. However, we have been separated from our comrades in the American and international left for nearly the last 30 years. And we are not any where near the level of organization as when we had these close connections with the American left…

BW: You’re speaking about the 1970s, I assume…

BD: Yes, then we had the Confederation of Iranian Students, with very close ties to the American progressive groups. Right up until the Iranian Revolution.

BW: How can we begin to rebuild this sort of thing?

BD: That’s just what I was going to speak about. The first thing is, we need to re-familiarize ourselves with each other, with more dialogue and more cooperation in international issues such as the movement against globalization of capital, the anti-war movement, and support of peoples in struggle such as in Latin America, through groups such as the Oaxaca Study Action Group. Slowly, slowly, we can re-familiarize again and rebuild our ties.

RESOURCES:

Salam-Democrat
http://www.salam-democrat.com

Oaxaca Study Action Group (OSAG)
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/oaxacastudyactiongroup/

IWW statement on Eric Larson in Oaxaca
http://www.iww.org/en/node/2984

Iran: New government fails to address dire human rights situation
Amnesty International, February 2006
http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/engmde130102006

From our weblog:

Iranian solidarity with Oaxaca
WW4 REPORT, Jan. 20, 2007
/node/3068

Iran: protesters condemn Holocaust conference
WW4 REPORT, Dec. 12, 2006
/node/2901

Oil prices rise as Iran nuclear deadline passes
WW4 REPORT, Feb. 27, 2007
/node/3247

——

Special to WORLD WAR 4 REPORT, March 1, 2007
Reprinting permissible with attribution

Continue ReadingIRAN: THE LEFT OPPOSITION SPEAKS 

PRESIDENTS IN THE DOCK

An End to Africa’s Reign of Impunity?

by Michael Fleshman, Africa Renewal

The world took a giant step towards eliminating impunity for human rights abuses on November 9 when the International Criminal Court (ICC) opened its first-ever hearing in a case against a Congolese militia leader—Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, former leader of the Union of Congolese Patriots, a Ugandan-sponsored guerrilla movement which is believed to have engaged in massacres of the Lendu people in the Democratic Republic of Congo’s eastern Ituri district.

Unlike temporary and specially-created tribunals like the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, the ICC is the world’s first permanent international criminal court, with the authority to try and convict individuals for serious human rights violations wherever they occur. Africa is expected to feature prominently on the new court’s docket, with investigations into alleged abuses by members of Uganda’s rebel Lord’s Resistance Army, and combatants in the Darfur region of western Sudan.

But Africa’s own efforts to hold senior government officials and rebel leaders accountable for torture, murder, rape and other crimes against humanity also reached new milestones in 2006. In March, Nigerian authorities arrested the former Liberian president, Charles Taylor, and transferred him to the authority of a special court in Sierra Leone. He faces charges of complicity in war crimes committed there by rebels said to have been equipped, supported and controlled by him during that country’s civil war. The charges range from terrorism, rape and murder to mutilation and the use of child soldiers. It was the first time a former African head of state had been arrested and charged with human rights abuses committed while in office

Four months later Senegal announced plans to try the former Chadian leader Hissène Habré for the torture and murder of suspected political opponents during his eight years in power. Habré was overthrown in 1990 and fled into exile in Senegal, where he has successfully evaded prosecution. In November, Senegalese President Abdoulaye Wade announced the formation of a commission to prepare for the trial, which will require changes in some domestic laws and international technical assistance and financing.

Targeting Impunity

The moves have been hailed as the beginning of a new era of accountability for abusive political leaders in Africa and an important blow against impunity for official misconduct around the world. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan declared that “the capture and trial of Mr. Taylor will send a powerful message to the region and beyond that impunity will not be allowed to stand and that the rule of law must prevail.” Reed Brody of the non-governmental group Human Rights Watch and an attorney for some of Habré’s alleged victims welcomed the Senegalese announcement as “an important step in the right direction.”

But the political and legal obstacles to the prosecution of government leaders for serious rights violations remain formidable. Governments are often loath to take up cases outside their borders, particularly when the accused are heads of state who traditionally enjoy immunity from prosecution for acts committed in office. In some instances guarantees of immunity are demanded by combatants in exchange for peace. In others, differences between national and international legal systems and the absence of competent institutions can pose vexing issues of jurisdiction and procedure.

In Habré’s case, the long effort to bring him to trial began within months of his overthrow and exile to Senegal in 1990, with the creation of l’Association des Victimes des Crimes et de la Répression Politiques au Tchad (AVCRP) a group of nearly 800 victims of human rights abuses. In 1992 a Chadian government commission of inquiry found that Habré was responsible for the deaths of upwards of 40,000 people and for the widespread use of torture. Although the commission recommended that Habré be charged and tried in a Chadian court, the government declined to take up the case amid fears of violence by Habré’s supporters and concerns about meeting international fair trial standards.

In 2000, the AVCRP went to court in Senegal, accusing the former president of responsibility for crimes against humanity. Although the judge ruled in AVCRP’s favour, the indictment was later dismissed by Senegal’s highest appeals court, the Cour de Cassation. It ruled that Habré could not be charged in Senegal for crimes said to have been committed in another country. Three of Habré’s alleged victims then went to court in Brussels, where it was possible to try him under legislation permitting Belgian courts to try individuals for heinous human rights offences wherever committed. It was not until September 2005, however, that Belgium issued an international arrest warrant for Habré and requested his extradition from Senegal.

“On Behalf of Africa”

Again the Senegalese courts demurred, with the country’s appeals court ruling that it lacked jurisdiction over the Belgian request. Amid indications that Belgium would take Senegal to the International Court of Justice for failing to meet its obligations under the UN Convention Against Torture, President Wade referred the matter to the African Union (AU) at the end of 2005. Following the recommendations of a special judicial review committee, the AU mandated Senegal on July 2, 2006 to “prosecute and ensure that Hissène Habré is tried, on behalf of Africa, by a competent Senegalese court with guarantees for fair trial.” The pan-African body also pledged to assist Senegalese authorities, and urged African countries and the international community to support the effort.

After years of delays, however, the issue for Habré’s alleged victims is less about where and by whom he will be tried, but if and when. “We as the victims don’t think that it is the AU or Senegal with their limited resources who can try Habré,” says AVCRP founder and vice president Suleymane Guengeung. “What means do they have?” AVCRP is not insisting that Senegal try Habré, he continues, “but for them not to deny us his trial” in another venue.

“The best solution,” he asserts, “is to extradite him to Belgium. If the AU is firm in its decision to fight impunity that is laudable.” Yet months after the AU decision, he notes, “nothing has been done up to today?. It doesn’t give one confidence that this action will take Africa in the direction of no impunity. I don’t think their decision will materialize?. We victims feel it is their intention to keep us waiting so long that we die without seeing justice. It is very sad.”

Persuading Senegal that it has the legal obligation and moral responsibility to try Habré has been difficult, acknowledges Richard Dicker, director of the international justice program at Human Rights Watch. But the problem isn’t limited to Africa, he says. “National courts around the world are reluctant to try former heads of state for crimes not committed on their territory,” he told Africa Renewal in an exclusive interview. With the Senegalese announcement, however, “we finally have the prospect for an African domestic court to put on trial a former head of state accused of the most serious crimes that can be committed under international law. If that happens, it will be a significant breakthrough. The implications are very exciting.”

No Sanctuary

Charles Taylor’s day in court appears to be more certain, but his case too has been marked by difficult political choices between justice and stability, national sovereignty and international jurisdiction, and the venue of the trial itself. Taylor was elected Liberia’s president in 1997 after a bloody civil conflict. Fighting resumed in 1999. With rebels closing in on the Liberian capital, Monrovia, Taylor accepted an offer of safe haven from Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo in August 2003 as part of a peace agreement. The arrangement allowed Taylor to evade prosecution for alleged complicity in atrocities committed in neighbouring Sierra Leone by a rebel force known as the Revolutionary United Front, RUF. An international tribunal established by the UN and Sierra Leone’s government, the Special Court for Sierra Leone, issued a warrant for his arrest earlier that year for numerous war crimes and crimes against humanity.

He was finally arrested by the Nigerian police and turned over to Liberian authorities in March 2006 at the request of Liberia’s newly elected president, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf. Taylor was transferred to Sierra Leone, and then on to The Hague, where he awaits trial on 11 war crimes charges by the Special Court, a unique “hybrid” tribunal composed of Sierra Leonean and international judges and staff.

But initially there was little enthusiasm in West Africa for bringing Taylor to trial—in part because of fears that his supporters, some still armed and disaffected, could destabilize fragile peace and reconstruction efforts in the war-ravaged region. There were also concerns that his hand-over could prolong other conflicts by persuading combatants they could not rely on promises of amnesty or asylum. Despite the Sierra Leone warrant, Ghanaian authorities refused to arrest Taylor in Accra in 2003, since he was there to attend crucial peace talks. In the face of heavy political pressure from Washington—the US Congress once offered a $2 million reward for Taylor’s arrest—President Obasanjo defended the sanctuary offer as a diplomatic necessity and refused to expel him in the absence of a formal request from a democratically elected Liberian government.

Liberian authorities, however, were notably reluctant to have Taylor back on Liberian soil. Indeed, Taylor is not wanted by the Liberian police and does not face charges there. Speaking at her first press conference as president in January 2006, Ms. Johnson-Sirleaf said that she did not want Taylor’s fate “to be the issue that constrains us or the issue that causes us not to be able to do what we have to do here for the Liberian people.” Taylor’s prosecution, she noted pointedly, was therefore of secondary importance to Liberia “even though it may be of utmost concern to the international community.”

Even his transfer to Freetown and into the custody of the Sierra Leone Special Court proved only a temporary stop on Taylor’s winding journey towards justice. Within days of his arrival the Special Court requested that the trial be moved to ICC facilities in The Hague to allay security concerns among the region’s governments. Although Taylor would still be judged by the Special Court, it took three months to work through the diplomatic and legal details of the transfer, including an agreement by the UK to imprison Taylor if convicted and a UN Security Council resolution authorizing the shift.

Richard Dicker of Human Rights Watch acknowledged that there can be a tension, “but not an opposition,” between the need for criminal accountability and the political imperatives of peacemaking. “But it’s a serious misstep to trade away justice in the hope of reaching a peace settlement. For peace to be durable there must be justice for the most serious offences.”

Justice for All?

Part of the challenge of bringing presidents to trial, he noted, lies in the gaps between sovereign national courts, which remain the cornerstone of the world’s justice system, and a body of international jurisprudence and institutions still very much in its infancy. Ideally, Dicker says, “national courts would try individuals for egregious human rights crimes, even those not occurring on their territory or involving their citizens” using doctrines like universal jurisdiction. International courts like the ICC, and the Rwanda and former Yugoslavia tribunals, he noted, “are courts of last resort, becoming involved only when national courts are unable or unwilling to assume jurisdiction.”

Part of the challenge for the future, he asserts, is to ensure that the evolving system of international justice is not seen as an instrument of Northern power—with only the leaders of poor, weak countries held to account in the courts of the mighty.

While much of the focus of the campaign against official impunity is presently on Africa, it is not limited to the continent. In Europe, an international tribunal continues to hear charges against leaders of the former Yugoslavia. Victims and investigators in Latin America mounted a long campaign to bring a the late Chilean general, Augusto Pinochet, to trial for torture and executions alleged to have been committed in the wake of his 1973 coup. Nor are officials of the most powerful countries necessarily exempt. In mid-November a group of international human rights organizations headed by the New York-based Center for Constitutional Rights filed charges in a German court alleging that some senior US government officials are responsible for torture and other crimes related to the “War on Terror” and the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts. “Over time,” Dicker predicts, “international justice will become a more level playing field.”

National Courts, International Justice

The primacy of national courts in protecting human rights makes strengthening legal systems in post-conflict and developing countries, an urgent priority, Dicker says. “In many places the courts simply lack the expertise, resources and infrastructure to meet international trial standards and give real meaning to the idea of the rule of law.” Until local courts can successfully prosecute such cases, the world will need a mix of national and international institutions tailored to specific circumstances and supported by the UN and its member states.”

“Let’s keep in mind how new all of this is,” he concludes. “It has really only been in the last 15 years that these various courts have emerged. One size doesn’t fit all, and for that reason we need a number of different approaches. We have a long way to go, but it’s still a dramatic departure from business as usual in the 20th century.”

——

This story originally appeared in the January edition of Africa Renewal, a United Nations publication.

http://www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/vol20no4/204-ending-impunity.html

From our weblog:

African Union to decide in Chad war crimes case
WW4 REPORT, Nov. 29, 2005
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Fierce fighting in east Chad
WW4 REPORT, Dec. 10, 2006
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War of perceptions on African genocide
WW4 REPORT, Sept. 26, 2006
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Ivory Coast violence: new “great game” for West Africa?
WW4 REPORT, Jan. 18, 2006
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Israeli diamond merchants worked with Hezbollah, al-Qaeda?
WW4 REPORT, Sept. 15, 2006
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World Court: Uganda guilty in Congo war
WW4 REPORT, Dec. 20, 2005
/node/1408

Historical truth at issue in France-Rwanda breach
WW4 REPORT, Nov. 25, 2006
/node/2840

Chile: Pinochet agents sentenced
WW4 REPORT, Jan. 11, 2007
/node/3022

War crimes charges filed against Rumsfeld
WW4 REPORT, Nov. 15, 2006
/node/2782

From our archive:

French Fight Hema Militia in Congo
WW4 REPORT #91, August 2003
/static/91.html#africa1

Sierra Leone war crimes tribunal mired in controversy
WW4 REPORT #86, May 19, 2003
/static/86.html#african6

Belgian Court will not prosecute Sharon for war crimes
WW4 REPORT #61, Nov. 26, 2002
Http://Ww4report.com/static/61.html#palestine13

Henry Kissinger: wanted in Chile, Spain, France
WW4 REPORT #31, May 28, 2002
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See also:

THE NEW SCRAMBLE FOR AFRICA:
The World Economic Forum, “Humanitarian Intervention” and the Secret
Resource Wars
by Wynde Priddy
WW4 REPORT #90, July 2003
/static/90.html#africa1

HOPE AND HORROR IN SIERRA LEONE
book review by Bill Weinberg
WW4 REPORT #90, July 2003
/node/657

——————-

Reprinted by WORLD WAR 4 REPORT, Feb. 1, 2007
Reprinting permissible with attribution

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