MEGAPROJECTS AND MILITARIZATION

A Perfect Storm in Mexico

by Todd Miller, NACLA News

The 40-day blockade of the Trinidad mine in the Oaxacan community of San José del Progreso came to a sudden and violent halt on May 6. Mine representatives and municipal authorities called in a 700-strong police force that stormed into the community in anti-riot gear along with an arsenal of tear gas, dogs, assault rifles, and a helicopter.

The overwhelming show of force was in response to community residents’ demand that the Canadian company Fortuna Silver Mines immediately pack its bags and leave. The company is in the exploration phase of developing the Trinidad mine. The result was a brutal attack, with over 20 arrests and illegal searches of homes. Police seemed to be going after a heavily armed drug cartel, not a community protest.

This is one of the drug war’s dirty secrets: As Mexican security budgets inflate with US aid—to combat the rising power of drug trafficking and organized crime—rights groups say these funds are increasingly being used to protect the interests of multinational corporations. According to a national network of human rights organizations known as the Red TDT, security forces are engaged in the systematic repression of activists opposed to megaprojects financed by foreign firms such as Fortuna Silver Mines.

In Oaxaca and throughout southern Mexico these types of conflicts seem destined to increase. Defying the logic of the international financial crisis, Mexico remains the top destination in Latin America for foreign direct investment, particularly in extractive industries. In the last three years alone, multinational companies have received over 80 federal mining concessions in just Oaxaca, covering 1.5 million acres of land. Mining is only the tip of the iceberg: Other megaprojects include hydroelectric dam construction, tourism and infrastructure, energy generation projects, water privatization, and oil exploration.

In response to the influx of capital-intensive projects, Marcos Leyva, director of Services for an Alternative Education, a community group, says, “We saw it coming, but we didn’t realize the utter force with which it was coming at us.”

The warning signs were there. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) gave foreign investment free range in the country. NAFTA even forced changes to the constitution so that communal lands could be broken up and sold piecemeal—in a word, privatized. In 2000, Plan Puebla Panamá was unveiled; the Plan sought to link southern Mexico with Central America through a series of networked megaprojects. But a strong wave of community resistance pushed the plan into the corner. Many say the plan is back, moving ahead with all cylinders, under a new name: Plan Mesoamerica.

In April, dozens of grassroots groups came together in Oaxaca to discuss these developments at a forum titled, “Weaving Resistance in Defense of Our Territories.” The forum’s declaration, signed by participating communities and organizations, denounced, “A privatization of our territories and natural resources is clearly being pushed forward, and the majority of this is located in rural and indigenous communities.”

At the meeting, representatives of rural and indigenous communities all share similar experiences to those of their counterparts in San JosĂ© del Progreso. The common denominator is the everyday struggle of life in Oaxaca where endemic and structural poverty has left 76 percent of the state’s population in desperation. Those affected by the mine described it as a “virus” that was gnawing away at their land, leaving it infertile and taking away their only sources of livelihood—agriculture and cattle.

Residents also complained the mine would pose a health hazard through the poisoning of their clean water sources with chemicals such as cyanide and arsenic, which are used to extract precious metals from the ore. The mine would also drain scarce water sources. “A mine will use more water in one hour than an entire family uses in one year,” says Raymundo Sandoval from the Project for Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, a Mexico City-based organization.

“It is not right that foreigners come here and steal our natural wealth,” complains community resident Dominga RodrĂ­guez. And this wealth could be significant. Though the project is still in its exploration phase, Fortuna Silver Mines expects the mine to yield 50 million ounces of silver worth about $700 million.

The community says neither the government nor the company consulted it about the mine—that’s pretty much par for the course for these kind of projects. In March, municipal authorities ignored complaints from residents about dynamite blasts damaging their homes and cattle dying after drinking contaminated water. RodrĂ­guez believes the municipal officials had already “sold out to the mine company.”

After the community took over the mine in March, the army set up camp a mere 100 meters from its entrance. Though the soldiers said they were there to remove explosives from the mine, the foreboding message was clear: When it comes to the $35 million that the company has invested in the project so far, there is little room for dialogue.

The events of May 6 confirmed the army’s implicit threat. Agripina VĂĄsquez, one of the people arrested in the massive police raid, told the Oaxacan daily Noticias: “What we wanted was dialogue, but they didn’t give us the opportunity. The police simply surrounded and arrested us.” The magnitude and brutality of the police raid was an eerie reminder for locals of Oaxaca’s months-long social conflict in 2006; the uprising was met with brute force by police. The government’s response was a human rights disaster by any measure and has yet to be resolved.

In recent visits to Mexico, high-level US officials, including President Barack Obama, have failed to acknowledge the country’s deteriorating human rights situation. Washington has moved ahead with its $700 million military and police aid package—with another $470 million in the pipeline—for Mexico known as the MĂ©rida Initiative. As security forces use this aid to fight the drug cartels, it is at least indirectly supporting repressive police operations such as the one seen in San JosĂ© del Progreso that are literally shielding private companies from legitimate community grievances.

In an unguarded moment, Thomas Shannon, the Bush administration’s top diplomat for the Western Hemisphere, admitted last year that Washington was in the process of “armoring NAFTA.” Although Shannon was just replaced by the Obama administration, it does not look like the Democratic president is inclined to rollback this “armoring” of the trade agreement.

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This story first appeared May 19 on NACLA News.

Resources:

Red TDT
http://www.redtdt.org.mx

See also:

THE RETURN OF PLAN PUEBLA-PANAMA
The New Struggle for Central America
by Bill Weinberg, World War 4 Report
World War 4 Report, May 2007

MINING IN MEXICO: VIOLENCE MADE IN CANADA
by Mandeep Dhillon, Upside Down World
World War 4 Report, May 2007

From our Daily Report:

Mexico: peasant ecologist arrested in Chihuahua
World War 4 Report, May 27, 2009

Mexico: indigenous protests in Oaxaca
World War 4 Report, March 24, 2009

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Reprinted by World War 4 Report, June 1, 2009
Reprinting permissible with attribution

Continue ReadingMEGAPROJECTS AND MILITARIZATION 

MEXICO’S RESURGENT GUERILLAS

Washington’s Drug War and the Ghosts of 1910

from Frontera NorteSur

A new twist with unpredictable political consequences has emerged amid the shifting battle fronts of Mexico’s narco war. Sometime the weekend of May 9-10 and somewhere in the mountains of southern Guerrero state, a group of at least 20 armed men presenting themselves as a column of the Revolutionary Army of the Insurgent People (ERPI) appeared before Mexican reporters.

Uniformed and armed with AK-47 rifles, the group was led by Comandante Ramiro, or Omar Guerrero Solis, one of the most wanted men in Mexico and an almost folkloric figure who escaped from a prison outside Acapulco more than six years ago and wasn’t publicly seen again until the weekend’s secret press conference.

In comments to reporters, Comandante Ramiro accused the Felipe CalderĂłn administration of not only staging the fight against drug trafficking, but of also protecting the interests of alleged drug lord Joaquin “El Chapo” GuzmĂĄn. The masked guerrilla commander charged Guerrero Governor Zeferino Torreblanca, who was elected with the backing of the center-left Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) and social sectors sympathetic with the guerrilla movement, with also protecting Chapo GuzmĂĄn and an alleged associate, Rogaciano Alba.

A former head of the Guerrero Regional Cattlemen’s Association, Alba also served as the mayor of the Guerrero town of Petatlan for the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). Gunmen associated with Alba are responsible for about 60 murders in the conflictive Tierra Caliente and Costa Grande regions of Guerrero, Comandante Ramiro said.

“The strategy of combating the narco is phony,” Comandante Ramiro charged. “Here in Guerrero, for example, the narcos participate in meetings that the army and state government hold to strike at one cartel and protect another, but essentially they are the same, because they murder, kidnap and torture,” he asserted. “Here the cartel of Chapo GuzmĂĄn is serving the army, and vice-versa..”

The fugitive rebel leader likewise accused Erit MontĂșfar, director of the Guerrero state ministerial police, of involvement in criminal activities in the Tierra Caliente region of the state.

Comandante Ramiro said narco-fueled violence was inspiring young people to join the ERPI’s ranks, which had successfully expelled Alba’s men from some mountain zones. The ERPI, he said, is engaged in active armed self-defense, “striking” and “dismantling” paramilitary groups connected to Alba and the state government.

The guerrilla leader said his troops try to avoid confrontations with Mexican soldiers, whom he called “sons of the people” welcome to join the revolutionary movement.

The ERPI first emerged in 1998 as a splinter faction of the leftist Popular Democratic Revolutionary Party/Popular Revolutionary Army (PDPR-EPR). Two top ERPI leaders, Jacobo Silva and Gloria Arenas, were captured by the Mexican army in 1999, but the guerrilla group survived and reorganized.

The EPR, as well as other spin-offs, remains active. As the 15th anniversary of the founding of the organization’s armed wing neared this month, the PDPR-EPR issued a new communique.

In its message, the underground organization addressed the recent flu epidemic, deficiencies in the Mexican healthcare system, human rights, political scandals, labor movements, the suffering of the mothers of Ciudad Juarez femicide victims, and more.

The group also said its members were reviewing the next step to take in its campaign to force a clarification of the fate of two high-ranking leaders, Edmundo Reyes Amaya and Gabriel Alberto Cruz SĂĄnchez, who were allegedly disappeared by the Mexican government in May 2007.

Subsequently, the EPR waged a sabotage campaign against gas pipelines to force the appearance of its two leaders. The guerrillas later declared a truce, and a mediation commission was established between the EPR and CalderĂłn administration. The commission, however, recently broke down, with no word on the fates of Cruz and Amaya.

Now 33 years old, the ERPI’s Comandante Ramiro told Mexican media he first joined the Poor People’s Party, a predecessor group of the PDPR-EPR which was founded by the late legendary rebel leader Lucio Cabañas in the late 1960s, when he was fourteen years of age.

According to Comandante Ramiro, the ERPI is organized like Cabañas’ old Campesino Justice Brigade, with units going up and down in size. Claiming his organization enjoys broad popular support in the Guerrero countryside, Comandante Ramiro said he spent the last four years year in the mountains, adding with a half-smile, “without a vacation.” Addressing reporters, he personally challenged President CalderĂłn and Defense Secretary Guillermo GalvĂĄn to come fight against him if they had a beef and stop sending “innocents” to die.

Replies to Comandante Ramiro
Reaction to the rebel leader’s bravado was slow in coming from CalderĂłn administration officials and Governor Torreblanca, but other state officials and well-known political figures in Guerrero had quick words of response.

Dismissing Comandante Ramiro’s allegations, State Ministerial Police Director Montufar contended the fugitive was using the name of the ERPI to cover for crimes including cattle rustling, robbery and rape.

“How is it possible that someone who escaped from the Acapulco penitentiary, a delinquent of that level, assumes the mantle of defender of social causes?” MontĂșfar responded.

Armando ChavarrĂ­a, coordinator of the PRD group in the Guerrero State Congress and a former state interior minister under Torreblanca, urged the governor to initiate a dialogue with the ERPI.

“Personally, I don’t justify the armed struggle,” Chavarria said, “but I understand it.” The veteran politician said the ERPI’s public reemergence, arising from a grinding poverty trapping hundreds of thousands of people in the state, “makes the situation graver in Guerrero.”

After news of the EPRI’s reappearance hit the press, residents reported stepped-up Mexican military movements, especially in the Tierra Caliente.

While Mexican guerrillas engaged the media this past week, presumed narcos mounted their own publicity campaign by hanging more so-called “narco-banners” in Guerrero, Morelos, Tabasco, Sinaloa, and Chihuahua. Directed at President Felipe CalderĂłn, Federal Public Safety Secretary
Genaro GarcĂ­a Luna and other top law enforcement officials, the latest messages were strikingly frank, with the banner signers acknowledging they were not members of a Boy Scout troop but nevertheless protesting alleged CalderĂłn administration retaliations against family members of accused narcos. According the anonymous authors, the global code of conduct mandates that the family “should be respected.”

A New Game for Washington?
Locally, the EPRI column led by Comandante Ramiro adds another explosive element to a multi-faceted conflict underway in Guerrero involving several rival drug cartels, the Mexican armed forces and different police agencies, which often back different crime groups and battle one another. Last month, a fierce battle in the mountains between the army and suspected gunmen from the Beltran-Leyva cartel left at least 15 gunmen and one soldier dead. Along with large-caliber weapons and grenades, 13 suspects were seized by the army.

Politically, the persistence and even growth of the ERPI further signals the collapse of the broad-based political movement spearheaded by Zeferino Torreblanca that swept into power in early 2005 based on promises of change and end to decades of corruption and misrule by the PRI party.

The ERPI’s ability to attract young recruits shows how the guerrilla in Guerrero, like the narco, has become part of the trans-generational landscape. Comandante Ramiro’s column represents at least the third generation of Mexicans to take up arms since the late 1960s.

The existence of a guerrilla group in the heart of the narco conflict zone has national and international ramifications, especially at a time when the Democratic Party-controlled US Congress is considering a $470 million security funding request for the Mexican government, including money for more helicopters, advanced technology and training for the Mexican armed forces. The modern military equipment could used to fight guerrillas as well as narcos.

On May 7, the House Appropriations Committee approved the military assistance package and sent it on for further action. In an action bearing perhaps more than just passing political symbolism, the Mexico aid was approved as part of a larger security outlay for Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Now, even as the new Obama administration retunes its military strategy in Central Asia, Washington could be poised to become more deeply involved in a Mexican civil conflict that has centuries of deep political, social and historical roots.

On the eve of the House committee vote, scores of prominent Mexican human rights organizations wrote the US Congress opposing new military aid. The signatories of a May 6 letter noted that allegations of human rights abuses against Mexican soldiers mainly deployed in anti-drug operations soared 600% from 2006 to 2008, reaching 1,230 cases filed with the official National Human Rights Commission last year. In both Guerrero and neighboring MichoacĂĄn, complaints against soldiers are on the upswing in 2009.

Juan AlarcĂłn, longtime president of the official Guerrero State Human Rights Commission, said his agency saw an unprecedented 85 complaints against soldiers from last December to the first three weeks of April. The majority of accusations, encompassing alleged violations of search and seizure, arrest and other laws, “have nothing to do with drug trafficking or organized crime,” AlarcĂłn insisted.

Ghosts of 1910
In some respects, the situation in Guerrero and other parts of the Mexican countryside, both south and north, resembles the era before the 1910 Mexican Revolution when armed bands, heavy-handed government forces and insurgent political forces all rose to the occasion. Then, as now, foreign companies commanded key sectors of the economy.

Ironically, the huge copper mine in Cananea, Sonora, which witnessed one of the historic, runner-up battles to the 1910 revolt, has been the scene of a mounting conflict during the last two years between the mineworkers union led by exiled leader Napoleon GĂłmez on one side and the CalderĂłn administration and owners Grupo Mexico on the other. Internationally, GĂłmez’s group has received important backing from the United Steel Workers and other labor organizations.

The Cananea strike almost erupted into a bloody showdown just as US President Barack Obama was preparing to visit Mexico last month. Attempting to break the strike, Grupo Mexico announced the firing of more than 1,000 workers. Hundreds of federal police then began saturating the area around the mine defended by miners and a women’s defense force.

In solidarity with the Sonora strikers, mine and metal industry workers blockaded shipments of containers scheduled for export from the Pacific Coast port of Lazaro Cardenas, Michoacan, near the border with Guerrero.

Back in Sonora, miners took over a highway toll booth. At one demonstration, the Cananea strikers cried out: “If there is no solution, there will be revolution!”

As the Cananea strike approached its second anniversary, Sonora Governor Eduardo Bours appealed on the federal government to find a solution amicable to all parties.

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This story first appeared May 14 on Frontera NorteSur.

See also:

MEXICO’S SOUTHWESTERN FRONT
Low-Intensity War in MichoacĂĄn and Guerrero
from Frontera NorteSur
World War 4 Report, March 2009

From our Daily Report:

Mexican miners take action to protest mass firing at Cananea
World War 4 Report, April 30, 2009

Mexico: feds probe “forced disappearance” of leftist militants
World War 4 Report, Aug. 17, 2008

Mexico: guerilla convicts’ sentences reduced
World War 4 Report, March 10, 2008

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Reprinted by World War 4 Report, June 1, 2009
Reprinting permissible with attribution
 

Continue ReadingMEXICO’S RESURGENT GUERILLAS 

KIDNAP, NO RANSOM

by Peter Gorman, Fort Worth Weekly

The drug war raging along the US-Mexico border might seem distant to many in North Texas, but it landed squarely in one Fort Worth woman’s living room in late February, when her grown son, a US citizen, was kidnapped by armed gunman in the central Mexican state of Zacatecas.

Two months later, she still has not heard a word from the kidnappers regarding a ransom and believes that her 19-year-old son and two other relatives may have been taken to serve as slave labor in some drug boss’ operation. It’s a better outcome to imagine than believing her son has been killed.

Unfortunately, she’s not alone in her worries: A recent US State Department travel alert notes that “In recent years, dozens of U.S. citizens have been kidnapped in Mexico,” in crimes believed to be the work of drug gangs. Some have been heard from, and others haven’t. The travel alert noted that many of the cases remain unresolved. In fact, such kidnappings by drug gangs are epidemic in Mexico. Sylvia, who is being identified only by her first name, said other members of her own family in Mexico have already disappeared in similar incidents.

Names are withheld to protect Sylvia and her son from retaliation. Rather than give either of her son’s names, he is referred to in this story as Julio.

“In my heart I don’t believe my son is dead,” Sylvia said. “I believe he is being forced to work for the cartels. Those who are not dead must work to earn their food, and as no one has asked the family there or sent word to me for a ransom, that’s what I’m praying has happened.”

Julio, she said, was visiting relatives in the small village of Sombrerete when a caravan of late-model vehicles roared up to the ranch house. The armed men who emerged ordered everyone inside to get in the cars. In addition to Julio, two of his male cousins, ages 15 and 21, three women from the family, and one infant were taken.

The kidnappers are believed to be members of the Zetas, the US-trained Mexican drug war soldiers who years ago changed their allegiance, became notoriously violent enforcers for the Gulf Cartel, and now in some areas are believed to have broken off and formed their own cartel.

“The Zetas just move into the town, and they take whatever they want,” said Sylvia. “They just tell people to move out if they want a house or tell farmers to give them a cow if they want one. And no one will stand up to them, because if they do the men will come and kill them. It’s very bad there now.”

An official in an investigative agency of the Zacatecas government, who would not give his name, said that, until about a year ago, Sombrerete was out of the range of the drug war. But with Mexico’s push to clamp down on the cartels, the town, like many others in rural Mexico, was essentially invaded by young gang members looking for a place where the military and other gangs wouldn’t search for them. “The disruption caused by the drug war is causing all sorts of movement through the country,” said the official. “We’re seeing cartel members cropping up in places we never have before.”

The description of the kidnapping came from one of the women who were abducted. After driving through the hillsides for more than two hours, she said, she, the other women, and the baby were released. The woman told Sylvia that she counted 15 cars in the caravan. She said the men were dressed in military-looking uniforms and carrying automatic weapons.

It’s not the first time the Zetas have preyed on her family, Sylvia said. “Last summer the father of the family [in Sombrerete] was kidnapped, and his oldest son brought a ransom. Neither of them has been seen since. And now they’ve taken that family’s two other sons and my son as well. I don’t know how the word does not get out about what’s happening in Zacatecas, but maybe it’s because the people who write the news are afraid to report about it because they’ll be killed if they do.”

Sylvia said she begged Julio not to visit his cousins. “After he graduated high school last year in Oakland, California, I decided we should move here to Fort Worth. It’s just three of us: Julio, his eight-year-old brother, and me. And Julio found work building houses and saved money. But when they stopped building houses here, he got restless and wanted to go. I told him not to, that it wasn’t safe.”

She said Julio promised her that nothing would happen to him because he doesn’t do the things that would get him in trouble. “He doesn’t fight or even drink beer,” she said. “I told him if he had to go, then to make it a short visit. But then he found a girlfriend and decided to stay a little longer, and then this happened.”

After learning of her son’s abduction, Sylvia got in touch with a community activist on Fort Worth’s East Side. Together they contacted authorities in Mexico to report what had happened. Mexico responded by sending the equivalent of an assistant district attorney to Fort Worth to talk with them.

“The woman who came was very nice, but I don’t think she’ll do anything,” said the activist, who also asked not to be named. “The situation is so bad in some places that the government really can’t do anything.”

Andy Laney, a spokesman for the State Department, said his agency has known about the incident since shortly after it happened. “I am told that the FBI office in Dallas has been involved in the case, and the FBI takes the lead on cases involving kidnapping of American citizens in Mexico,” he said. But the Washington, DC-based official said he had no knowledge of what had happened to the young men in Sombrerete.

Typically, kidnappings are followed by ransom demands, often after the abductees have been tortured into telling their kidnappers about relatives in the United States who might be able to raise ransom money.

In other cases, however, no ransom demand is ever delivered, either because the victims have been killed or because they are being forced to work for the drug lords. The forced-labor movement is well known in Mexico but has not received much coverage in this country.

One kidnapping that did make the US news occurred on Nov. 10, 2008, when 27 farm workers were abducted in Sinaloa state just outside the capital of CuliacĂĄn. According to a New York Times report, the men were thought to have been taken to work under duress on marijuana plantations.

The anonymous Zacatecan investigative official acknowledged that forced labor is becoming more common throughout certain areas of Mexico. But he added, “We have had no confirmed cases of it happening here in Zacatecas.”

Author and freelance investigative journalist Bill Weinberg, whose specialty is Latin America, said that while it’s often difficult to prove, “There is strong reason to believe” that some people are being kidnapped to work in marijuana or opium fields. Others are used to move drugs for the cartels or as inductees into groups like the Zetas and others, he said.

“There is a history of forced labor in Mexico since colonial times,” he said. “Recently, where drugs are concerned, it’s mostly gone on in remote areas where the indigenous are held in semi-feudalism to the local bosses. But now, with Mexico spinning out of control and with drug-war kidnapping at epic proportions all over the country, it simply stands to reason that this is happening.”

A spokesperson for the FBI in Washington DC said that the kidnapping of US citizens in Mexico, particularly along the border, is a frequent problem, but she could not confirm any cases of US citizens kidnapped into forced labor in Mexico. She confirmed that the agency is investigating dozens of kidnap-for-ransom cases but said she had no statistics to show how many other cases might involve family squabbles or child custody, for instance, versus drug cartel activity.

“We cannot be under the illusion that the war in Mexico is not crossing the border,” said the Fort Worth activist who is helping Sylvia. “It is affecting the United States. This is just one case, but there are hundreds more around the country.”

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This story first appeared April 29 in the Fort Worth Weekly.

From our Daily Report:

Mexico: shake-up in wake of Zacatecas jailbreak
World War 4 Report, May 23, 2009

Mexico: gunmen kill reporter, kidnap farmworkers
World War 4 Report, Nov. 15, 2008

Marcos: forced labor camps in Sonora
World War 4 Report, Oct. 26, 2006

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Reprinted by World War 4 Report, June 1, 2009
Reprinting permissible with attribution

Continue ReadingKIDNAP, NO RANSOM 

THE “COLOMBIANIZATION” OF CHIHUAHUA

from Frontera NorteSur

A high-ranking delegation of political, business and legal leaders from Ciudad JuĂĄrez and the state of Chihuahua returned to Mexico late last month after completing a May 21 trip to Colombia. The visit netted commitments by the Colombian government to train Chihuahua police and help implement new social welfare programs.

The accords cover Colombian training of a planned Chihuahua state police group of 50 rapid response, anti-kidnapping personnel, assistance in improving police investigative and surveillance techniques and help in establishing four social welfare programs in Ciudad JuĂĄrez modeled after similar ones developed in MedellĂ­n, Colombia. Colombian trainers for the new Chihuahua anti-kidnapping squad could be in Ciudad JuĂĄrez as early as next month.

“It will be a very interesting experience to talk with President Alvaro Uribe to find out his experiences over the course of the years,” said Chihuahua Governor JosĂ© Reyes Baeza in the run-up to the trip.

A major Colombian product—cocaine—has played a tremendous role in shaping the history of Ciudad Juárez and Chihuahua during the last 30 years.

Led by Reyes Baeza, the 31-person Mexican delegation included State Attorney General Patricia GonzĂĄlez, federal Congressman Octavio Fuentes, Autonomous University of Ciudad JuĂĄrez rector Jorge Quintana Silveyra, state lawmaker and Mexican Green Party (PVEM) regional leader Maria Avila Serna, businessman Luis Carlos Baeza, Ciudad JuĂĄrez Chamber of Commerce president Daniel Murguia Lardizabal, and the mayors of Ciudad JuĂĄrez and Chihuahua City, among numerous others. The invited list read almost like a Who’s Who of Chihuahua society and politics.

Oddly enough, Antonia GonzĂĄlez Acosta, the coordinator for the state anti-kidnapping unit in Ciudad JuĂĄrez, allegedly shot herself to death on the eve of the state delegation’s visit to Colombia. GonzĂĄlez was reportedly pregnant.

In Colombia, the Mexican visitors met with President Alvaro Uribe, National Police Chief Oscar Naranjo Trujillo, Interior Minister Fabio Valencia, and Attorney General Mario Iguaran. The Chihuahua delegation also met with judges and prosecutors to discuss Colombia’s experience with oral trials, a new legal model that is now in place in Chihuahua.

According to Ciudad JuĂĄrez Mayor Jose Reyes Ferriz, MedellĂ­n-style social programs will be launched in his city with the twin goal of reducing delinquency and creating social opportunities.

“We are going to apply the programs the Colombians have in Ciudad JuĂĄrez,” Reyes said, “since the conditions in the city of MedellĂ­n are similar to this border.”

Split among the municipal, state and federal governments, the programs will cost about $4.5 million, Reyes said, but did not immediately offer other details. The border mayor said he invited his counterpart from Medellin to visit Ciudad JuĂĄrez.

Coming at a time of economic depression and an immediate budget deficit ofnearly $7 million for Ciudad JuĂĄrez alone, the costs of the Colombia trip were questioned by local reporters and some members of the public.

Writing for the Lapolaka news website, Eduardo SalmerĂłn warned of corruption tainting the new training program.

“It scares me to think they continue importing models that correspond to other realities and try to implement them in our contexts,” SalmerĂłn wrote. “What guarantee are we going to have that this group won’t contaminate a structure which is full of vice?”

Earlier taking exception to the cost issue, Governor Reyes Baeza said the expenses, which were paid by trip participants or their employers, will reap many benefits in greater security. The Colombians, he said, are offering their services for “practically free,” with the Mexicans expected to pay nominal transportation and lodging costs. According to the Chihuahua governor, local members of the new anti-kidnapping group will be carefully selected.

An important issue not raised by the Chihuahua press was the relationship between human rights and security training. The Colombian government’s human rights record has been repeatedly criticized by international rights organizations like Amnesty International.

The Chihuahua-Colombia agreements fit in with a growing synchronicity between the conservative CalderĂłn and Uribe administrations on important economic, political and security issues in a hemisphere that is titling to the left. Together with the Peruvian government of Alan GarcĂ­a, the CalderĂłn and Uribe administrations are vocal defenders of a free trade model that has fallen into disrepute in much of Latin America.

On a geo-political scale, the Chihuahua-Colombia accords complement the anti-drug, US-Mexico Mérida Initiative that will provide hundreds of millions of US dollars in security and military aid to the Calderon administration

Politically, the Mexico City-BogotĂĄ connection was evident last month when the Mexican government expelled a Colombian sociologist, Miguel Angel Beltran, who was accused by BogotĂĄ of being an important member of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)

The growing Mexico-Colombia cooperation is viewed with suspicion by the Mexican left. Among the sore points is the Colombian army’s sneak attack on a FARC encampment in Ecuador last year that killed guerrilla leader Raul Reyes and 24 others, including four young Mexican visitors who were ostensibly researching the FARC for academic purposes.

A fifth Mexican national, National Autonomous University of Mexico student Lucia Moret, survived the attack and was given temporary asylum in Nicaragua before returning to Mexico. Moret currently faces prosecution in an Ecuadoran court for infringing on the country’s national security.

The March 2008 attack on the FARC encampment led Ecuador and Venezuela to break diplomatic relations with Colombia, and even threatened to erupt into a regional war.

The Chihuahua-Colombia alliance unfolds amid a rise in kidnappings in Ciudad JuĂĄrez and other parts of Chihuahua. Kidnappings have sparked multiple political crises for the state government in recent weeks. Earlier last month, hundreds of members of the Mormon and Mennonite communities of northwestern Chihuahua camped out for days in front of the Governor’s office in Chihuahua City to protest the kidnapping-for-ransom of 16-year-old Eric LeBaron, who was later freed unharmed.

On May 19, hundreds of residents of AscensiĂłn, an agricultural municipality located south of the New Mexico border, occupied the town hall to demand the deployment of the army and other actions directed against kidnappers and violent criminals.

“There are not three or five or 20 kidnappings,” said Alfredo Frias Reyes, municipal government secretary. “We are more than 20,000 people who have been sequestered and we cannot continue like this.”

As in Ciudad JuĂĄrez, shop owners in AscensiĂłn are putting up their businesses for sale or trying to rent out storefronts. Residents are reportedly fleeing to the United States and other parts of Chihuahua. Following the AscensiĂłn protest, the Mexican army and Chihuahua state police increased patrols in the zone.

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This story first appeared May 27 on Frontera NorteSur.

RESOURCES

LaPolaka.com—Periodismo en Caliente!

From our Daily Report:

Mexico: more army troops to JuĂĄrez in wake of prison massacre
World War 4 Report, March 7, 2009

Mexico: bomb threats shut Ciudad JuĂĄrez airport
World War 4 Report, Feb. 26, 2009

Colombian “farcpolĂ­tica” scandal hits Nicaragua
World War 4 Report, May 23, 2008

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Reprinted by World War 4 Report, June 1, 2009
Reprinting permissible with attribution

Continue ReadingTHE “COLOMBIANIZATION” OF CHIHUAHUA 

WINTER FUND DRIVE EXTENDS INTO SPRING

Are We Really That Irrelevant?

We’ve been trying to reach our winter fund-drive goal of $2,000 since the beginning of December. The total now stands at $1,390. That means $610 to go.

We really don’t get it, even given the current financial crisis. All the other left-wing websites out there—both the ones we have fraternal relations with like Toward Freedom and those we frankly view as rivals due to their bad politics, such as CounterPunch—can routinely raise twice that in a fraction of the time. This isn’t exactly encouraging.

If you are reading these words, please pitch in so we can concentrate on bringing you news instead of asking for funds for the rest of the year. Or, if you chose not to support, us please tell us why! Use the Paypal link to the left, or click here. Or write us at feedback (at) ww4report.com (remove spaces, obviously).

Continue ReadingWINTER FUND DRIVE EXTENDS INTO SPRING 

LOST DAUGHTERS OF THE RIO GRANDE

Crosses mark where slain women were found outside JuĂĄrez. Photo: Flickr” title=”Crosses mark where slain women were found outside JuĂĄrez. Photo: Flickr” class=”image image-_original” width=”500″ height=”375″ />Crosses mark where slain women were found outside JuĂĄrez. Photo: FlickrWar on Women in the Borderlands

from Frontera NorteSur

Up and down the Rio Grande/Rio Bravo, from Laredo to Albuquerque, families and friends protest, plead and pray for the return of their missing daughters, mothers and loved ones.

In Laredo, Texas, a case of two missing young women ended on a positive note April 3, when 19-year-old Yazmin Silva and 18-year-old Nydia Benavides were returned home. The two friends were reported missing in Laredo’s sister city of Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas, on March 29. A car driven by the young women was subsequently recovered in a supermarket parking lot not far from Nuevo Laredo’s red-light district.

US and Mexican law enforcement officials teamed up find out what happened to Silva and Benavides, but it is still not clear who was behind the disappearance of the two friends and for what ends. Elizabeth HernĂĄndez Arredondo, investigator for the Tamaulipas state attorney general’s office, confirmed the two young women were held against their will, but insisted their nearly week-long absence was “not a case involving organized crime.”

After reappearing in public, Benavides and Silva hid their faces and avoided talking to the media. Benavides’ mother, Angeles Benavides, later described her daughter as depressed and in need of treatment.

While last week brought good news to two families, others in the two Laredos continued to wonder about their loved ones. A web site maintained by the relatives’ group Laredo’s Missing lists 17 women reported vanished between 2003-2006.

In Ciudad JuĂĄrez, Chihuahua, many families also anguish over the fate of missing relatives. Scores of young women have been reported missing since the early 1990s, with the latest instance involving an 18-year old student from the Autonomous University of Ciudad JuĂĄrez (UACJ), Monica Janeth Alanis Esparza, who vanished last March 26 after advising her family she was leaving the school to go with friends.

“My family is destroyed,” said Monica’s father Ricardo Alanis. “We are desperate from not knowing anything.”

The missing person’s department of the Chihuahua state attorney general’s office lists 33 “high-risk” cases of young women who disappeared in Ciudad JuĂĄrez between 1995 and March 2009, but many women’s advocates say the true number is much higher.

According to research by El Paso reporter and author Diana Washington Valdez and subsequent press reports, more than 620 women have been murdered in Ciudad JuĂĄrez because of various reasons since 1993; reportedly, 22 women have been slain in the border city since the beginning of 2009.

The prevalence of forced disappearance and violence against women motivated a group of human rights activists and mothers of missing and murdered women to stage a protest outside the Ciudad JuĂĄrez offices of Mexico’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (SRE) on April 3. The group demanded that the Mexican government comply with international human rights agreements protecting women from violence, that Mexico finally get to the bottom of the femicides and disappearances and that former Chihuahua governor Francisco Barrio be retired as Mexico’s ambassador to Canada.

Mothers of femicide victims and their supporters contend that as governor of the state of Chihuahua from 1992-98, Barrio blamed the alleged lifestyles of victimized women for the violent crimes perpetrated against them, while he permitted the mass murders of women to go unchecked by helping to fabricate a scapegoat for the crimes, the late Egyptian national Abdul Latif Sharif Sharif.

“Let’s Not Export Impunity,” read a sign at the April 3 demonstration in Ciudad JuĂĄrez. “Barrio is not a dignified representative of Mexicans,” charged Marisela Ortiz, spokeswoman for the Ciudad JuĂĄrez non-governmental organization Nuestras Hijas de Regreso a Casa.

A letter containing protestors’ demands was also written to the Mexican Senate. In addition to Nuestras Hijas, signatories included Pastoral Obrera, Tonantzin Women’s Center, Mesa de Mujeres, academic researchers from the Colegio de la Frontera Norte and UACJ, and many other individuals and groups.

Simultaneous to the Ciudad JuĂĄrez demonstration, the Quebec Federation of Women, Committee for Human Rights in Latin America and Committee in Solidarity with the Women of Ciudad JuĂĄrez held protests outside Mexican consulates in Montreal and Ottawa in support of the demand that Barrio be declared “persona non-grata” in Mexico’s most northern NAFTA partner.

There was no immediate public comment by either the SRE or Ambassador Barrio on the bi-national demonstrations.

Four hours upriver from Ciudad JuĂĄrez, the city of Albuquerque, New Mexico, is another community now forced to come to terms with issues of violence against women.

In a scene strikingly reminiscent of previous events in Ciudad JuĂĄrez, a group of relatives and their supporters gathered on the bitterly cold evening April 4 to honor the memories of at least 20 young women who have gone missing or fallen victim to the streets since 1989. As an arctic-like chill whipped the Duke City, scores of activists and relatives installed a shrine, displayed photos of missing women, set up pink crosses, and conducted an indigenous ceremony in Robinson Park on Central Avenue.

Speakers challenged a narrative of stigmatization flowing from media stories and police reports that emphasize the connection between missing women and drugs/and or prostitution. Six of the women honored April 4 were among the 11 sets of female remains that have been unearthed at a clandestine graveyard on the outskirts of Albuquerque since last February. One of the presumed victims of violence was pregnant.

“She was a beautiful person, always smiling,” said Elsie Montano, god-mother of Veronica Romero, whose remains were identified last week. Montano said years passed between filing the police report about Romero’s disappearance on Valentine’s Day 2004 and any official word of her fate. “I don’t think [police] responded very well to anything,” Montano added. “I mean, this was terrorism, actually. These girls have been killed and thrown like garbage.”

Although differences exist in the backgrounds of some victims in Albuquerque and Ciudad JuĂĄrez, similarities are also evident. In both cities, working-class Latinas went missing and later turned up in mass graves uncovered not by hard-nosed detective work but by a random member of public.

Little is publicly known about the ongoing Albuquerque investigation, which is headed by the Albuquerque Police Department. For example, it is still not publicly known how the 11 women died in what the mass media refers to as the “West Mesa Mystery.”

Several elected officials attended the Albuquerque victims’ memorial, including city councilors Rey Garduno and Ike Benton and Bernalillo County Commissioner Art de la Cruz, who represents the district where the mass graveyard is located.

In an interview with Frontera NorteSur, de la Cruz said he was concerned about initial law enforcement responses to the women’s disappearances in Albuquerque and elsewhere, but was confident police were now working “very, very hard” to get to solve the “mystery.” De la Cruz called the West Mesa saga a “huge issue” that can’t be permitted to happen again.

Several relatives of missing women said they were against reported proposals to discontinue excavations at the crime scene soon. They also vowed to form a relative’s group to press for justice and the apprehension of criminals.

“We’re a little snowball at the top of the hill where we started,” said Dan Valdez, father of Gina Michelle Valdez. “When we get to the base we’re going to be an enormous snowball. We’re not going to stop.”

After delivering a short but powerful speech about her disappeared cousin, an eight-year-old girl perhaps best summed up the sentiments of the people gathered. “And [my cousin] got a son,” the elementary school student said. “And her son’s here too, but he loves her and he misses her. I hope everyone prays for her too.”

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This story first appeared April 6 on Frontera NorteSur news service, and also ran in El Paso’s online Newspaper Tree.

RESOURCES

Laredo’s Missing
http://www.laredosmissing.com/

Nuestras Hijas de Regreso a Casa
http://www.mujeresdejuarez.org/

See also:

CIUDAD JUÁREZ MILITARIZED
Mexico’s Internal “Surge” on the Rio Grande
from Frontera NorteSur
World War 4 Report, April 2009

From our Daily Report:

JuĂĄrez femicide cases go before Inter-American Court of Human Rights
World War 4 Report, April 30, 2009

Mexico: narco-war death toll doubles ’07; JuĂĄrez femicide breaks records
World War 4 Report, Dec. 10, 2008

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Reprinted by World War 4 Report, May 1, 2009
Reprinting permissible with attribution

Continue ReadingLOST DAUGHTERS OF THE RIO GRANDE 

COUNTER-TERRORISM THREATENS SPANISH DEMOCRACY

An Interview with Martin Scheinin, UN Human Rights Rapporteur

by Xan Harriague, Berria, Bilbao

Last spring, Martin Scheinin, the UN’s Special Rapporteur on the protection of human rights while countering terrorism, spent a whole week in Spain and the Basque Country. He analysed Spain’s legislation, its justice system and its tribunals. On March 9, 2009 the results of his analysis were made public before the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva. He showed concern about several issues, including Spain’s definition of “terrorism,” freedom of speech, the practice of holding detainees incommunicado and the methods of the country’s highest court, the Audiencia Nacional. He recommended to the Spanish government changes and specifications to improve laws.

Scheinin, born 1954 in Helsinki, was named Special Rapporteur in 2005. He is also a professor of international law at the European University in Italy, and vice-president of the International Association of Constitutional Treaties. He was also a member of the UN Human Rights Committee during the years of 1997 and 2004 and President of Finland’s Abo Akademi Human Rights Institute from 1998 to 2008.

The Spanish government has nevertheless attempted to discredit the conclusions presented by Scheinin. Javier Garrigues, the Spanish government delegate, spoke in these terms about Scheinin and his report when it was his turn to enter the opposition: “He does not know the reality of the fight against terrorism, or the opinion of the majority of the Spanish population or the basis of the Spanish Constitution… He has made his critiques and complaints that are baseless and that are not tested. He has doubted the impartiality of the judges and the division of powers.”

The Bilbao Basque-language newspaper Berria spoke with Scheinin on March 18. This English translation was provided to World War 4 Report.

The Spanish government says that your definition of terrorism is too limited. What do you think about that?

I believe that the definition of terrorism is well defined in Spanish legislation, but then there are many other derivative crimes. The definition extends itself more and more, and in the end engulfs crimes that have nothing to do with terrorism. I believe that the use of the anti-terrorist legislation is too broad in Spain. Some of the issues treated in the Audiencia Nacional should not be there, such as for example, the kale borroka [violent street protests].

Then, should the government better define the legislation?

Yes, I propose the use of anti-terrorist legislation against the real terrorism. The criminal court is enough to take care of the other crimes, without having to mention terrorism. Kale borroka is a violent act, but not terrorism. They are not the same.

What is your opinion of the politicians imprisoned for being members or collaborators in a “terrorist group”?

It is very difficult for me to know if there is [sufficient] evidence. It is very difficult to know if someone receives orders from ETA, or, as the government says, is part of ETA. I have received more information in the case of political parties and electoral platforms. I believe that the point of view of the government is too broad. It acts against groups that have nothing to do with violence. To have the same political objectives as ETA should not be considered a crime, not a reason to have a political party made illegal, as long as there is no relation with violence.

The Spanish government has answered your report by stating that the terrorism is in the objective, not in the behavior. What is your opinion of this logic?

I am in complete disagreement with that definition… In my opinion the definition of terrorism is always in the behavior. It is a strategy defined by the use of violence against innocent people… If we start defining violence by its political objectives, then any organization opposing the government could be defined as terrorist.

Do you believe that there is freedom of speech in Spain and in the Basque Country?

It is a confusing picture. Spain is an insecure democracy, that does accept many criticisms and points of view. At the same time it is true that the banning of political parties and the closing of newspapers limit freedom of speech. Then it is the judges who decide if these limitations are acceptable or constitute a violation. As far as I’m concerned, the Spanish government has gone too far in some cases.

In your opinion, is the Law of Parties [electoral law] a guarantee of freedom of speech?

It is too broad. It is too open to interpretation and in the end, it is confusing. The Law of Parties can be used against freedom of speech, but I would not say that this is specifically its objective. That would be going too far. Although in my opinion as it is too broad, it causes problems.

What would the Spanish government need to change to guarantee freedom of speech?

I proposed an examination by an expert on Penal Code, in order to improve and clarify the Law of Parties. This expert would analyze how to make it not so weak and to leave less open to interpretation.

The Spanish government has made it clear that they will continue to hold detainees incommunicado, ignoring your recommendations. What do you think of this?

I am not the first one who asks for such a measure. Many experts on human rights have said similar things before me. Most countries don’t have similar measures. Spain is hanging itself with this practice. As long as it is being used, it is debilitating itself in order to defend against complaints and false accusations of torture. I asked for it to be discontinued and, as long as it is being maintained, to improve measures to guarantee the rights of the detainees.

In its defense, Spain has mentioned the legislatures of England and France…

There is a huge difference. Other countries limit the choice of a lawyer, but they can still choose one of confidence… They have some special measures for the first days of detention, but not a system of incommunicado detention. Here lies the biggest difference in respect to Spain. The majority of countries allow for the choosing of a trusted lawyer from the very beginning of the detention, which is one of the most useful measures to avoid police mishandling. That is why Spain’s attitude is much more dangerous than the majority of European countries.

What is your opinion on the return to incommunicado detention by the Ertzaintza [Basque police]?

As I have said before I am against the practice, which should be replaced with other measures. Therefore the news is not good in my opinion.

What do you think about the many torture complaints that are not investigated?

I believe that when there is a torture complaint, the criminal case should be postponed until the complaint gets clarified. I don’t think it is good, the way Spain deals with this issue, investigating the crime in one court and the torture complaint in another. Besides, there are very few cases of torture complaints that are actually investigated.

Is that why you say the Audiencia Nacional can be a problem?

Yes, among other reasons, but there are many more reasons. First of all, only one tribunal deals with too many offenses. They should be better distributed. Second, it has too much power from the very beginning of the investigation, and finally, too much control… The appeal process is limited, as the higher court is the one in charge from the beginning of the investigation… Therefore, the Spanish government should think again about dealing with terrorist crimes through the ordinary judicial means.

How do you reply to the Spanish government’s statement that when you mention the Audiencia Nacional you are entering territory that does not concern you?

What can I say…? The Spanish Government says it is its concern to establish its institutions and legislations, that this is part of its sovereignty. In my opinion, it is mistaken. Speaking as a UN Special Rapporteur, I can give recommendations to any country to modify any law or to install a new institution or to depose another one. I am an expert in international legislation, above all concerning those human rights, and therefore I am in full capacity to do so. I do it in many countries, and Spain is not the exception. In any case, yes, it is clear that Spain is sovereign and I am not reforming the law. I am simply giving some recommendations.

Do you think the Spanish government’s position goes far enough in the improvement of human rights?

It is a position with a double facet: Spain is a reference on many levels, above all, on an international level, in the promoting of dialogue among civilizations. In this field it is doing a good job. But I find problems in regard to the anti-terrorist legislation; it utilizes too many restrictive measures and besides, Spain has institutions that have no place in a democracy.

What is your response to the Spanish government claim that your report is a personal opinion and that it is based on unproved facts?

It is not true. I am an independent expert dedicated to analyze the bases of human rights international legislations. I analyze the current law. In regards to method, I am completely free to obtain information from any source. I should point out that in my report there is nothing that the Spanish government has not previously seen. I have presented my report to them and they have had months to comment on it. Consequently, I am the one who decides what to include or not in the final report.

Is it common that the governments act this way?

Yes, I always receive criticism. From there, it is a question of intensity and style…

In the future, do you believe that Spain will move towards an improvement of human rights?

In general, I perceive a good attitude. Especially since the change in the Government of the USA, many countries have admitted to making mistakes. I hope Spain will move in that direction, too.

What will the UN do after the answer that Spain has given to your report?

I don’t think that the Human Rights Commission will take special measures. In regards to me personally, I will keep a vigilant eye on the case.

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This story first appeared March 18 in Berria. It is archived in Spanish translation at www.escuela.net.

RESOURCES

UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights while countering terrorism
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/terrorism/rapporteur/srchr.htm

From our Daily Report:

UN blasts Spain’s repression of Basque political parties
World War 4 Report, Feb. 9, 2009

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Reprinted by World War 4 Report, May 1, 2009
Reprinting permissible with attribution

Continue ReadingCOUNTER-TERRORISM THREATENS SPANISH DEMOCRACY 

DARFUR: THE SHOCK OF RESPONSIBILITY

Al-Bashir and the International Criminal Court

by Rene Wadlow, Toward Freedom

After a thorough examination of the evidence presented by the Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC), Luis Moreno-Ocampo, a panel of three judges has issued an arrest warrant against President Omar Hassan al-Bashir of Sudan. There are seven charges against al-Bashir, including crimes against humanity, murder, extermination, forcible transfer, torture, rape, attacks against civilian population and pillaging. The ICC confirms the statements that non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have been making to UN human rights bodies since early 2004.

The evidence against al-Bashir had been collected at the request of the UN Security Council and had been added to by the High Level Mission established by the UN Human Rights Council in December 2006, chaired by Prof. Jody Williams, the 1997 Nobel Peace Laureate for her work on a ban on landmines. The High Level Mission confirmed that there is a high level of destruction, millions of people are displaced, and a large number of people have been killed. There is a refugee flow to Chad and a danger of the conflict spreading to Chad and the Central African Republic. The High Level Mission also indicated that the responses of the Sudanese government are inadequate. Their report stated that “Mechanisms of justice and accountability, where they exist, are under-resourced, politically compromised and ineffective. The region is heavily armed, further undercutting the rule of law, and meaningful disarmament and demobilization of the Janjaweed, other militias and rebel movements is yet to occur. Darfur suffers from longstanding economic marginalization and underdevelopment, and the conflict has resulted in further impoverishment.”

The indication that the national court system is inadequate is crucial, as the ICC can act only when the national court system is unable or unwilling to prosecute the person in question.

This first ICC arrest warrant against a ruling head of state is an historic moment in the development of world law. There is a distinction between “international law” and “world law” that is made, at least by advocates of world citizenship and some international law professors such as the late Louis Sohn of Harvard Law School. International law is basically treaty law and deals with relations among states. World law is the law of the world community and thus deals with individuals. Most human rights standards, the ICC and the ad hoc courts dealing with former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone can be considered “world law” as they deal with individuals. The ICC deals with an individual not an entire state. However, the standards against which the individual is judged have often been set out in treaties and conventions such as the 1948 Convention on Genocide. Thus there is a close relationship between international law and world law, but it is intellectually useful to make the distinction between the two. World law is likely to grow.

The earlier heads of state to face an international court had already lost power prior to being arrested: Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia; Charles Taylor of Liberia; Radovan Karadzic of the Republika Srpska, the Serbian unit of Bosnia-Hercegovina. Taylor and Karadzic have not yet been tried.

The fate of al-Bashir is uncertain. Only speculation is possible. He originally came to power in June 1989 as the “front man” for the intellectual ideologue Hassan al-Turabi, who became speaker of the parliament. Al-Turabi had the intellectual vision of a new Islamic-based society. Al-Bashir had no ideas, but as a military man with an outgoing personality he fitted the image of a head of state. Al-Bashir and al-Turabi parted ways in February 2001. Al-Bashir’s power base is narrow, mostly security people from the army and the police. My guess is that he will be eased out of power and go into exile in some “safe haven” such as Arabia, which was willing to take in [Idi] Amin Dada of Uganda whose crimes were at least as evident.

In the meantime al-Bashir is still able to make life worse for the people of Sudan. His first move was to expel 13 foreign humanitarian NGOs and to close down one of the more active Sudanese relief agencies. Some observers fear that the situation in Sudan could get worse without al-Bashir, but it is difficult to see how the situation can get worse.

There is no obvious replacement for al-Bashir from within his own camp. However, there is a good deal of political talent in Sudan, if the political structures were more open. There are probably a good number of people who see themselves in the president’s chair once al-Bashir is pushed out. Hopefully, there can be enough international pressure to speed his departure, even if his arrest and transfer to the ICC is unlikely.

Leaders of the African Union and the Arab League are watching the situation closely in a state of near shock. If one of their own can be held responsible for crimes against humanity by the ICC, does this not open a courtroom door for many of them?

After the ICC arrest warrants, things are starting to fall into place. Hassan al-Turabi “for reasons of health” was released from jail in Port Sudan on March 9 and sent by government plane to his home in the suburbs of Khartoum. Al-Turabi has been, since his break with al-Bashir in 2001, in and out of jail but most of the time under house arrest. In January 2009, after suggesting that al-Bashir was guilty of the crimes charged by the ICC and should give himself up to the Court, al-Turabi was re-arrested and placed in a prison in Port Sudan, far from his supporters, many still in government service in Khartoum. Al-Turabi has a good number of people influenced by his thinking in all sections of the Sudanese elite, including among the Darfur insurgencies. His release is a sign that a post-al-Bashir future is being considered, though not yet openly discussed.

—-

This story first appeared March 10 in Toward Freedom.

See also:

DARFUR AND SUDAN: TOWARDS REVOLUTION
Justice & Equality Movement Seeks Power, Not Separatism
by Savo Heleta, Pambazuka News
World War 4 Report, November 2008

PRESIDENTS IN THE DOCK
An End to Africa’s Reign of Impunity?
by Michael Fleshman, Africa Renewal
World War 4 Report, February 2007

From our Daily Report:

Darfur rebels sentenced to death in Khartoum attack
World War 4 Report, April 25, 2009

International lines drawn in Sudan war crimes warrant
World War 4 Report, March 15, 2009

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Reprinted by World War 4 Report, May 1, 2009
Reprinting permissible with attribution

Continue ReadingDARFUR: THE SHOCK OF RESPONSIBILITY 

AFRICOM: MAKING PEACE OR FUELING WAR?

by Daniel Volman and William Minter, Foreign Policy in Focus

At the end of President Barack Obama’s inauguration ceremony, civil rights leader Rev. Joseph Lowery invoked the hope of a day “when nation shall not lift up sword against nation, when tanks will be beaten into tractors.” No one expects such a utopian vision to materialize any time soon. But both Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton have spoken eloquently of the need to emphasize diplomacy over a narrow military agenda. In her confirmation hearing, Clinton stressed the need for “smart power,” perhaps inadvertently echoing Obama’s opposition to the invasion of Iraq as a “dumb war.” Even top US military officials, such as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. Mike Mullen, have warned against overly militarizing US foreign policy.

In practice, such a shift in emphasis is certain to be inconsistent. At a global level, the most immediate challenge to the credibility of change in foreign policy is Afghanistan, where promised troop increases are given little chance of bringing stability and the country risks becoming Obama’s “Vietnam.” Africa policy is for the most part under the radar of public debate. But it also poses a clear choice for the new administration. Will de facto US security policy toward the continent focus on anti-terrorism and access to natural resources and prioritize bilateral military relations with African countries? Or will the United States give priority to enhancing multilateral capacity to respond to Africa’s own urgent security needs?

If the first option is taken, it will undermine rather than advance both US and African security. Taking the second option won’t be easy. There are no quick fixes. But US security in fact requires that policymakers take a broader view of Africa’s security needs and a multilateral approach to addressing them.

The need for immediate action to promote peace in Africa is clear. While much of the continent is at peace, there are large areas of great violence and insecurity, most prominently centered on Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Somalia. These crises require not only a continuing emphasis on diplomacy but also resources for peacemaking and peacekeeping. And yet the Bush administration has bequeathed the new president a new military command for Africa—the US Africa Command, known as AFRICOM. Meanwhile, Washington has starved the United Nations and other multilateral institutions of resources, even while entrusting them with enormous peacekeeping responsibilities.

The government has presented AFRICOM as a cost-effective institutional restructuring and a benign program for supporting African governments in humanitarian as well as necessary security operations. In fact, it represents the institutionalization and increased funding for a model of bilateral military ties—a replay of the mistakes of the Cold War. This risks drawing the United States more deeply into conflicts, reinforcing links with repressive regimes, excusing human rights abuses, and frustrating rather than fostering sustainable multilateral peacemaking and peacekeeping. It will divert scarce budget resources, build resentment, and undercut the long-term interests of the United States.

AFRICOM in Theory and Practice
Judging by their frequent press releases, AFRICOM and related programs such as the Navy’s Africa Partnership Station are primarily focused on a constant round of community relations and capacity building projects, such as rescue and firefighting training for African sailors, construction of clinics and schools, and similar endeavors. “AFRICOM is about helping Africans build greater capacity to assure their own security,” asserted Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Theresa Whelan in a typical official statement. AFRICOM defenders further cite the importance of integrating development and humanitarian programs into the program’s operations.

Pentagon spokespeople describe AFRICOM as a logical bureaucratic restructuring that will ensure that Africa gets the attention it deserves. They insist AFRICOM won’t set the priorities for US policy toward Africa or increase Pentagon influence at the expense of civilian agencies. Testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in August 2007, Whelan denied that AFRICOM was being established “solely to fight terrorism, or to secure oil resources, or to discourage China,” countering: “This is not true.”

But other statements by Whelan herself, by Gen. William “Kip” Ward, the four-star African-American general who commands AFRICOM, and Vice-Admiral Robert Moeller, his military deputy, lay out AFRICOM’s priorities in more conventional terms. In a briefing for European Command officers in March 2004, Whelan said that the Pentagon’s priorities in Africa were to “prevent establishment of/disrupt/destroy terrorist groups; stop the spread of weapons of mass destruction; perform evacuations of US citizens in danger; assure access to strategic resources, lines of communication, and refueling/forward sites” in Africa.

On Feb. 19, 2008, Moeller told an AFRICOM conference that protecting “the free flow of natural resources from Africa to the global market” was one of AFRICOM’s “guiding principles,” citing “oil disruption,” “terrorism,” and the “growing influence” of China as major “challenges” to US interests in Africa. Appearing before the House Armed Services Committee on March 13, 2008, General Ward echoed the same views and identified combating terrorism as “AFRICOM’s number one theater-wide goal.” Ward barely mentioned development, humanitarian aid, or conflict resolution. US official discourse on AFRICOM doesn’t engage with the parallel discussions in the United Nations and the African Union about building multilateral peacekeeping capacity. Strikingly, there was no official consultation about the new command with either the United Nations or the African Union before it was first announced in 2006.

In practice, AFRICOM, which became a fully independent combatant command on Oct. 1, 2008, with its headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany, is built on the paradigm of US military commands which span the globe. Although AFRICOM features less “kinetic” (combat) operations than the active wars falling under CENTCOM in Iraq and Afghanistan, its goals and programs are more conventional than the public relations image would imply. The Pentagon now has six geographically focused commands, each headed by either a four-star general or admiral—Africa (AFRICOM); the Middle East and Central Asia (Central Command or CENTCOM); Europe and most of the former Soviet Union (European Command or EUCOM); the Pacific Ocean, East and South Asia (Pacific Command or PACOM); Mexico, Canada, and the United States (Northern Command or NORTHCOM); and Central and South America (Southern Command or SOUTHCOM), as well as others with functional responsibilities, such as for Special Forces and Nuclear Weapons.

Before AFRICOM was established, US military operations in Africa fell under three different commands. EUCOM handled most of Africa; but Egypt and the Horn of Africa fell under the authority of CENTCOM (Egypt remains under CENTCOM rather than AFRICOM); Madagascar and the island states of the Indian Ocean were the responsibility of PACOM. All three were primarily concerned with other regions of the world that took priority over Africa, and had only a few middle-rank staff members dedicated to Africa. This reflected the fact that Africa was chiefly viewed as a regional theater in the global Cold War, as an adjunct to US-European relations, or—in the immediate post-Cold War period—as a region of little concern to the United States. But Africa’s status in US national security policy and military affairs rose dramatically during the Bush administration, in response both to global terrorism and the growing significance of African oil resources.

The new strategic framework for Africa emphasizes, above all, the threat of global terrorism and the risk posed by weak states, “empty spaces,” and countries with large Muslim populations as vulnerable territories where terrorists may find safe haven and political support. This framework is fundamentally flawed. No one denies that al-Qaeda has found adherents and allied groups in Africa, as evidenced most dramatically by the bombings of US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in 1998. But Islamist ideology has had only limited impact among most African Muslims, and even in countries with extremist Islamist governments or insurgent groups (such as Algeria, Sudan, and Somalia), the focus has been on local issues rather than global conflict. Counterinsurgency analysts such as Robert Berschinski and David Kilcullen have warned that “aggregating” disparate local insurgencies into an all-encompassing vision of global terrorism in fact facilitates al-Qaeda’s efforts to woo such groups. Heavy-handed military action such as air strikes that kill civilians and collaboration with counter-insurgency efforts by incumbent regimes, far from diminishing the threat of terrorism, helps it grow.

Examining the Record: Somalia
The most prominent example of active US military involvement in Africa has been the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA). Speaking not for attribution at a conference in early 2008, a senior AFRICOM official cited this task force, which has taken the lead in US engagement with Somalia, as a model for AFRICOM’s operations elsewhere on the continent. In October 2002, CENTCOM played the leading role in the creation of this joint task force, designed to conduct naval and aerial patrols in the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and the eastern Indian Ocean, in order to counter the activities of terrorist groups in the region. The command authority for CJTF-HOA was transferred to AFRICOM as of October 1, 2008.

Based since 2002 at Camp Lemonier in Djibouti, the CJTF-HOA is comprised of approximately 1,400 US military personnel—primarily sailors, Marines, and Special Forces troops. Under a new five-year agreement signed in 2007, the base has expanded to some 500 acres. In addition, the CJTF-HOA has established three permanent contingency operating locations that have been used to mount attacks on Somalia, one at the Kenyan naval base at Manda Bay and two others at Hurso and Bilate in Ethiopia. A US Navy Special Warfare Task Unit was recently deployed to Manda Bay, where it is providing training to Kenyan troops in anti-terrorism operations and coastal patrol missions.

The CJTF-HOA provided intelligence to Ethiopia in support of its invasion of Somalia in December 2006. It also used military facilities in Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya to launch air raids and missile strikes in January and June of 2007 and May of 2008 against alleged al-Qaeda members involved in the Union of Islamic Courts in Somalia. At least dozens of Somali civilians were killed in this series of air attacks alone, and hundreds wounded. These were only a fraction of the toll of the fighting during the invasion, in which hundreds of civilians were killed and over 300,000 people displaced by mid-2007. By the end of 2008, over 3.2 million people (43% of Somalia’s population), including 1.3 million internally displaced by conflict, were estimated to be in need of food assistance. The US air strikes made US backing for the invasion highly visible.

These military actions, moreover, represented only part of a broader counterproductive strategy shaped by narrow counterterrorism considerations. In 2005 and 2006, the CIA funneled resources to selected Somali warlords to oppose Islamist militia. The United States collaborated with Ethiopia in its invasion of Somalia in late 2006, overthrowing the Islamic Courts Union that had brought several months of unprecedented stability to the capital Mogadishu and its surroundings. The invasion was a conventional military success. But far from reducing the threat from extremist groups, it isolated moderates, provoked internal displacement that became one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises, inflamed anti-U.S. sentiment, and even provoked the targeting of both local and international humanitarian operations.

In short, Somalia provided a textbook case of the negative results of “aggregating” local threats into an undifferentiated concept of global terrorism. It has left the new Obama administration with what Ken Menkhaus, a leading academic expert on Somalia, called “a policy nightmare.”

Examining the Record: The Sahel
Less in the news, but also disturbing because of the wide range of countries involved in both North and West Africa, is the US military involvement in the Sahara and Sahel region, now under AFRICOM. Operation Enduring Freedom Trans Sahara (OEF-TS) provides military support to the Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP) program, which comprises the United States and eleven African countries: Algeria, Burkina Faso, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, and Senegal. Its goals are defined on the AFRICOM web site as “to assist traditionally moderate Muslim governments and populations in the Trans-Sahara region to combat the spread of extremist ideology and terrorism in the region.” It builds on the former Pan Sahel Initiative, which was operational from 2002 to 2004, and draws on resources from the Department of State and USAID as well as the Department of Defense.

Operational support comes from another task force, Joint Task Force Aztec Silence (JTFAS), created in December 2003 under EUCOM. JTFAS was specifically charged with conducting surveillance operations using the assets of the US Sixth Fleet and to share information, along with intelligence collected by US intelligence agencies, with local military forces. Among other assets, it deploys a squadron of US Navy P-3 Orion maritime patrol aircraft based in Sigonella, Sicily.

In March 2004, P-3 aircraft from this squadron and reportedly operating from the southern Algerian base at Tamanrasset were deployed to monitor and gather intelligence on the movements of Algerian Salafist guerrillas operating in Chad and to pass on this intelligence to Chadian forces engaged in combat against the guerrillas. In September 2007, an American C-130 “Hercules” cargo plane stationed in Bamako, the capital of Mali, as part of the Flintlock 2007 exercises, was deployed to resupply Malian counter-insurgency units engaged in fighting with Tuareg forces and was hit by Tuareg ground fire. No US personnel were injured and the plane returned safely to the capital, but the incident signaled a significant extension of the US role in counter-insurgency warfare in the region.

These operations illustrate how strengthening counterinsurgency capacity proves either counterproductive or irrelevant as a response to African security issues—which may include real links to global terrorist networks but are for the most part focused on specific national and local realities. On an international scale, the impact of violent Islamic extremism in North Africa has direct implications in Europe, but its bases are urban communities and the North African diaspora in Europe, rather than the Sahara-Sahel hinterland. Insurgencies along the Sahara-Sahel divide, in Mali, Niger, and Chad, reflect ethnic and regional realities rather than extensions of global terrorism. The militarily powerful North African regimes, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya, have very distinct experiences with Islamic extremism. But none have a record of stability based on democratic accountability to civil society. And associating all threats to security in Nigeria with the threat of extremist Islam is a bizarre stereotype ignoring that country’s real problems.

In his November 2007 paper on AFRICOM, cited above, Berschinski noted that the United States and Algeria exaggerated the threat from the small rebel group GSPC (Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat), officially allied with al-Qaeda. A scary, if geographically inappropriate, headline in Air Force Magazine in November 2004, heralded the threat from a “Swamp of Terror in the Sahara.” The emphasis on counterinsurgency, Berschinski argues, has disrupted traditional trade networks and allowed local governments to neglect the need for finding negotiated solutions to concerns of Tuareg areas and other neglected regions. In the case of Mali, Robert Pringle—a former US ambassador to that country—has noted that the US emphasis on anti-terrorism and radical Islam is out of touch with both the country’s history and Malian perceptions of current threats to their own security. The specifics of each country differ, but the common reality is that the benefits of US collaboration with local militaries in building counterinsurgency capacity haven’t been demonstrated.

Cases to the contrary, however, aren’t hard to find. In Mauritania, Gen. Mohamed Ould Abdelaziz overthrew the elected government in August 2008, leading to sanctions from the African Union and suspension of all but humanitarian aid from France and the United States. US aid to Mauritania for the 2008 fiscal year that was suspended included $15 million in military-to-military funding, as well as $4 million for peacekeeping training—and only $3 million in development assistance. More generally, the common argument that US military aid promotes values of respect for democracy is decisively contradicted by what resulted in Latin America from decades of US training of the region’s military officers. If democratic institutions are not already strong, strengthening military forces is most likely to increase the chances of military interventions in politics.

Potential Threats
With at least a temporary withdrawal of Ethiopian troops and the election of moderate Islamic leader Sheikh Sharif Ahmed as president of the transitional Somali government, there is at least the option of a new beginning in that country. But no one expects any quick solution, with all parties internally divided (including the insurgent militia known as Al-Shabaab) and international peace efforts distracted by multiple agendas. There will be a continuing temptation to continue a narrow anti-terrorist agenda, even if this path is now more widely recognized as self-defeating.

In the region covered by Operation Enduring Freedom Trans Sahara, the conflict in Chad, where the World Bank abandoned efforts to ensure accountability for oil revenues, is still intimately tied with the larger conflict in Darfur to the east, as well as with the legacy of Libyan intervention. Although the United States has deferred to France in active military and political involvement in Chad, it has also supported President Idriss Deby, who has been in power since 1991 and changed the constitution in 2005 to allow himself another term. Despite attacks by rebels on the capital in February 2008, Deby retained control with French military assistance. In northern Niger, uranium resources threaten to provide new incentives for the conflict with the Tuareg minority reignited there and in Mali since 2007. Mali is generally seen as one of West Africa’s most successful democracies, but it’s also threatened by Tuareg discontent which requires a diplomatic rather than military solution.

Of particular strategic importance for the future is Nigeria, where US military concerns of anti-terrorism and energy security converge. As Nigeria specialists Paul Lubeck, Michael Watts, and Ronnie Lipschutz outline in a 2007 policy study, the threat to Nigeria from Islamic extremism is wildly exaggerated in statements by US military officials. In contrast, they note, “nobody doubts the strategic significance of contemporary Nigeria for West Africa, for the African continent as a whole, and for the oil-thirsty American economy.” But the solution to the growing insurgency in the oil-rich Niger Delta isn’t a buildup of US naval forces and support for counter-insurgency actions by the Nigerian military. The priority is rather to resolve the problems of poverty and environmental destruction, and to promote responsible use of the country’s oil wealth, particularly for the people of the oil-producing regions.

Currently, US military ties with Nigeria and other oil-producing states of West and Central Africa include not only bilateral military assistance, but also the naval operations of the Africa Partnership Station and other initiatives to promote maritime safety, particularly for the movement of oil supplies. In recent years, United States military aid to Nigeria has included at least four coastal patrol ships to Nigeria, and approximately $2 million a year in other funds, including for development of a small boat unit in the Niger Delta. According to the State Department’s budget request justification for the 2007 fiscal year, military aid to the country is needed because “Nigeria is the fifth largest source of US oil imports, and disruption of supply from Nigeria would represent a major blow to US oil security strategy.”

In fact, maritime security is a legitimate area for concern for both African nations and importers of West African oil. Piracy for purely monetary motives, as well as the insurgency in the Niger Delta, is a real and growing threat off the West African coast. Yet strengthening the military capacity of Nigeria and other oil-producing states, without dealing with the fundamental issues of democracy and distribution of wealth, won’t lead to security for African people or for US interests, including oil supplies. Likewise, a military solution can’t resolve the issue of piracy in the Indian Ocean and Red Sea.

The threats cited by US officials to justify AFRICOM aren’t imaginary. Global terrorist networks do seek allies and recruits throughout the African continent, with potential impact in the Middle East, Europe, and even North America as well as in Africa. In the Niger Delta, the production of oil has been repeatedly interrupted by attacks by militants of the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND). More broadly, insecurity creates a environment vulnerable to piracy and to the drug trade, as well as to motivating potential recruits to extremist political violence.

It doesn’t follow, however, that such threats can be effectively countered by increased US military engagement, even if the direct involvement of US troops is minimized. The focus on building counter-insurgency capacity for African governments with US assistance diverts attention from more fundamental issues of conflict resolution. It also heightens the risks of increasing conflict and concomitantly increasing hostility to the United States.

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Adapted from a longer story that appeared March 13 in Foreign Policy in Focus.

RESOURCES

US Africa Command
http://www.africom.mil/

From our Daily Report:

African leaders, civil society reject Pentagon’s Africa Command
World War 4 Report, Feb. 27, 2008

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Reprinted by World War 4 Report, May 1, 2009
Reprinting permissible with attribution

Continue ReadingAFRICOM: MAKING PEACE OR FUELING WAR? 

THE VOICE OF FREE SOMALILAND

An Interview with Dr. Saad Noor, North American representative of the Republic of Somaliland

by Bill Weinberg, WBAI Radio

Somaliland is a de facto independent country in what is known in the media (none too accurately) as “Somalia.” It is an ironic situation that southern Somalia has no effective government on the ground, but has a largely fictional government that is recognized by the international community; whereas in the northern part of the country—Somaliland—exactly the opposite is true: it has a functioning government on the ground, but no government that is recognized by the international community.

So-called “government-controlled” Somalia in the south is war zone, while Somaliland, with no recognized government, is an enclave of stability. With all the media attention Somalia has received in recent years—with the warlords, the Islamic Courts Union, the Ethiopian invasion, the insurgents, and now the pirates—there is very little acknowledgment that the northern third of the country is a functioning independent republic.

Dr. Saad Noor, North American representative of the Republic of Somaliland, spoke with Bill Weinberg over the airwaves of WBAI Radio in New York City on the night of April 21.

Dr. Noor, what does your work entail? What is it like to be the representative of a government that most people in America don’t know exists?

My post is not an official one, because Somaliland is not internationally recognized yet. But nonetheless, I do the same kind of work that envoys from officially recognized countries do perform. I am working to create a situation where there will be connections and contacts between the government of Somaliland and the government of the United States of America. It is rather difficult, because you feel like you are here, yet you are invisible. It takes a great deal of patience.

Is there any kind of de facto diplomatic contact between Washington and Somaliland?

Yes, indeed. That’s the reality of the situation—there are de facto diplomatic contacts between Somaliland and the government of the United States of America, and a great deal of understanding on a number of issues.

Well, the issue of piracy is the one that happens to be in the news at the moment. Have there been any moves towards cooperation around addressing that crisis?

The piracy phenomenon takes place, actually, in Somalia—the former Italian colony—and particularly in the northern province of Puntland. It does not, as such, concern Somaliland. But anything that calls for cooperation between the government of the United States and Somaliland, Somaliland happily will do that. And of course, there already is cooperation in the area of security.

Let’s talk a little bit about the history. What we might call “government-controlled” Somalia in the south of the country and the autonomous enclave of Puntland together make up what was the former Italian colony; whereas, Somaliland is the former British colony…

That’s correct.

…and it achieved its independence in 1991 with the fall of the Siad Barre dictatorship.

Somaliland actually became independent on June 26, 1960, from Great Britain. Unfortunately, in the same year, it formed a union with the former Italian colony of Somalia, which became independent on July 1, 1960. But that union did not work. And eventually, there was an armed struggle on the part of Somaliland against the former Italian colony of Somalia. And that ended in 1991, when Somaliland re-proclaimed its independence in May of that year.

What were the issues that led to the emergence of this independence struggle? Why was the union with Somalia not working?

It was a union that was created in a haphazard fashion. The people of Somaliland were actually the ones who instigated that union, because it was seen that there was a need to have a government that included both the former British colony and Italian colony, and what had been French Somaliland [Djibouti], and Ethiopian Somalia [Ogaden], and a part of Kenya—the northeast part of Kenya, the Northern Frontier District. The idea was to create a government that encompasses all the Somali-speaking communities in the Horn of Africa.

But that did not happen. What happened was that the guys in the south began usurping all the government powers. They took advantage of the good intentions of the people of Somaliland. They had the capital, Mogadishu, the president, the prime minister, the commander of the army, the commander of the police—you name it. Eventually, it became a southern oppression against the north. So the north eventually had to react.

As you pointed out when we spoke earlier, the union of Somalia and Somaliland was actually an exception to the stated policy of the Organization of African Unity that the colonial boundaries were to remain intact under independence.

Absolutely correct. When that resolution of the Organization of African Unity was passed in Addis Ababa [1963], it actually made the union retroactively illegal—because it changed the boundaries that were inherited from the colonial administration. And now we are saying that all that Somaliland has done is to go back to the [original] boundaries. And therefore, the Organization of African Unity, and now the African Union, should uphold that principle of the inviolability of the boundaries inherited from the colonial administration. But unfortunately, both the Organization of African Unity and now the African Union never took that seriously. Our separation from the former Italian colony of Somalia is legal, as a matter of fact. The problem is a political one. There is no political will, thus far, on the part of the African Union, to address this issue the way it should be addressed.

And the problem is that countries like the United States of America and the European Union are saying that this issue should be dealt with by the Africans first. If the African Union recognizes Somaliland, then we have no problem with Somaliland, they say. But the African Union does not have the same capability of the European Union—which would never allow the continuation of such a thing. They immediately recognized the republics of the former Yugoslavia, and lately Kosovo. But the African Union has never, thus far, since its inception—or the Organization of African Unity before it—recognized one single new entity.

Well, there is Eritrea…

Eritrea was actually in a federation with Ethiopia, and Ethiopia agreed in advance to let it go. If Ethiopia did not agree, the African Union would not have done anything.

So in 1991, Somaliland formally declared its independence. A referendum was held, I understand.

Yes, and 79% of the people approved it.

And elections were held?

We created an electoral process. We have three political parties, a multi-party system. And we have held elections—parliamentary elections; elections for the governorates, the local regions of the country; elections for president and vice president. And now we are preparing our second multi-party presidential elections. This president is the third one, but the first two actually were appointed. From now on, all our presidents will be popularly elected, with a one-man-one-vote multi-party system.

The current president is Dahir Riyale. How long has he been in power?

I think this is his sixth year now.

And he was elected into office?

Indeed.

So he’s the third president, and the first to be elected?

Well, he’s the first to be elected popularly, with a multi-party system, one-man-one-vote. The first two were appointed. Our first president, Abdirahman Ali, led the independence struggle. Our second president, Mohammed Egal, put together our political system.

And who appointed them?

They were appointed by a body of elders, who were appointed by their constituencies. A council of elders.

But there has been a functioning parliament—it’s a bicameral system, like the United States—for how many years now?

At this point, from 1993.

So how does the country function? Since it has no recognized government, I don’t imagine there’s a lot of corporate investment. I imagine there’s a lot of fishing going on. What else is going on?

Livestock is the most important thing that sustains the local economy at this point. Beyond that, our people are very industrious—doing business with Ethiopia, with Djibouti. And also, remittances from our own diaspora. That helps a lot.

But the country is known to be a potential oil area. There are indications that we may be sitting on an oil glut. But because of the absence of international recognition, international companies cannot come. They say, “Look, we would love to come, but according to international law, you don’t exist. And if you don’t exist, we cannot insure our equipment, our capital, our staff. If we invest in the place, and something goes wrong, we cannot sue you anywhere.”

So it’s a very, very difficult situation. The country is far away from being self-sufficient at this point. But look at the other African countries, that have been independent for 20, 30, 40 years. Many of them are not democratic. Second, they are not that better off than we are, despite the recognition and heavy investment and foreign aid. The majority of them could not exist without foreign aid for six months. We are standing without foreign aid, and we don’t owe anyone a penny—because nobody would give it to us to begin with! [Laughs]

Right! Well, this is a very critical point. I’d like to hear your analysis of why the entity that people consider to be “government-controlled” Somalia has been a war zone with no functioning government since 1991, while Somaliland, with a government not recognized by the outside world, has been an enclave of peace and stability. How do you account for this seeming paradox?

This is a question that has been raised a lot by many people. The people in both areas are Somalis—they all speak the Somali language. But people who have studied the question attribute it, at least as one factor, to the different colonial administrations. The British rule of Somaliland was totally different from the Italian rule of Somalia. The British—as in many other parts of Africa, as in Ghana, as in Nigeria—had an indirect rule. They empowered the local indigenous political structure that was in place. And they controlled it from afar. The Italians did not have this political culture. They penetrated the society down to its lowest level, and they eliminated whatever local political structure that was there. So by the time they left, there was nothing.

Whereas, when the British were preparing Somaliland for independence, they did it from the grassroots, to the level of a shadow parliament. So that is one thing. Another thing is the lack of cohesion. There has never been an attempt on the part of the people of Somalia—the former Italian colony—to go and sit down and do what we did. We built ours from the bottom up—not from the top down. We began at the household and worked up to the sub-clan, clan, major clan, all the way to the regions. None of that has been tried in Somalia, unfortunately. In Somalia, everything which the international community has supported has been trying to impose everything from the top. Unless someone gets a handle on the situation at the level of the grassroots, I don’t think anything is going to happen there.

And yet there was, at least, a functioning government in Somalia from independence in 1960 through the fall of the Siad Barre regime in 1991.

That government would not have functioned if it had not been for the sacrifice made by the Somalilanders, who offered themselves as a sacrificial lamb.

How so? Explain.

When the leaders in the south tried to grab power, the Somalilanders said, “What are you fighting about? You want power? Here, take it. Let us create a government and let us hope for a better future.” There are some people who say—although I personally reject it—that unless Somaliland goes back to that union, there will never be a Somalia. But we say: Hell no. Never, never, never again. Like the Jewish community say when they recall the ghettos of Warsaw.

Union with Somalia was that much of a disaster for your people?

Oh, my God. It was more than a disaster. It was a real excruciating pain and destruction. We never got anything from that union other than death and destruction and deprivation.

What was the mechanism of oppression?

Well, first of all, they disenfranchised us, even before the [1969] military coup d’etat of Gen. Siad Barre. They sent their own rulers to our cities and regions, and treated us as second-class citizens. In the 30 years of the union, not one single development project was put in place in Somaliland. All of them were put in Somalia. It was just as if they said, “Go to hell, you’re not going to get anything.”

And then when the resistance began, the city of Hargeisa, our capital, was totally razed. I mean, 85% of it was destroyed in June 1988 by the Somali air force. About 50,000 people were killed or injured. And 1.1 million were displaced or fled as refugees to Ethiopia. This is the first time an air force flew from a city airport to bomb the same city! And after that, the Somali army was brought in with field artillery. This is what happened. You call that brotherhood? You call that unity?

Now, this received very little coverage at the time in the world media.

Right, it did not. Because at the time, unfortunately, it was during the Cold War, and Siad Barre had severed his relationship with the Soviet Union and moved toward the American side.

Right, he flipped. After the fall of Haile Selassie in Ethiopia in the mid-1970s, they flipped sides. Before that, Ethiopia had been in the US camp and Somalia had been in the Soviet camp, and then they totally flipped.

Indeed, that’s what happened. So by 1988, everybody here [in the US] was looking the other way. And Somalia was a member of the Arab League, so the Arab League looked the other way—and still continues to see Somaliland’s departure from the union as a secession which should be shunned and rejected.

So for the US, because Ethiopia was Communist at the time, everybody was paying attention to the very real atrocities which were going on there, but I guess they didn’t want to look at what was happening in Somalia, which was their ally.

That’s right. You see, Siad Barre, seeing instability, attacked Ethiopia when Haile Selassie fell and Mengistu Haile Mariam came to power. He thought he could take the Somali Ethiopian region by force, so he began a war.

The Ogaden crisis.

Yes, in 1977. And he was defeated—by the Ethiopian army, supported by the Red Army. Can you imagine? The Red Army was there, and East Germans and Cubans.

Well, the Soviets had military advisors in Ethiopia…

No! Real combat units! This was the first time that the Red Army came to the African continent. And the Somali forces were beaten to death. And then when Siad Barre started dealing with Somaliland, and destroyed the city of Hargeisa, everybody looked the other way.

Right. I follow the news, and I was not aware of it at the time. I was aware of the Ogaden crisis and the starvation in Ethiopia, but I was not aware of what was happening in Somaliland in 1988.

Yes, it was unbelievable. We have rebuilt the city now. And without any international support. There are even new hotels opening in downtown Hargeisa. The city still needs a lot of work. But I even saw some tourists from Europe the last time I was in Hargeisa! And there is peace. There is nobody fighting there. Nobody is going to shoot you. So people are welcome.

Now, the situation is becoming very tense, as you know, because of the machinations of these Islamic extremists…

Yes, there’s been some recent political controversies I’d like to discuss. But first—how did you manage to rebuild your city without any international aid? That’s quite an accomplishment.

Well, people came back, and reclaimed the location of what was left of their houses. And what did help us was the money that came from the diaspora.

People working in Europe, for the most part…?

In the Middle East, Europe, Canada and the US.

Your liberation struggle was led by the Somali National Movement, or SNM. When did it take up arms?

In 1981.

And finally achieved victory in 1991.

Yes, 10 years of armed struggle.

And 1991 was also when the warlords emerged in Somalia proper, so to speak. And there was the famous “Black Hawk down” incident after the apparent threat of mass starvation prompted the US military intervention of 1992. What was happening in Somaliland at this time?

At that time, we were just busy trying to pick up the pieces and put the place together. Operation Restore Hope was launched by the first President George Bush with good intentions, but it ended disastrously. The SNM at first aided Farah Aidid and his Somali National Congress to fight Siad Barre in the south. We gave him ammunition and training and our own officers. We wanted our two movements to get rid of Siad Barre and sit down together and come up with some acceptable political order. But unfortunately, it didn’t happen. It turned into a fight within the major clan in that part of Somalia, Mogadishu and its environs, the Hawiye. And that, unfortunately, is still going on.

Well, I have to say that some of us took a much more cynical view of George HW Bush’s intervention, and saw it as a means to secure a very strategic region. There’s a strategic choke-point there at the southern end of the Red Sea that could be used to block off the world’s oil. And I think it was perceived that there was a power vacuum that could be filled by Islamic radicals or what have you, and that it was necessary to get some kind of military presence there to fill the vacuum.

The US action was not devoid of strategic interests. Remember, Berbera, which is now Somaliland’s major port, was a Red Army air and naval base, given by Siad Barre to the Russians during the Russian [influence] era. The things they left in the ground there, we cannot even clean them up. So, yes, it is strategically located close to the Middle East and the Persian Gulf—where the oil was coming from, and is still coming from. So I cannot divorce strategic thinking from Bush’s actions. But nonetheless, I think he did a fantastic job of stopping the fighting at the time, and feeding the starving children and dying mothers.

And yet the fighting certainly continued.

Unfortunately, yes. And it ended with Black Hawk down, with 18 Americans killed and 72 injured.

So at the same time that (for lack of another phrase) Somalia proper was being torn apart by the warlords, Somaliland was rebuilding from a period of war.

That’s a fact.

Then we could fast-forward nearly 20 years to the current situation. In June 2006, the Islamic Courts Union established power in Mogadishu. They brought a modicum of stability there, but under extremely draconian terms, imposing their very harsh interpretation of sharia law. And this prompted the US to back the Ethiopian intervention of that December, which ousted them but merely succeeded in re-igniting the war.

Yes. [Laughs]

So what has been the view of this whole chess game which has been playing out from Somaliland? Who were you rooting for in all of this conflict?

We were rooting for no particular faction. We were rooting for stability and order, so Somalia would not be a source for extremist activities. We are not going to go back to the union. We withdrew from the union freely. But we are still waiting for leadership in Somalia to whom we can say, “Let us cooperate as two sisterly states. We cannot close our borders or deny our common Somali language and culture. So why don’t we cooperate, as brothers?” That is what we have been waiting and waiting for.

We really were not rooting for a particular group. But now, with the emergence of this Islamic extremism, it is a whole new ballgame. You know they attacked us last October…

Yes, there were a series of suicide blasts in Somaliland in October…

The al-Shabaab group…

The Islamist insurgent group that is active in Somalia proper.

That’s right. They attacked the presidency, attacked the Ethiopian consulate, and attacked the United Nations office in Hargeisa, and killed and injured so many people.

And these people are actually in control of much of Somalia proper. The government, which is called the Transitional Federal Government, is actually the third effort at a transitional government. The first one was created in Djibouti in the year 2000. It collapsed. The second one was created in Kenya and was headed by a former warlord, Abdillahi Yusuf. It collapsed. This is the third one, and it’s not doing well. I don’t want to be pessimistic, and in fact we wish them success. But we also wish that if they succeed, they will be realistic and deal with us as an equal state. Because if they don’t, nothing is going to go anywhere. They cannot control us. If they attack us, I don’t think they will be victorious. There is no way they can be.

Why do you think the Islamists attacked Somaliland? Somaliland had not even been involved in the crisis in the south of the country.

Because they don’t believe in international boundaries. They have threatened to attack Ethiopia and Kenya. They want what they call the “Somali Islamic Emirate.” And they believe Somaliland is the biggest [regional] enemy, because it has a democratic constitution—which in their dictionary is equal to the denial of God and the Koran. They see Somaliland as a bridgehead against them. They call us the government of the Americans and Jews.

But your government is not even recognized by Washington! So how could they accuse you of being a puppet of Washington?

They simply say that we cooperate with Washington, that the West likes us because we don’t want to become a part of the emirate that they want to form. They call us pro-Western. Well, we are pro-Western. We don’t deny that. Is that a crime?

What do you mean by “pro-Western” exactly?

I mean, simply, that we are a democracy, to the best of our ability. We have a democratic constitution. We believe in human rights. We are not recognized by any state, but we uphold international law. Our relations with Britain and the United States of America are excellent, although it is a de facto diplomatic [arrangement]. You could even call it de facto recognition—but not de jure.

They don’t want that. They don’t want any Western influence in the area. They don’t want a political order that calls itself a democratic political order. They say democracy is a Western deception, they say it is anti-Islam. Just like the Taliban.

When was Somaliland’s constitution drawn up?

In the year 2000. Before that we had a national charter, which was drawn up in 1993.

And what does your constitution have to say about Islam and freedom of religion?

Like any Muslim nation—except Iran and Saudi Arabia, which are theocracies, as you know very well—Somaliland is governed by a democratic constitution and a modern legal code, within the sharia framework. Sharia courts exist, but deal largely with religious and moral issues—and do not supersede the civil courts.

What exactly do you mean by “religious and moral issues”?

Marriage, inheritance, things along those lines. The local sharia courts, overseen by people well-versed in Islamic jurisprudence, oversee those things. But they cannot supersede the civil courts.

So the sharia courts have jurisdiction in cases of divorce, inheritance, child custody?

Yes. But if things cannot be adjudicated through the sharia courts for one reason or another, then they go to the civil courts.

So the sharia courts exist more to adjudicate than to rule, and if they fail to adjudicate the case would go to the civil courts.

Yes, sir.

I would imagine there is acknowledgment in the constitution of Islam on some level.

Yes, indeed. As in Afghanistan’s constitution, Pakistan’s, Egypt, Yemen, Libya, Mauritania. They all say that the religion of the land is Islam, and that the constitution cannot contradict the basic beliefs and philosophical underpinnings of the Islamic religion. It’s based on that ethos.

Are there provisions for freedom of religion?

Well, 99.9% of the people are Muslim. Accordingly, that issue is mute. There is a very small Christian minority, but you never hear from them. I’m sure one day, they will come to the fore within the context of human rights.

So perhaps this is still a developing question.

Yes.

Let’s talk about some of the recent instances of violence and unrest in Somaliland. It is certainly nothing approaching the scale of what is happening in southern Somalia, but it is nonetheless worrying. For instance, I understand there has been a certain amount of violence around the elections which are coming up…

Well, there has been no violence actually, but a great deal of commotion between the opposition and the ruling party. But nobody has been killed. There have been flare-ups here and there, where clans disagree on the possession of certain lands or wells or what have you. But it never gets out of hand. We have been there. We know what it means.

Well, there’s been this move on the part of the sitting president, Dahir Riyale, to postpone the election for several months, which has been met with some controversy. Why did he choose to do that?

Well, the government’s version is that there are things that have to be completed prior to holding the election. For instance, voter registration, which has been happening. Legally, it has been stipulated that no election should take place prior to the identification and registration of all voters.

And yet the opposition has held protests against the postponement in the capital.

Yes. Democracy comes with its own problems. The government is being accused of being sluggish, taking its own sweet time [in the voter registration], and using undemocratic techniques to have people arrested and what have you. And the government is saying, no, this is just a matter of upholding law and order. There is always a gray area in the middle… So yes, we are going through a very delicate time. I think we will come through it.

And, as you say, there’s been some clan violence in the countryside…

In one small area only, not far away from the capital. It has been a simmering feud for a long time. This feud goes back to the Siad Barre period. Some clans say their lands and wells were given to another clan that was loyal to Siad Barre. And so far, nobody has really looked into it and come up with the right solution. It is a sensitive situation, but there are groups that are working on it now to solve it once and for all.

Through mediation…

Yes, through mediation. You have to give and take.

More worrisome, in 2007 there were border clashes between Puntland and Somaliland. What was that all about?

Well, first of all, Puntland is a new name. The name Punt was used by the ancient Egyptians when they went to the Horn of Africa for the first time. The entire Horn, the entire frankincense area, they called Punt. In, as I recall, 1998, they began using the name Puntland for that northeast region of Somalia that is inhabited by one major clan, called the Harti. Some of the Harti are also on the Somaliland side, according to the international boundaries created by the Anglo-Italian agreement of the 1880s. But they say they are creating a state that is based on ethnicity—on the clan. Now, when the Europeans were making boundaries in Africa, clans were not taken into consideration. So, there are Isaaqs—who are the majority group in Somaliland—who live in Ethiopia and in Djibouti. But there are some in Puntland who refuse to accept the international boundary between Somaliland and Somalia—because, they say, their cousins live there. We say, it is not a matter of cousins. Everybody’s cousin is living across international borders in Africa. We told them, you cannot do it that way.

There was speculation that international oil companies may have been behind the Putland attacks, because they were seeking to exploit oil in Somaliland’s territory.

That’s right. We sent them away, we told them they cannot come.

Do you know which oil companies?

Some Canadians, we believe, and maybe some Australians. In 2003, they took an area from Somaliland—the capital of the Sool region, which is called Laascaanood. Puntland occupied it. We told them to leave and they refused. Eventually, we took it back without killing anybody, because they were fighting among themselves.

The Puntlanders?

Yes. There is no state as such there, but they are better than Somalia proper. Although they have been heavily infiltrated by the Islamists.

The leadership of Puntland has?

No, the people on the ground. The port of Bossasso is full to the hilt with Islamists. They don’t even hide.

And yet it seems that the pirates are operating out of Puntland, and the pirates and Islamists are not allied. In fact, they seem to be antagonistic.

When it comes to command and control, they are not allies. But when it comes to cooperating on the clan level, it is very difficult to discern. And it has been alleged time and again that the leadership of Puntland have been involved in piracy themselves.

And yet they’ve also at least made some token efforts to crack down on the pirates.

Yes, but it has been said that the appointed president of Puntland [Abdirahman Mohamud Farole] is a godfather of the pirates. I’m not accusing him, but it has been said time and again.

Now, it should be said that Puntland has not declared independence from Somalia.

No, they haven’t. They are still flying that flag, and using the old money. In Somaliland, we have our own currency, the Somaliland shilling.

You mint it in Somaliland?

No, we mint it outside, but with reputable people in Europe. It cannot be falsified, and, strangely enough, it has been stable.

We have the flag, we have the currency, we have the army, we have the police, the intelligence service, we have the national anthem, we are at peace—but where’s the recognition? It’s tough.

Well, Puntland may not have declared independence, but it isn’t under the control of the Transitional Federal Government, or the Islamic Courts Union, or any of the other factions that have been vying for control.

That’s correct, although they cooperate with the government in Mogadishu—particularly under Abdillahi Yusuf, that last president who was pressured to get out. Because Abdillahi Yusuf was the founder of Puntland.

Oh really? And he was replaced by the current Transitional Federal Government president, Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, who was formerly the leader of the Islamic Courts Union. Which is rather an irony!

It’s an irony. This man was chased from Mogadishu by the Ethiopian army, and when he was appointed in Djibouti, his first trip was to Addis Ababa! [Laughs.] So, it’s politics.

Well, I think Ethiopia, probably with US connivance, decided to put him in power to try to buy peace with the Islamist insurgents.

But they cannot.

It has failed, largely.

No, they cannot. And we are all worried, because everyone is saying this is Somalia’s best chance. The international community, it seems to me, is really in a state of daydreaming.

Daydreaming?

Because they are dreaming of a unitary government of Somalia. And that is not going to happen. The international community should help Somalia to rebuild the state that existed before union in 1960—[the former] Somalia Italiano. We will help you with that. But time and again, they say they have to have a central government in Somalia.

The international community?

Including the USA. They tell us our government will not be included. And none of the factions in Somalia have recognized Somaliland as a separate entity, no matter what color they are—democrats, Islamists. They refuse. The international community is still trying to put Humpty-Dumpty together.

Right.

But they cannot put it together. We need someone who will say, OK, let’s call a spade a spade.

So what about the pirate crisis, and the showdown with the international naval taskforce that has been assembled to confront them? What challenges dos this situation pose to Somaliland’s independence?

At this point, there is no challenge as such. There has never been any hijacking in our part of the Gulf of Aden. We have a small coast guard. The pirates came and tried to operate from Somaliland twice. Both times, we arrested them. They are serving in our jail now. We sentenced them to 20 years.

What do you make of the claim that they aren’t really pirates, that it’s actually the Somalia Volunteer Coast Guard, and that they are protecting Somalia’s coast from illegal fishing, toxic waste dumping, et cetera? Does this have any legitimacy, in your view?

When it comes to fighting the illegal fishing and dumping, it has some legitimacy. Because the place was raped, really. The kind of illegal fishing that was taking place was unbelievable. They destroyed the coral reefs…

You are using the past tense. Is this still continuing?

It is still continuing, but it is getting better since those guys came! They chased a lot of them out. Last week, they took two Egyptian trawlers. But Thailand, China, India—they were the worst. So yes, it began as resistance against this. They were cutting their nets, and eventually they realized they could take them over. There are a lot of people [in the pirates] who used to be in the Somali coastguard, with a lot of know-how. That’s true. So these are the origins. But now it’s becoming a real thriving business, and a real menace to international trade.

And I think the solution to this is not on the sea, it’s on the shore. The area that has to be patrolled is about 1.4 million square miles. How are you going to do it? The entire US Fifth Fleet couldn’t do it. You have to solve the problem on land.

How?

By creating some kind of order in Somalia. And that’s what the international community talks about.

They’ve been trying since 1991 to impose some kind of stability in Somalia, and they’ve completely failed.

Speaking unofficially, to my friends, I say this. You have to come up with a comprehensive policy and put behind it what it takes in men and matĂ©riel. That’s the only way you can do it. And there is no heart for that. So sometimes I jokingly say—failing to do that, why don’t you recognize us and deputize us? We will bring peace to that country. I’m not kidding you!

Aren’t you afraid of getting sucked into the maelstrom?

No. Listen, we are all Somalis. We know everybody and his grandmother. Nobody can lie to us.

Well, this is my fear actually—what I’ve been trying to get around to in this line of questioning. When the crisis is just on land, they can let it fester. But when it is actually posing a threat to global commerce on the seas, there’s a greater imperative to get Somalia under control. And every intervention by the international community has only made things worse. So if they go into Puntland to clean out the pirates, Somaliland could be the next domino, so to speak.

Listen, we could assist to a great extent. This whole thing has been from outside and half-hearted. The international community should say, first of all, Somaliland is safe; we have to see to it that it remains safe. Two, we should see what we can do to utilize the know-how of the Somalilanders. When it comes to the reconciliation of the clans—we created Somaliland through a reconciliation conference in 1993. It took us only four months. And we brought every clan and sub-clan to the level of households together through representatives at that conference in Borama. In four months, we came up with a president, a charter and a republic! Still, we are using the same structure.

So you think this is model that could work in Somalia proper?

We have a Ph.d in that business! I’m telling you!

—-

RESOURCES

Somaliland Official Website
http://www.somalilandgov.com/

Somaliland International Recognition Group
http://www.sirag.org.uk/

Somaliland Times
http://www.somalilandtimes.net/

Somaliland Press
http://somalilandpress.com/

Somaliland American Council
http://www.somalilandamerican.com/

See also:

SHAKE DJIBOUTI
Eritrea Crisis Destabilizes Imperialism’s Horn of Africa Beachhead
by Sarkis Pogossian, World War 4 Report
World War 4 Report, July 2008

SOMALIA: THE NEW RESISTANCE
Successor Factions to the Islamic Courts Union
by Osman Yusuf, World War 4 Report
World War 4 Report, April 2007

From our Daily Report:

Will US intervention against pirates deepen Somalia’s crisis?
World War 4 Report, April 17, 2009

——————-

Special to World War 4 Report, May 1, 2009
Reprinting permissible with attribution

Continue ReadingTHE VOICE OF FREE SOMALILAND 

Iraqi Secular Forces Struggle Against U.S. and Religious Fundamentalists

by Bill Weinberg, New America Media

Eclipsed from the headlines by the ongoing carnage in Iraq, there is an active civil resistance in the country that opposes the occupation, the regime it protects, and the jihadist and Baathist “resistance” alike. This besieged opposition—under threat of repression and assassination—is fighting to keep alive elementary freedoms for women, leading labor struggles against Halliburton and other U.S. contractors, opposing privatization of the country’s oil and resources, and demanding a secular future for Iraq. They note that what they call “political Islam” dominates both sides in the Iraq war—the collaborationist regime and the armed “resistance.”

The Iraqi Freedom Congress (IFC) is a new coalition, founded just a year ago, bringing together labor unions, student groups, women’s rights organizations and neighborhood assemblies. At a Jan. 28-29 [2006] conference in Tokyo, organized by Japanese anti-war activists to support the IFC, the organization’s president Samir Adil spoke of their struggle to maintain a political space for civil society in a country increasingly dominated by utterly ruthless armed actors. “Civilian people are paying the price for the armed resistance, so we believe it is a bad tactic,” he said. “But we are mobilizing the people to protect themselves.”

One of the IFC’s member groups, the Organization of Women’s Freedom in Iraq (OWFI), led a successful campaign against a proposed measure for the interim constitution to grant Islamic clerics power to adjudicate in domestic disputes and impose sharia law—which many use to deny divorce and inheritance rights to women. Following a series of public protests by OWFI and other pro-secular groups, in February 2004 Iraq’s Governing Council narrowly voted the measure down. OWFI leader Yanar Mohammed has since been the target of repeated death threats.

Now, OWFI is fighting a similar measure, which has been included in the permanent constitution approved in October 2005. OWFI blames the United States for acceding to this policy, and making common cause with fundamentalists.

Yanar Mohammed argues that far from protecting Iraq from a descent into ethno-religious warfare, the United States has laid the groundwork for exactly that. She wrote in October, as the new constitution was pending: “Since the beginning of the occupation, the U.S. administration has recognized Iraqis according to their ethnic/nationalist and religious identities. This pre-determined polarization of the society around its most reactionary forces has resulted [in] a most lethal weapon, which is a government of division and inequality—a potential time-bomb for a civil war that has already started.”

Because the new order in Iraq is being crafted on these quasi-theocratic lines, and under the auspices of a foreign occupation, the IFC advocates non-collaboration with the “official” political process.

Another member organization is the Federation of Workers Councils and Unions in Iraq (FWCUI), which opposed the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein, and built a strong presence in the ’90s in the Kurdish-controlled autonomous zone of the north. Since the fall of Saddam, it has established a presence in Baghdad, organizing the legions thrown out of work in the chaos that has ensued since the U.S. invasion, and demanding jobs or relief. This effort, the Union of the Unemployed in Iraq, has protested at the gates of the “Green Zone,” the heavily-fortified area of central Baghdad where the U.S. occupation and collaborationist government have set up shop. These marches have resulted in tense stand-offs for control of public space with U.S. troops.

In June 2005, the group U.S. Labor Against the War sponsored representatives of the FWCUI and other independent labor organizations in Iraq on a tour of the United States, meeting with American anti-war and labor groups. At the end of the tour, leaders of the Iraq organizations, together with their U.S. supporters, issued a joint statement expressing unity around demands of workers’ rights and an end to the occupation.

Anti-war forces in the United States must square with the reality that the armed “resistance” in Iraq seeks to exterminate this legitimate civil resistance. The armed insurgent groups are overwhelmingly composed of Sunni fundamentalist factions, with some assistance from Baathist remnants (often posing as Islamists). In the towns they have “liberated” from the occupation, they have declared “Islamic kingdoms” and imposed anti-woman interpretations of sharia even more harsh than those sought by the regime. Shi’ite residents have been forcibly expelled.

The most tragic thing about the polarized media portrayal of Iraq is that the predominantly Shi’ite fundamentalists of the regime and the Sunni jihadi insurgents closely mirror each other. For instance, it is unknowable whether the death threats against Yanar Mohammed come from forces allied to the regime or the insurgents. It is also basically irrelevant. The Worker Communist Party calls U.S. imperialism and Islamist insurgency the “two poles of terrorism” that are destroying Iraq.

At the Tokyo conference, Samir Adil emphasized the IFC’s need for international solidarity: “The U.S. lost in Vietnam not because the U.S. lost soldiers in Vietnam, but because they lost the support of the American people. But we don’t want the American people to just protest to bring the troops home, but to support the secular progressive forces in Iraq, to think about the Iraqi people. We do not want another Taliban regime or Islamic Republic in Iraq.”

—From New America Media, March 2006

Continue ReadingIraqi Secular Forces Struggle Against U.S. and Religious Fundamentalists