ECUADOR: OIL REGION ENDS STRIKE

from Weekly News Update on the Americas

On Aug. 25, Ecuador’s Congress voted 56-0 with 15 abstentions for a resolution calling for the end of a state of emergency in the Amazon provinces of Orellana and Sucumbios. President Alfredo Palacio had declared the state of emergency on Aug. 17, two days after residents of the oil-producing region went on strike to demand attention to their basic needs. The resolution also urged Palacio to dismiss Minister of Government (Interior) Mauricio Gandara.

The two-week strike ended officially on Aug. 25 with the signing of an agreement between the oil companies, the government and residents of the two provinces. Under the terms of the pact, the private oil companies will pay 16% in taxes directly to the provinces, out of a total 25% in income taxes, and will pave 260 kilometers of local roads within three years. The oil companies also pledged to hire local workers, goods and services.

But at an Aug. 28 meeting in El Coca, capital of Orellana province, strike leaders gave the government two days to force the oil companies to comply with the accord; otherwise, they said they would resume the strike. Leaders of the two provinces accused representatives of the multinational companies of meeting separately with the government after signing the accord and modifying some of its requirements. (Adital, Aug. 29; El Nuevo Herald, Aug. 29, 30, both from AFP; Hoy, Quito, Aug. 26)

“The oil companies and the [cabinet] ministers met in another assembly and came up with a new agreement, ignoring what was signed, and now they say it’s the same thing and expect us to sign it,” said Jose Rosero, president of the civic action board of Lago Agrio (Nueva Loja), capital of Sucumbios. Rosero said the changes to the text would allow the companies to pay less in taxes and take more time to pave the roads. (ENH, Aug. 29 from AFP)

On Aug. 30, the threat of a renewed strike dissipated after local authorities from Sucumbios and Orellana met with government and oil company officials at the Ministry of Energy to ratify the text of the original agreement, without changes. (Hoy, Quito, Aug. 31)

Weekly News Update on the Americas, Sept. 4

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See also WW4 REPORT #113
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Reprinted by WORLD WAR 4 REPORT, Oct. 1, 2005
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VENEZUELA: GRINGO PROPERTY EXPROPRIATED

from Weekly News Update on the Americas

On Sept. 5 Venezuelan troops under the command of a general took control of a tomato-processing plant owned by the Pittsburgh-based company H.J. Heinz in Caicara in the eastern state of Monagas. The move by the military came after state governor Jose Gregorio Briceno, an ally of left-populist president Hugo Chavez, encouraged campesino groups to occupy it. “The governor decided to seize the plant so it can be protected from looters and later be put to use,” said Angelica Rivero, a spokesperson for the governor.

Heinz reportedly bought the small plant in 1997 and has not operated it for eight years. On Sept. 6 Heinz spokespeople admitted the plant was idle, blaming tomato growers who they said had not honored contracts with Heinz. Gov. Briceno charged that Heinz had bankrupted the growers, who would now be able to run the plant themselves. Heinz says it has a total of 700 employees in Venezuela and has “full confidence in the future of the country.” The company is “open to dialogue and negotiations” and is requesting meetings with Vice President Jose Vicente Rangel and Agriculture and Land Minister Antonio Albarran.

In July Chavez warned companies that plants that were idle or operating below capacity could be expropriated and restored to full operation under worker co-management programs. The government is currently carrying out a survey of some 700 idle plants and 1,149 others said to be “partially paralyzed.” Venezuela’s 1999 Constitution guarantees property rights; an expropriation requires a court decision and “fair compensation (Miami Herald, Sept. 6, 7: Labor Educator, Sept. 9)

On Sept. 10 National Land Institute (INTI) president Richard Vivas said that 317 estates with a total of 3 million hectares were under study for expropriation because of failure to use land. On Sept. 8 soldiers occupied a 27,000-hectare ranch owned by the Vestey Group, Britain’s largest British meat producer, in the western state of Apure. There are reportedly plans to occupy two other Vestey ranches in the area. Also during the week of Sept. 5, Lorenzo Mendoza, president of the Venezuelan food and beverage company Empresas Polar, issued a press release saying the military had occupied its installations in the western state of Barinas “on instructions from…Albarran.” (El Nuevo Herald, Miami, Sept. 11)

Weekly News Update on the Americas, Sept. 11


CHAVEZ OFFERS $1 MILLION FOR HURRICANE RESCUE

Citgo, the US gasoline distribution affiliate wholly owned by the Venezuelan state oil company Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA), announced on Aug. 31 that it would donate $1 million to help in rescue efforts for areas of the Southern US affected by Hurricane Katrina. “The funds will be directed to rescue organizations in the affected areas,” said Citgo president Felix Rodriguez in a statement from the company’s Houston headquarters. Rodriguez said the donation had the total support of PDVSA and Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez Frias. “Our hearts are with the victims of this terrible tragedy and Citgo is prepared to offer its assistance,” said Rodriguez.

On Aug. 29, Chavez had said he was offering to send the Venezuelan international rescue brigade, as well as fuel, to help with the disaster in the US. The Venezuelan foreign ministry reiterated the offer on Aug. 31, but US State Department spokesperson Sean McCormack said he was unaware of it. (El Nuevo Herald, Sept. 1 from AFP)

Weekly News Update on the Americas, Sept. 11

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See also WW4 REPORT #113
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See our blog post on Chavez’ historic September visit to New York City
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COLOMBIA: INDIGENOUS RE-TAKE THE LAND; PARAS STILL ACTIVE

from Weekly News Update on the Americas

CAUCA: INDIGENOUS SEIZE ESTATE

On Sept. 2, between 500 and 1,000 indigenous Nasa (Paez) people demanding “Freedom for Mother Earth” began a peaceful occupation of the La Emperatriz estate on the Huellas indigenous reserve in Caloto municipality, in the north of Cauca department, Colombia. “This is not only an action to reclaim a piece of land, legitimately deserved and required, but also a declaration of freedom for the land, all the land, [which has been] attacked to end life itself,” said a Nasa leader. (Minga Informativa de Movimientos Sociales, Sept. 6 from ACIN Communications Network; Regional Indigenous Council of Cauca–CRIC, Sept. 2)

On Sept. 5, after Cauca governor Juan Jose Chaux ordered the Nasa evicted from the estate–apparently under instructions from President Alvaro Uribe Velez–government forces arrived and attacked the community with tear gas, gunfire and grenades, and beat and arrested many community members. According to the Regional Indigenous Council of Cauca (CRIC) and the Association of Indigenous Councils of Northern Cauca (ACIN), residents reported that government forces destroyed the community’s food reserves in the Bodega Alta reservation, blocked ambulances from taking away the wounded and prevented health workers from treating the injured. Police agents brutally attacked an administrator for ACIN who was trying to help evacuate a person wounded by grenade shrapnel; they dragged him from the ambulance and beat him repeatedly. An official from Caloto municipality finally managed to win his release. (Minga Informativa, Sept. 6, from ACIN; Adital, Brazil, Sept. 8 from CRIC/ACIN; Equipo Nizkor, Sept. 11)

On Sept. 9, Henry Chocue, coordinator of the Alvaro Ulcue youth movement of the northern Cauca indigenous communities, reported that army and anti-riot police units from Popayan (capital of Cauca) and Cali (capital of neighboring Valle del Cauca department) had attacked again, wounding and arresting community members and burning part of the estate. The indigenous governor of the Huellas reserve was beaten badly and had to be hospitalized, said Chocue. Early on Sept. 10, Chocue reported that 21 community members had been wounded and 13 youths were being detained by security forces. The police gunfire stopped during the night but resumed shooting and detonating explosives on the morning of Sept. 10. Community members on the nearby Guayabal estate were also attacked. (Report from Red Juvenil, Medellin, Sept. 10; Report from CRIC/ACIN, Sept. 10)

A Sept. 10 report from CRIC and ACIN gave the number of wounded at La Emperatriz as 35, including 13-year old Ovidio Dagua, who lost his eye to grenade shrapnel, and Huellas governor Maximiliano Conda, who suffered cranial and facial trauma. Two community members were hospitalized with skull fractures and one suffered a bullet wound to the chest.

When Sandro Garzon, captain of the police anti-riot squad, was wounded during the night of Sept. 9, the Nasa Indigenous Guard–which arms itself only with traditional wooden staffs–rescued and protected him, and indigenous authorities treated his wounds. The Indigenous Guard sought help from the Office of the Defender of the People, the United Nations and human rights organizations to return Garzon to authorities the next day. In an interview with the ACIN Communication Network, Garzon thanked the Nasa community for treating him with respect, and with tears in his eyes, contrasted his treatment with the abuses carried out against the community by security forces.

In a ceremonial fire, the Nasa communities burned the riot police shields and other war gear they had recovered from government forces. Circling the fire, they sang the anthem of the Paez people and saluted the indigenous movement as armed soldiers stood by, watching in silence. Also on Sept. 10, Nasa leaders met with National Police director Gen. Jorge Daniel Castro in the mayor’s office in Santander de Quilichao, and won a pledge that his forces would not attack or try to remove the Nasa from La Emperatriz while the community seeks a dialogue with the government. (Report from CRIC/ACIN, Sept. 10)

The Nasa activists chose La Emperatriz for the occupation because the estate was included in a reparations agreement for the Dec. 16, 1991 massacre of 20 indigenous people who had occupied El Nilo estate in Caloto. The massacre was carried out by state police agents in alliance with drug traffickers. In the agreement, signed a week after the massacre on Dec. 23, 1991, the government promised to hand over 15,663 hectares of land to the Nasa over the next three years. The government reiterated its commitment in another agreement signed in 1995 with the indigenous communities, indigenous councils and the CRIC, yet so far has provided just over 9,000 hectares.

The Nasa say they will remain on the estate until the government appoints a high-level commission to address their three main demands: ownership of the La Emperatriz estate; resolution of the land problem; and a national debate between the government and the people to resolve the country’s structural problems.

Northern Cauca’s indigenous communities face a desperate lack of agricultural land; 70% of the land they hold has forest cover and only 12% is suitable for agriculture. According to a study by the Colombian Rural Development Institute (INCODER), the area’s 13,500 families need an additional 39,000 hectares of land in order to survive. (Minga Informativa, Sept. 6 from ACIN; CRIC, Sept. 2)

Messages urging that the government immediately negotiate with Nasa leaders to resolve their demands can be sent to:

President Alvaro Uribe (auribe@presidencia.gov.co) Vice President Francisco Santos (fsantos@presidencia.gov.co) Presidential Human Rights adviser Carlos Franco (cefranco@presidencia.gov.co) Please send copies to ACIN at acincauca@yahoo.es

Weekly News Update on the Americas, Sept. 11

MEDELLIN: PARA “DEMOBILIZATION” A SHAM

On Sept. 1, Amnesty International (AI) released a new report showing that the Colombian government’s strategy of demobilization of rightwing paramilitary groups “threatens to…ensure that those responsible for some of the worst human rights atrocities continue to kill, disappear, and torture with almost complete impunity.” The report focuses on Medellin–Colombia’s second-biggest city and the capital of Antioquia department–where the November 2003 demobilization of more than 860 members of the Bloque Cacique Nutibara (BCN) paramilitary group “has proved to be a deadly illusion.”

According to the report, paramilitaries in Medellin continue to operate as a military force, to kill and threaten human rights defenders and local community activists, to recruit and to act jointly with the security forces. However, rather than operating in large, heavily-armed and uniformed groups as they did in the past, they are now increasingly cloaking their activities by posing as members of private security firms or by acting as informants for the security forces.

Marcelo Pollack, Amnesty International’s researcher on Colombia, blasted the “Justice and Peace” Law–approved by Colombia’s Congress in June 2005–and Decree 128, which provide the legal framework for a national paramilitary “demobilization” process. “The Justice and Peace law will open the way to recycle paramilitary members, even those responsible for killings, kidnappings, ‘disappearances’ and torture, into security guards, civilian police and informants,” said Pollack. Amnesty International is calling on the Colombian government to overhaul the demobilization process to guarantee the right of victims and their relatives to truth, justice and reparations, and to ensure that demobilized combatants are not “recycled” into the conflict, among other measures. Amnesty International also calls on the international community not to provide political and economic support to the demobilization process until the Colombian government implements such measures.

In the last 20 years, Colombia’s armed conflict has cost the lives of at least 70,000 people, the vast majority of them civilians killed out of combat, while more than 3 million people have been internally displaced since 1985. Tens of thousands of other civilians have been tortured, kidnapped or disappeared. The vast majority of these human rights violations have been carried out by army-backed paramilitaries. The latest figures suggest that the paramilitaries have been responsible for at least 2,300 killings and disappearances since the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) declared a unilateral “ceasefire” in December 2002.

Under the July 2003 Santa Fe de Ralito agreement, the AUC agreed to demobilize all its combatants by the end of 2005. More than 8,000 paramilitaries have reportedly demobilized so far, not counting those from the BCN, who demobilized under a separate but linked process. (AI News Release, Sept. 1)

The report is online at: http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engamr230192005.

BARRANCABERMEJA: MORE UNIONISTS MURDERED

On Aug. 20, hired killers shot to death union activist Manuel Antonio Florez in a rural area of Barrancabermeja municipality, on the road leading to the village of Llanito in the Magdalena Medio region of Santander department in eastern Colombia. Florez was a member of the National Union of Industrial Agriculture Workers (Sintrainagro) who worked for the oil palm production company Oleaginosas las Brisas. The Barrancabermeja section of the Unified Workers Confederation (CUT) called the murder “one more sign of the violation of the ceasefire that the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) committed themselves to in the framework of negotiations with the government of President Alvaro Uribe.”

“While the Colombian state announces with great fanfare the demobilization of the Central Bolivar Bloc [of the AUC], the paramilitaries headed by ‘Julian Bolivar’ and ‘Ernesto Baez’ continue in their sacred task of completely exterminating unionism in this area of the Magdalena Medio with the blessing of this government,” said the CUT.

The CUT also reported the Aug. 21 abduction and murder near Barrancabermeja of Jose Gualdron, who worked for the palm company Bucarelia. His body was found on Aug. 24, covered with leaves, on a palm plantation on the road leading from Puerto Wilches to the company’s land. (CUT Barrancabermeja, undated, posted on Colombia Indymedia, Aug. 30)

BOGOTA: DISPLACED OCCUPY HOMES

On Aug. 29, more than 300 families displaced to the capital by Colombia’s internal armed conflict began occupying six blocks of housing under construction, part of the Riberas del Occidente residential complex in the Patio Bonito sector of the Kennedy neighborhood in western Bogota. The group includes about 1,200 people, 577 of them children; they are occupying 163 houses which the District Savings and Housing Fund (Favidi) began building six years ago but which remain unfinished and unoccupied. The occupation leaders say they are not necessarily seeking homes at the site, but rather are seeking dignified living situations for the time being, and eventually a safe return to their places of origin. Agents from the Mobile Anti-Riot Squad (ESMAD) of the National Police have surrounded the area and are restricting people who enter or leave; police have reportedly prevented the delivery of a water tank, and refused to let neighbors bring in donated food. (Statement from Asentamiento Permanente de Refugiados Internos por la Vida y la Dignidad, Aug. 29 via Red de Defensores No Institucionalizados; Consultoria para los Derechos Humanos y el Desplazamiento (CODHES), Aug. 31 via Colombia Indymedia; International Peace Observatory (IPO), Aug. 31 via Colombia Indymedia; El Tiempo, Bogota, Aug. 30; Humanidad Vigente, Aug. 29 via Colombia Indymedia) (See our last report on rights abuses attributed to ESMAD: /node/1097)

“The government promised us homes and they haven’t given them to us,” said one spokesperson as he helped bring children and supplies into the buildings as the occupation began on Aug. 29. Another spokesperson, Orlando Mora from the southern city of Pasto in Narino department, told a reporter: “Those of us who are here are political leaders from each one of our regions. We belonged to the Patriotic Union, but the paramilitaries forced us to flee.” (ET, Aug. 30) The Patriotic Union (UP) was a leftist party formed when an armed faction of the Colombian Communist Party demobilized in 1985; the party was dissolved after thousands of UP members were murdered.

On Sept. 2, police agents surrounding the housing complex attacked, beat and arrested a television cameraperson who had just filmed a news segment on the occupation with journalist Patricia Uribe of the Noticias Uno program. Police also confiscated his camera and footage. (Message posted by Prensa Cajar on Colombia Indymedia, Sept. 2)

The families are asking supporters to write to the following Colombian officials to demand that their rights be respected:

General Prosecutor Edgardo Jose Maya Villazon (reygon@procuraduria.gov.co, anticorrupcion@presidencia.gov.co), Presidential Human Rights adviser Carlos Franco (cefranco@presidencia.gov.co, fibarra@presidencia.gov.co), Attorney General Luis Camilo Osorio (contacto@fiscalia.gov.co, denuncie@fiscalia.gov.co), Human Rights unit of the Attorney General’s office (elbsilva@fiscalia.gov.co), Defender of the People Volmar Antonio Perez Ortiz (secretaria_privada@hotmail.com). Please send copies to Michael Fruhling at the Colombia office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights: oacnudh@hchr.org.co

(Statement from Asentamiento Permanente de Refugiados Internos por la Vida y la Dignidad, Aug. 29)

ACTIVIST SEIZED IN VENEZUELA

On Aug. 26, Colombian teacher and grassroots activist Enrique Alfonso Gonzalez Torres was kidnapped in Maracaibo, capital of the western Venezuelan state of Zulia. The same day, he was taken to the Colombian city of Barranquilla, where on Aug. 30 Gen. Mario Montoya Uribe, commander of the Colombian Army’s First Division, presented him as a rebel allegedly captured in the Colombian city of Maicao. Gonzalez had been living in Venezuela after fleeing persecution in Colombia; he was a member of the Continental Bolivarian Coordinating Committee (CCB), which says individuals linked to Colombian state security forces carried out his abduction with the complicity of Zulia state police. (Message from CCB General Secretary Oscar Rotundo, undated, posted on Colombia Indymedia, Sept. 4) Gen. Montoya served as an instructor at the US Army School of the Americas in Fort Benning, Georgia, in January 1994. (SOA Watch List of Graduates)

The incident echoes the Dec. 13 kidnapping of Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) representative Rodrigo Granda Escobar (Ricardo Gonzalez) in Caracas; the Colombian military initially claimed it arrested Granda in Cucuta, Norte de Santander department. The incident sparked a diplomatic row between the two countries. (See WW4 REPORT #107: /node/284)

U.S. SOLDIER SENTENCED

In a US court-martial process on Aug. 10, US Army Specialist Francisco Rosa pleaded guilty to using, possessing and distributing cocaine and making a false official statement. He was sentenced to five years in prison, demoted to the rank of private and will receive a bad conduct discharge. US Army Staff Sgt. Daniel Rosas, Staff Sgt. Victor Portales and Staff Sgt. Kevin G. Irizarry-Melendez are jailed in the US awaiting court-martial in the same case. The four were among five US soldiers stationed in Colombia who were arrested last March 28 or 29 while using a US military plane to smuggle 35 pounds of cocaine from Colombia into the US. (See WW4 REPORT #108: /colombiapeasantsassassinated)

In a sworn statement to military investigators at Fort Bliss, TX, on March 31, Staff Sgt. Rosas detailed how the drug ring successfully shipped some 170 pounds of cocaine from Colombia to the US, taking advantage of the fact that US customs agents rarely searched the luggage of US soldiers. (AP, Sept. 3)

ARMS DEALER FIGHTS EXTRADITION

An attorney for international arms trafficker Sarkis Garabet Soghanalian told a Miami federal judge that Soghanalian should not be extradited to Colombia because “for decades, [he] has supplied valuble assistance to the US government, in criminal trials as well as in the reduction of illegal arms shipments.” The attorney, public defender Kathleen Williams, did not mention specific examples. The extradition request for Soghanalian was filed in Miami federal court on July 15. Another public defender, Paul Rashkind, took over Soghanalian’s defense in late July. Colombian judges want Soghanalian to testify about a complex international operation which led to the fall of Peruvian president Alberto Fujimori (1990-2000), now exiled, and his intelligence advisor, Vladimiro Montesinos, jailed in Peru since 2001. The Colombian government says Soghanalian acted as an intermediary between 1998 and 2000 in a deal for the purchase from Jordan of 50,000 AK-49 rifles destined for the leftist Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). Some 10,000 of the weapons were eventually parachuted to the FARC rebels in and around the municipality of Barranco Minas, in the eastern department of Vichada. Soghanalian told Peruvian authorities that Montesinos agreed to pay $80 million for the guns. Peruvian prosecutor Ronald Gamarra last year expressed suspicions that the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) supported the deal with the goal of radicalizing Colombia’s counterinsurgency war.

(See WW4 REPORT #95: http://www.ww3report.com/95.html#andean12)

Miami federal judge Robert Dube has set Soghanalian’s extradition hearing for late September, and has allowed him to be released from detention to his brother’s home in South Florida, where he is under 24-hour guard and must wear an electronic monitoring device. (El Nuevo Herald, Miami, Sept. 2–quote retranslated from Spanish)

Soghanalian, a Lebanese citizen of Armenian origin, is a longtime permanent resident of the US. (Democratic Underground Fact Sheet) He is 76 years old, has diabetes and a spinal problem and uses a wheelchair. Soghanalian made a fortune selling weapons to Iraq during that country’s war with Iran; he also sold rifles to Christian forces in Lebanon, missiles to the Argentine military junta during the Falklands War with Britain, and ammunition to right-wing dictator Anastasio Somoza Debayle in Nicaragua.

Soghanalian was arrested in December 1999 in Miami and charged with bank fraud and money laundering in California, but he used the argument of close collaboration with the US government to win his freedom in August 2001. (ENH, Sept. 2) It was not clear when he was rearrested; both the Medellin daily El Colombiano and the Spanish news service EFE reported on Aug. 30 that Interpol and Colombian Administrative Security Department (DAS) officials collaborated with US authorities to arrest him in Florida. According to EFE, the DAS said in Bogota that an Interpol warrant was issued for Soghanalian’s arrest in April, and the extradition request was submitted once US authorities confirmed his arrest. (EC, EFE, Aug. 30)

Weekly News Update on the Americas, Sept. 4

VALLEDUPAR: ANOTHER UNION LEADER MURDERED

Early on Sept. 11, the body of Colombian union leader and human rights activist Luciano Enrique Romero Molina was found in Valledupar, capital of Cesar department, in Las Palmas, a sector of the La Nevada neighborhood which is under the control of right-wing paramilitaries. Romero had been tied up, tortured and stabbed 47 times in various parts of his body. He was last seen alive around 9 PM the previous night while driving his taxi; his wife reported his disappearance around 10 PM.

Romero worked for 20 years in the Cicolac-Nestle Food Products Factory in Valledupar; the company fired him in October 2002 for participating in a strike which the Labor Ministry falsely declared illegal. He continued to be active in the National Union of Food Industry Workers (Sinaltrainal) as a member of the union’s human rights committee, and was also active in the Political Prisoners Solidarity Committee Foundation. Romero had received many death threats and several times had to leave Valledupar; he lived in Gijon, in the Asturias region of Spain, from October 2004 to April 2005 under an international solidarity and protection program. He had recently returned to Valledupar. According to the Unitary Workers Federation (CUT), Romero is the 37th union activist murdered in Colombia so far this year. (Sinaltrainal, Sept. 11; Fundacion Comite de Solidaridad con los Presos Politicos Valledupar, Sept. 11; CUT, Sept. 12; Colectivo de Colombiano/as Refugiados/as en Asturias, Sept. 12)

FLOWER WORKERS BEAT DOLE

The Colombian government’s Ministry of Social Protection has finally granted formal recognition to the Union of Workers of Splendor Flowers (Sintrasplendor), an affiliate of the Union of Flower Workers (Untraflores). Sintrasplendor was founded 10 months ago to represent workers at Splendor Flowers, a subsidiary of the multinational company Dole. In a brief message announcing the victory, the union did not say when the recognition was granted but thanked “Colombian and foreign friends” for their support. The next step, the union writes, is to win the rehiring of fired workers and negotiate a contract. Dole’s attempts to prevent the union’s recognition had sparked an action campaign by the US-based Labor Education in the Americas Project (US/LEAP) and the Campaign for Labor Rights (CLR). (Sintrasplendor Message, undated, posted on Colombia Indymedia, Sept. 3)

Weekly News Update on the Americas, Sept. 18

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See also WW4 REPORT #113
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Reprinted by WORLD WAR 4 REPORT, Oct. 1, 2005
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Continue ReadingCOLOMBIA: INDIGENOUS RE-TAKE THE LAND; PARAS STILL ACTIVE 

HOLY LAND OR LIVING HELL?

Pollution, Apartheid and Protest in Occupied Palestine

by Ethan Ganor

From the Jordan River Valley and Dead Sea Basin, through the central highlands comprising the West Bank’s populated core to the fertile western hills bordering Israel, recent reports from occupied Palestine reveal a worsening environmental crisis. A labyrinth of settlements, industrial zones, dumps, military camps, fortified roads, electrified fences and a massive concrete wall—all of it installed by Israel in the West Bank since 1967 and intensified since 2000—are draining the life from this ancient land.

Destructive actions by settlers and soldiers, waste from factories and settlements, land confiscations to expand settlements and roads, the plunder of water, the mass uprooting or burning of trees, and the snaking, sunset-eclipsing structure known to Palestinians as the “Apartheid Wall” are causing the West Bank’s once-green ecology to deteriorate. The cumulative impact on the land’s hydrology, topsoil, biodiversity, food security and natural beauty is severe. No longer recognizable as a “Holy Land” bountifully “flowing with milk and honey,” as inscribed in religious texts and memories, Palestine’s environment has become a weapon of war, deliberately designed to turn its inhabitants’ lives into a living hell.

Israel’s much-touted “disengagement” from the Gaza Strip, while proof that decolonization is possible, is also a smokescreen, distracting attention from the escalation of violence in the West Bank. Fully chronicling the current devastation in Palestine could fill several volumes; what follows is only a few snapshots.

Poisoning the Land

In late March, shepherds from Tuwani and Mufakara, Palestinian villages near Hebron in the southern West Bank, discovered strange, blue pellets littering their grazing fields. Suspecting these seeds as a possible cause of the mysterious deaths of dozens of goats and sheep during the previous week, villagers had them analyzed. The tests confirmed their hunch: The pellets were barley laced with fluoroacetamide, a rodenticide produced only in Israel and illegal in many other countries due to its acute toxicity.

Not just livestock, but also wild gazelles, migratory birds, snakes and other animals had been poisoned. Palestinian farmers were forced to quarantine their flocks and stop selling or using their milk, cheese and meat. On April 8, a new poison—pink pellets tainted by brodifacoum, another highly toxic, anti-coagulant rodenticide—was found at a hillside grazing area near Tuwani. Later that month, Amnesty International issued a press release condemning Israeli authorities for failing to clean up the toxic chemicals from affected areas and bring the perpetrators to justice.

Local Palestinians blame Israeli settlers from nearby Maon and Havat Maon, two small outposts south of Hebron, whose male members are notorious for assaulting Tuwani children as they walk past the settlements to school. Solidarity activists videotaped one Maon security official admitting that he knew that Havat Maon settlers had planted the poisons.

Despite this admission, no arrests were made, and the poisoning has spread. In mid-April, in Yasouf, a Palestinian village south of Nablus, in the northern West Bank, large quantities of wheat seeds boiled in brodifacoum were found.

Industrial Pollution and Dumps

While such poisonings may seem to be isolated attacks by rogue settlers, other forms of pollution in the West Bank are systemic and permanent. The landscape is blotched with Israeli factories. Based mainly on hilltops at Israeli settlements and border-area industrial zones, the factories manufacture products ranging from aluminum, plastic and fiberglass to batteries, detergents, pesticides and military items.

Because Israel’s own, generally stringent, environmental laws regulating industrial processes and waste discharge are not enforced inside the Occupied Territories, the West Bank has become a sacrifice zone. Many of the factories have no environmental safeguards and unleash solid waste burned in open air, wastewater that flows into watersheds, or hazardous waste dumped and buried at outdoor sites. Lands near the foothills of industrial zones are especially vulnerable. One of the largest zones, Barqan, near Nablus, encompasses 80 factories and generates 810,000 cubic meters of wastewater per year. The wastewater flows into a wadi (a watercourse that is dry except during the rainy season) and pollutes the agricultural lands of three Palestinian villages.

On July 5, International Solidarity Movement activists joined Palestinians to demonstrate against Geshuri Industries, an Israeli-owned manufacturer of pesticides and fertilizers. Originally located in the town Kfar Saba, in Israel—until citizens obtained a court order shutting it down for pollution violations—Geshuri moved to its current site at the edge of the Palestinian town Tulkarem in 1987. Pollution from the plant has damaged citrus trees, tarnished soil and groundwater, provoked respiratory ailments among neighboring residents, and contributed to Tulkarem having Palestine’s highest cancer rates. This Spring, a new wall (which annexed vast swaths of agricultural land) was constructed around the complex. Wearing blue surgical masks to avoid inhaling factory fumes, the protesters held signs and painted messages on the wall: “Remove the death factory,” “Get your poison away from our children” and “This is terror!”

Illegal dumps are another chronic problem. On April 11, more than 200 people from Anarchists Against the Wall, Green Action Israel and the Palestinian village of Deir Sharaf blocked Israeli garbage trucks from transporting trash onto the grounds of Abu Shusha, the West Bank’s largest quarry. In 2002, during its “Operation Defensive Shield” invasion, the Israeli army seized this site from its Palestinian owners. Since then, thousands of tons of waste have been moved covertly into the quarry, which is in close proximity to four wells and only 250 yards from the aquifer that provides Nablus with its drinking water.

An investigation by the Palestinian Hydrology Group confirmed that runoff from the dump “has killed medicinal and wild plants in the valley. It has affected the biodiversity and aesthetics of the area. Most importantly, the land is no longer fit to grow olive trees.”

After three years of silence, international outrage finally erupted in early April, when Israeli journalists exposed the scheme. With tacit government approval but no official permit, settlers were churning profits from the dump by selling their trash-transport services to Israeli cities. Environmental justice scored a rare victory in July, when an Israeli court passed an injunction shutting down the dump. Yet the reservoir of refuse remains, and dozens of other dumps throughout the West Bank remain in operation. Nor has a factory above the quarry been shut down, and it continues to pump streams of foul-smelling black sludge into the olive groves below.

Sustainable Apartheid?

While Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s right-wing government and extremist Israeli settlers are the immediate agents of this ecocide, a global system that benefits from and sustains the Occupation is also culpable. The US supplies the military firepower and diplomatic muscle that makes it possible; Caterpillar provides bulldozers that raze homes, trees and fields to build the wall; and financial institutions like the World Bank bestow essential economic lubricants.

In 2004, the World Bank published two reports outlining a sick version of “sustainable development” for Palestine, which accepts the reality of the wall rather than its illegality. As the wall carves its path through the West Bank, isolating communities and annexing cropland, the livelihood of tens of thousands of Palestinian families is destroyed and unemployment becomes endemic. In line with Israeli objectives, the World Bank proposes to solve this artificial problem by establishing new “industrial estates” alongside the wall, where cheap Palestinian labor, working for one-fourth Israel’s minimum wage, will be exploited to produce goods for export into the globalized economy.

Already, one such estate is under construction in Tulkarem, on Palestinian land that has been annexed behind the wall. In addition, the World Bank has helped Israel raise funds to create a more “secure,” “efficient” and “growth-orientated” apartheid: upgraded, high-tech checkpoints and prison gates, “smart fences,” watchtowers, border crossings with radioactive “naked spy” machines that look through people’s clothing, and underground tunnels to facilitate full Israeli control over Palestinian travel and a continuing monopoly on the land’s natural resources. Under the apartheid regime, travel between any of the West Bank’s eight population districts—Jenin, Nablus, Qalqilia, Tulkarem, Jericho, Ramallah, Bethlehem and Hebron—is barred without special permission, and Jerusalem is completely cut off by the wall. Rather than end this matrix of segregation and dispossession, the World Bank wants Israel to “ease internal closures and restore the predictable flow of goods across borders.”

This normalization of apartheid not only shreds the basic human rights of Palestinians by confining them to ghettos and sweatshops, it also perpetuates the ecological devastation of the land. True sustainability can be based only upon the July 9, 2004, decision by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) requiring Israel to tear down the wall. The decision mandates the international community “not to recognize the illegal situation created by the construction of the wall, and not to render any aid or assistance in maintaining the situation created by it.”

Grassroots Resistance to the Wall

With international powers unwilling to enforce the ICJ ruling and the United Nations resolutions calling for an end to occupation, Palestinian communities are mobilizing to defend their lands from annexation and destruction. Since September 2002, when Israel began building the wall’s first ring to enclose the then-wealthy agricultural town of Qalqilya, the Palestinian Environmental Non-Governmental Organizations Network has coordinated the Grassroots Anti-Apartheid Wall Campaign (AAWC). AAWC is rooted in nonviolent direct action, organized by Popular Committees Against the Wall in dozens of communities that are directly threatened by the wall’s path.

Budrus is a small village of 1,300 people, located 20 miles west of Ramallah, where two years of fierce resistance have yielded the first case of a community successfully blocking erection of the wall on its land. Mass rallies united the whole town, as everyone from toddlers to elders converged in targeted fields and olive groves, swarming construction crews with peaceful discipline and raising enough ruckus to prompt Israel’s Supreme Court to alter the wall’s route. In March, after Israeli forces stormed a local wedding, opened fire and arrested a teenager, villagers spontaneously tore down 1,000 feet of a barbed-wire fence erected in lieu of the wall. Yet the cost has been high: six village residents have been killed and hundreds wounded by army retaliation against the nonviolent struggle.

Current resistance is most active in Bil’in, a village of 1,600 also near Ramallah, where almost-daily demonstrations since February have opposed Israeli plans to annex 60% of the community’s 1,000 acres via the wall. With support from international and Israeli solidarity activists, villagers have been employing Earth First!-style tactics. On May 4, protesters chained themselves to olive trees to obstruct the razing of an orchard situated in the wall’s path. On June 1, they locked themselves into a mock wall in front of bulldozers, forcing soldiers to symbolically dismantle the wall before they could remove the activists. These actions and other creative visual stunts have generated extensive media attention but also prompted a brutal military crackdown. Tear gas, rubber-coated metal bullets, shock grenades and a new device called “the Scream”—a huge loudspeaker that emits painful sound waves—are commonly used to disperse the demonstrators, who have not yet halted the wall’s construction.

About one-third of the planned 420-mile wall is finished; 80% of it penetrates into the West Bank. Construction is occurring now in the Jerusalem, Bethlehem and Hebron regions, as well as around the Ariel bloc of settlements deep inside the northern West Bank. If completed there and along the Jordan Valley, the wall stands to annex around 46% of the West Bank. More than 400,000 olive trees, which comprise 40% of Palestine’s cultivated land and are the staple crop of rural communities, are estimated to have been uprooted during the last five years.

This Fall promises to be another season of intense grassroots resistance. Palestine’s annual olive harvest peaks in October and November, and international activists will once again be present to challenge Israeli settler and army actions that deny Palestinians access to their land and the right to harvest their crops.

——

Ethan Ganor is an anti-Zionist, eco-anarchist Jew, a graduate from the Arava Institute for Environmental Studies in Israel and the founder of the Trees Not Walls Network. He owes a debt to forests for providing refuge to his grandfather for two years in Eastern Europe during the Holocaust. Contact him at: treesnotwalls@riseup.net

This story originally appeared in the Mabon (September) issue of Earth First! Journal http://earthfirstjournal.org/modules/AMS/article.php?storyid=11

RESOURCES:

International Solidarity Movement
http://www.palsolidarity.org

Stop the Wall
http://www.stopthewall.org

See also our previous coverage of Tulkarem (Tul Karm)

WW4 REPORT #80: http://www.ww3report.com/80.html#palestine1
WW4 REPORT #73: /73.html#palestine3
WW4 REPORT #51: http://ww3report.com/51.html#palestine3

Our last report on Bi’lin:
/node/1060

And on Tuwani (Twane):
http://www.ww3report.com/cave.html

Our coverage of the World Court decision against the Apartheid Wall:
http://ww3report.com/hague.html

——————–

Reprinted by WORLD WAR 4 REPORT, Oct. 1, 2005
Note: Reprinting of this story by permission of original source only

Continue ReadingHOLY LAND OR LIVING HELL? 

WORKER UNIONS IN IRAQ: AN INTERVIEW WITH AMJAD ALJAWHARY

by Benjamin Dangl

Amjad Aljawhary is the North American representative of the Federation of Worker Councils and Unions in Iraq (FWCUI). In this interview he discusses his union’s main objectives, the US government’s response to union organizing in Iraq, how the money for reconstruction is being spent, public opinion in Iraq regarding the presence of US troops there and what activists and workers outside of the country can do in solidarity to help Iraqi workers.

Benjamin Dangl: Please describe the work of the Federation of Worker Councils and Unions in Iraq.

Amjad Aljawhary: The work of the federation is to organize the workers in their workplaces to demand their rights. We formed our organization in 2003 in Baghdad in a public conference attended by many delegates from every city in Iraq. They elected 55 representatives who formed the executive board representing the workers from different sectors and industries in Iraq. Today the federation has members in almost every sector and industry from Basra in the south to Mosul in the north. The federation policy does not discriminate against its members; it considers them all as workers regardless of their ethnicity or religious background.

BD: What are some of the group’s main goals and demands?

AA: Our major goal is to build a strong working class that leads to a modern society, and direct intervention in making policies and decisions in the state level. Nevertheless, that would not be possible without a strong and free working class. Our demands are mainly focusing on working hours, wages, women’s rights, social benefits and employment insurance. These demands are actually either missed, neglected or do not exist at all. In Iraq today where there are millions of unemployed workers who have no employment issuance [unemployment insurance]; it is very hard for them to survive under severe conditions such as the lack of a good health care system, the lack of security, the devastated economy and corruption. All these are actually factors of a crippled society. The women’s situation has deteriorated because of the occupation and political Islamic groups who forced women to be as a prisoner in their homes. We in our federation have always raised these issues while the government that is based on ethnicity and religion didn’t want to pay any attention.

BD: What is your role within this Federation?

AA: My role is to represent the federation in North America… This means I am linking the working class or the labor movement here in North America to the labor movement in Iraq, and try to build a strong foundation of solidarity between these two movements. I’ve had many tours to different countries in the world, for example Japan, France, Finland, and I have visited the United States twice after the occupation. In each tour I explain the situation in Iraq and express the feeling of the Iraqi people–especially the workers under occupation–and maintain the line of communication between these movements. To a certain level, I was able to deliver the Iraqi message to the American public and in turn, I was able to deliver the message from the American people to the Iraqi people. Unfortunately, the American public is not seeing the reality in Iraq because of the corporate media, who tried to portray Iraqi people and workers as religious fanatics who have no goals in their lives but to kill their opponents. However, I was able to deliver a different message and to draw an opposite picture of the Iraqi people, which actually represents the reality. In my recent visit to the states people were surprised and stunned by the facts of what is going on today in Iraq, and they could not believe that Iraqi people endured this much. Sadly, the American public was told that Iraq is in a process of development and everything is in right track, while in reality this is far from the truth.

BD: What has the US government’s reaction been to union organizing in Iraq?

AA: The American government did not want to intervene directly into the union’s business. However, after two months of the occupation, they raided our office in Baghdad and arrested some of our leaders for some days; they were released later on. That was part of the intimidation process. The government that was installed by the US troops has issued a decree called Decree 16 which recognizes one union only, stating that the other unions are illegal. This decree still exists and has never been abolished. Our understanding is that the US government wants to include in the upcoming constitution a labor law that is similar to the one in United States, which is unaccepted by the Iraqi labor movement. We in our federation struggle to include a labor law that we drafted in any constitution. Today the major barrier for the labor movement in Iraq is the occupation because it has driven the society into a chaos and corruption, and without driving the occupation out, the situation is going to become worse and worse.

BD: Do you believe the money going into Iraq from the US for reconstruction is being spent wisely? Where is most of the money going?

AA: I personally do not believe that the money is going into Iraq for reconstruction. Simply because Iraq is exporting its oil and as you see, the oil prices have risen today, for example, to $65.00 a barrel. Millions of barrels are flowing out of the country. Nevertheless, the revenue of this oil has not been seen by the Iraqi public. I mentioned earlier that the major problem in Iraq today is the violence and corruption; they both work hand in hand to destroy the society. While the money is sent by the American public from their taxes, the oil revenue is actually in the hands of corrupted officials, whether they are Iraqis or Americans. Electricity, for example, is still far from being in better shape; water purification still as bad as it was, and so on. Clearly, there are certain groups of people who are benefiting from the current anarchy.

BD: What are the major industries in Iraq which have been privatized by US corporations? What has the impact of this privatization been on the functionality of these industries and on employment in Iraq?

AA: Regarding privatization, the US-appointed Governor Paul Bremer in the early days of the occupation announced that they will privatize every sector in Iraq’s industry except the oil sector. However, they could not proceed with that because of the growing anger by the Iraqi people, and also because of the absence of a government that gave legality to the occupation. Even today what the government is doing is trying to [portray] these industries as a losing business, by either not maintaining their parts, not providing raw materials so they will not have any production, and eventually show them as idle industries. It is actually a conspiracy to sell off the entire country. Shutting down these businesses or industries will lead to massive unemployment, and that is already at a high rate. Imagine under these circumstances–where there is no unemployment insurance, no basic services, and the poverty level is very high–what kind of living condition the normal Iraqi has. We think that these unemployed people who’ve reached the millions will be very easy recruits to the so-called insurgents.

BD: Please describe the current strike among health care workers in Kirkuk.

AA: Health care workers in Iraq are the most of vulnerable workers for many reasons. The violence leads to many casualties, poverty, and a lack of electricity and clean water, which leads to different kinds of diseases. All that gave the health care employees a very special and important role in Iraqi society. However, the government did not want to appreciate their work. What they did recently is to decrease their wages, which led the health care employees to go mad because of the recent act. First, they decided to go on strike, and they did. The ministry of health official met with the leaders of the strikers. He didn’t negotiate anything. However, he received a list of demands made by the health care employees to be negotiated with the ministry of health. Next thing they halted their strike, giving the government one week to respond to all their demands–otherwise they will go on an open strike until their demands are met. This is truly what happened, and why that happened, in Kirkuk.

BD: Could you discuss the oil workers’ strike in Basra and their demands?

AA: What happened in Basra is a very different story. The mayor of Basra tried to take advantage of the miserable living conditions of the oil workers in Basra, [he] said [that] in order to make our life better we have to form our own federalism where we can maintain part of the oil revenue to ourselves–and this federalism actually is based on sectarian division, that discriminate against other workers who are not Shiites or not even Muslims. The oil workers of Basra did not go on strike in response to the mayor of Basra or his demands. They went on strike because they live under a very miserable living condition. The wages are too low, and the basic needs are absolutely not available. Therefore, they went on strike demanding that the government fix the situation. However, the government and their allies sought to lead the strike and give the strike another shape or another goal… I mentioned the workers have their legitimate demands, which were increase of wages, decrease of working hours, providing electricity and clean water. But the mayor and his assistants and allies told the media that these workers seek federalism, which was in fact a sheer lie.

BD: How will the new Iraqi constitution obstruct the rights of women?

AA: The constitution that has been drafted recently states that Islamic shariah should be the main source of law. That means considering women as second-class citizens, not to mention that Islam itself has failed to show a democracy in every country that…had Islam as a main source of [the] constitution. Under these laws human rights will be severely abused and we will go back to the old ages and we have examples of what is happening today in Iran and Saudi Arabia… You can imagine if you are a second-class citizen, what kind of rights you would have. Simply, you will have to ask for permission for every single move you want to make. For example, making decision to go to school, making decision to get married, making decision to travel, making decision to have the custody of your kids, making decision of giving birth or to have an abortion, and so on. These are just examples of the obstructions that women face.

BD: What is the general consensus among Iraqi citizens regarding the US occupation of Iraq? Do most people want the US troops out of Iraq immediately?

AA: The Iraqi people do not want to live under occupation even though the occupation has ousted Saddam. Nonetheless, the outcome of the occupation was disastrous. It’s been more than two and a half years and Iraqi people have never enjoyed one single moment of peace. Every aspect of life is going downwards, [there is] nothing good in the foreseeable future. I can assure you that the Iraqi people want this occupation to end today–before tomorrow, as soon as possible. You can even sense the madness [anger] among Iraqis towards the current government which for last six months has not achieved one goal, but corruption and nothing else. Everything is still the same or worse, and people believe that this government is appointed, installed and brought in by United States.

BD: What can workers and activists in the US do in solidarity to help workers in Iraq?

AA: Workers and activists not just in the United States but all over the world can help the Iraqi people move forward by building a strong foundation of solidarity between the Iraq labor movement and the international labor movement. Our major barrier is the occupation that handcuffs the Iraqi labor movement. Building a strong labor movement in Iraq requires a strong organization that is able to lead their demands and hopes. We have built this organization; however, our major problem today is the financial issue, which we cannot overcome because the government does not want to recognize us as a union. Therefore we don’t have any funding coming from the government, we don’t have any funding coming from anyone else but from within ourselves as workers or donations by some organizations from Japan or from the US. For example, the US labor movement and activists can look into that and try to help us in this way. US Labor Against War donated a certain amount of money to our organization and we thank them for that.

However, this is not enough, because…we still cannot issue our newspaper, we still cannot hold conferences because of the lack of money. All of these things are considered a barrier and we hope that the that the US labor movement and activists can look into that and try to help us in this way. Besides, we look at the American labor movement and activist as our friends who can tell the American public that the Iraqi labor movement is suffering and try to tell the American public the stories of the Iraqi labor movement and try not to believe the corporate media but the real voices of Iraqi labor.

——

Benjamin Dangl is the editor of TowardFreedom.com

This story originally appeared Aug. 23 in Toward Freedom
http://towardfreedom.com/home/content/view/555/1/

RESOURCES:

Federation of Worker Councils and Unions in Iraq
http://www.uuiraq.org

US Labor Against the War
http://uslaboragainstwar.org

See our last report on labor struggles in occupied Iraq
/node/1026

——————–

Reprinted by WORLD WAR 4 REPORT, Oct. 1, 2005
Reprinting permissible with attribution

Continue ReadingWORKER UNIONS IN IRAQ: AN INTERVIEW WITH AMJAD ALJAWHARY 

GOLD MINE IN GUATEMALA FACES INDIGENOUS RESISTANCE

by Cyril Mychalejko

Indigenous communities in the western highlands of Guatemala who are organizing against an illegal gold mine in the face of violence and repression are beginning to see the fruits of their labor. The Canadian/US mining company Glamis Gold operates the World Bank-funded project. Construction of the open-pit gold mine is nearly complete, with the company eager to start the drilling. Local community members claim the World Bank and Glamis Gold violated international law when they failed to consult them and gain their consent for the “Marlin” mine project. Yet Glamis counters that it consulted with the community, that the project has broad support and that international NGO’s and a few individuals are solely responsible for orchestrating the “small” opposition to the mine.

“Support” for the Gold Mine

Marcelo Etequiel Lopez, a resident of Tres Crues village, in Sipacapa municipality, said the deception used by the mining company was both very strategic and upsetting.

“That’s what hurts the most,” said Lopez. “Thank God we have figured out what’s going on. Now we are going to defend our rights.”

Siapacapa is next to San Miguel, where the open-pit mine is located. Water resources are expected to be taken from the large farming community, and contamination of local water is likely.

Lopez and other residents of Sipacapa decided to conduct community consultations with the intention of voting on a referendum concerning present and future mining in their communities.

Both Glamis and Guatemala’s Ministry of Mines immediately filed lawsuits [against the municipal government of Sipacapa] to stop the consultations–only to have Guatemala’s supreme court remind them that these people have rights. [The Constitutional Court, Guatemala’s highest, ruled in June in favor of Sipacapa, citing the indigenous tradition of community consultations.] The company then targeted community leaders by filing lawsuits against them for alleged threats and violence against their employees. People in Sipacapa unequivocally rejected the charges, suggesting that this is just another tactic of intimidation and repression.

Glamis and the government blame the consultations on a small group of private individuals and NGO’s. Grahame Russell, co-director of Rights Action, said this reveals a lot about how the Guatemalan government and Glamis regard the country’s indigenous citizens. Rights Action is a community development organization based in Canada with an office in Guatemala City.

“I think it has to be fundamentally racist and derogatory towards poor people and in this case mainly indigenous,” said Russell. “It’s a classic allegation used when people educate and organize themselves. It takes attention from the real issues of poverty, oppression and the fact that they have a different vision for what they want.”

One local resident who has been an outspoken opponent of the mine–and consequently a target of a recently filed lawsuit by Glamis–said, “The World Bank was supposedly created to alleviate poverty in communities and they give money to this mining company. Why don’t they give money to alternative development instead?” (He asked that his name not be printed.)

Glamis stated that the consultations are illegal and unconstitutional and that the whole process is “corrupt.” Yet NGO’s and Guatemalan lawyers contend that the referendum complied with rights established by Guatemala’s constitution, the country’s municipal codes, as well as International Labor Organization Convention 169, protecting the rights of indigenous peoples, which Guatemala ratified in 1996.

Another concern of Glamis was that “suggestions that third parties be permitted to monitor the referendum process for fairness have reportedly been rejected by the referendum organizers.”

On June 18, thirteen indigenous communities in Sipacapa voted overwhelmingly to reject mining in their lands. Oxfam issued a press release with the results: 2486 votes against, 35 in favor, 32 abstaining and one blank vote.

According to Sandra Cuffe of Rights Action, the level of participation in the consultations was comparable to that of the last municipal election. Cuffe has been monitoring events in Guatemala since the project’s commencement.

Glamis Senior Vice President Charles Jeannes responded to the vote in an interview with Business News Americas by saying, “The private interests went ahead and held something–I don‚t know what you call it–a referendum or non-binding, non-sanctioned vote if you will.”

Seventy-five national and international observers of the consultations and voting disagree with Jeannes’ assessment. They concluded in a communiquĂ© that the consultations “unfolded normally in all of the communities, according to traditional indigenous customs [and that local residents] freely and democratically participated in the consultation process, expressing their decisions regarding mining activity.”

Yet Jeannes remarkably insisted to Business News Americas that the open-pit gold mine remains popular and “the majority of the residents in the vicinity of the mine support our activity.”

Truth and Consequences

The consultations in Sipacapa dealt a thunderous blow to Glamis’ project, although opposition to the mine is not unanimous. This is especially the case in the divided community of San Miguel, where the mine is located and where local residents have been given some jobs. But all signs point to changing tides.

According to Cuffe, a month after the vote in Sipacapa the community of San Miguel announced that it would also hold consultations regarding mining activities in their municipality.

Russell, who works with Cuffe, said these consultations are empowering the communities.

“They are taking it upon themselves to educate themselves, debating the issues and voting. [But] the importance goes deeper,” said Russell. “They are voting to take political control over their lives, something that’s never happened in the country.”

Then on Aug. 21, many of the claims made by local residents of malfeasance (if not criminal activity) on the part of Glamis and the World Bank were validated–by the World Bank. The Financial Times received a draft copy of the response by the World Bank’s Compliance Adviser Ombudsman to a formal complaint filed by the Guatemalan NGO Madre Selva regarding the mining project. The Financial Times reported that the Ombudsman “charges that the bank failed adequately to consult the local community or properly evaluate the environmental and humanitarian impact of the mine.”

The article even mentioned the results of Sipacapa’s “illegal” referendum in which 98% of the residents rejected mining.

It’s Not Over Yet

The World Bank’s report is a positive step. (Someone was honest enough to leak this report, which according to news reports was supposed to be confidential.) But one of the concerns with the World Bank’s oversight procedures is that there are no tangible enforcement mechanisms. The same caveat applies to putting too much hope behind international law–ike ILO 169.

“Impunity is the norm in how the global community works,” said Russell.

However, conditions in Guatemala might make it possible for this global fiasco to become an exception to the rule. Indigenous communities in Sipacapa continue to meet on a regular basis in their organizing efforts against the mine, and San Miguel is readying itself for its own referendum, with popularity for the mine dwindling. In addition, more people are becoming aware of the situation as a result of solidarity work by activists, NGOs and others.

The Guatemalan government showed it is not afraid to use violence to protect Glamis’ interests. In January the military killed a protestor and injured dozens of others [at a blockade of mining equipment on the Panamerican Highway]. Glamis can be expected to continue with its repressive tactics, while the Canadian government is Glamis’ biggest cheerleader. The vast majority of the international mainstream press still has not found this story “newsworthy” enough to report on thoroughly.

Yet despite these obstacles, local activists insist this mine can still be shut down.

——

Cyril Mychalejko is the assistant editor of UpsideDownWorld.org, an online magazine about activism and politics in Latin America.

This story originally appeared Aug. 30 in Toward Freedom
http://towardfreedom.com/home/content/view/567/1/

RESOURCES:

Mines & Communities Website on the Sipacapa referendum
http://www.minesandcommunities.org/Action/press667.htm

Financial Times, Aug. 21, online at Americas.org
http://americas.org/item_21452

Land Research Action Network on the January protests
http://www.landaction.org/display.php?article=262

See also our last report on Central America:
/node/1034

———————

Reprinted by WORLD WAR 4 REPORT, Oct. 1, 2005
Reprinting permissible with attribution

Continue ReadingGOLD MINE IN GUATEMALA FACES INDIGENOUS RESISTANCE 

PERU’S CAMISEA GAS PROJECT: ONE YEAR LATER

Indigenous, Campesinos and Civil Society Stand Up to Pipeline Politics

by Yeidy Rosa

The Camisea gas extraction and pipeline project—extolled by the government of Peru, the companies building it, and the banks financing it, as an important contribution to Peru’s economic development, creating jobs and significantly increasing the country’s standard of living—is starting to appear more like the social and ecological disaster that civil society and environmental groups had warned of. And this after only one year of operations.

On Sept. 17, massive ruptures along the Camisea pipeline caused the evacuation of the Andean town of Toccate in Ayacucho region, reported the Lima daily El Comercio. Three hundred cubic meters, or 4,000 barrels, of natural gas liquids spilled into the soil and water of Toccate—an area considered to be one of three where the year-old pipeline is in danger of collapsing. It was the second spill near Toccate, in Ayacucho’s La Mar province, in two weeks. Omar Quezada, regional president of Ayacucho, told Reuters on Sept. 23 that Ayacucho would in fact seek legal action, on both penal and civil counts, to ensure reparations for the environmental and health hazards inflicted upon the residents of the region by the construction and operation of the project.

This has been the third Camisea gas spill since December 2004 along the pipeline, operated for an international consortium by Transportadora de Gas del Peru (TGP), in turn controlled by Techint of Argentina. On December 22, 2004, a major spill at kilometer eight of the Camisea pipeline leaked liquid natural gas into Kemariato Ravine, near the gasfields in the Peruvian Amazon.

Toccate is also the site where, in June 2003, 71 employees of the Techint Group were kidnapped by a group of armed individuals who President Alejandro Toledo termed as “remnants” of Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path), reported the BBC on June 11, 2003. Peru’s La Republica reported on June 16, 2003, that ex-hostages indicated that the kidnappers called themselves “Nuevo Sendero,” a group fighting for social justice. The group’s demands included food, antibiotics, and that jobs are given to local residents rather than Argentines, with equal pay and benefits as foreign workers. John Ferriter, a spokesperson from the office of external relations of the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), the project’s main financer, states: “We are concerned about the spill and are closely monitoring the situation and are awaiting a full report from company and Peruvian authorities. We are confident the necessary measures will be taken to enhance pipeline security and safety and will work with the company and the Peruvian authorities to assist in carrying out such measures. The primary responsibility for pipeline security, as with construction of the pipeline, rests with the project company, Transportada de Gas del PerĂș (TGP). However, the IDB is committed to monitoring and evaluation as well as providing assistance in all aspects of the project.”

Nadia Martinez from the Institute of Policy Studies takes a harsher view: “The spills that have occurred demonstrate the lack of planning and attention dedicated by the operating companies in order to minimize the impacts of the project. It is not surprising that after so many problems in the stages of construction with erosion and other technical problems, that the companies are not prepared to handle this kind of disaster.” Martinez, who works with Peruvian civil society groups monitoring the Camisea project, charges that a worker was killed in the December 2004 blast on the pipeline—a fact which has never been officially acknowledged.

The Camisea Gas Project was heralded under the official slogan “Something Good is Arriving” in the summer 2004, as gas from the Camisea Basin in the Peruvian Amazon began to arrive at the Pacific coast near Lima via parallel trans-Andean pipelines. The IADB’s abstract on the (to date) $2.7 billion project hails it as in the host country’s “national interest,” saying it is “expected to greatly contribute to the economic development of Peru.” The Peruvian government says it will add a projected 0.8% to the county’s GDP growth for each year of the 33-year concession. Moreover, the pipeline is predicted to save Peru $4 billion in energy costs over the life of the project, and to earn it billions more in export earnings.

Yet, an independent monitoring report—drawn up by the local Machiguenga Council of the Urubamba River (COMARU) with Amazon Watch and the Amazon Alliance—describes the project as being “the most damaging project in the Amazon Basin,” representing a “considerable threat to the environment, rights, and health of several indigenous peoples in the location of the gas wells and along the pipeline route.”

One year after going on-line, Camisea gas reaches only 41 businesses and 600 homes in Lima, a city of over 8 million. The project continues to be cited as the cause of irreversible destruction to some of the world’s most diverse and threatened ecosystems. Reports continue of violations to the internationally-recognized rights of indigenous groups living in voluntary isolation in the rainforest near the Camisea gas field. Concerns are also raised about the health and safety of all communities located along the 800-kilometer pipeline route.

Anatomy of the Consortia

On September 19, while attending the UN World Summit in New York, President Alejandro Toledo, Peru’s first native Qechua-speaking national leader, said in an interview with Reuters that the Camisea Basin has much more than the 40-year reserves accessible today. In the 1980s, oil companies such as the Royal Dutch/Shell Group and the Mobil Corporation established a presence in the Camisea Basin, located in the Lower Urubamba River Valley of eastern Peru. These companies abandoned plans for major development in Camisea after the government of Peru rejected Shell and Mobil’s demand for a distribution monopoly and the right to set prices, as reported by the New York Times on July 17, 1998.

Current extraction wells, providing access to an estimated 11 trillion cubic feet of natural gas and 600 million barrels of liquid petroleum gas, are located in the area known as Block 88—two thirds of which is located within the Nahua-Kugapakori Reserve for Indigenous Peoples. Home to at least four distinct indigenous groups (the Nahua/Yora, Nanti, Kugapakori, and the Machiguenga/Kirineri), this reserve is one of five created in 1990 to safeguard the rights of indigenous groups living in voluntary isolations or in initial stages of contact with national society.

The Camisea Gas Project consists of three components: the exploration and extraction of the non-renewable resource at four drilling platforms in the Urubamba Valley (the “Upstream Project”), two pipelines to transport the gas from the Urubamba Valley to the coast of Peru (the “Downstream Project”), and two processing and distribution systems on the coast near Lima (the “Distribution Project”). One of these coastal facilities, a gas processing plant, is being built within the buffer zone of the National Reserve of Paracas, a marine refuge of international significance recognized by the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands of 1971, ratified by Peru in 1992, which states: “Under the Convention there is a general obligation for the Contracting Parties to include wetland conservation considerations in their national land-use planning.”

Ownership the Camisea Project, awarded in 2000, is shared by two overlapping consortia, one for gas production and another for gas transportation and distribution. The Upstream Consortium is formed by Texas-based Hunt Oil, Pluspetrol (Argentina), SK Corporation (South Korea), and Tecpetro, owned by Techint Argentina.

The Downstream Project is formed by Texas-based Hunt Oil (22.2%), Tecgas N.V. (Argentina, 23.4%), Pluspetrol (Argentina, 22.2%), SK Corporation (South Korea, 11.1%), Sonatrach (Algeria, 11.1%), Tractebel (Argentina, 8%), and Graña y Montero, the sole Peruvian company, with 2% of the ultimate ownership. The Distribution Project was assigned to Tractabel (Argentina) by Transportadora de Gas del PerĂș (TGP). Construction of the Paracas gas processing plant is contracted to Kellogg, Brown & Root, a subsidiary of Halliburton. Ray Hunt, chief executive officer of Hunt Oil, sits on the board of Halliburton and has been a major donor to the Bush campaign.

While the government of Peru has repeatedly pointed out the benefits of Camisea gas being used in Peruvian homes and businesses, the focus of project proposals is in making Peru a net exporter of gas—with plans to sell gas to Mexico, Chile, Argentina and the West Coast of the United States as soon as 2007. President Toledo has stated that Camisea gas will unify South America, yet Amazon Watch reports that half of all Camisea gas is intended to be exported to the western United States by 2009. When asked about the planned Camisea gas exports, President Toledo told the Miami Herald on July 12: “Let the free market operate.”

Initially intended to be mainly financed by loans from the Inter-American Development Bank and the US Export-Import Bank—both tax-payer backed institutions—the latter rejected a request for a $214 million loan for the Camisea consortium, citing environmental concerns. The IADB—in which the US government holds 30% of the voting power—delayed consideration of the project on two occasions due to outstanding concerns and pressure from lawmakers in Congress, environmental and human rights groups. Of main concern was the bank’s violation of its own environmental and social standards, which the Bush administration had played a key role in tightening. A likely reason for the Bush administration’s interest in tightening environmental standards is that it allows President Bush to negotiate an agreement requiring countries to offer greater market access if a violation occurs. Monetarily fining violators also benefits the US, as trade is not disrupted as with sanctions.

In September 2003, the US abstained in a vote on the project, and a $135 million loan was approved. Had the US voted a clear “no,” other member countries may have been swayed to oppose the loan as well. Critics consider the approval of the loan a breach of both modern industry standards and international environmental guidelines.

It is interesting to note that the World Bank and the US Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) kept their distance from the Camisea Project due to its failure to meet international social and environmental protection measures, citing the consortium companies’ inexperience and poor records. Other banks involved in the financing of the project include SACE (Italy, $20 million), the Andean Development Corporation ($50 million), Ducroire (Belgium, $170 million investment insurance), and BNDES (Brazil) and BICE (Argentina) with a combined $125 million. Citigroup serves as the consortium’s financial advisor.

Ethnocidal Impacts

The recent spill in Toccate is only the most recent of disasters caused by the oil and gas companies involved in the Camisea Basin. In the 1980s, the presence of the Shell Group directly contributed to the death of over half of the Yora/Nahua indigenous population living in voluntary isolation. The isolated Nahua had no immune defenses to common sicknesses such as the flu, gastro-intestinal and respiratory illnesses brought to the area by Shell employees and the loggers and missionaries that used Shell access roads to gain entry into the area. Today, illnesses within isolated indigenous groups are on the rise along the Rio Urubamba, as are reports of forced contact by the Camisea companies’ workers. The project also threatens the livelihood of indigenous peoples through water contamination, deforestation and erosion.

There are some 30 voluntarily isolated peoples in the Peruvian Amazon, exercising their internationally-recognized right to choose the moment and manner in which they make contact with national society. From the initial stages of the Camisea Project, this right has been violated. Amazon Alliance, an NGO focusing on the indigenous and traditional peoples of the Amazon Basin, reports that other subcontractors have left items such as machetes, clothing, knives, and mattresses along seismic lines; items which carry a potentially catastrophic disease threat. There have also been reports that TGP has allowed their helicopters to be used by missionaries in order to force contact with voluntarily isolated groups for religious purposes. These abuses are outlined in an August 2003 statement against the project by the Interethnic Association for the Development of the Peruvian Amazon (AIDESEP).

The Bank Information Center has records of forced contact by Camisea member companies dating back to August 2002, when Pluspetrol anthropologist Jose Luis Cabral openly admitted that groups of Pluspetrol representatives, accompanied by a Machiguenga guide, approached isolated groups by announcing their presence through a loud speaker. A separate incident, reported by anthropologist Kacper Swierk in July 2002, involved forced contact with a settlement of Shiateni by Pluspetrol personnel. The group was reportedly forced to leave their homes, threatened with arrest by the army as “terrorists,” and told that disease would kill them if they did not abandon the area. Workers from the subcontracted Canadian company Veritas forced contact with an isolated Kirineri settlement, telling the settlers to relocate in order for seismic testing to take place. Though a Peruvian government agency for indigenous peoples, the National Commission of Andean, Amazonian and Afro-Peruvian Peoples (CONAPA), was created in 2001 to address such issues, it has yet to develop and implement a plan to protect isolated indigenous peoples from contact. Instead, it provides guidelines for company workers as to what to say and do in the event of contact.

The issue of forced contact is particularly worrisome, considering the flawed compensation negotiations which have taken advantage of the lack of community experience in calculating monetary value in regards to their land and natural resources. Coupled with weak government oversight, the companies have taken to causing damages beyond the scope of agreements and then returning to the unprepared community to negotiate minimal compensation. In a summary of findings from June 2003 Investigative Mission to Indigenous Communities Affected by the Camisea Project, it is reported that in the village of ShimĂĄa, consortium companies led the community to believe that outstanding compensation agreements will not be fulfilled unless the community agrees to additional construction.

The Washington Post website featured the Machiguenga community living in the village of ShimĂĄa in a video documenting a landslide caused by the pipeline, as well as resulting erosion, water contamination, and the effects of construction noise on the group’s hunting, on August 19, 2003.

Irreparable impacts resulting from massive landslides and soil erosion caused by the pipelines’ steep route are directly linked to the health and safety of the local population. As heavy rains wash thousands of tons of soil and vegetation into local rivers, groups find themselves without the fish and clean water their survival depends on. Noise and pollution from river and air traffic has scared away game for groups that depend on hunting. Deficient local diets due to such severe declines pose immediate health dangers, while the erosion of traditional subsistence practices could have long-term effects on the cultural identity of the group. All of the above violate the minimum standards on the rights of indigenous peoples as set in the International Labor Organization’s Convention 169, ratified by Peru in 1993, particularly the right of prior consultation regarding any project on indigenous territories.

Also feared are waves of loggers and developers in the wake of the oil companies–the usual pattern–causing further deforestation, environmental degradation, social pressures, and resource conflicts.

Civil Society and Camisea

The Interethnic Association for the Development of the Peruvian Amazon (AIDESEP), Peru’s main advocacy group for the region’s indigenous peoples, demands complete abandonment of the project and immediate withdrawal from indigenous lands. However, many of the Peru’s civil society bodies have expressed a commitment to the development of the Camisea Project within the parameters of social and environmental safeguards.

Mobilization around the issue of the Camisea Project by Peruvian civil society, environmental, and indigenous groups has been the largest the country has ever seen. Over twenty organizations have united to demand full participation in the negotiations regarding the project. The Peruvian constitution states that all natural resources belong to all Peruvians, and any private party that exploits them must pay a “gas canon fee” equaling 50% of the total income that the state earns through taxes and royalties for the use of any resource. This distribution is one of the rights demanded by civil society groups, in a “Positions and Recommendations” document submitted to the IADB in July 2003. Other demands include continuous monitoring of the consortia, independent health and environmental monitoring, and relocation of the plant near the Paracas Marine Reserve. They also demand that the rights of the indigenous peoples in voluntary isolation are guaranteed, that no right-of-way routes be constructed, that the project be transparent, that affected communities have a say throughout the life of the project, and that a Camisea Project Ombudsman serve the communities throughout the life of the project.

The government of Peru, however, passed law #28455, which allocates 40% of the royalties from the project into a special fund to buy arms for the military and national police force. Moreover, no fund has been created to mitigate the impacts of the project on the communities and ecosystems affected. Regarding this law, Nadia Martinez states that, “It is truly unthinkable that funds that should be used for the ‘development’ of the country, especially for the development of the affected communities on the local level, be used to buy arms and maintain armed forces. The conditions that the IADB demanded included a development fund that would utilize 7% of the profits. As far as I know, this requirement has not been fulfilled. Yet 40% has been allocated for arms without consequence.”

While the IADB has agreed to a series of public meetings with civil society and non-governmental organizations, community members have complained that these do not represent a real exchange, but rather presentations of the consortiums’ plans and visions. The affected groups have gone as far as to boycott the meetings, stating that they are un-transparent, undemocratic, and that they are not allowed time to speak.

At a meeting in Lima regarding an expansion of the project into Blocks 56 and 76, referred to as Camisea II, community members stated that they were not presented the details of the project in a comprehensible form, and that the communities were given only one month to read the 4,000-page document and prepare their comments.

Such unfair negotiations have marked the project since its inception, critics charge. The Nahua, in a rare communication with national society, sent an advocate to publicly voice their rejection of such an expansion.

Asked via e-mail if the recent spills would affect their decision on financing an expansion of the Camisea Project, Ferriter of the Inter-American Development Bank states: “Involvement of the IDB in any future expansion of the project will depend on a number of complex factors, among them the environmental and social issues.”

Asked what impact the mishaps will have on expansion of the project, Nadia Martinez of the Institute for Public Policy says: “I would say that surely it will delay it for a bit, but it will not stop it. In December there was an explosion that left one dead, and just days later the IADB disbursed the loan to the consortium, which goes to show that this kind of disaster is considered part of the expected impacts and is not taken seriously enough for there to be serious consequences for the operating companies or the government.”

Asked if the Camisea Project could be carried out from this point forward in a socially and environmentally responsible way, Martinez answers: “It is too late. The damage is done… The IADB claims to be concerned about the poor in Latin America, yet they support devastating projects like Camisea that benefit primarily foreign oil companies and a few elites in the Peruvian government.”

Martinez says the next challenge facing the IADB will be whether to fund the expansion of the project. “If the IADB has learned anything from the disastrous Camisea experience, they will not go near the expansion project known as Camisea II. But if they do, we’ll be there to make sure they remember all they did wrong in the first one.”

——

RESOURCES:

For an extensive list of resources in English and Spanish regarding the Camisea Gas Project, including articles, contacts, official documents, civil society analysis and meeting minutes, and useful websites, please visit The Bank Information Center at:

http://www.bicusa.org/bicusa/issues/camisea_natural_gas_project_peru/index.php

Amazon Alliance summary of independent monitoring report “Summary of Findings from June 2003 Investigative Mission to Upper and Lower Urubamba River Valley, Peru”
http://www.amazonalliance.org/camisea.html

Amazon Watch, “Peru: Camisea Natural Gas Project”
http://www.amazonwatch.org/amazon/PE/camisea/

Declaration of Indigenous Peoples in Defense of Life, Territory and the Environment, AIDESEP, Lima, Aug. 25, 2003 http://www.bicusa.org/bicusa/issues/AIDESEP_camisea_statement_25.08.03.pdf

Proyecto Camisea
http://www.camisea.com.pe/project.asp

IADB Sector Department page on the Camisea Project http://www.iadb.org/pri/english/dbase/projectSummary.cfm?ProjectNumber=PE0222

ECA Watch: International NGO Campaign on Export Credit Agencies http://www.eca-watch.org/problems/americas/peru/2001_01_25_sace.html

Halliburton Watch on Hunt Oil
http://www.halliburtonwatch.org/news/board_political_donations.html

Washington Post, Aug. 19, 2003, “Pipeline Problems: Shimaa, Peru” http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/mmedia/photo/081903-1v.htm

BBC, Aug. 10, 2004, “Peru prepares for the gas age”
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/3543060.stm

See also our last report on the Camisea Project:
/peru2.html

——————–

Special to WORLD WAR 4 REPORT, Oct. 1, 2005
Reprinting permissible with attribution

Continue ReadingPERU’S CAMISEA GAS PROJECT: ONE YEAR LATER 

HOPE AND HORROR IN SIERRA LEONE

BOOK REVIEW

HOW DE BODY?
One Man’s Terrifying Journey Through an African War
by Teun Voeten
St. Martins Press, 2002

by Bill Weinberg

Belgium-based Dutch photojournalist Teun Voeten was already a veteran of the bloodbaths in Bosnia, Rwanda, Chechnya, Afghanistan and Colombia when he arrived in the West African nation of Sierra Leone in February 1998. A particularly brutal guerilla army, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), had been terrorizing Sierra Leone since 1991, and Voeten was there to photograph demobilized child soldiers who had been abducted and forced to fight for the rebels. At first, he is almost cynical about the whole ghastly affair, as if jaded to the point of complacency–the clichĂ© of the hardbitten war journalist.

But shortly after his arrival, a ceasefire ended as the country was invaded by a multi-national intervention force led by Nigeria. RUF and government troops alike went on a rampage of looting and senseless killing, plundering what they could before Nigerian forces seized the country. As a European journalist, Voeten was an obvious target. He was forced to flee into the bush before he finally escaped across the border to Guinea weeks later. Voeten quickly loses his swagger after a few brushes with death. He was humbled by the selflessness of locals who put their lives on the line to help him survive, hiding him from the rebels, feeding and housing him. Voeten certainly wouldn’t have made it without the bravery and savvy of his colleague, local BBC correspondent Eddie Smith. When Voeten was safely back home in Brussels, Smith would be killed in a rebel ambush.

Reckoning with the experience sent Voeten back to Sierra Leone a year later–partly to deliver funds to a friend’s school project. It also drove him to dissect and understand the conflict, and how it has frayed Sierra Leone’s social fabric. “How de body?” is the common greeting in Krio, Sierra Leone’s creole tongue–which takes on a hideous irony in light of the rebels’ habit of ritual amputation of their victims. “Jamba” (marijuana) didn’t seem to mellow out these killers, who were also hootched up on amphetamines, heroin and worse stuff–the better to brainwash press-ganged pre-adolescents. As numerous war victims bitterly complained to Voeten, the Sierra Leone violence was even worse than that of Bosnia and Kosovo–yet the world paid little attention.

For all his vivid depictions of on-the-ground brutality, Voeten doesn’t overlook the international context for a near-forgotten war in a paradoxically impoverished but resource-rich part of Africa. His investigations also took him back to Belgium, where he interviewed sleazy Antwerp diamond merchants who fund the rebels and launder their “conflict diamonds.” He documents how the British, meanwhile, snuck around an official embargo to sell arms to the government forces, who were hardly less brutal than the rebels. As in so many countries in Africa and the global south, Sierra Leone’s people were caught between hostile forces backed by foreign powers for their own ends.

How de Body?, illustrated with Voeten’s own photos, is a testament to the heroism of ordinary people around the world who struggle to keep alive a sense of simple humanity in wars that grind on outside the global media spotlight–portrayed only as decontextualized atrocity pornography, if at all. Voeten’s journeys through Sierra Leone’s nightmares shed light where too many other journalists have only seen hearts of darkness.

###

See Teun Voeten’s special WW4 REPORT photo essay
IMAGES OF OCCUPIED BAGHDAD: ww3report.com/iraqphotoessay/

Continue ReadingHOPE AND HORROR IN SIERRA LEONE 

#. 113. September 2005

Exclusive Interview:
MAURITANIA: SLAVERY, ETHNIC CLEANSING, DEMOCRATIC OPPOSITION
Voices of the African Liberation Forces of Mauritania (FLAM)
by Bill Weinberg

DARFUR: THE OVERKILL
The Janjaweed Spin Out of Control
by Rene Wadlow

OIL AND OCCUPATION IN WESTERN SAHARA
Kerr-McGee Lubricates Morocco’s Illegal Annexation Agenda
by Jacob Mundy

IRAQI UNIONS DEFY ASSASSINATION AND OCCUPATION
by David Bacon

“PEAK OIL” DECONSTRUCTED
Critique of the National Security Paradigm
by George Caffentzis

From Weekly News Update on the Americas:

ECUADOR: STRIKE HALTS AMAZON OIL PRODUCTION
BOLIVIA: REGIONAL STRIKE OVER OIL DEAL
ARGENTINA: PROTESTS HIT OIL SECTOR, CAMPESINOS ATTACKED
PERU: CAMPESINOS OCCUPY MINE CAMPS, CABINET RESIGNS
COLOMBIA: INDIGENOUS, CAMPESINOS MASSACRED
VENEZUELA: OLIGARCHY STRIKES BACK AT CAMPESINOS
CENTRAL AMERICA: BUSH SIGNS CAFTA; NAVAL MANEUVERS HELD

Book Review:
INSIDE THE KINGDOM
A Feminist Dissident from the Bin Laden Dynasty — Almost!
by Chesley Hicks

“A man who says that no patriot should attack the war until it is over is not worth answering intelligently; he is saying that no good son should warn his mother off a cliff until she has fallen over it.”

— G.K. Chesterton

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Continue Reading#. 113. September 2005 

AN ACCIDENTAL DISSIDENT FROM THE BIN LADEN DYNASTY

BOOK REVIEW

INSIDE THE KINGDOM
My Life in Saudi Arabia
by Carmen Bin Ladin
Warner Books, 2004

by Chesley Hicks

“Socially, Saudi Arabia is medieval, dark with sin and interdiction,” opens chapter seven of Carmen Bin Ladin’s chronicle of the years she spent married to Yeslam Bin Ladin, one of the infamous Osama’s 22 brothers.

In her 2004 memoir, recently out in paperback, the Western-raised, half-Swiss, half-Persian Bin Ladin (the book refers to Carmen and Yeslam as Bin Ladin, and the rest of the clan, including the notorious brother, as Bin Laden) outlines how she came to meet and marry a young Saudi Arabian jetsetter, leave her Geneva home, and endure life for nine years as a near-captive on his family compound in the Arabian desert.

Bin Ladin describes how the path to this fate really began with her mother. Far from fundamentalist, but nonetheless socially conventional, Carmen’s mother was eager for her eldest daughter to find a husband after her own husband—Carmen’s father, a Swiss man—abruptly left her. Carmen says that when she first met her future husband in Geneva, both were young, idealistic, and living Western lives. At the time, his family—who were taking a long vacation in Geneva—also struck the author as open-minded and even hip. However, as she gradually became acquainted with Yeslam’s family on their own turf, Carmen recognized that her husband was different from the rest—more progressive and appreciative of her Western values and autonomy—just as she was radically different from the Bin Laden clan’s subjugated wives and sisters. Even so, when the oil boom hit Saudi Arabia in the ’70s and it became apparent that colossal cash piles could be collected doing business there, Carmen and Yeslam decided to make a go of it in the desert kingdom.

Before moving there for good after the birth of their first daughter, the couple made several trips to Saudi Arabia, the earliest in order to procure the Saudi King’s mandatory permission to marry. From beneath an abaya—the compulsory head-to-toe covering for Saudi women—Carmen made her prescient first encounter with Saudi Arabia: “I watched the desert approach as we landed. The light through the black gauze cloth was so dim, I didn’t know if this new country was simply the darkest, dimmest place I had ever seen, or if the cloth across my eyes was preventing me from seeing anything that was there.”

Her ensuing Saudi wedding was likewise foreboding. “I waited, in my abaya, in the car,” she writes. “Yeslam and Ibrahim [his brother] brought me out a book that I had to sign. That was the marriage register
 Then someone took the book back and we were married.” On this first visit to Saudi Arabia and with each subsequent one, Carmen portrays her increasing awareness of Saudi culture’s deeply entrenched misogyny, utter disregard for women’s welfare, and penchant for violent oppression. Yet she says that when the young couple arrived there to live, she was optimistic. “I thought [wearing the abaya] was temporary,” she writes. “Jeddah was booming, and foreigners had come flocking to the country… I assumed that Saudi culture would move into the modern world, just as other cultures had.” Writing in hindsight, Carmen seems alternately appreciative of and dismayed by her naive temerity, which she says was born both of her youth and having been a teenager in the revolutionary-feeling sixties. Coming from what appears to have been a sheltered, wealthy environment, it’s fair to say she found her Altamont in Saudi Arabia, 1979.

From 1976 to 1979, Carmen witnessed massive, breakneck modern development in Saudi Arabia. Though the culture followed at a glacial pace—she spent those years adjusting to harsh Saudi protocols, learning to circumscribe her public behavior while creating a liberal safe haven within her own home—she describes a relative loosening of fundamentalist strictures. Women began to appear in public without the full abaya, some of the Bin Laden wives brought their children to the birthday parties Carmen threw for her daughters (observation of birthdays is considered sacrilege by some strict Saudi Muslims). But it all came to a grinding halt in 1979 with the overthrow of the Shah of Iran. The Iranian revolution caused panic in the royal family, which was already straining between the pull of the austere Wahabist Islam it purported to uphold and many of the royal family members’ libertine inclinations. “The more debauched princes,” Carmen writes, “continued indulging in their privately lavish lifestyles, while at the same time the royal family enforced increasing restrictions on the ordinary people they ruled.” Nearly overnight, the kingdom’s streets reverted to its brutish, tribal past, the culture of which Carmen spends a good portion of her book dissecting—revealing the parts to be even less appealing than the desiccated whole.

Throughout book—sometimes with a redundancy perhaps resounding with the years spent silent on the matter, and with how intensely she believes it a threat to the world—Carmen depicts a Saudi culture as crude as the oil that sustains it. She contrasts the culture of Saudi Islam with the Persian Islamic culture of her grandmother: “The Saudi version of Islam—Wahabism—is ferocious in its enforcement of a stark and ancient social code. This is not a complex intellectual culture like that of Iran or Egypt.” In her view, contemporary Saudi Arabia amounts to little more than a primitive tribal society that stumbled upon a whole lotta money, which has brought the country gross material wealth and power but not a whit of sophistication or enlightenment. She offers vivid, succinct depictions of the ways in which the Saudis have adopted garish and gaudy simulations of Western opulence without any sense of form or function She describes her first impression of her mother-in-law’s home: “It was a relief to take off my abaya. Suddenly the light inside the house seemed blinding. There were so many chandeliers blazing, it was like stepping into a lamp shop
 The lack of sophistication surprised me. I had imagined an exotic Oriental abode, like in the movies, or like my grandmother’s home in Iran. After all, Yeslam’s father had been one of the richest men in Saudi Arabia. But this was just a basic house furnished in poor taste.” She also presents numerous examples of comically absurd but painfully oppressive Saudi moral bureaucracy, generally employed to keep women lowly.

And where she thought she might find sorority among the repressed women with whom she lived in the Bin Laden compound, she instead found relationships among wives and sisters to be superficial and catty—a consequence in part of their being relentlessly segregated, herded, and quartered like breeding heifers. Carmen depicts many Saudi women as spiritually and intellectually lobotomized, forced to get by on the favors they are able to curry from the men who control them, usually by dint of deceit and manipulation. Their dynamic reflects a concentration camp mentality—the sense that there are never enough resources to go around and what is given to another extracts from one’s own welfare. This might seem strange in as wealthy a nation as Saudi Arabia, but polygamy is the norm there—so it seems each wife knows she is only as good as her last performance. Even the wives’ forays into lesbianism come off as desperate attempts to compensate for what they don’t get from men and aren’t allowed to do for themselves. Carmen addresses these behaviors with varying degrees of compassion and resentment, and of course takes care to detail the exceptions—a handful of women with whom she could relate, including some who remained close following her estrangement from the kingdom.

And the men in Carmen’s kingdom are generally craven-hearted brutes wearing complacent veneers. By adolescence, Carmen says, boys have learned to control their own mothers with an arrogance and sense of entitlement bred deeply into them. Within the family, they are subject mainly to birth order. The formerly nomadic tribes relied heavily on patrilineal clan organization: still in full effect today according to Carmen. “Families are headed by patriarchs and obedience to the patriarch is absolute,” she writes. “The only values that count in Saudi Arabia are loyalty and submission—first to Islam then to the clan.”

Carmen says she got by not just pursuing illusory Saudi liberalism, but by going on a mission to educate herself on the country’s history and the inextricably entangled intrigues of the Saudi royal and Bin Laden families. She achieved her goal by listening to the conversations around her and reading books and newspapers smuggled in from elsewhere. Apparently the governmental watchdogs dared not investigate luggage or packages bearing the Bin Laden name, so she even was able to access information that was critical of the royal family.

The result of that inquiry helps make Inside the Kingdom the compelling read it is. Carmen connects what’s going on in her personal life to what’s happening globally and in Saudi Arabia in particular. It’s a view into Saudi culture and a political history lesson, shown in the unfolding of the author’s personal saga.

Carmen’s rendition of modern Saudi affairs resides largely in an examination of legacy, which is a recurring theme in the book. She frames the current state of the Bin Laden family as reflective of each brother’s relationship to the pious, self-made, and shrewd patriarch, Sheik Mohammed Bin Laden, who had 22 wives and 54 children before he died at age 59 in a plane crash—rumored to have occurred en route to his taking a 23rd wife. “Sadly,” Carmen writes, “none of his children has ever really measured up to Sheikh Mohamed,” her misgivings about the family he spawned oddly notwithstanding her admiration for the legend of the man she never met. One doesn’t have to read too far between Inside the Kingdom‘s lines to see that Carmen craves a father figure.

Similarly, Carmen identifies her haste to marry as, in part, answering her mother’s insecurity and concern for appearances—something that she says was not of her mother’s true character but a carry-over from her Iranian upbringing that only expressed itself after she was humiliated by her husband’s departure. (Carmen’s mother never admitted her divorce to her own family). “That is what it meant to me to be from the Middle East,” Carmen writes. “You lived behind secrets. You hid things that were disagreeable.” It is not clear when in Carmen’s life she fully figured this out, though she describes an epiphany—one of a few in the book—she had upon returning to Iran as an adult. Though she maintains her respect for the rich and ancient Iranian culture, she describes having been devastated to find that life on Iran’s streets did not resemble the aristocratic gardens within the walls of her grandmother’s estate she visited as a child. Carmen says she told Yeslam when she first met him that she would never marry, as she didn’t want to see her children abandoned by a father as she and her three sisters were. Yet about 15 years later, that is precisely the predicament in which Carmen finds herself.

And in that vein, the dissolution of the Saudi royal family itself can be seen as a microcosm of modern Saudi Arabia. Carmen says there are rumored to be some 25,000 in the Saudi clan now, and she portrays the generation coming to dominate the country as remarkably shiftless. They all receive some stipend or another from the country’s oil wealth and believe themselves above work (Carmen depicts Saudis relying heavily upon yet abusing their foreign hired help, treating them as slaves). Add to that the Saudi belief that, as the caretakers of Mecca, they are a chosen people, and you have delusional, dysfunctional elite—yet depicted as possessing little substance with which to fill their lives. One can only wonder how that legacy will unfold when the oil wells begin to run dry.

Returning to the Bin Laden legacy: there is the book’s tacitly central character of Osama, and there is Yeslam. Among Carmen’s chief reasons for writing her memoir, she says, was the opportunity to exonerate her daughters and herself from the scourge wrought on their surname, and to warn the world of the roiling Saudi threat. Osama, she says, was neither a black sheep nor an exalted member of the Bin Laden family while she lived in the compound. She met him only briefly on a few occasions and comes to no definitive conclusion about him other than that his pious commitment to strict fundamentalism and its causes celebres seemed to earn him increasing respect in polarized, backward-sliding Saudi society. Near the book’s conclusion she writes: “I cannot believe that the Bin Ladens have cut Osama off completely. I simply can’t see them depriving a brother of his annual dividend from their father’s company, and sharing it among themselves. This would be unthinkable—among the Bin Ladens, no matter what a brother does, he remains a brother.” She also says: “It’s certainly possible that Osama retains ties to the royal family, too. The Bin Ladens and the princes work together, very closely. They are secretive and they are united.” On 9-ll she asserts: “Though they have made a few public statements condemning the tragedy, neither clan has gone to any length to prove that they have not given Osama Bin Laden and Al Qaida moral and financial support in the past, and that they are currently not doing so.”

Yeslam, as it turns out, succumbs to neuroses and, ultimately, to the pull of the clan’s gravity. According to Carmen, Saudi Arabia is a nation of wealthy hypochondriacs who fly across the globe to visit their various favorite doctors and collect prescriptions. Her husband, whose level-headed, intelligent composure had always impressed her, eventually joins and then even surpasses their obsessive ranks. She watches as he slips deeper into anxiety disorder, becoming phobic, distant, and, finally, estranged. It’s hard not to feel the parallels between his trajectory and that of his country. He ascends his family’s stature-ladder, defying birth order, establishing contacts within the royal family, and making a name for himself as a highly successful businessman. He marries a Western woman to whom he intimately and intellectually relates, while always managing to maintain face in traditional Saudi culture as it catapults into Western capitalism. But eventually his sanity splinters, his own psychiatric decline and the subsequent deterioration of his marriage mirroring the kingdom’s decent into fractured consciousness.

It seems that as Carmen was finishing her book, she was still involved in a protracted, painful divorce from Yeslam. She says that as she watched Yeslam lose his sanguine self-possession, she also saw him drawn further into the recesses of Saudi moral despotism. When she recognizes that she’s losing him as an ally, she realizes that she and her daughters are close to becoming true captives in Saudi Arabia. Her daughters are coming of age–and becoming subject to the Saudi interpretation of womanhood. Finally, with of one of their annual visits to Switzerland, they simply don’t return to the desert. Then the marriage disintegrates. Carmen says that though he was living in Geneva, Yeslam became ever more Saudi, and even started cheating on her. They divorce. The odd thing is that Yelsam stays in Switzerland, too, but lives an entirely separate life and eventually denies the existence of his daughters. According to Carmen, he used his might and money to try to extradite all of their daughters to Saudi Arabia—even though he’d asked her to abort her pregnancy with the third daughter—where she would lose access to them. Apparently parts of their battle became public news in Switzerland—something one imagines might also have compelled Carmen to set the record straight with a book.

Though there are some holes in the telling, one tends to believe Carmen’s story comes from the heart, and that her insights are solid. Her tale is a memoir, yet it’s not as forthcoming as it could be. For instance, she never reveals the source of her birth family’s wealth, though it’s apparent and certainly shapes her experiences and perspective on the world. (Hell, I doubt you meet and marry a Bin Laden if you’re not rich to begin with.) Sometimes you get the feeling that as far out on limb as she’s gone to tell her story, she’s still holding back at times—maybe a remnant of her mother’s secretive conventionalism.

She offers lucid views into many of the kingdom’s angles and shadows, but Carmen says little about the intimate intertwining of US and Saudi legacies. Her approach is uncritical of Western values, coming rather from a vantage of unmitigated gratitude for the freedoms the West offers in relief to Mideastern oppressions. Indeed she even sees in the rigors of her own divorce from Yeslam an epochal struggle against Saudi tyranny. In the conclusion, she says that she fears for her and her three daughters’ safety in the wake of the book’s release. But a year later, it doesn’t seem to have roused dire controversy. Maybe it’s because she never injured Allah in her writing, or perhaps it is because her words are too close to the truth.

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For more on the Bin Laden dynasty see:

WW4 REPORT #43
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WW4 REPORT #28
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Special to WORLD WAR 4 REPORT, Sept. 1, 2005

Reprinting permissible with attribution

Continue ReadingAN ACCIDENTAL DISSIDENT FROM THE BIN LADEN DYNASTY 

CENTRAL AMERICA: BUSH SIGNS CAFTA; NAVAL MANEUVERS HELD

from Weekly News Update on the Americas

Shortly before flying to his Texas ranch for a month-long vacation, on Aug. 2 US President George W. Bush signed the Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA) into law, following a 19-month effort to get the controversial measure approved by Congress. So far, the legislatures of El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and the US have approved it; Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic and Nicaragua have not yet ratified. “CAFTA is more than a trade bill,” Bush said at the White House signing ceremony. “It is a commitment among freedom-loving nations to advance peace and prosperity throughout the region.” (Bloomberg News, Washington Times, Aug. 2)

Weekly News Update on the Americas, Aug. 7

DOMINICAN SENATE PASSES CAFTA, WORKERS PLEDGE RESISTANCE

On Aug. 26 the Dominican Senate voted 27-2 to ratify DR-CAFTA. The approval process requires the Senate to vote a second time and the Chamber of Deputies to also ratify the pact; the vote in the lower house is expected soon. The trade accord has yet to come up for a vote in Costa Rica and Nicaragua. (El Diario-La Prensa, NY, Aug. 27; Miami Herald, Aug. 28)

At a press conference in Tegucigalpa, Honduras, on Aug. 23, leftist unionists from the region announced plans for the Central America and Caribbean Union Coordinating Committee, an organization to coordinate regional strategies against the impacts of DR-CAFTA, which is expected to go into effect on Jan. 1. “[I]t is essential that we workers be united to block the negativity of this trade accord,” Israel Salinas, general secretary of the Unified Federation of Workers of Honduras (CUTH), told a press conference. The organization expects to have branches in Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama. (El Nuevo Herald, Miami, Aug. 23 from AP)

PANAMA: THREE DEAD IN U.S.-LED MANEUVERS

Three members of Panama’s National Maritime Service died on Aug. 14 while participating in “Operation Panamax 2005,” a US-led international naval exercise in which some 3,500 sailors from nine countries practiced repelling a hypothetical terrorist attack on the Panama Canal. The maneuvers took place from Aug. 9 to 16 with the participation of the Panamanian maritime police agency and the navies of Argentina, Chile, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Honduras, Peru and the US. Six other countries–Canada, Costa Rica, El Salvador, France, Mexico and Uruguay–acted as observers. After Sgt. Luis Perez and marines Omar Durango and Jackson Angulo drowned in an attempted amphibious landing on Guacha Island in Lake Gatun, Panama suspended its forces’ direct participation in the exercises and began an investigation. (Adital, Aug. 16; El Nuevo Herald, Miami, Aug. 15)

Weekly News Update on the Americas, Aug. 28

GUATEMALA: 33 DEAD IN PRISON RIOT

On Aug. 15, a string of gang riots at six Guatemalan prisons left at least 33 alleged gang members dead and at least 80 others wounded. The attacks–five of which were nearly simultaneous–are believed to have been planned by the Mara Salvatrucha gang; nearly all the victims were apparently members of the rival Mara 18 gang. Weapons used in the attacks included fragmentation grenades, 9mm and 45mm pistols and at least one “mini-Uzi” assault rifle. The riots took place in the departments of Guatemala, Suchitepequez and Escuintla. Police reportedly headed off similar riots at prisons in Chimaltenango (Chimaltenango department) and Coban (Alta Verapaz). (Centro de Estudios de Guatemala–CEG, “La Semana en Guatemala,” Aug. 8-15; Guatemala Hoy, CEG, Aug. 16)

Penitentiary System director Francisco de la Pena said prison guards were responsible for inflicting most of the deaths, in their efforts to restore order. One of the wounded prisoners said Salvatrucha members at the “El Hoyon” prison in Escuintla–where 18 prisoners died–planned the attacks and coordinated them via telephone. A representative of the Human Rights Ombudsperson’s office in Escuintla, Osmin Revolorio, said survivors told him a prison guard had entered one of the jails with a suitcase full of weapons which were later used in the attacks. (GH, Aug. 16)

Weekly News Update on the Americas, Aug. 21

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Weekly News Update on the Americas
http://home.earthlink.net/~nicadlw/wnuhome.html

See also WW4 REPORT #112
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Reprinted by WORLD WAR 4 REPORT, Sept. 1, 2005

Reprinting permissible with attribution

Continue ReadingCENTRAL AMERICA: BUSH SIGNS CAFTA; NAVAL MANEUVERS HELD 

VENEZUELA: OLIGARCHY STRIKES BACK AT CAMPESINOS

Peasants are stepping up pressure on Venezuela’s government to enforce the land reform law, decreed by President Hugo Chavez in November 2001. Over a million hectares of public lands were redistributed in the first three years of the law under the “Plan Ezequiel Zamora,” named for a nineteenth-century populist leader. This year, for the first time, the government is starting to redistribute private lands—mostly titling disputed lands to peasant settlers. In response, the rural oligarchy is striking back against campesino organizers. The latest assassination is reported from the west-central state of Portuguesa. Meanwhile, Rev. Pat Robertson’s comments point again towards a natural anti-Chavez alliance between reactionary sectors in Venezuela and the US alike.—WW4 REPORT

from Weekly News Update on the Americas

PORTUGUESA: ANOTHER CAMPESINO KILLED

On Aug. 12, campesino Carlos Hernandez was shot to death at the La Felicidad cooperative in Guanarito, in Venezuela’s Portuguesa state. The murder was apparently carried out by a group of five hired killers (sicarios) accompanied by a woman named Noly Carmona. The cooperative includes about 25 families who have rights to agricultural use of 200 hectares on the Romulo Lepage settlement. The murder was reported in an Aug. 17 statement issued by the Ezequiel Zamora National Campesino Front (FNCEZ) in conjunction with several international groups–including Brazil’s Movement of Landless Rural Workers (MST)–participating in an “International Bolivarian Camp” in Venezuela. (FNCEZ, Aug. 17, via Colombia Indymedia)

Weekly News Update on the Americas, Aug. 21

U.S. PREACHER WANTS CHAVEZ OFFED

On his nationally televised “700 Club” program for Aug. 22, rightwing US televangelist Pat Robertson complained that left-populist Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez Frias “is a dangerous enemy to our south controlling a huge pool of oil.” Robertson said: “If he thinks we’re trying to assassinate him, I think that we really ought to go ahead and do it. It’s a whole lot cheaper than starting a war, and I don’t think any oil shipments will stop.” Robertson, a strong supporter of President George W. Bush, initially denied making the remark, then apologized for it on Aug. 24.

The US government was restrained in commenting on the incident, which could get Robertson’s Christian Broadcasting Network in trouble with the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). Sean McCormack, US State Department spokesperson, said in Washington on Aug. 23: “We don’t share [Robertson’s] view, and his comments are inappropriate.” US defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld remarked: “Private citizens say all kinds of things all the time.” (NYT, Aug. 28; Financial Times, Aug. 23)

On Aug. 26, the second day of a meeting in Bariloche, Argentina, the foreign ministers of the 19 Latin American and Caribbean countries in the Rio Group expressed “astonishment” that a man whose organization is “linked to the US Republican Party” could call for the assassination of a “democratically elected president.” The group expressed its confidence that the US government would start “the relevant legal processes.” In a speech the same day, Chavez asked: “What would happen if here, in Venezuela, someone got on television to ask my government to assassinate the president of the US? I can imagine everything they’d say.” (La Jornada, Mexico, Aug. 27)

Weekly News Update on the Americas, Aug. 28

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Weekly News Update on the Americas
http://home.earthlink.net/~nicadlw/wnuhome.html

See also WW4 REPORT #112
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See our last blog post on Venezeula
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RESOURCES:

“Land for People not Profit in Venezuela” by Gregory Wilpert, Venezuelanalysis, Aug. 23 http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/articles.php?artno=1529

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Reprinted by WORLD WAR 4 REPORT, Sept. 1, 2005

Reprinting permissible with attribution

Continue ReadingVENEZUELA: OLIGARCHY STRIKES BACK AT CAMPESINOS