COLOMBIA: MILITARY TERROR IN CAUCA, ARAUCA, LA GUAJIRA

from Weekly News Update on the Americas

CAUCA: ARMY KILLS CIVILIANS

On Jan. 8, Colombian army troops from the No. 26 Cacique Piguanza Infantry Battalion, headed by Lt. Hoyos, shot to death 17-year-old Hortensia Neyid Tunja Cuchumbe and Manuel Antonio Tao Pillimue and wounded William Jose Cunacue Medina in Inza municipality, in the southern department of Cauca. On the night of Jan. 7 Tunja left her home in the community of San Antonio, accompanied by Cunacue, to attend a party in the nearby community of Belen. At 4 AM Tunja’s mother was informed by neighbors that her daughter was wounded on the road about 100 meters from Belen. When the mother arrived, she found her daughter dead, lying face down on the side of the road with bullet holes in her body. Uniformed and hooded soldiers threatened Tunja’s mother and told her that her daughter was a leftist rebel who had been killed along with a rebel “commander.” The soldiers then forced the mother to leave her daughter’s body at the site and go to Belen; they claimed they were waiting for officials from the attorney general’s office to come to the site to officially record the deaths.

The soldiers then blocked anyone from leaving Belen and attacked and beat a number of people at the party there; several people were injured, including one who was hit in the head with a rifle butt. When family members of Tunja and Tao tried to return to the site where their bodies lay, the soldiers fired their rifles in the air to force them to retreat. Around 6 AM, Tunja’s mother managed to return to the site and found the soldiers still there but her daughter’s body gone. She was told that the corpses had been taken to the town of La Plata in Huila department, where the attorney general’s office would file the report on them. Under Colombian law, only the attorney general’s office is allowed to move cadavers from the location where they are found; the army’s removal of the bodies from the site was in blatant violation of the law.

As Tunja’s mother and other family members headed toward La Plata, they found Tunja’s and Tao’s bodies covered up and dumped on the side of the highway about 30 minutes from Belen in the village of Puerto Valencia. Army troops at the site forced the family members to leave the area after telling them that the bodies would be left there for the attorney general’s office to deal with. The army then took the bodies to the military base in La Plata, where they were handed over to the families around 4 PM on Jan. 8. The family members took the bodies to the local hospital. There soldiers again intimidated the family members.

Tunja was a domestic worker who had been employed in Bogota since April 2005; she had been on vacation visiting her family in San Antonio since Dec. 27. Tao Pillimue was a young campesino who lived in the community of San Isidro in Inza municipality; he had left his home on Jan. 7 to go to the party in Belen. Tunja and Tao were members of the Campesino Association of Inza -Tierradentro (ACIT). William Jose Cunacue Medina suffered several bullet wounds and was taken to the hospital in La Plata, where army troops detained him and accused him of “rebellion.” Community members insist that none of the three youths were members of any armed organization; they say the army falsified evidence, planting weapons on the corpses and claiming the victims were guerrillas. (ACIT Communique, Jan. 11)

LA GUAJIRA: WIWA INDIGENOUS LEADERS MURDERED

On Jan. 3, Colombian army troops from the Rondon de Buenavista Group came to the indigenous Wiwa community of Seminke, in the area of San Juan del Cesar and Riohacha municipalities in the northeastern department of La Guajira. They took away community members Celso Carrillo Perea and Ricardo Arias Solis; the next day shots and explosions were heard at a distance from where the two were seized. The decomposed bodies of the two men were found in Riohacha on Jan. 5. In a joint communique, the Yugumaiun Bunkuanarrua Tayrona Wiwa Organization (OWYBT) of San Juan del Cesar, the Kogui-Malayo-Arhuaco Reserve in the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta and Prensa Indigena correspondent Guillermo Riguera indicated that Carrillo and Arias had no links to armed groups and were just campesinos engaged in agriculture to support their families. Their families were linked to an International Red Cross project in the community.

Last Dec. 9, troops from the Rondon de Buenavista Group arrived in the Wiwa community of Ulago and took resident Laudelino Mejia Montano from his home; the next day shots, explosions and a helicopter were heard nearby, and Mejia was subsequently found murdered.

The Wiwa communities are concerned because a number of residents and community leaders have been accused of being rebels or rebel sympathizers; those who are detained often turn up dead, presented as rebels killed in combat.

On Jan. 9 two individuals on a motorcycle assassinated Fernando Montano Armenta, a resident of the Wiwa indigenous community of La Pena de los Indios. He was murdered in San Juan del Cesar municipality. The community does not know which armed group is responsible for his murder. (Prensa Indigena, Jan. 3; Adital, Feb. 3)

Weekly News Update on the Americas, Feb. 5

ARAUCA: COMMUNITY LEADER MURDERED

On Feb. 4, community leader Alirio Sepulveda Jaimes was shot to death in Saravena municipality in the eastern Colombian department of Arauca, just a block and a half from an outpost of the National Police. The Departmental Association of Campesinos (ADUC) reports that Sepulveda was murdered by hired killer Edgar Guiza Gamboa, who permanently accompanies the National Army’s “Gabriel Reveis Pizarro de Saravena” Mechanized Cavalry Group No. 18, commanded by Lt. Col. Carlos Vicente Prada Garces. (ADUC, Feb. 10 via Colombia Indymedia) Prada Garces, whose first name was given in some sources as Jose Vicente, is likely the same person listed in the US Army School of the Americas (SOA) graduate list as Carlos Vicente Prado Garces; as a cadet he took SOA’s C-3 Arms Orientation Course for Cadets in January 1984, when the school was still in Panama. (SOA Graduates List)

Sepulveda’s body was picked up by several individuals on motorcycles whom witnesses recognized as members of the National Army’s S2 military intelligence unit, dressed in civilian clothing. After the killing, witnesses say Guiza went to a local shopping center where he drank alcoholic beverages and threatened passersby with the same gun he had used to shoot Sepulveda. According to ADUC, Guiza claims to be the commander of the Saravena paramilitaries.

Sepulveda was detained on Nov. 12, 2002 with 42 other Arauca community leaders, based on allegations by former rebels who were allowed to demobilize if they accused others. Sepulveda was freed for lack of evidence, but he continued to suffer constant threats and harassment; the army claimed he was a member of the National Liberation Army (ELN). (ADUC, Feb. 2 via Colombia Indymedia)

Weekly News Update on the Americas, Feb. 20

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Weekly News Update on the Americas
http://home.earthlink.net/~nicadlw/wnuhome.html

See also WW4 REPORT #118
http://www.ww3report.com/node/1536

“Colombia’s army chief sacked in brutal hazing ritual” WW4 REPORT, Feb. 27
/node/1652

——————-

Reprinted by WORLD WAR 4 REPORT, March 1, 2006
Reprinting permissible with attribution

Continue ReadingCOLOMBIA: MILITARY TERROR IN CAUCA, ARAUCA, LA GUAJIRA 

FROM BAGHDAD TO TOKYO

Japanese Anti-War Movement Hosts Iraqi Civil Resistance

by Bill Weinberg

Japan is one of the minor members of Bush’s “coalition of the willing” in terms of troop commitment, but the Asian superpower’s anti-war movement has made more progress than any other in the world in establishing direct links of human solidarity with the civil resistance in Iraq—groups of the embattled secular left which oppose the US-led occupation and the Islamist insurgents alike.

Over the weekend of January 28-9, Japan’s Movement for Democratic Socialism hosted a meeting dubbed, with greater comprehension than concision, “The International Conference Aiming at the Complete Withdrawal of All the Occupation Forces and Reconstruction of Democratic Iraq in Solidarity with the Iraqi Freedom Congress.” The event, held at a Tokyo conference hall followed by a day of speeches and presentations at a Yokohama convention center, brought together some 500—mostly Japanese, but also including small delegations from the United States, France, the Philippines, Indonesia and South Korea. Front and center was a delegation of five—including a girl of nine named Sanaria—from Iraq, representing a political alliance that stands for inter-ethnic solidarity against the occupation, and resisting the trajectory towards civil war.

Report from the Autonomous Zones

The Iraqi Freedom Congress (IFC) is a new coalition, founded just a year ago, bringing together labor unions, student groups, women’s rights organizations and neighborhood assemblies to defend civil society against the occupation troops and profusion of armed factions in Iraq. The IFC is working to establish a parallel structure to that of the US-backed regime and armed militias linked to ethnic and religious groups. Its working model for this program is a neighborhood in Kirkuk, which the IFC has established as an autonomous zone, dubbed Al-Tzaman (Solidarity).

“Anybody can live in this area,” IFC president Samir Adil said of Al-Tzaman, speaking to a group of international activists at the Tokyo conference hall. “This is a humanity area—nobody has the right to ask you your religion or ethnic identity.”

The neighborhood of some 5,000 has a mixed population of Sunni Arabs, Christians, Turcomans, and Kurds, and has been an IFC autonomous zone for a year. In a city starkly divided by vying ethnic factions, it has become a haven for peaceful co-existence. The IFC re-named the neighborhood “Solidarity” from its Saddam-era militarist appellation of Asraiwal Mafkodein—”Prisoners of War and Missing,” a tribute to conscripts lost in the war with Iran.

“There is no government in Iraq—the government is only within the Green Zone,” Adil says, explaining the proliferation of ethnic and religious militias. “If you give security they support you.” Adil admits the IFC has established armed checkpoints in Al-Tzaman to prevent infiltration by militia and insurgent groups at night. He claims a local presence by the al-Zarqawi network has been cleared out by the IFC’s efforts. Adil says the IFC is now seeking to establish a second autonomous zone in the Baghdad neighborhood of Husseinia—and is in a contest with the Shiite Badr militia, which has a presence there.

“Every household in Iraq is armed now,” Adil says. “Iraqi society is a jungle society—you have to have a gun to defend your family.” Despite this reality, he emphasizes that the IFC is seeking to build a civil resistance to the occupation—not an armed insurgency. “Civilian people are paying the price for the armed resistance, so we believe it is a bad tactic,” he says. “But we are mobilizing the people to protect themselves.”

In addition to Kirkuk and Baghdad, Adil says the IFC has a significant presence in Basra in the south and in the northern Kurdish-controlled zone.

“Iraq has become an international battleground,” Adil says. “Every terrorist group and every terrorist state wants to exploit the situation in Iraq—Iran, Sunni political Islam backed by Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, the US. And every faction has its own media. The pro-American and Islamist groups all have their own satellite TV stations.”

Which brings Adil to the IFC’s special agenda for the Tokyo conference—to raise international funds for the IFC’s own satellite station. Adil says the US-backed politician Iyad Allawi controls two satellite stations (including the US-funded Iraqi network), while Shiite factions have three (including the Iranian state network), and four more are voices for Sunni “political Islam.” Adil includes Qatar’s Al-Jazeera among these last four.

“If we get sat TV we can bring many hundreds of thousands into our movement and bring about a big change in the next six months,” Adil says. He also believes this project could change the general climate of the Middle East, where Adil says secular left perspectives have no media voice.

Adil, like many of the IFC leaders, is a veteran of political struggle against the Saddam Hussein dictatorship and a follower of the Worker-Communist Party of Iraq, founded after Operation Desert Storm to oppose both the regime and US imperialist designs on the Persian Gulf region. Born in Baghdad in 1964, he was imprisoned for six months in 1992 for labor activities in the construction trade. He was tortured in prison—he never removes his cap, but a long scar can be seen extending down his scalp to his temple. Supporters in Canada launched an international campaign which finally won his release. Realizing he was no longer safe in Saddam’s Iraq, he fled first to the Kurdish zone, then Turkey, and finally Canada. He returned to Iraq in December 2005 to help revive an independent political opposition.

If post-Saddam Iraq affords the possibility of building a new political movement, the new ethnic and religious polarization makes that movement more essential than ever, Adil says. To illustrate how the atmosphere has changed, Adil, who was born into a Shiite family, says he only became aware that his wife was born into a Sunni one when they discussed returning to Iraq together and realized their “mixed” marriage could become an issue. His wife chose to remain in Canada.

The IFC brings together several organizations, including the Federation of Worker Councils and Unions in Iraq (FWCUI), one of the major post-Saddam labor alliances, and its affiliated Union of the Unemployed in Iraq, which demands jobs and benefits for the thousands thrown out of work in the chaos since the US invasion; the Organization of Women’s Freedom in Iraq (OWFI), which is fighting the sharia law measures in the new constitution; the Kurdistan Center for the Defense of Children’s Rights, and the Worker-Communist Party.

An incident which helped spark the IFC’s founding came on March 15, 2005, when a Christian female student was physically attacked by the Sadr militia at a campus picnic at Basra University, and a male student who came to her defense was shot and killed. Thousands of students marched in protest, a solidarity march was held by students in Sulaymaniyah, and the Sadr militia was driven from the campus. These struggles led to the establishment of the National Federation of Student Councils, another IFC member organization.

Also attending the Tokyo conference was Nada Muaid, vice president of the Organization of Women’s Freedom in Iraq, who described the group’s work—including volunteer medical teams, computer classes for women, and shelters in Baghdad and Kirkuk for women fleeing domestic violence or “honor killings.” Such cases of women being murdered by their own families for adultery or even for being raped have exploded since the US invasion, Muaid says. “Political Islam has pushed women back under this occupation.” And now basic services are in rapid decline because of the heightening insecurity. “NGOs are pulling out due to kidnappings just as needs are growing—water poor quality and unreliable, blackouts are frequent.”

So OWFI is organizing self-help projects for women; the group is now seeking to expand its medical teams into full health clinics.

It is similarly picking up the slack in documenting systematic violence against women as foreign human rights organizations are reducing their presence on the ground in Iraq—again, just as the need is growing. “Abuse and rape are routine in the Interior Ministry’s political prisons,” Muaid says. “We are monitoring the human rights situation, sending reports of abuses to Amnesty International. But it is too dangerous to bring foreign rights workers to the country. And the existing human rights groups in Iraq are politicized—either they are pro-US and only report abuses by insurgents, or pro-Islamist and only report abuses by the US.”

Azad Ahmed Abdullah of the Children’s Protection Center tells a similar story. The group was founded in 1999 in the Kurdish zone, and spread after fall of Saddam, to help children wounded or left homeless in the war, or addicted to drugs. It runs shelters in Baghdad and Kirkuk, and is establishing programs in Basra and Sulaymaniyah. The Tokyo conference featured an exhibit of art by Iraqi children from the Protection Center’s workshops—most of it, not surprisingly, on themes of war.

Abdullah sees the collapse of the economy and public services as fueling the growth of political Islam. “The public schools now demand payment that many families cannot afford,” he says, “Religious schools are filling the void. And political Islamic groups exploit children for suicide bombings.”

Sanaria, the young girl from Kirkuk who was part of the IFC delegation, recounted how friendships are torn apart in her school by the ethnic tensions, how she was ostracized by Turcoman and Arab classmates for speaking Kurdish.

The fifth member of the Iraqi delegation was Ali Abbas Khafeef, who is Basra leader of both the Freedom Congress and the FWCUI. Like Samir Adil, he is a veteran of the Baathist prisons—only, after seven years in Iraqi prisons for labor activities, he was drafted and spent another 13 years in Iran as a prisoner of war.

Khafeef says the FWCUI is growing in Basra despite death threats and harassment against its leaders. It has organized strikes in the local transport and petrochemical sectors, and publishes the weekly newspaper Workers Council. Among its affiliates is the new Homeless Association, with 15,000 members in Basra. In defiance of threats, the FWCUI held a thousands-strong Mayday march through downtown Basra last year. Like OWFI’s Baghdad rally for International Women’s Day, this was a more powerful statement than many such marches around the world given the atmosphere of terror in Iraq.

Iraq Adventure Threatens Japanese Anti-Militarism

The Movement for Democratic Socialism (MDS) is one of several groups in Japan opposing their country’s involvement in Iraq, where Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi has dispatched some 530 troops. These forces are ostensibly involved in reconstruction and other “noncombatant” activities, but there is growing talk on the Japanese right of a greater military role—and even abandoning Article 9 of the post-war constitution, in which Japan officially “forever renounce[s] war as a sovereign right of the nation.” Already, Japan has the world’s fourth highest military budget, after the US, Russia and China—despite Article 9’s stipulation that “land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained.”

MDS activists are involved in a variety of causes, but all related to opposing the resurgence of Japanese militarism. MDS supports the Non-Defended Localities movement, an effort to move municipalities to reject the stationing of either Japanese or US military forces within their territory and to declare their non-cooperation with war—a right recognized by Article 59 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions.

Members are also involved in the movements to win compensation for the victims of World War II-era forced labor under Japanese occupation in China, Korea and the Philippines, and their survivors. They actively oppose the US military presence in Japan, with a current key struggle the planned expansion of a US airbase onto a coral reef at Henoko, Okinawa, threatening critical dugong habitat. All the MDS campaigns are punctuated by cultural programs by the group’s music and dance company, which incorporates traditional drumming and martial arts moves.

MDS sees an historical irony in the fact that Article 9 was imposed by the US after World War II, and it is now Bush’s need for coalition partners in Iraq which is playing into the hands of Japan’s neo-militarists.

Founded in 2000, MDS emerged from a Marxist study group at Kyoto University, and is a current within one of Japan’s oldest anti-war organizations, Zenko. An acronym for “national assembly,” Zenko began life in the early ’70s as the National Assembly of Young Workers, one of several groups then opposing Japan’s role as a staging ground for the US war on Vietnam. It has today been renamed the National Assembly for Peace and Democracy—a fruit of the same post-Soviet re-evaluation that led to the establishment of MDS, which views lack of internal democracy as critical in the collapse of the socialist bloc.

With the start of the Iraq adventure, MDS helped organize a series of Tokyo public hearings for the International Criminal Tribunal on Iraq, and loaned support for Occupation Watch, a Baghdad-based group of international volunteers who monitor US military abuses. It was through this work that MDS became aware of the groups which now make up the IFC. Over the past two years, the MDS brought members of these groups to Japan to testify at the Tribunal and to participate in the annual Zenko conference. MDS also sent two delegations of Japanese activists to Iraq, where they were hosted by the civil resistance groups.

Says Mori Fumihiro, an MDS leader and co-chair of the Japanese Committee for Solidarity with Iraqi Civil Resistance: “We were impressed with their struggle as a humanitarian movement. They are involved in unarmed struggle against the occupation. They demand a secular and non-religious government as well as full equality between women and men. They call for the global anti-war movement to make solidarity with them… I believe that they are part of a global anti-war and anti-capitalism struggle and that international solidarity with them will strengthen our struggle.”

The MDS and Zenko conferences have helped build support for the Iraqi civil resistance groups internationally. The group SolidaritĂ© Irak is now working to support the IFC in France, and its representative Nicolas Dessaux attended the January conference in Tokyo. Members of the US group United for Peace & Justice have also attended, and in a step towards international coordination between the US anti-war movement and Iraqi civil resistance, the IFC held marches coinciding with last year’s Sept. 24 mobilization against the war in Washington DC. The IFC marches against the occupation that day brought out 600 in Baghdad and 3,000 in Basra—again, numbers rendered more significant by the fact that street mobilizations in Iraq are now routinely attacked by either occupation troops, security forces or armed factions.

The decision to work in solidarity with the IFC came only after much disputation both within the MDS and with international anti-war organizations. Says Asai Kenji, editor of the MDS Weekly newsletter: “When OWFI head Yanar Mohammed came and attended the Zenko annual conference in 2004, there were heated debates on how we can or cannot support a specific grouping in Iraq opposed to the occupation.”

At the July 2004 34th Zenko conference, the most intransigent voices opposed to adopting solidarity with the Iraqi civil opposition in the meeting’s final resolution came from American and British delegations. MDS president Sato Kazuyoshi wrote up an evaluation of the debate after the conference—and explained why MDS finally rejected the criticisms:

“The most disputed point in the conference was about the slogan of solidarity with Iraqi Civil Resistance. Representatives of the ANSWER (‘Act Now to Stop War & End Racism’) Coalition in the U.S. and of the Stop the War Coalition in the U.K. expressed their view that ‘we can’t say from outside Iraq which of the anti-occupational resistance forces are right,’ and that ‘it is a matter to be left to the self-determination of the Iraqis, and the world anti-war movements have only to focus on bringing troops home.’ In response to this argument, representatives of the UUI (Union of the Unemployed in Iraq) and OWFI (Organization of Women’s Freedom in Iraq) emphatically protested and asked what is wrong with building solidarity with movements that are demanding the withdrawal of occupation forces, and aspiring to a free, egalitarian and secular Iraq…

“Presently, the Movement for Democratic Socialism (MDS) is right in the middle of the struggles against the war on Iraq, hoisting aloft the flag of solidarity with the Iraqi Civil Resistance… The tactics adopted by the Islamic armed forces, i.e. kidnapping, confinement, abduction, beheading, assassination, cannot be justified…for the sake of opposing U.S. imperialism. Their suicide bombings are killing more Iraqi civilians than U.S. soldiers. Discrimination and oppression against women cannot be justified. They are trying to confront the U.S. military, ignoring lives and human rights of the Iraqis. .. They are trying to materialize an Islamic dictatorship in Iraq, not a democracy. Iraqi people do not want the U.S. occupation forces to be replaced by a dictator…

“In the case of the Vietnam War, victory was achieved through combining armed struggle and global anti-war movements. However, the National Liberation Front and the army of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam did not direct their guns toward the civilian population. Nor did they commit suicide bombings… In the Vietnam War, the victory was achieved because they succeeded in mobilizing all anti-U.S. imperialist forces, regardless of religions and ethnicities…

“It should be a natural right for the OWFI to protest against Islamist groups that intimidate women who don’t wear a hijab (head scarf). It should also be a natural right for them to criticize the kidnapping of women in the name of resistance. How do these events relate to the interests of the U.S. imperialist occupation? What is wrong with women struggling for their own safety?”

The statement also outlined analytical differences between MDS and the Worker-Communist Party of Iraq—particularly concerning the significance of political Islam on the world stage. MDS considers the Worker-Communist Party’s juxtaposition of US imperialism and political Islam as “two poles of terrorism” an oversimplification that exaggerates the importance of the latter. The statement calls for “further examination” of this and related questions, while concluding: “We have to strengthen the Iraqi Civil Resistance, which is struggling to drive out the occupiers and to realize secularism and democracy in Iraq.”

Towards a Free, Secular Iraq

Even a month before the horrific bombing of the Golden Mosque at Samarra, Samir Adil warned that Iraq was sliding towards collapse of the government, and civil war. “More than a month after the elections, pro-occupation terrorist groups are still forming a government in secret deliberations,” he said. “This is not democracy, this is a sham. Social services, security—the elections didn’t solve anything, they just gave legitimacy to the same scenario. Ethnic and nationalist conflict is deepening day by day. The militias carry out disappearances, throw bodies in the desert every night.”

The room for civil political activities closes day by day. On Jan. 1, US forces opened fire on a demonstration against high oil prices in Kirkuk, killing four. Days later, two were killed in Nasiriyah when Iraqi security forces opened fire on a march against unemployment.

Adil says the IFC advocates complete non-collaboration with the Iraqi government as long as the country is occupied by foreign troops and as long as the new state is predicated on “dividing power and oil proceeds between the ethnic factions.” Instead he calls for “public accountability and visibility on administration of resource money for the benefit of the Iraqi people as a whole.”

While Arab nationalists call for officially defining Iraq as “part of Arab homeland” and Kurdish nationalist parties ultimately seek secession, Adil says the IFC sees Iraq as first and foremost “part of the world.” He says the IFC opposes federalism as a recipe for civil war and the permanent fracturing of the Iraqi state. He calls for an Iraqi state in which the citizen is not a member of an ethnic or religious group but “human first, human last and human always.”

Adil sees the Western press as complicit in Iraq’s slide towards civil war by failing to note the existence of the secular opposition, or even to recall Iraq’s tradition of secularism as an independent nation. “They define our society as reactionary, religious. Nobody is talking about our secular society.

Asked for a final message for readers in the Unites States, Adil says: “The US lost in Vietnam not because the US lost soldiers in Vietnam, but because they lost the support of the American people. But we don’t want the American people to just protest to bring the troops home, but to support the secular progressive forces in Iraq, to think about the Iraqi people. We do not want another Taliban regime or Islamic Republic in Iraq.”

RESOURCES:

Iraqi Freedom Congress
http://www.ifcongress.com

Movement for Democratic Socialism
http://www.mdsweb.jp

MDS Appeal for World Solidarity with the IFC
http://www.mdsweb.jp/international/i923/i923_01a.html

Sato Kazuyoshi statement on 2004 Zenko conference
http://www.mdsweb.jp/international/magazine/r56/i_r56t1.html

MDS page on Non-Defended Localities
http://www.mdsweb.jp/international/i886/i886_45b.html

International Criminal Tribunal for Iraq—Japan
http://www.icti-e.com/englishsite.html

Save the Dugong Campaign Center
http://www.sdcc.jp/

Zenko
http://www.zenko-peace.com

Solidarité Irak
http://www.solidariteirak.org/

See also:

“Civil War in Iraq: Already Here?”
by Bill Weinberg,
WW4 REPORT, October 2005
/node/1151

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Special to WORLD WAR 4 REPORT, March 1, 2006
Reprinting permissible with attribution

Continue ReadingFROM BAGHDAD TO TOKYO 

WAR AT THE CROSSROADS

An Historical Guide Through the Balkan Labyrinth

by Bill Weinberg and Dorie Wilsnack

The Balkan region is intensely multicultural—a point of crossroads and clash for some of the world’s major religions, cultural spheres, and economic systems. While there have been vicious wars in Balkan history, these have taken place in the context of manipulation by imperial powers and the self-serving local leaders who cater to them.

The Balkans as Theater of Imperial Rivalry
Among the earliest inhabitants of the Balkans were the Illyrians, ancestors of the Albanians, who arrived before the seventh century B.C.E. They eventually came under the domination of the Roman Empire. In the fourth century C.E., the declining empire was divided in two for reasons of administrative expediency. The Western Empire remained based in Rome, while the Eastern Empire was centered in Constantinople (today Istanbul) and became the Byzantine Empire. While the Western Empire crumbled, the Byzantines grew more powerful. The border between the two empires was drawn right through the Balkans—setting the stage for centuries of future conflict.

The Slavs moved into the region from the north in the fifth century C.E., with Slavic tribes developing into the nations of Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia, and Montenegro (united by the Serbo-Croatian language), and Slovenia and Macedonia. Under the feudal system, smaller regions within these nations maintained a certain autonomy—such as Dalmatia and Slavonia in Croatia, and Herzegovina in Bosnia.

The border between the ancient Eastern and Western Roman Empires corresponds almost precisely with that between present-day Serbia and Croatia. The power vacuum left by the decline of Rome allowed Croatia and Slovenia in the north and west to attain a degree of independence and sovereignty—though pressure from the Magyars in Hungary forced them into the influence sphere of Germanic powers like the Frankish empire of Charlemagne. The Serbs, however, came under Byzantine rule. The neighboring Bulgarian Empire, which included Macedonia, also eventually fell within the Byzantine sphere, as did Montenegro and much of the Dalmatian coast—although the port of Ragusa (today Dubrovnik), a center of trade with the Italian city-states, maintained its independence.

The two branches of the Roman Empire, of course, developed into the two great branches of Christianity. Hence, Slovenia and Croatia became Roman Catholic, while Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia became Eastern Orthodox. Both religions vied in Dalmatia and other contested regions. Bosnia, a remote and mountainous region between the two spheres, was never effectively under the control of either and developed a “heresy” with populist and anti-authoritarian overtones called Bogomilism, which the Catholic powers to the north and Orthodox powers to the south both did their best to exterminate.

Independent Croatia disappeared in 1102 C.E., when it was absorbed by Catholic Hungary. Bosnia also fell under Hungarian rule following a Rome-sanctioned crusade against the Bogomils in 1244, though it regained its independence in 1377. In 1190, as the Byzantine Empire began to lose its grip on the Balkans, Serbia emerged as an independent kingdom. At its most powerful, medieval Serbia included Macedonia and extended south to the Aegean coast.

In the fourteenth century the Byzantine Empire was in rapid decline, besieged by Turkish invasions from the east. The Turkish (and Islamic) Ottoman Empire established itself on the ruins of the Byzantine Empire and expanded into the Balkans. Following the decisive Battle of Kosovo in 1389, Serbia lost most of its territory to the Ottomans. A reduced Serbian kingdom survived along the Danube River to the north under Hungarian protection, but completely succumbed to the Ottomans in 1459. Belgrade, the city on the Danube which had been established as Serbia’s new capital, held out under direct Hungarian rule until it was finally taken by Ottoman emperor Suleiman the Magnificent in 1521.

The Ottomans had succeeded in winning the loyalty of Bosnian peasant Bogomils during their uprisings against Catholic Hungary. In 1463, Bosnia was annexed to the Ottoman Empire and most of the Bogomils converted to Islam. The Ottoman administrators favored Bosnia’s Muslim Slav majority with status and access to land. Those Bosnians who remained Catholic were considered ethnic Croats. Those who remained Orthodox identified themselves as Serbs.

While many Bosnian peasants had welcomed the Ottomans as liberators, the Serbs mourned their lost kingdom and were loathe to acknowledge Constantinople’s new rule.

Beginning in the sixteenth century, the Balkans became the scene of a great struggle between the Ottoman Empire and the Hapsburg monarchy in Austria. As the Austrian and Hungarian empires merged in the seventeenth century, Croatia and Slovenia came under the control of Vienna, while Serbia, Bosnia, and Macedonia remained under Turkish rule. The Austrians encouraged Serbs to migrate to Croatia to form a border militia and fight against their former Turkish masters. These Serbs established the Krajina, a semi-autonomous martial zone within Croatia.

The Ottomans invaded Austrian territory in 1683, but were driven back. Then, Austria invaded Ottoman territory in 1689 but was similarly driven back. Afterwards, local Serbs were accused of “collaboration” with the invader. Facing violent reprisals, many Serbs migrated from Kosovo, and this plateau which had been the heart of medieval Serbia became more the domain of ethnic Albanians. Pushed into the mountains by the Serbs centuries earlier, the Albanians were now favored by the Ottomans and many converted to Islam.

The Emergence of Nationalism
After the French Revolution, both nationalism and the idea of South Slav (Yugoslav) unity spread in the Balkans. Napoleon Bonaparte”s armies established the “Illyrian Provinces” in Dalmatia, formally abolishing feudalism there. Dalmatia was returned to Austrian rule after Napoleon’s defeat in 1815, but the ideological seeds of modernity had taken root.

A movement for Serbian independence emerged, which, despite violent repression by the Ottomans, succeeded in creating a semi-independent Serbian state by 1830. The following decades saw growing violence. The Turks attempted to crush nationalist movements in Macedonia and to take Montenegro, which maintained a precarious independence. Christian peasants revolted against the Ottomans in Bosnia, and were aided by Austria and Serbia. Bosnia was occupied by Austria in 1878 and formally annexed in 1908.

In 1912, Greece, Bulgaria, and Russia joined with Serbia in the First Balkan War to wrest Macedonia and Kosovo from the Turks. The Albanians in Macedonia and Kosovo suffered reprisals at the hands of the invading Serbian forces, including the burning of villages. Fearing annexation by Serbia and Greece, regional leaders in Albania declared their own independence. While the leadership of the Albanian independence movement was Muslim, Catholics and the Orthodox were also embraced by the nascent Albanian national identity. The Albanian national movement had actually first emerged in Kosovo, with the founding of the patriotic League of Prizren in 1878.

In 1913, the winners of the First Balkan War began fighting among themselves in a Second Balkan War. Russia and Greece were joined by Romania in backing Serbia’s struggle against Bulgaria for control of Macedonia. Serbia won control of both Macedonia and Kosovo.

The balance of power had shifted again. Serbian nationalists no longer saw the Hapsburg monarchy as an ally against the Ottomans, but as the remaining imperial power standing in the way of a Greater Serbia. Serbia began supporting nationalist organizations like the clandestine Black Hand among Serbs in Austro-Hungarian Bosnia and Croatia.

Allegedly, it was a Black Hand activist who assassinated the Austro-Hungarian Archduke Ferdinand at Sarajevo in 1914. However, lax security during Ferdinand’s visit to the Bosnian city led some to speculate that Austrian hard-liners wanted the Archduke dead as an excuse to make war on Serbia. When Austria attacked Serbia, Europe was plunged into World War I.

The Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires now joined forces against Russia, and its ally Great Britain, which came to Serbia’s aid. Germany lined up with Vienna and Constantinople; France with London and Moscow. Greece and Romania sided with Russia and the Serbs against Bulgaria and the Turks. Croats and Slovenes who had been conscripted into the Austrian army were pitted against the Serbs. Albanians in Kosovo revolted in support of the Austrian invasion, and were favored with administrative posts and restoration of their language and cultural rights by the Austrian occupation forces.

When the Bolsheviks seized power in 1917, Russia withdrew from the war. But by then the United States had entered on the side of Britain and France, and the Allies landed at Greece to help the Serbian army retake the country. In 1918, the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires were defeated and finally dismantled.

From the First Yugoslavia to World War II
The victorious Allies redrew the map of the region. In cooperation with local forces who aspired to South Slav unity, a Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes was created—later renamed Yugoslavia. For the first time Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia, Montenegro, and Macedonia were united into a common state. The Hungarian region of Vojvodina was annexed to Serbia (having been an autonomous Serb duchy within the Hapsburg empire). The small enclave of Zara on Croatia’s Dalmatian coast was taken by Italy which, in 1919, called in U.S. troops to back up its claim.

The new Yugoslav government was based on the Serbian monarchy, and was seated at the Serbian capital of Belgrade. The establishment of a dictatorship by King Alexander in 1929 further consolidated Serb power in the new state. Administrative borders were redrawn within the kingdom, augmenting Serb control and eliminating the constituent nations as unified territories.

This “First Yugoslavia” began to fall apart with the rise of European fascism in the 1930s. In 1934, King Alexander was assassinated by a member of the Croatian nationalist organization Ustashe, which was backed by Mussolini’s Italy. The Regency appointed to rule in place of Alexander’s ten-year-old son granted Croatia some autonomy. With the outbreak of World War II, it also tilted toward the Axis, signing a pact with Hitler in March of 1941. This resulted in British support for a coup d’etat and popular uprising against the Regency. But the uprising was put down by invading Nazi troops as the Luftwaffe bombed Belgrade. The government and royal family fled into exile in Britain.

The fascist powers dismantled Yugoslavia. The German occupation forces ruled Serbia with collaborationist elements from the old regime. A pro-Nazi “independent” Croatian state, which included Bosnia, was established under the Ustashe. Italy had seized Albania in 1939 and now occupied Dalmatia and Montenegro as well, and divided Slovenia with Germany. Most of Kosovo was annexed to Italian-occupied Albania. Hungary took much of Vojvodina, while Bulgaria annexed Macedonia.

The Ustashe regime in Croatia established a death camp at Jasenovac and carried out genocide against hundreds of thousands of Serbs, Jews, and Roma (Gypsies). Bosnia’s Muslim leadership was co-opted by the Ustashe regime and cooperated in the genocide. Nazi and collaborationist forces in Serbia deported Jews and Roma to Auschwitz, and sent uncooperative Serb army officers to German prison camps. Many Kosovo Albanians, their loyalty bought by unification with Albania, also formed collaborationist militias. Serbian nationalist elements in the Yugoslav military that remained loyal to the monarchy formed a guerrilla group known as the Chetniks, which initially received aid from Britain and resisted the Nazi occupation.

However, at the behest of Russia’s Joseph Stalin, the Allies ultimately threw their support behind a Communist guerrilla movement known as the Partisans, which remained committed to the idea of Yugoslavia, as opposed to Serb nationalism. The fighting became extremely confused. Perceiving the Partisans as the greater threat, some Chetniks joined Italian and German offensives against the Communist guerillas. Chetniks in Bosnia massacred Muslims and Croats. Britain and the U.S. air-dropped aid to the multi-ethnic Partisans in their struggle against the Ustashe, the Chetniks, and the occupation forces.

The Tito Era
In July 1943, Mussolini was overthrown and Italian troops returned home from the Balkans. In November 1944, the Soviet Red Army advanced on Belgrade. The overstretched Germans were dislodged and the Partisans emerged victorious. Their Croatian-born leader, Marshal Josip Broz Tito, was installed in power. Tito established the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which consisted of six republics (Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia, Macedonia, and Montenegro) and two autonomous regions within Serbia (Vojvodina and Kosovo). Not only was defeated Italy forced to cede its claims to Dalmatian territory, but the Italian peninsula of Istria was liberated from Mussolini’s rule by Tito’s Partisans and annexed to Croatia. Tito even tried to claim the Italian city of Trieste, but backed down after sparking a post-war crisis with the West.

Following Tito’s break with Stalin in 1948, Yugoslavia maintained independence from the Soviet bloc, pursuing a “non-aligned” path between East and West. The neighboring Albanian Communist regime under Enver Hoxha, which had been closely allied with Tito, broke from Yugoslavia at this time and became a rigidly closed dictatorship.

Yugoslavia embarked on a program of reconstruction and industrialization. Creating a multi-ethnic Bosnian republic was part of Tito’s plan to solidify the anti-nationalist character of the new Yugoslavia. But Serbs retained predominance in the Communist Party apparatus, the political police, and the leadership of the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA). Fearing invasion from both NATO and the USSR, Tito gave the JNA a central role in the new Yugoslavia. It became one of the largest of Europe’s armies. Using the Partisan model, the government also built an extensive territorial defense network of local militias.

Tito built Yugoslavia’s defense industry into one of Europe’s largest, with Bosnia (seen as the strategic center from which to defend in the event of war) home to some of the most important arms plants. Trade and investment for the Yugoslav arms industry poured in from both the East and West. American defense giants like Lockheed won contracts in Yugoslavia. Tito’s system of “self-management” incorporated certain capitalist elements and allowed for a larger degree of autonomy in the industrial sector than in most Communist states. International capital was obtained for the development of heavy industry, especially metallurgy, in Croatia. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) loaned heavily in the 1960s. In the effort to transform a peasant economy into an industrial power, Yugoslavia racked up a $20 billion foreign debt—a figure comparable to that of many Third World nations.

While Yugoslavia became the most open of the Communist nations, there was still significant repression. Tito kept the lid on the hatreds left smoldering from World War II, but he muzzled legitimate discourse and dissent as well. Any expression of nationalist sentiment was completely forbidden. Nevertheless, demands for autonomy continued to surface. The Yugoslav security forces, suspicious of Hoxha’s designs on the region, took a heavy hand with Kosovo Albanians in the 1960s, leading to demonstrations in Pristina (the regional capital) in 1968. Student democracy protests in Belgrade that year were also met with arrests. In the “Croatian Spring” of the early 1970s, the republic’s Communist Party began moving towards autonomy from Belgrade, prompting Tito to unleash a purge.

However, these developments also prompted Tito to purge hard-liners from the federal apparatus and to unveil a new constitution instating a high level of decentralization in nearly all areas except military and foreign policy. The 1974 constitution established a rotating federal presidency among the republics, to take effect after Tito’s death. The autonomy of Kosovo and Vojvodina was extended to make them equal with the six republics in most capacities.

In the late 1970s the IMF started to call in its loans. Following Tito’s death in 1980, Yugoslavia fell into dramatic economic decline as IMF repayment plans imposed harsh austerity. Richer Slovenia and Croatia began to resent the drain of local wealth to the JNA—and the poorer regions of Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia. Albanian students demanding greater autonomy protested angrily in Kosovo in 1981. Thousands were arrested and eleven students were killed by the police. Grassroots movements against militarism and nuclear power, especially in Croatia and Slovenia (where an atomic plant was built), called for a looser Yugoslav confederation. But such initiatives were blocked by the JNA.

Yugoslavia Self-Destructs
In 1986 word surfaced of a secret memorandum written by the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences delineating a plan for a Greater Serbia within Yugoslavia. The text, revealed in the press years later, called for revoking Kosovo’s autonomy and charged the Kosovar Albanians with “war” against the province’s Serbs. In fact, Kosovo’s mines were a source of much wealth for the federal regime, yet the region was Yugoslavia’s poorest. The Albanians, as Yugoslavia’s poorest group, had soaring birth rates, while Serbs of means were moving out of Kosovo. At the time, Albanians made up 90 percent of Kosovo’s population, and there were widespread accusations of violence and discrimination against local Serbs.

Slobodan Milosevic’s League of Communists of Serbia (soon to be renamed the Socialist Party of Serbia) became the first group to successfully break the Titoist prohibition on nationalism, launching a populist campaign in 1987 that exploited both class resentment against bureaucratic elites and Serb fears of Albanian demographic dominance in Kosovo. The 1389 Battle of Kosovo became a rallying cry. The campaign led to Milosevic’s election as Serbia’s president. The JNA, with a largely Serb officer corps, fell in line behind him.

In 1989, Milosevic arranged a purge of Kosovo’s Communist party and pushed through constitutional changes that abolished Kosovo’s autonomy. Students again took to the streets in Pristina, and workers occupied Kosovo’s mines in protest of the move. Milosevic put down the actions with army troops, while opposition protesters in Belgrade also met violent repression. Albanian teachers and government workers in Kosovo were fired on a massive scale. Schools and other public institutions became rigidly segregated. Albanian-language newspapers and radio stations were closed. Kosovo’s Albanians established a parallel network of schools, clinics, and civic agencies run out of private homes.

The Serbian treatment of Albanians evoked disgust in Slovenia and Croatia. Nationalist parties emerged in each of the republics, and the Yugoslav Communist Party fell apart, surviving only as Serbia’s ruling party. The federal structure ceased to function.

In 1990, a new deal with the IMF imposed economic “shock therapy” on Yugoslavia, freezing wages and dramatically cutting back such basic services as energy and transportation. That same year, the United States cut off economic aid pending the results of the upcoming separate elections in each of the six republics. The elections were marked by populist campaigns highlighting ethnic grievances in each republic.

Franjo Tudjman, leader of the Croatian Democratic Union (CDU), was a veteran of the Partisans who had been briefly imprisoned under Tito for espousing Croatian nationalism. Tudjman won 67 percent of the vote in Croatia. The CDU victory stirred fears among Croatia’s Serbs when the party refused to disavow Croatia’s Ustashe past. This stance proved helpful to Milosevic in Serbia as he used his nationalist program to outmaneuver student and intellectual opposition.

A plebiscite in Slovenia in December of 1990 went overwhelmingly for secession, and Slovenia prepared to declare independence. A similar referendum in Croatia in May 1991 had similar results. Fears of Croatian independence were inflamed in Croatia’s Serb enclaves when the nascent state adopted the flag and crest that had been used by the Ustashe (although the symbols had roots in medieval Croatia). Tudjman’s draft constitution made no reference to the citizenship rights of ethnic Serbs, who were a “constituent nationality” under Croatia’s Communist constitution. He purged Serbs from the republic’s police and militia forces in preparation for independence. Before the plebiscite, Serbs formed their own militias and sealed off their enclaves. No polling stations were allowed in their territory. After three generations, the Krajina had reemerged.

On June 21, 1991, United States Secretary of State James Baker visited Belgrade, warning of the “dangers of disintegration” and urging Yugoslavia to maintain “territorial integrity.” Belgrade took this as a “green light” to use force to halt secession. Meanwhile, Germany, with substantial investments in Slovenia and Croatia, was urging the European Community to recognize the breakaway republics. One week after Baker’s comments, Croatia and Slovenia declared independence and JNA tanks and troops invaded Slovenia, meeting strong resistance from Slovenian territorial defense forces. After ten days of fighting, with forty-four JNA troops dead, the international community helped negotiate a cease-fire and a three-month moratorium on Slovenia’s secession. By the time the moratorium expired, the JNA had pulled out. The Balkans’ borders had changed for the first time since World War II.

War in Croatia and Bosnia
By then Croatia had descended into war. The Serbs in the Krajina declared their own independence, expelling Croat residents from their territory. The JNA invaded eastern Croatia in August, coming to the defense of local Serb militias. Serb artillery demolished the city of Vukovar in Croatia’s eastern Slavonia region. Atrocities against civilians were committed by both sides.

The European Community tried to mediate the conflict at a September conference in The Hague, where Serbia demanded that Serb regions in any seceding republic have the option to remain in Yugoslavia. Talks in The Hague deadlocked, and the fighting intensified. In October, the city of Dubrovnik, on Croatia’s Dalmatian coast, was shelled by Serb/JNA forces from the overlooking hills. Fourteen cease-fires were implemented and failed until February 1992, when United Nations Special Envoy Cyrus Vance brokered one that included the introduction of UN peacekeeping forces.

Under German pressure, in December 1991 the European Community recognized Slovenia and Croatia as independent. But the Serb-controlled regions of Croatia in the Krajina and Slavonia continued to maintain their autonomy – which was not recognized by the Croatian capital of Zagreb, but backed by force of arms. In June 1992, the UN began an economic embargo against Serbia. An arms embargo against all republics failed to stop the war from spreading, and some say it solidified the Serbs’ power since they had large weapons stockpiles supplied by a sympathetic JNA.

The future of Bosnia become unclear. Bosnia’s cultural diversity (45 percent Muslim Slav, 33 percent Serb, and 18 percent Croat), traditionally a point of pride, became a source of tension. The Bosnians initially declared their desire to remain in a loose Yugoslav confederation. But faced with secession by Slovenia and Croatia they were compelled to hold a referendum of their own in February 1992. This halted all negotiations in Bosnia, and strengthened a strategic alliance between Bosnian Muslims and Croats against the Serbs, who boycotted the referendum. The vote went for secession.

The 1991 Bosnian elections had brought Alija Izetbegovic of the Muslim-supported Party of Democratic Action to power. Izetbegovic was a former dissident who had been imprisoned in 1983 for writing an “Islamic Declaration” outlining a program for Muslim nationalism. Although Izetbegovic put together a multi-ethnic coalition government, the Milosevic regime used his background to convince Bosnian Serbs that the Bosnian government was a fundamentalist Islamic power bent on massacring Serbs in a holy war.

By April 1992, fighting had begun in Bosnia. Under the leadership of poet and psychiatrist Radovan Karadzic, and with support from Serbia, Bosnian Serbs formed their own “Serb Republic” and military. Karadzic’s forces sought to cut a corridor though northern Bosnia to connect Serbia with Serb-controlled areas of Croatia. They attempted to create ethnically homogeneous zones, eventually gaining control of some 70 percent of Bosnian territory. The expulsion of Muslims and Croats from areas under their control drew international protest, as did the discovery of makeshift concentration camps run by Serb troops where mass rapes and other atrocities occurred. (United States President George Bush knew of these horrific realities from CIA reports before they were revealed in the international press, but remained silent about them.)

Karadzic integrated Bosnian Serb JNA troops into his military command, which continued to receive support from Belgrade. Zagreb backed Bosnian Croat forces under Mate Boban, who came to the aid of the besieged Bosnian government. The UN sent peacekeeper troops to police the lines of control, and UN negotiators Cyrus Vance and Lord David Owen developed a Peace Plan dividing Bosnia into ten semi-autonomous regions. The plan won grudging agreement from the Bosnian government and Croat forces, but the Serbs rejected it at their self-declared parliament.

In January 1993, fighting briefly broke out between Croats and Serbs in Croatia, where the presence of UN troops had done little to move the situation toward a political settlement. In March, Bosnian Croat forces also began attacking Muslims in towns like Mostar, with an eye to staking a territorial claim before the Peace Plan took effect – leading many Muslims to suspect a Serb-Croat plot to divide Bosnia.

Bosnia settled into a war of attrition, with Sarajevo and a few other government-held cities besieged by the rebel Serb forces that controlled most of the country. For months, Sarajevo, Bosnia’s capital, was intermittently shelled from the surrounding hills. The UN announced war crimes charges against Karadzic and his general, Ratko Mladic, as well as lesser figures from all three sides.

Macedonia also declared independence, gaining UN recognition in 1993. Yugoslavia now consisted only of Serbia and Montenegro. In 1992, Kosovo Albanians had gone to the polls in their living rooms, electing a parliament and president—dissident intellectual Ibrahim Rugova—to lead their parallel underground government, but held back from declaring themselves an independent state.

Slobodan Milosevic, his Serbian nationalist party now known as the Socialist Party, faced opposition from both marginalized anti-war dissidents and ultra-nationalists like Vojaslav Seselj’s Radical Party, which controlled seats in the Yugoslav Parliament. But Milosevic, shifting to maintain power, sometimes found Seselj a useful ally against Serbian moderates.

In Croatia, the hard-line opposition of Dobroslav Paraga (which was openly nostalgic for the Ustashe) represented a more strident nationalism than Tudjman. Like Serbia’s Seselj, Paraga controlled extremist paramilitary groups in Bosnia. But an anti-war opposition also persisted in Croatia. In both Serbia and Croatia, the opposition press was periodically closed by official decree for criticism of the regime.

The forces of the Bosnian Muslims, Croats, and especially Serbs, who faced the most stringent embargo, turned to smuggling heroin and other contraband for arms and petrol. A criminal economy exploded throughout the region.

Western Intervention
In February 1994, following a rocket attack on Sarajevo’s marketplace, NATO planes struck Serb targets in Bosnia. The siege of Sarajevo was eased. Mate Boban was ousted as leader of the Bosnian Croats, and a formal Croat-Muslim alliance was rebuilt. In May 1994, after NATO threatened air strikes against Serbia, Milosevic ordered the Bosnian border sealed, ostensibly cutting off aid to Karadzic. President Bill Clinton then pressed to lift the arms embargo against the Bosnian government, but the United Kingdom and France (with UN peacekeeper troops in Bosnia) refused. Nonetheless, Clinton later vetoed bills to end U.S. participation in the arms embargo.

In May 1995, Croatian government forces took the Serb-held Western Slavonia enclave, sending Serb refugees fleeing into Serb-held Bosnia.

In July, Bosnian Serb forces overran the UN-protected “safe areas” of Zepa and Srebrenica, summarily evicting thousands of Muslim women and children to Bosnian government-held territory. Srebrenica’s men were held, their whereabouts a mystery—years later, international investigators would find the mass graves where they had been dumped. Investigators maintain that the Serb forces used the mind-altering gas BZ against the troops defending Srebrenica. Sarajevo, Gorazde, Tuzla, and Bihac were the only remaining UN “safe areas.” Croatian troops intervened as Bosnian Serbs attempted to take the government-held Bihac pocket near the Croatian border.

In August, Croatia invaded the Krajina, meeting little resistance. Serbia did nothing to intervene, leading to further theories of a Tudjman-Milosevic carve-up deal. A U.S. warplane based on a carrier off Dalmatia’s coast launched strikes on the Serbs’ missile defense system in the Krajina just before Tudjman ordered in his troops. The Croatian forces were also trained by U.S. military advisors for the Krajina invasion, dubbed Operation Storm—technically not a violation of the arms embargo, which did not cover military instruction.

Two hundred thousand Serb refugees fled the Krajina in a massive exodus to Serb-held Bosnia and Serbia, with Croatian troops burning and ransacking their houses behind them. Milosevic faced nationalist protests in Belgrade for his failure to act. The overwhelmed Serbian government settled the refugees in Vojvodina and Kosovo, helping tip the demographic balance away from Hungarians and Albanians, respectively. As the refugees arrived, Croats were expelled from Serb-held Bosnia and Vojvodina.

Tensions also escalated in the one remaining Serb-held area of Croatia, the Eastern Slavonia enclave bordering Serbia. Skirmishes erupted with Croatian troops, and Milosevic sent forces to Serbia’s border with the enclave. Pushing a new U.S.-brokered peace plan for a confederated Bosnia with large Serb and Croat ethnic zones, NATO threatened further raids if Sarajevo was shelled. At the end of August a second marketplace bombing called NATO’s ultimatum. From U.S. air bases in Italy, NATO launched successive bombing raids aimed at Serb arms depots and artillery outside Sarajevo. The NATO raids and Serb losses in the Krajina marked a turning point. Bosnian government and Croat forces made territorial gains in a sweep through central Bosnia.

The new U.S. role augmented the Clinton Administration’s renewed leadership status in Europe, and headed off greater involvement by Islamic countries that had sent mercenaries to fight for the Bosnian government. Despite opposition at home, Clinton ordered 20,000 U.S. troops to Bosnia, which was divided by NATO into U.S., French, and British spheres. Greece, Turkey, Germany, and other NATO members sent smaller troop detachments. In a special arrangement for a non-NATO state, so did Russia—the perceived protector of the Serbs.

American negotiators successfully brokered a cease-fire in October, bringing Serb, Croat, and Muslim leaders to Wright Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, Ohio, for a three-week marathon session that resulted in the Dayton Peace Accord. Under heavy pressure, the Bosnian Serbs agreed to be represented in Dayton by Milosevic, who suddenly took on the mantle of “peacemaker.” This finally brought the lifting of economic sanctions against Serbia. In the wake of Dayton, Serbia also agreed to pull out of Eastern Slavonia, ending the last armed stand-off in Croatia.

The Dayton Accord ostensibly established a single Bosnian state—but one made up of two separate entities, a Serb Republic and a Croat-Bosnian Federation, which maintained their own militaries and separate relationships with bordering states. Even those areas under Croat control were more answerable to Zagreb than Sarajevo. NATO troops replaced the ineffective UN forces as the monitors of compliance with the Accord. Yet responsibility for overseeing elections, rebuilding, refugee repatriation, and civil reconciliation stayed with UN, European Union, and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) agencies with comparatively modest budgets.

The Dayton Accord displayed a pattern familiar since the region’s early history. The agendas of the Western powers informed the Accord, and the local political leaders used it for their own advantages, just as they used ethnic nationalism and war. Bosnia’s civilian population had little say in the matter. Over 10,000 had been killed in Sarajevo since the war started.

The Kosovo Explosion
The Dayton Accord failed to include any provisions for Kosovo. In frustration, many young Albanians gave up on Ibrahim Rugova’s nonviolent strategy of building a parallel society that could eventually gain international recognition. In 1997, an Albanian guerrilla group, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), began ambushing police patrols and attacking stations. Serbian security forces responded by sealing off villages and rounding up suspected guerrilla collaborators. Reports of torture and “disappearance” of detained Albanians escalated.

Milosevic was then facing the biggest crisis of his career. When his regime refused to recognize local elections for the opposition in November 1996, thousands of protesters took over Belgrade’s central square for several weeks. The protests were broken by police in January 1997 and the opposition coalition splintered, though the regime finally did recognize some opposition electoral victories.

Milosevic was barred by the constitution from running for a third term as Serbian president, but in July 1997 he had the federal Parliament he controlled elect him president of Yugoslavia. The vote was taken in an atmosphere of terror, with the opposition press closed by decree. Milosevic remained Serbia’s real boss, and actually increased his power.

Neighboring Albania had meanwhile descended into chaos. The weak post-Communist government had entered NATO’s Partnership for Peace military program and opened the country to U.S. troops and spy planes. It also promoted unscrupulous pyramid schemes, designed by get-rich-quick outfits to exploit the desperation and ignorance of Europe’s poorest, most isolated country. When the pyramids crashed, thousands of Albanians lost their life savings. In March of 1997 the country exploded into rebellion. Village clans plundered the military armories and seized local control. Thousands of refugees fled across the Adriatic to Italy. In April, a multilateral European intervention force landed, restored a measure of central authority, and prepared to oversee new elections.

Many of the arms plundered from the Albanian military were smuggled across the border to the KLA. Interpol claimed the KLA had also turned to the heroin trade to fund arms purchases. In any case, the rebel group swelled as repression gripped Kosovo. In February 1998, following a KLA attack on a police patrol that left four officers dead, Serbian police and paramilitary groups responded with a new campaign of “ethnic cleansing.” By early 1999, hundreds of villages had been torched and a quarter of a million Kosovar Albanians (out of a total population of 1.4 million) were displaced. Some fled across the border to Albania and Macedonia. Others hid in Kosovo’s mountains.

In return for guarantees of Serbian sovereignty over Kosovo, U.S. envoy Richard Holbrooke secured Milosevic’s agreement on a deal calling for an OSCE “verification mission” to monitor the situation on the ground. But the violence continued, despite the monitors. International investigators discovered evidence of massacres, which was predictably contested by Serbian authorities.

In February 1999, a new round of U.S.-brokered talks between the Milosevic government and an Albanian team including both KLA and Rugova representatives convened at Rambouillet, France. Milosevic rejected Clinton’s demands for NATO troops to police Kosovo. The Albanians rejected terms mandating a three-year interval before Kosovo could vote for secession. The Albanian team finally gave in and signed the Rambouillet Accords. Fearing a backlash from hard-liners in his own regime, Milosevic remained intransigent. On March 24, NATO began Operation Allied Force, a sustained bombing campaign of Yugoslavia. Belgrade’s forces responded with Operation Horseshoe, a campaign to finally drive the Albanians from Kosovo altogether. Whole villages fled at gunpoint, families loaded onto tractors.

Ultimately, 800,000 Kosovar Albanians settled in massive refugee camps hastily established in Albania and Macedonia. Milosevic was finally accused of war crimes, and ordered to surrender himself to a UN tribunal established at The Hague.

Despite NATO claims of precision bombing guided by military necessity, civilian targets were widely hit—including bridges, factories, oil refineries, power plants, and Belgrade’s TV station. In one embarrassing error, a convoy of Albanian refugees was bombed. In May, Belgrade’s Chinese embassy was destroyed by a NATO missile. Another errant missile destroyed a civilian passenger train. Another hit a suburban area of Bulgaria. Such “collateral damage” cost perhaps 2,000 lives. The bombing also unleashed an ecological nightmare. Mercury and PCBs from bombed industrial sites contaminated the Danube, bringing fishing and commerce on the river to a halt. In Pancevo, where a dark cloud from the destroyed petrochemical works enveloped the city, doctors noted a doubling of the miscarriage rate. NATO forces suffered no casualties, though Yugoslav air defense forces did succeed in downing a U.S. Stealth fighter (the pilot was rescued).

While the air assault was overwhelmingly led by the U.S., it also saw participation by Germany’s military, in combat operations for the first time since World War II—ironically, under a left-coalition government that included the Green Party. Greece allowed NATO troops and war material to pass through to Macedonia and Albania, but refused to participate in the air raids. Many NATO countries saw large protests against the bombing. On April 28, the U.S. Congress voted not to declare war, but not to halt the bombing either, ceding authority on the question to the president.

The bombing ended on June 20. Both NATO and Belgrade claimed victory. In fact, both compromised: Milosevic agreed to accept NATO troops, but the West dropped demands for any moves towards actual independence for Kosovo. The deal was sanctioned by the UN, which also prepared its own international police force for Kosovo. The KLA, which had fought Serb forces on the ground throughout the bombing, was to be partially disarmed and converted into a civilian police force.

As the U.S., Britain, France, Italy, and Germany divided Kosovo into occupation zones, Russian troops rushed in from Bosnia to seize Pristina’s airport as a bargaining chip. NATO’s commander, U.S. General Wesley Clark, wanted to push the Russians out, but was overruled by his European coalition partners. Russian troops were allowed into the international “peacekeeping force” despite protests from Albanians, who accused Russian mercenaries of participation in Operation Horseshoe. Kosovo was now part of Serbia in name only, with power actually divided between NATO and the KLA—now swelled with volunteers from throughout the Albanian diaspora.

As Albanian refugees flooded back in, Serb civilians fled towards Belgrade. By summer’s end, Kosovo’s Serb population had been reduced by two-thirds, to 70,000. Many towns were divided into Serb and Albanian zones, separated by barbed wire and occupation troops. Both Serbs and Roma, who were accused of collaborating with the Serbs, were targets of forced evictions, executions, and other revenge violence. As Serb refugees poured into Serbia, widespread protests again erupted demanding the resignation of Milosevic—in defiance of a state of emergency.

Protests simmered for a year, but a united opposition movement failed to consolidate. In the Summer of 2000, Milosevic—having pushed through constitutional changes allowing him to run for another term as Yugoslav president—called new elections. The three opposition candidates shared the consensus on Serb nationalism. Montenegro’s leadership called for a boycott of the election, while the West chose to support the most moderate candidate, Vojislav Kostunica of the Serbian Democratic Party.

In the September 24 elections, Kostunica claimed a 55% victory, but Milosevic refused to recognize this, demanding a run-off vote. A huge protest movement—with considerable financial backing form the U.S. State Department—now mobilized throughout Serbia to oppose a run-off and demand Milosevic’s resignation.

On October 5, half a million people amassed in Belgrade, with tens of thousands of Serbs arriving in the capital from the provinces. In Kolubara, thousands of miners and their local supporters seized the streets and forced the police to withdraw. The following day, Yugoslavia’s Constitutional Court confirmed Kostunica’s victory, and Milosevic resigned. After 13 years, Milosvic’s reign was finally over. Even Montenegro agreed to recognize Kostunica as president.

However, almost immediately, remnants of the officially disbanded KLA stepped up attacks on Serbian patrols in the “buffer zone” between occupied Kosovo and Serbia proper with an eye towards liberating more territory. Kostunica warned that the guerilla attacks could spark a “large-scale war.” The Kosovo crisis also exacerbated divisions in Macedonia. Before the country was called upon to host thousands of Albanian refugees, the large Albanian minority there already faced harassment and demands for their expulsion, and Albanian-language classes at the national university were threatened. The U.S. maintained 300 troops in Macedonia—the only U.S. troops under UN command in the world. But, once again, the UN presence failed to prevent violence.

In February 2001, a KLA offshoot, the National Liberation Army (NLA), took up arms in northern and western Macedonia, and began expelling ethnic Macedonians from the territory they grabbed. Macedonian government forces responded by shelling guerilla-held towns. In August, a tentative cease-fire was reached, and NATO launched Operation Essential Harvest, calling for 3,500 troops (mostly British) to oversee the “voluntary disarmament” of the NLA in exchange for constitutional guarantees of Albanian language and cultural rights. But the agreement could fall apart, and if war resumes the Macedonian crisis could become quickly internationalized. Bulgarian and Greek expansionists both have open designs on the country, and many local Macedonians accuse NATO of backing a “Greater Albanian” design on their territory, as there is no deadline for guerilla disarmament.

Dangers of a Wider War
There is much potential for re-escalation of the Balkan crisis, and the presence of foreign troops makes the stakes higher. Many Kosovo Albanians view KLA disarmament and retreat from official independence as a capitulation, while Serb hard-liners like Seselj accused Milosevic of selling Kosovo, and are even more hostile to Kostunica. Nonetheless, in June 2001, Kostunica capitulated to Western pressure and turned Milosevic over to the UN war crimes tribunal. Several lesser figures from all sides in the Bosnian and Croatian wars have also been turned over to The Hague—although Karadzic and Mladic remain at large.

Montenegro, which was bombed by NATO in 1999 despite being at odds with Belgrade, remains another likely flashpoint. Montenegro’s president, former black marketeer Milo Djukanovic, has support from local Albanians, urban dwellers, and the West, but was opposed by Milosevic’s followers. Unwilling to support Serbia’s war in Kosovo, Djukanovic threatened to hold a referendum on secession if Montenegro was not granted greater autonomy, and actually switched Montenegro’s currency from the Yugoslav dinar to the German mark. The contradiction there, if less urgent than under Milosevic, has not been resolved under Kostunica.

The large Hungarian minority in Serbia’s northern breadbasket of Vojvodina mostly rejected Belgrade’s Kosovo war, and expansionists in Hungary have designs on that region.

Bosnia remains tense and divided, dependent on outside governance and funding. Karadzic has lost control of the Serb Republic to more moderate forces, and is in hiding. The Muslim-led government in Sarajevo has become more narrowly nationalistic, but has little control of the countryside. In Croatia, efforts by Serb refugees to return to their homes remains a source of tension. In December 1999, Tudjman died of cancer, and his CDU was voted out by a reformist coalition in subsequent elections. The Croatian reformists worried that Croatia’s continued violations of international human rights standards, and the lack of effort in arresting Croatians wanted by the war crimes tribunal, would stall the desired entry into the EU.

In the immediate aftermath of the 1999 bombing, Russia conducted its largest military maneuvers since the end of the Cold War. Russian bombers approached Norwegian and Icelandic airspace, and were confronted by NATO fighters. The exercise ended with a “simulated” nuclear strike—a chilling echo of Cold War brinkmanship. Moscow faces domestic terrorism and economic collapse, and views it as significant that the bombing campaign began days after NATO, on its 50th anniversary, expanded to include Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Poland—three former Warsaw Pact members, two of which border the former Soviet Union. Russia is now waging a counter-insurgency war against Muslim rebels in the Caucasus mountains. The former Soviet republics of Georgia and Azerbaijan, immediately to the south, have established preliminary military-diplomatic links to NATO. In the Central Asian republics of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, NATO is training troops to fight Islamic guerrillas based in neighboring Tajikistan under the Partnership for Peace program. The Kremlin sees all this as an embryonic encirclement of the Caspian Sea, which is eyed by U.S. corporations for major oil development in the twenty-first century.

Never Again?
Wars are often followed by waves of public sentiment that such carnage must never happen again. But wars do happen again, frequently in the same places. The new Balkan wars are usually portrayed in the media as part of a never-ending conflict among ethnic groups. History shows, however, that these conflicts are most often the result of outside pressures from more powerful nations and manipulation by the local leaders who do their bidding. If the international community, either at the level of nation-states or citizen initiatives, truly wants to promote peace, an understanding of Balkan history must inform any action we take. Otherwise, it is likely that the cycles of violent conflict in the region will continue to spiral.
August 2001

Balkan War Resource Group
39 Bowery PMB# 940
New York, NY 10002

Continue ReadingWAR AT THE CROSSROADS 

ARGENTINA: ECO-PROTESTERS BLOCK URUGUAY BORDER

from Weekly News Update on the Americas

ENTRE RIOS: PAPER MILL PROTESTS CONTINUE

On Dec. 30, hundreds of protesters blocked traffic along three bridges which span the Uruguay River, linking Argentina’s Entre Rios province with Uruguay, to protest the Uruguayan government’s decision to allow the construction of paper mills along the river. Residents say the mills will pollute the river and cause serious harm to the environment.

The largest protests were led by residents and local officials of Gualeguaychu, Argentina; protesters there blocked the General San Martin bridge leading to the Uruguayan city of Fray Bentos, in Rio Negro department, where the paper mills are being built by the Finnish company Botnia and the Spanish company Ence. Another group of protesters blocked traffic for several hours across the Gen. Jose Artigas bridge linking the Argentine city of Colon with the city of Paysandu in Uruguay’s Paysandu department. Eventually the demonstrators opened one lane of traffic and allowed cars and trucks to pass, but the protest caused serious delays for travelers. The third protest was held on the bridge linking Concordia in Argentina to the city of Salto in Salto department, Uruguay. There residents distributed informational flyers to travelers. The protests were timed to cause maximum impact at a time when Argentine holiday vacationers traditionally flock to Uruguay’s beaches.

Gualeguaychu mayor Daniel Irigoyen supports the protest; a spokesperson for his office, Hernan Rossi, told AFP that if Uruguayan authorities don’t cancel construction of the paper mills, residents will carry out “programmed and surprise blockades” along the bridges throughout the summer vacation period. (El Nuevo Herald, Miami, Dec. 31 from AFP; AP, Dec. 30; Resumen Latinoamericano, Dec. 30) Entre Rios governor Jorge Busti also supports the protests. The Argentine national government said on Dec. 29 that it would send 200 gendarmes (federal border police agents) to the region to control traffic during the protests.

On Dec. 29 the Uruguayan government announced that the construction of the paper mills was “irreversible,” while unofficial sources reported that the Argentine government was urging Uruguay to move the paper mills elsewhere, a proposition expected to cost between $10 million and $14 million. On Dec. 27, Argentine deputy foreign minister Ricardo Garcia Moritan said his government is urging Uruguay to halt construction of the paper mills until an impartial environmental impact study is carried out. (Resumen Latinoamericano, Dec. 30)

Weekly News Update on the Americas, Jan. 1

CHACO: VIOLENT SQUATTER EVICTION

On Jan. 5, some 400 agents of the provincial police of Chaco province, Argentina, used violence to carry out an eviction order against 200 families who had taken over public housing units earlier that day in Puerto Vilelas, 21 kilometers south of Resistencia, the provincial capital. The families, including many children, took over the recently built houses after having lost their homes in a storm on Dec. 16, and having unsuccessfully sought help from the government. In scenes recorded by news cameras and viewed around the country, police agents from Infantry and Cavalry units and the Special Operations Command–protected by helmets, shields and bullet-proof vests–fired rubber pellets at residents and used whips, clubs and kicks against those who fell to the ground or who were handcuffed. A number of people were treated for injuries. German Pomar, a photographer for the daily newspaper Norte was hit with 12 rubber pellets in his leg. (Prensa Latina, Jan. 5)

POLICE SENTENCED IN PIQUETERO KILLINGS

On Jan. 9, the Oral Tribunal No. 7 of Lomas de Zamora sentenced former police inspector Alfredo Fanchiotti and former sergeant Alejandro Acosta to life in prison for the killing of piquetero (organized unemployed) activists Dario Santillan and Maximiliano Kosteki during a demonstration on June 26, 2002, in the Buenos Aires suburb of Avellaneda. Fanchiotti and Acosta were also convicted of attempted homicide for wounding seven other demonstrators with live bullets.

Former police inspector Felix Vega and ex-police agents Carlos Quevedo and Mario de la Fuente were each sentenced to four years of prison for aggravated concealment. Former police agents Gaston Sierra and Lorenzo Colman got three and two years, respectively, for aggravated concealment, but will not go to jail. Francisco Celestino Robledo, a retired police agent who carried out arrests during the 2002 protest despite not being in active service, gota suspended sentence of 10 months in prison for usurping authority.

More than 400 uniformed and plainclothes police agents took part in the operation against protesters who tried to march across the Pueyrredon bridge into the city of Buenos Aires. The agents were from three federal units (Gendarmeria, Prefectura and Federal Police) and the Buenos Aires provincial police. Retired agents were also called up to take part in the operation. (Resumen Latinoamericano, Jan. 12; Cronica, Buenos Aires, Jan.. 22)

Weekly News Update on the Americas, Jan. 22

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Weekly News Update on the Americas
http://home.earthlink.net/~nicadlw/wnuhome.html

See also WW4 REPORT #117
http://www.ww3report.com/node/1439

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Reprinted by WORLD WAR 4 REPORT, Feb. 1, 2006
Reprinting permissible with attribution

Continue ReadingARGENTINA: ECO-PROTESTERS BLOCK URUGUAY BORDER 

THREE CITIES AGAINST THE WALL

US, Israeli and Palestinian Artists Unite Across Borders

by Robert Hirschfield

Transposed upon the face of the famous Wall, in the photo-shop print by Suleiman Mansour, is Michaelangelo’s hand of God and hand of Adam reaching toward one another—only separated by a chasm, not a inch, as on the ceiling of the Sistine Chapel.

Mansour’s print is part of the Three Cities Against The Wall exhibit that began Nov. 9 in Ramallah, Tel Aviv and New York. The New York site, ABC NO RIO, a gallery in an old tenement building on the Lower East Side that evolved from a squat into a center for art and activism, was chosen by artist Seth Tobocman, the primary organizer of the show in the US.

“We knew that ABC was very independent, and wouldn’t allow themselves to be prevented from doing the show,” he said.

The idea for the show grew out of Tobocman’s meeting with artist Tayseer Barakat in Ramallah four years ago. Israeli artists were not included in their original plans, but when Tobocman discussed the show with Steven Englander, the director of ABC NORIO, he thought it would be good to have Israeli participation in the project to broaden its political scope.

“I wrote Tayseer a proposal for Three Cities Against The Wall. I chose to focus on the Wall because that was one area where the young Israeli artists I knew had proven themselves. They had been involved in actions the Wall where people had been shot by the soldiers. They were legitimate activists.”

Barakat appointed Mansour as his outreach person to the Israelis, as he was a Palestinian artist from East Jerusalem who was more easily able to travel around Israel and keep in contact with the Israeli artists.

“Suleiman,” said Tobocman, “has been a major figure in the resistance of Palestinian artists to Israeli occupation.”

At the show’s opening in New York—jammed with neighborhood people, as well as Palestinians, Israelis, Europeans—the works displayed ranged from Hamadi Hijazi’s brooding oil painting of ladders with broken rungs climbing the blood red Wall into an ochre-colored sky, to a photo display by American artist Susan Greene of little children painting the Wall with flowers, with fish, with green and red streaks, with a huge yellow bird, its beak pointing skyward.

Suleiman Mansour was among the crowd. A white-bearded man with deep set eyes, he spoke of how the Wall throws his life as an artist into daily chaos.

“I live in East Jerusalem, and my studio is on the other side of the Wall, towards Ramallah. Coming back from the studio, it can take me two or three hours to get through the checkpoints.”

He shrugged. “I am desperate,” he said, “but my work is not desperate.” He was jailed three times by the Israelis, once for photographing a West Bank village he wanted to paint. He was imprisoned a month for that.

“They put sacks on my head. I was beaten. I was made to stand up for long periods of time.”

Palestinian art, he said, has tended to reflect the stages of the Palestinian struggle. In the years following the Nakba, artists painted refugees. When the Fatah was formed in the mid-sixties, they painted fighters. During the first Intifada, when the emphasis was on self-reliance and the boycotting of Israeli products, Palestinian artists stopped buying oils from Israel.

“We began using other materials. I came up with mud. I painted with the land itself.”

In the early ’70s, Mansour was one of eigtheen Palestinian artists who decided to form a union. They asked the Israeli military authorities for permission. It was denied.

“We went ahead and started our union anyhow. We called it Legal Palestinian Artists in the Occupied Territories.”

Mansour related that the shipment of American art works bound for Ramallah was seized by Israeli security at the airport in Tel Aviv. They refused to release the works until the addressee in Ramallah came to claim them. A Kafkaesque excursion, given Israeli travel restrictions.

The artists involved in the Three Cities exhibit drafted a statement. Part of it reads as follows: “Through this collaborative exhibition, the organizers and participating artists will draw attention to the reality of the Wall and its disastrous impact on the daily lives of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians by the separation of Palestinian communities from each other and from the fertile lands, water resources, schools, hospitals and work places, thereby ‘contributing to the departure of Palestinian populations’, as the International Court of Justice has warned.”

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This story originally appeared in the January issue of Washington Report on Middle East Affairs

RESOURCES:

Three Cities Against the Wall page, ABC NO RIO website
http://www.abcnorio.org/againstthewall/

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Reprinted by WORLD WAR 4 REPORT, Feb. 1, 2006
Reprinting permissible with attribution

Continue ReadingTHREE CITIES AGAINST THE WALL 

CENTRAL AMERICA: CAFTA DELAYED; REPRESSION CONTINUES

from Weekly News Update on the Americas

U.S. DELAYS CAFTA

On Dec. 30 Office of the US Trade Representative (USTR) spokesperson Stephen Norton announced that the US was postponing implementation of the Dominican Republic-Central American Free Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA), which was scheduled to go into effect on Jan. 1. Although “various countries are almost ready for their startup, none have completed their internal procedures,” he said, referring to enabling legislation the participating countries have to pass for DR-CAFTA to go into effect. The trade pact will be implemented progressively, according to Norton, “to the extent that the countries make sufficient progress to comply with the promises set in the accord.” Until then, the countries will continue to benefit from tariff reductions under the Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act (CBTPA).

DR-CAFTA is intended to bring Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and the US together into a trade pact which would largely eliminate tariffs between the countries. Costa Rica’s legislature has yet to approve the pact; the legislatures of all the other participating countries have approved it despite major protests by labor, campesino, environmental and other groups.(El Nuevo Herald, Jan. 30, 31, quotes retranslated from Spanish)

Weekly News Update on the Americas, Jan. 1

GUATEMALA: NEW VIOLENCE AT OCCUPIED RANCH

Four Guatemalan campesinos were reportedly wounded when private security guards opened fire on Jan. 20 on protesters attempting to renew their occupation of the Nueva Linda ranch in Champerico municipality, Retalhuleu department. At least two of the campesinos were injured seriously and were taken to a hospital in Retalhuleu. The names of three of the wounded were given: Roberto Gonzalez, Macario Gomez and Bernardo Guillen.

Twelve people, including protesters and police agents, were killed at Nueva Linda on Aug. 31, 2004, when hundreds of police used force to end a year-long occupation by thousands of campesinos protesting the disappearance of ranch administrator and campesino leader Hector Rene Reyes; some of the campesinos renewed their occupation in September 2004 but were removed without major violence two months later. There were conflicting reports about the Jan. 20 incident. The leftist Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG) party said the campesinos had wanted to talk to people at the ranch about their demands for justice for Reyes, while the National Indigenous and Campesino Coordinating Committee (CONIC) reported that the campesinos, who have maintained a protest along the highway outside Nueva Linda, were trying to reoccupy the ranch. Other sources said they had succeeded in renewing the occupation.

The Guatemala Human Rights Commission-USA (GHRC-USA) is calling for letters to President Oscar Berger Perdomo (fax: +502-2251-2218), Interior Minister Carlos Vielman (fax: +502-2362-0237, e-mail: ministro@mingob.gob.gt) and others to demand a full investigation of the current incident and prosecution of those responsible for Reyes’ disappearance and the deaths in 2004. (GHRC-USA urgent action, Jan. 20)

Weekly News Update on the Americas, Jan. 22

GUATEMALAN RESEARCHER THREATENED

On Jan. 9 Fredy Peccerelli, the head of the Guatemalan Forensic Anthropology Foundation (FAFG), received a text message on his mobile phone with a death threat against his brother, Gianni Peccerelli. “Stop the exhumations, sons [of bitches],” the message ended, referring to the FAFG’s work exhuming mass graves of those killed by the Guatemalan military and their civilian adjuncts in the early 1980s.

On Jan. 10 Fredy Peccerelli’s sister, Bianka Peccerelli Monterroso, and her husband, Omar Giron de Leon, who is the laboratory coordinator for the FAFG, received an anonymous letter deposited in their mailbox. “We’re going to kidnap your sister and rape her again and again,” the letter read, “and if you don’t stop, we’ll send her to you piece by piece. Omar will be a widower, but only for a few minutes. Then we’re going to put a bullet in your head. One by one we will kill you. Death to the anthropologists.”

Fredy Peccerelli, his family and other members of the FAFG have received numerous threats over the last several years. After an earlier threat to Bianka Peccerelli and Giron de Leon, the government provided some police protection. But the police agents began skipping shifts in December and stopped guarding the couple completely on Jan. 7. The human rights organization Amnesty International is recommending letters expressing concern to Vice-Minister of the Interior Julio Cesar Godoy Anleu (+502 2361 5914) and Head of Special Prosecutor’s Office on Human Rights Rosa Maria Salazar Marroquin (+502 2230 5296), with copies to Ambassador to the US Jose Guillermo Castillo (fax: 202-745-1908, e-mail: info@guatemala-embassy.org). (AI Urgent Action, Jan. 13)

Weekly News Update on the Americas, Jan. 15

HONDURAS: INDIGENOUS ARRESTED

On Jan. 12, Margarito Vargas Ponce and Marcos Reyes, members of the Honduran indigenous community of Montana Verde, presented themselves in court in the town of Gracias, Lempira department, in an attempt to end their persecution by security forces. The judge acceded to their written request to revoke an arrest order against them. Then, according to the Civic Council of Popular and Indigenous Organizations of Honduras (COPINH), another judge at the court, Hermes Omar Moncada, vacated the order in what COPINH called an “abuse of authority.” COPINH noted that Moncada is the same judge who refused to dismiss charges against “Luciano Pineda” (Feliciano Pineda), a member of the Montana Verde community who was jailed last June after being shot and wounded by paramilitaries. (COPINH press release, Jan. 17)

On Jan. 19, Amnesty International began an international campaign to win the release of Feliciano Pineda and two other Montana Verde activists, Marcelino and Leonardo Miranda. All three were charged with the 2001 murder of Juan Reyes Gomez, another community member, in an alleged land dispute. Last December, Pineda was acquitted of homicide charges in the case, but the judge refused to dismiss theft and vandalism charges, even though the statute of limitations on those crimes had run out. The Miranda brothers were arrested on Jan. 8, 2003; they were convicted of murder in December 2003 and are each serving 25-year prison sentences, even though evidence showed that the charges were falsified in retaliation for their efforts to win recognition of their community’s land rights.

AI has adopted Pineda and the Miranda brothers as prisoners of conscience and is demanding their immediate release, as well as a full and thorough investigation into the murder of Juan Reyes Gomez. “The criminal charges against Feliciano Pineda and the Miranda brothers are part of a campaign against indigenous leaders and human rights defenders in Honduras that aims to deter them from their work to secure land titles and to protect the environment,” said AI in a press release. (AI press release, Jan. 20)

Weekly News Update on the Americas, Jan. 22

EL SALVADOR: TORTURE VERDICT UPHELD

On Jan. 4 a three-judge panel of the US Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit in Atlanta reversed its own earlier ruling and upheld a jury’s $54.6 million verdict against two retired Salvadoran generals accused of responsibility for torture by soldiers under their command. The same panel had thrown the verdict out on Feb. 28, 2005, saying a 10-year statute of limitations had expired. But the panel reversed its decision after concluding that it had made factual errors on the dates. “I have never, ever heard of such a thing,” the defendants’ attorney, Kurt Klaus, Jr., said on learning that the panel had reversed its own decision.

Three Salvadorans living in the US filed the suit on May 11, 1999 under the 1991 Torture Victim Protection Act against former defense ministers Gen. Carlos Eugenio Vides Casanova and Gen. Jose Guillermo Garcia, who both left El Salvador in 1989 and now live in Florida. A federal jury found the generals liable for torture in July 2002. Vides Casanova left office as defense minister on May 31, 1989, less than 10 years before the suit was filed. In addition, in its new ruling the panel decided that the statute of limitations did not apply until 1992, when the Salvadoran government signed a peace accord with the rebel Farabundo Marti Front for National Liberation (FMLN), since until then the government “remained intent on maintaining its power at any cost and acted with impunity to do so.” (New York Times, Jan. 8)

Weekly News Update on the Americas, Jan. 8

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Weekly News Update on the Americas
http://home.earthlink.net/~nicadlw/wnuhome.html

See also WW4 REPORT #117
http://www.ww3report.com/node/1440

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Reprinted by WORLD WAR 4 REPORT, Feb. 1, 2006
Reprinting permissible with attribution

Continue ReadingCENTRAL AMERICA: CAFTA DELAYED; REPRESSION CONTINUES 

COLOMBIA: PARAMILITARY ATTACKS IN META

from Weekly News Update on the Americas

On Jan. 5, paramilitaries who identified themselves as members of the “Autodefensas del Llano” (Plains Self-Defense) group murdered four people in the community of Matabambu, in Puerto Lleras municipality, in the southern Colombian department of Meta. The victims were campesinos Arelis Diaz, Alcibiades Pachon, Luis Guillermo Gonzales and Rafael Quinto Orjuela Diaz. The paramilitaries also forcibly disappeared four siblings–Rafael, Amir, Yurley and Esteban Rodriguez–from the La Laguna farm owned by Rafael Rodriguez in Matabambu. The two youngest siblings are minors: Yurley is 17 and Esteban is 13. Among the paramilitaries were two men recognized as active duty soldiers from the army’s Counter-Guerrilla Battalion No. 42.

The massacre culminated a week of attacks on area residents by military and paramilitary forces. On Dec. 31, troops from the “Motilones” Counter-Guerrilla Battalion No. 17 of the Mobile Brigade No. 2, headed by Lt. Avila, arbitrarily detained Norberto Lujan in the community of El Vergel, village of Santo Domingo in Vistahermosa municipality, Meta department. On Jan. 3, soldiers arbitrarily detained eight campesinos in the village of Santo Domingo, accusing them of being guerrilla sympathizers. On Jan. 4, paramilitaries who identified themselves as members of “Autodefensas del Llano” forcibly disappeared Ecelino Pineda Pena, a campesino from the community of Santa Lucia. Pineda was on a bus headed from Granada to Puerto Toledo when the paramilitaries abducted him at a roadblock. On Jan. 6, in Villa La Paz, Puerto Lleras municipality, paramilitaries detained and disappeared campesino Gildardo de Jesus Salinas Piedrahita. Pineda, Lujan and Salinas all remained missing as of Jan. 18.

Another area resident, Rosabel Rincon, was forcibly disappeared by the paramilitaries at a roadblock in an area known as Cano Blanco. She also remained missing as of Jan. 18. Rincon was abducted while returning from Vista Hermosa, where she had gone on Jan. 4 to try to get information about her daughter, Marilyn Martinez Rincon, one of the eight people detained on Jan. 3 in Santo Domingo. The eight were all supposedly released on Jan. 5 in Vista Hermosa, although only one of them managed to return home. As of Jan. 18, the whereabouts of the others were still unknown.

A number of residents were apparently wounded during the paramilitary attack in Matabambu. While paramilitaries were still in the area, members of the Human Rights Comission of the Guejear River Region in Puerto Toledo went to see Lt. Garcia, in charge of the Counter-Guerrilla Battalion No. 42 of the army’s Mobile Brigade No. 4, to ask him to provide security for the community; Garcia responded that he had not committed himself to providing security. Soldiers under his command told Commission members that the same thing that happened in Matabambu would soon happen in Puerto Toledo. Lt. Garcia then blocked residents of Puerto Toledo from fleeing the town. (Communiques from Comision Intereclesial de Justicia y Paz, Jan. 4, 5 via Red de Defensores No Institucionalizados)

Weekly News Update on the Americas, Jan. 22

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Weekly News Update on the Americas
http://home.earthlink.net/~nicadlw/wnuhome.html

See also WW4 REPORT #117
http://www.ww3report.com/node/1434

See our last update on state terror in Colombia:
/node/1489

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Reprinted by WORLD WAR 4 REPORT, Feb. 1, 2006
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ECUADOR: GUERILLAS RE-EMERGE

from Weekly News Update on the Americas

In a Jan. 11 communique from “the sovereign mountains” of Ecuador, the Ecuadoran Guerrilla Coordination (CGE) announced that as of Jan. 1, 2006, the 1991 peace agreement signed between the “Alfaro Vive Carajo!” rebel group and the Ecuadoran government was being revoked. The country’s rebel forces currently have 5,000 weapons, says the communique, and the support of about 20,000 Ecuadoran soldiers and military officers “in active and passive service.”

“At present we are not carrying out armed actions,” says the CGE, in the hopes that the government will address popular demands and avoid “that we begin an internal conflict, of unpredictable consequences, as happened in the case of Central America or Colombia.” The rebel coalition lists four demands: no Free Trade Treaty (TLC), and full economic sovereignty; prison for corrupt officials; doubling of the national monthly salary to $300; and respect for the people of Ecuador and their [popular] organizations. The groups that signed the document, under the umbrella of the CGE are “Alfaro Vive Revolucionario,” “Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias,” “EPA Ejercito Rebelde” and “ELA Ejercito Libertador Liberando a Todo el Ecuador!!” (Communique, Jan. 11 via Resumen Latinoamericano, Jan. 20)

STUDENTS PROTEST TRADE PACT

On Jan. 12 some 3,000 Ecuadoran high school and university students protested in front of the Carondelet government palace in Quito to demand that Ecuador withdraw from negotiations over a Free Trade Treaty (TLC) with Peru, Colombia and the US (known in English as the Andean Free Trade Agreement). The students were also protesting a US military base established in 1999 in the coastal city of Manta, and demanding that the Ecuadoran government cancel its contract with the US oil company Occidental (Oxy). Police broke up the protests with tear gas. (EFE, Jan. 12; Prensa Latina, Jan. 12)

The protests continued on Jan. 13, as did police repression. Students threw rocks at police, and agents fired hundreds of tear gas grenades at protesters. More than 50 students were arrested and at least 20 were injured, according to Magdalena Velez, president of the Popular Front, a coalition of grassroots and labor groups. One police agent fired into the air and pointed his gun at several youth, allegedly to stop them from taking a police motorcycle which had stalled in the middle of the protest. Velez said student protests also took place in the provinces of Cotopaxi, Tungurahua, Esmeraldas, Guayas and Manabi. (El Diario-La Prensa, NY, Jan. 14; PL, Jan. 13)

Following a break over the weekend, students resumed their protests on Jan. 16 after Minister of Government Alfredo Castillo suggested that a bus fare hike–demanded by transport owner-operators–was “inevitable.” Castillo said the dollarization of Ecuador’s economy, in effect since 2000, has created economic distortions and has made vehicle parts more expensive. Since 2000, the US dollar has lost nearly 50% of its acquisition power in Ecuador, said Castillo.

“We reject, emphatically, an increase in fares,” said Marcelo Rivera, a leader of the Federation of University Students of Ecuador (FEUE). “[W]e have no choice but to continue with the mobilizations.” (EFE, Jan. 17) Marches continued every day throughout the week; in addition to protesting the TLC, the Oxy contract and the Manta base, students were rejecting any bus fare hike, demanding student ID cards, protesting the police repression and demanding the release of the arrested demonstrators. (PL, Jan. 20) The Jan. 18 arrival in Ecuador of Florida governor Jeb Bush, brother of US president George W. Bush, further stoked the protests. Jeb Bush went to Ecuador to promote the TLC. (Adital Jan. 19)

On Jan. 19, Castillo tried to calm the protesters by promising that bus fares would not be increased. Castillo also admitted that the police had committed “excesses” in their crackdowns on the protests. (Pulsar, Jan. 19) Castillo’s comments failed to stem either the protests or the repression. The Red Cross reported that 123 people were injured and more than 20 arrested in protests on Jan. 19. By Jan. 20, according to police, at least 142 people had been injured and 139 arrested. (AFP, PL, Jan. 20)

The Ecumenical Commission on Human Rights (CEDHU) condemned the repression and reported that police assigned to the National Congress have been illegally detaining and torturing young protesters in bathrooms and other areas of the building. According to testimony gathered by the commission, students have been punched, kicked, beaten and sprayed in the eyes and mouth with tear gas, and have been held for hours before being transferred to jails. The agents have also insulted and attacked human rights workers who try to assist the detainees, said CEDHU. (Adital, Jan. 19)

On Jan. 17, the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE) announced it was calling for a popular uprising to bring down all three branches of government: the Congress, President Alfredo Palacio and his ministers, and the judges. “They have not been capable of resolving the problems, for that reason we will rise up from below to reorganize the country,” said CONAIE in a communique. CONAIE is also demanding the suspension of negotiations over the TLC, the expulsion of Oxy from Ecuador, nationalization of the country’s oil resources and the withdrawal of US troops from Manta. (AFP, Jan. 17) The Unitary Workers Front (FUT), Ecuador’s main union federation, is demanding a 20% increase in the minimum wage and says that if bus fares go up, it will join in mass mobilizations and possibly a general strike. (EFE, Jan. 17)

Peru finished its TLC negotiations with the US in December; Colombia and Ecuador are still in talks with the US over details of the pact. (EFE, Jan. 12)

Weekly News Update on the Americas, Jan. 22

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Weekly News Update on the Americas
http://home.earthlink.net/~nicadlw/wnuhome.html

See also WW4 REPORT #117
http://www.ww3report.com/node/1436

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Reprinted by WORLD WAR 4 REPORT, Feb. 1, 2006
Reprinting permissible with attribution

Continue ReadingECUADOR: GUERILLAS RE-EMERGE 

PERU: SENDERO RESURGENT?

from Weekly News Update on the Americas

On Dec. 20, a group of about 20 guerrillas from the Maoist Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) rebel group ambushed a police contingent and killed eight agents in Aucayacu, Leoncio Prado province, in the central Peruvian region of Huanuco. On Dec. 5, alleged Sendero rebels ambushed two police vehicles farther south in the Apurimac river valley, killing five police agents and wounding a police agent and a prosecutor.

President Alejandro Toledo responded to the attacks on Dec. 21 by decreeing a 60-day state of emergency in the jungle provinces of Maranon, Huacaybamba, Leoncio Prado and Huamalies in Huanuco region, Tocache in San Martin region and Padre Abad in Ucayali region. The decree, which took effect on Dec. 23, allows the armed forces to take control of the provinces and suspends certain constitutional rights, including freedom from unwarranted searches and the rights to free assembly and travel. (Resumen Latinoamericano, Dec. 27; Miami Herald, Dec. 23; El Nuevo Herald, Dec. 24, 25; AP, Dec. 23)

Toledo accuses Sendero of links to drug traffickers; in November the government inaugurated a police anti-drug base, funded with aid from the US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), in Palmapampa, in the Apurimac valley. (ENH, Dec. 31)

In a communique published in the Huancayo daily Correo on Dec. 23, Sendero Luminoso took credit for the two recent attacks and announced its rejection of the upcoming April 9 presidential elections, which it called “the electoral circus.” The communique, signed by “Comrade Netzel” of the “Center-Mantaro Base of Sendero Luminoso,” calls for a “people’s war” against the country’s “alleged democracy,” and urged Peruvians to boycott the elections by abstaining. The communique included criticism of various politicians, including brothers Antauro and Ollanta Humala Tasso, whom Sendero called “pseudo-revolutionaries and fascists.” (Resumen Latinoamericano, Dec. 27; ENH, Dec. 24; La Cronica de Hoy, Mexico, Dec. 24; Terra Peru, Dec. 23)

The Humala brothers led an insurrection in 2000 against the government of then-president Alberto Fujimori, who has been detained in Chile since last Nov. 6 and is facing extradition to Peru. On Dec. 30 Ollanta Humala, a former lieutenant colonel, registered his presidential candidacy for the Nationalist Party Uniting Peru. (ENH, Dec. 31) Humala’s nationalist and pro-indigenous rhetoric appears to have propelled him into first place in the electoral race. On Dec. 26, a survey by the polling firm Idice showed Humala leading with 21.7% of voter intentions against 21.2% for traditional right-wing candidate Lourdes Flores Nano of the National Unity party. The poll showed ex-presidents Alan Garcia and Valentin Paniagua in third and fourth place with 19.8% and 16.7% respectively. Idice warned that Flores would likely lose a runoff against Humala. A poll released Dec. 28 by the international firm Datum showed Flores Nano ahead with 25% to Humala’s 23%, but even Datum acknowledged that support for Flores has stagnated while support for Humala “is growing daily.” (ENH, Dec. 29)

Weekly News Update on the Americas, Jan. 1

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Weekly News Update on the Americas http://home.earthlink.net/~nicadlw/wnuhome.html

See also WW4 REPORT #117
http://www.ww3report.com/node/1437

——————-

Reprinted by WORLD WAR 4 REPORT, Feb. 1, 2006
Reprinting permissible with attribution

Continue ReadingPERU: SENDERO RESURGENT?