THE GREAT WALL OF BOEING

Corporate Power and the Secure Border Initiative

by David L. Wilson, MR Zine

On September 10 the US government acknowledged that its Secure Border Initiative (SBI) was behind schedule and over budget. Promoted in 2005 as a new way to block unauthorized immigration, the $2.7 billion project was supposed to create a 670-mile physical and “virtual” fence by the end of this year along the 2,000-mile border with Mexico.

After three years, the government’s Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has only completed 341 miles of the physical fence—187 miles of wire-mesh fencing to stop pedestrians and 154 miles of shorter barriers to block vehicles. The cost for the pedestrian barriers has risen to $7.5 million a mile from earlier estimates of $4 million; the cost for the vehicle barriers has gone up from $2 million to $2.8 million a mile. The physical fence is already $400 million over budget. The “virtual fence”—SBInet, an electronic monitoring system being constructed by Boeing Co., the giant military contractor—is now on hold. Its cost so far has been $933 million; the official estimates are that it will cost $8 billion through 2013, and that number may triple, according to the DHS inspector general. (WSJ, Sept. 10, 2008)

None of this is really news, of course. Who is surprised by delays and cost overruns from politically connected contractors? And no one could have believed the physical fence would cost just $2-$4 million a mile; the 14-mile fence near San Diego, started in 1990, ended up costing taxpayers $9 million a mile.

Moreover, none of these estimates include the expense of maintaining the fence. In 1999 the US Army Corps of Engineers estimated that the total cost of a border fence over 25 years—including construction and maintenance—would range from $16.4 million to $70 million a mile (adjusted to 2005 dollars). (Cited in Nuñez-Neto & Stephen R. Viña, 2008) The 670-mile physical fence could cost as much as $46.9 billion by 2030, and that’s not including the still nonexistent “virtual fence.”

Clearly these taxpayer-funded projects are a windfall for corporate CEOs and stockholders from Boeing and the numerous other companies contracting on them. But will these fences actually stop people from entering the country without authorization?

Even if a fence along the entire border would reduce immigration—and there’s no reason to think it would—it’s clear that a fence along one-third of the distance will simply “squeeze the balloon,” forcing migrants to cross through the more remote and dangerous unfenced areas, or to get across the border smuggled in trucks or train cars, or by bribing border guards.

In the 1990s, the government started blocking parts of the border, promoting these efforts with catchy names like “Operation Gatekeeper” and “Operation Hold the Line.” Between 1993 and 2006 the number of Border Patrol agents on the southwest border tripled from less than 4,000 to about 12,000; the Border Patrol’s annual budget quadrupled from $400 million to $1.6 billion. What was the result? The Border Patrol gauges the rate of border crossing by the number of arrests of people seeking to enter the United States along the Mexico border. By this measure, the increased enforcement has had virtually no effect: arrests fell from 1.3 million in 1993 to 1.2 million in 2005. (AP, Oct. 6, 2006; NYT, April 4, 2006; Hing, 2004, p. 161, 164) (It’s true that unauthorized immigration has dipped recently—just as it did during the 2001 recession, demonstrating the importance of economic factors in determining the flow of immigration.) (NAM, Aug. 4, 2008)

This not to say that stepped-up border enforcement has accomplished nothing. Some 4,700 migrants have died over the past 13 years as the new policies forced them to use riskier routes for entering the United States. And people now pay dramatically more to smugglers and guides to get across the border. From 1994 to 2005 the average cost of being smuggled in the San Diego area rose from $300 to $2,500. (Cornelius et al., 2008)

As stepped-up enforcement increases the hardships, dangers, and expense of crossing the border, undocumented workers are naturally more afraid of losing the investment they have made in getting to the United States. In the past many immigrants—especially those from Mexico—would work here for brief periods and then return home after they’d earned some extra money for their families or when work slowed down. Thanks to increased border enforcement, now they are much more likely to stay rather than to risk another crossing.

Some experts on border issues think that by discouraging return migration, increased border enforcement may actually have raised the number of undocumented immigrants in the country. (Cornelius et al.) A careful study by researcher Florian Kaufmann found that as a result of escalated border enforcement during the 1990s, Mexican migrant household heads on average increased their time in the United States by 18%, moved one fourth of their family dependents to the United States, and reduced the amount of income they sent back as remittances—thus inducing other Mexicans to migrate to the United States. (Kaufmann, 2008)

Increased border enforcement has another effect: it means immigrant workers are more likely to stick with low-paying jobs and less likely to risk deportation by joining a union or making complaints about workplace abuses. Immigration enforcement in the workplace, while advertised as a way to turn off the “job magnet,” ends up doing the same thing: slowing unionization drives and intimidating workers.

One of the main concerns working people have about unauthorized immigration—especially in a failing economy—is that an influx of immigrants can contribute to downward pressure on the wages of native-born workers. Politicians and pundits use this fear to sell their enforcement policies. But in large part it’s those same enforcement policies that produce the downward pressure—rather than the number of immigrants competing for jobs, as many people believe. Studies indicate that unauthorized immigrants are paid 15‑22% less than authorized workers with the same characteristics; it’s hard to believe that enforcement policies aren’t a major reason for this disparity. (Hinojosa Ojeda, et al., 2001; Phillips & Massey, 1999)

If border walls and workplace raids are only helping to keep wages down for everyone, and aren’t even slowing migration, why do we keep paying for them? Is this just another corporate bailout, for companies that aren’t even failing?

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David L. Wilson is co-author, with Jane Guskin, of The Politics of Immigration: Questions and Answers (Monthly Review Press, July 2007)

This story first appeared Sept. 27 in Monthly Review’s online MR Zine.

RESOURCES

“Virtual Fence for Mexico Border Is Put Off”
Wall Street Journal, Sept. 10, 2008

Blas Nuñez-Neto and Stephen R. Viña, “Border Security: Barriers along the U.S. International Border,” Congressional Research Service (CRS), Library of Congress, May 13, 2008, 33-34

Bill Ong Hing, Defining America through Immigration Policy (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2004)

Douglas S. Massey, “The Wall That Keeps Illegal Workers In”
New York Times, April 4, 2006

“New Wall Not Expected to Stop Migrants,” AP, Oct. 6, 2006

Walter A. Ewing, “Immigration Fairytales,” New American Media, Aug. 4, 2008

Wayne A. Cornelius, Scott Borger, Adam Sawyer, David Keyes, Clare Appleby, Kristen Parks, Gabriel Lozada, and Jonathan Hicken, “Controlling Unauthorized Immigration from Mexico: The Failure of ‘Prevention through Deterrence’ and the Need for Comprehensive Reform,” Immigration Policy Center, June 10, 2008

Florian Kaufmann, “Attracting Undocumented Emigrants: The Consequences of U.S. Border Enforcement,” presentation at the Center for Popular Economics (CPE) Summer Institute in Chicago, July 31, 2008

Raul Hinojosa Ojeda, Robert McCleery, Enrico Marcelli, Fernando de Paolis, David Runsten, Marysol Sanchez, “Comprehensive Migration Policy Reform in North America: The Key to Sustainable and Equitable Economic Integration,” North American Integration and Development Center, School of Public Policy and Social Research, University of California, Los Angeles, August 29, 2001, 28, 30; Julie A. Phillips and Douglas A. Massey, “The New Labor Market: Immigrants and Wages After IRCA,” Demography, Vol. 36, No. 2 (May, 1999), 244

From our Daily Report:

Homeland Security admits to cost, time overruns in border fence
WW4 Report, Sept. 12, 2008
/node/6016

Mexican diaspora gets bigger
WW4 Report, Sept. 28, 2008
/node/6080

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Reprinted by World War 4 Report, Oct. 1, 2008
Reprinting permissible with attribution

Continue ReadingTHE GREAT WALL OF BOEING 

A MATTER OF JUSTICE

by Jane Guskin, The Huffington Post

Two Muslim men that our federal government has unfairly accused of supporting Palestinian terrorist groups celebrated victories last week. Both men are Palestinian immigrants who have been living legally in the US for many years and have been active in bringing together diverse communities, opposing religious extremism and working for social justice. Both have children who were born in the US, and both are devoted to their families.

In Paterson, New Jersey, an immigration judge ruled on September 4 that the federal government was wrong to try to deport local imam Mohammad Qatanani. The ruling upholds Qatanani’s petition for permanent legal residency, which the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) had sought to deny by claiming he lied on his application about an arrest in Israel. (Like thousands of other Palestinian men, he was detained administratively there.) Immigration Judge Alberto Riefkohl was unconvinced by the government’s evidence: “FBI Agent Angel Alicea’s testimony has been found not credible…and will be disregarded as unreliable,” the judge wrote. “The court also finds DHS’s other evidence is insufficient,” he added. One of the government documents in the case is so sloppy that it repeatedly misspells the name of the group Hamas as “Ramas.”

Qatanani and his family were not detained while they fought their deportation, and his win in immigration court was touted by his many supporters—including rabbis, priests, FBI agents and elected officials—as a sign that the US justice system works.

In the case of Sami Al-Arian, the same US justice system showed how unjust it can be. Al-Arian, a former Florida professor and civil rights activist, was released on bail on September 2 after spending more than five and a half years in jail fighting a vindictive prosecution. Here’s a condensed timeline:

* February 20, 2003: Al‑Arian is arrested and charged with supporting the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. He is denied bail and placed in solitary confinement for two and a half years while awaiting trial. Amnesty International decries Al-Arian’s treatment as “gratuitously punitive.”

* December 6, 2005: The jury acquits Al-Arian on eight charges while deadlocking 10 to 2 in favor of acquittal on nine others. The government keeps Al-Arian jailed and threatens a retrial on the deadlocked charges.

* February 28, 2006: Al‑Arian doesn’t want to spend another three years in prison awaiting a retrial, so he pleads guilty to one conspiracy count, acknowledging that he helped people who the government claims were associated with Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and that he lied to a reporter about his knowledge of associations with the group. In exchange, he is offered “time served” followed by a speedy deportation. The government acknowledges that Al‑Arian’s activities were nonviolent and that his actions created no victims.

* May 1, 2006: Judge James S. Moody Jr. in Tampa ignores the plea agreement and gives Al‑Arian the maximum sentence: an additional 19 months in prison. Projected release date: April 11, 2007.

* October 2006: Although the plea agreement released Al-Arian from cooperating with government investigations, Gordon Kromberg, Assistant US Attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia, summons Al-Arian to testify before a grand jury looking into an unrelated case of alleged terror funding.

* November 16, 2006: Because he refuses to testify, Al-Arian is placed under civil contempt until December 21, 2006. The time spent under civil contempt doesn’t count toward fulfilling the remainder of his sentence.

* January 22, 2007: Al-Arian is again summoned to testify before a second grand jury. After refusing to testify, he is again placed under civil contempt—postponing his release for another 11 months.

* December 13, 2007: Judge Gerald Lee of the Eastern District of Virginia lifts the civil contempt order. New projected release date for Al-Arian: April 11, 2008.

* March 2008: Kromberg subpoenas Al-Arian to testify before a third grand jury. Al-Arian again refuses to testify.

* April 11, 2008: Al‑Arian is transferred into the custody of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) after finally completing his sentence. Instead of deporting him as originally agreed, ICE keeps him detained.

* June 26, 2008: Kromberg indicts Al-Arian on two charges of criminal contempt for refusing to testify in March and October, even though Al-Arian provided two detailed affidavits [stating he had no knowledge of criminal activity], and repeatedly offered to undergo a polygraph examination. A few days later, Al-Arian is transferred to the custody of the US Marshals to await trial on the criminal contempt charges.

* July 10, 2008: Judge Leonie Brinkema orders Al-Arian released on bail. The government blocks his release on bail, claiming that ICE must detain him while preparing to deport him.

* August 8, 2008: Brinkema postpones the criminal contempt trial pending a Supreme Court ruling on Al-Arian’s appeal challenging the government’s right to compel him to testify.

* August 25, 2008: Al-Arian’s attorneys file a habeas petition demanding his release on bail. Brinkema gives the government until September 2 to explain why it should keep him jailed.

* September 2, 2008: ICE responds to Brinkema’s deadline by requesting that Al‑Arian be released from its custody. At last, Al-Arian walks out of jail.

Al-Arian is still not free—he is under house arrest awaiting trial. But he is finally reunited with his family, thanks to the intervention of one rational judge, thousands of people who sent messages protesting his detention, and a Norwegian filmmaker who has helped spread the word about his case with an award-winning documentary, USA vs. Al-Arian.

But does it redeem our system?

If the government can find a way, through abuse of power and by stretching the limits of the law, to detain you for five years—in solitary confinement for most of that time—without even enough evidence to convince a jury, is that justice?

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Jane Guskin is co-author of The Politics of Immigration: Questions and Answers (Monthly Review Press, 2007). Guskin also edits Immigration News Briefs, a weekly newsletter covering immigration issues. She lives in New York City.

This story first appeared Sept. 11 in The Huffington Post.

See also:

IMMIGRATION DETENTION: THE CASE FOR ABOLITION
by Jane Guskin, The Huffington Post
World War 4 Report, September 2008
/node/5969

From our Daily Report:

Civil rights activist Al-Arian released
WW4 Report, Sept. 8, 2008
/node/5995

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Reprinted by World War 4 Report, Oct. 1, 2008
Reprinting permissible with attribution

Continue ReadingA MATTER OF JUSTICE 

COMING IN FROM THE COLD

UN Membership for Eurasia’s Phantom Republics

by Rene Wadlow, Toward Freedom

The “Phantom Republics” has been the name given to the states demanding the status of independence after the break-up of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union: Abkhazia, Chechenya, Kosovo, Nagrono-Karabakh, South Ossetia and Transnistra. The current conflict between Russia and Georgia has put the Abkhazia and South Ossetia conflicts at center stage of world politics.

The independence of Kosovo has been recognized by a good number of countries, but there is also strong opposition, and Kosovo has not been granted membership in the United Nations. Chechenya has been “pacified” by Russian troops, and it is unlikely that the Russian government is willing to reopen the issue. However, if the Phantom Republics supported by Russia—Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transnistra—were granted UN membership, it might be possible that Chechnyan independence would be a counter-weight and a sign of good will on the part of the Russian Federation.

Security should start with a “package deal” of membership for all the Phantom Republics in the United Nations as soon as possible. The UN General Assembly begins in late September, and membership should be a high priority. With UN membership, the danger of changing their status by force is lessened. Membership in the UN raises for some the spectre of “fragmentation” or “Balkanization” of the world into a multitude of tiny units to the disadvantage of world security. However, in this case, the recognition of independence is a necessary first step for security and a lessening of tensions. Once UN membership has been universally accepted for the Phantom Republics, new forms of regional cooperation can be undertaken in a calmer and clearer atmosphere. Once recognized through UN membership, it will be up to each of the Phantom Republics to create economic, social and political ties with its neighbors.

There are obviously oppositions to recognizing each of these states as independent, in particular opposition from the states of which they were once a part. Serbia has run a long campaign against the independence of Kosovo, citing history, the human rights of minorities, and territorial integrity. At one stage, I had thought that it might be possible to create a pan-Albanian cultural union with official links among the Albanians in Albania, Kosovo and Macedonia while keeping a political status of autonomy within Serbia. However, governments like simple solutions—you are in or out, independent or not. Just as it is difficult to be partly pregnant, so it is difficult to be partly independent.

Thus, after long and bitter negotiations, Kosovo is an independent state which will have to create links with Albania and Macedonia but which cannot escape relations with Serbia, which remains the economic motor of the region. Each of the Phantom Republics is in a difficult position, and with good will and creative political imagination, other forms than independence guaranteed by UN membership might have been found. Alas, good will and creative political imagination have been in short supply.

In the case of Georgia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, at least since 1993 there have been mediators from the UN and the Organizations for Security and Cooperation in Europe. There have been “track two” non-governmental meetings to discuss the issues. There have been detailed proposals set out to the former UN mediator, Swiss diplomat Edward Brunner—one by a colleague from the University of Geneva, Prof Giorgio Malinverni, who proposed a form of asymmetrical federalism for Georgia. While the plan was discussed, nothing seems to have come of it. Today, the issues in Georgia have resulted in tensions between the USA, Europe and Russia not seen since the end of the Cold War in 1990.

My proposal is a “package deal” in which all the Phantom Republics become UN members at the same time. Such a package deal resembles earlier package deals for membership when countries had been blocked by Cold War tensions. UN membership grants recognition of being part of the “international community.” It guarantees existing frontiers and is a wall against aggression. UN membership will also provide an elegant way for Russia to withdraw its peacekeeping troops from Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and first from the “security zones” which are clearly in Georgian territory.

During the period of international control of Kosovo, prior to its independence, a shorthand term for policy was “standards before status.” In Kosovo, there should be at least minimum respect for the standards of the rule of law, safeguard of minorities, and a return of refugees, prior to discussions on its status of independence or autonomy within Serbia. One can discuss if these standards were in fact met prior to independence. However, in the case of the other Phantom Republics, the reverse policy is needed: status before standards. There needs to be universal recognition of the status of independence by UN membership before there can be any serious effort of establishing the rule of law and human rights. As long as a clear status is not established, the republics will remain politically and economically unstable. Without UN membership, there will always be excuses for the presence of Russian military forces.

Following the Kosovo precedent, the most stable outcome of the conflict in Georgia is independence for Abkhazia and South Ossetia with rapid membership within the United Nations. UN membership should be a sufficient guarantee against attack. There is probably no need for peacekeeping forces, especially not Russian peacekeeping forces. The United Nations should provide human rights monitors as well as providing help for economic planning with a regional focus. Independence with UN membership can provide a new and stable political-economic framework so that people may try to pull their lives together—which they have not been able to do since 1992, when armed violence and refugee flows broke out in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. UN membership for Nagorno-Karabakh and Transnistra will help prevent these “frozen conflicts” from melting into new violence as well.

Thus, the Phantom Republics will join the UN to sit along with such small UN members as Andorra, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Monaco, and San Marino—states born with the restructuring of feudal Europe. It may take some time to turn Abkhazia into a Black Sea Monaco, but inevitably, for economic and social reasons, neighboring states learn to cooperate if they are not able to destroy one or the other by war.

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Rene Wadlow is a representative to the United Nations for the Association of World Citizens and editor of the on-line journal of world politics and culture Transnational Perspectives

This story first appeared Sept. 17 in Toward Freedom.

See also:

PHANTOM REPUBLICS
Kosovo’s Independence Reverberates Across Eurasia
by Rene Wadlow, Toward Freedom
World War 4 Report, March 2008
/node/5166

NAGORNO-KARABAKH:
Stalin’s Shadow Looms Over Trans-Caucasus Pipeline
by Rene Wadlow, Toward Freedom
World War 4 Report, April 2006
/node/1800

From our Daily Report:

Georgia: bomb attack in Abkhaz capital
WW4 Report, Sept. 27, 2008
/node/6077

World Court to review Kosova’s independence?
WW4 Report, Sept. 19, 2008
/node/6042

Our readers write: whither Kosova?
WW4 Report, March 29, 2008
/node/5305

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Reprinted by World War 4 Report, Oct. 1, 2008
Reprinting permissible with attribution

Continue ReadingCOMING IN FROM THE COLD 

THE DISPOSSESSION OF THE PALESTINIANS

An Historical Outline

by Bill Weinberg

“Millions of peasants are robbed of their farms and sent trudging along the roads with no more than they can carry: this is called transfer of population or rectification of frontiers.

—George Orwell, “Politics and the English Language,” 1946

“Admitting honestly to the moral and political responsibility for the crime which the Zionist scheme has perpetrated against us is what will pave the way for a historical reconciliation between the two peoples—the Palestinian and the Israeli people.”

—Mahmoud Darwish, Palestinian national poet, 1941-2008, spoken in Radio Palestine address on the 50th anniversary of the Nakba, May 15, 1998

Zionism was conceived as the Jewish national liberation movement, and attained control over Palestine just as the national liberation struggles of the colonial world were gaining ground in the aftermath of World War II. But to the Palestinians, Zionism was a new form of colonialism which ironically came to power in the era of decolonization. The more the state of Israel came to behave like a colonial power over the Palestinians, the more it came to serve as a proxy and regional extension of the neo-colonial powers of the West, serving to beat back and humble the rising tide of revolutionary Arab nationalism and, later, Islamist militancy.

Many indigenous peoples around the world have been dispossessed of their homelands by colonialist projects. But both the centrality of Palestine to the three great Abrahamic religions, as well as its proximity to the world’s most strategic oil reserves, gives the Israeli-Palestinian conflict a unique criticality to the question of world peace. If the international community, either at the level of nation-states or citizen initiatives, truly wants to promote peace, an understanding of the dispossession of the Palestinians must inform any action we take.

The Historical Background

While Zionism is a movement of modernity, both sides in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict appeal to claims arising from past centuries and even millennia of contest over the territory, and any understanding of the contemporary crisis must begin with an overview of this history.

Palestine is the southern stretch of the western arm of the Fertile Crescent, whose eastern arm is the valley of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, known in ancient times as Mesopotamia and today the heartland of Iraq. Between the two arms is the northernmost stretch of the Arabian deserts. Palestine is divided between a low and fertile coastal plain along the Mediterranean Sea, and rugged uplands to the east—principally, the area now called the West Bank in reference to the Jordan River that forms its eastern border. The Jordan River flows south, through a comparatively fertile valley, into the inland Dead Sea; beyond the Jordan Valley is more hill country, and then the desert of the interior. South of the Dead Sea, the fertile lands end; a stretch of desert today known as the Negev reaches down to the Gulf of Aqaba, entrance to the Red Sea. (Nathan, p. 117-23)

From earliest times, the land that is now Palestine was inhabited by Semitic peoples who arrived out of these deserts to the south and east. The most significant and settled of these early inhabitants were the Canaanites (forebears of the Phoenicians, who would later maintain a powerful maritime trading empire just up the Mediterranean coast in what is now Lebanon). It is they who gave the land its earliest known name—Canaan. The Hebrews—led to the land by Abraham, according to biblical accounts—were one of several nomadic Semitic peoples who arrived sometime after the Canaanites. By biblical accounts the Hebrews originated in Ur in Mesopotamia, but they clearly had much in common with the Arabian nomadic peoples and almost certainly shared a common origin with them. Indeed, the words Hebrew and Arab are believed to both derive from the Semitic root-word abhar, meaning nomadic. Both peoples are traditionally held to be descendants of the biblical Shem, son of Noah (hence “Semite”). Both are also held to descend from Shem’s descendant Abraham—the Hebrews through the line of his son Isaac and grandson Jacob, the Arabs through the line of his son Ishmael. (Dimont, p. 30; Hitti, p. 24; Lewis, 1950, p. 10; Ludwig, p. 10-3; Roth, p. 3)

By the time the Hebrews arrived, other presumably Semitic peoples had established small kingdoms on the less fertile lands east of the Jordan River—Gilead, Ammon, Moab and others. Settled life slowly spread from Canaan’s seat in the hill country west of the river. But the region was far behind the two great centers of civilization—Mesopotamia across the desert to the east and Egypt’s Nile Valley across the Sinai Peninsula to the west. The Hittites, in Anatolia at the northern peak of the Fertile Crescent, were also building an empire that would make its influence felt. (Cohn-Sherbok, p. 2)

At approximately 1600 BCE, the Hebrews were among various Semitic nomads apparently driven by drought and famine in the Fertile Crescent into the rich Nile Valley. The rulers of Egypt at that time were a “foreign” dynasty, the Hyksos, themselves likely Semites who had arrived from the Crescent some years earlier. The Hyksos welcomed the Hebrews, who evidently held a privileged position in Egypt under their rule. (Dimont, p. 36-40; Roth, 5-8)

This began to change with the overthrow of the Hyksos and the restoration of a “native” dynasty to Egypt, cerca 1550 BCE, opening the most powerful period of its rule. The Hyksos and Hebrews alike were seemingly reduced to slavery by the Pharaoh Ramses II, “the Great” (1279-1213 BCE, Ozymandias to the Greeks). The name “Israelites” first comes into use with the biblical account of the Exodus from Egypt back towards Canaan, led by Moses and thought to have happened cerca 1225 BCE. After centuries in Egypt, presumably inter-marrying with Egyptians, it is uncertain that the Israelites who emerged were precisely the same people as the Hebrews who had entered. Israelite monotheism may have been influenced by the reign of Akhenaten (Amenhotep IV, 1353-1337 BCE), the Egyptian pharaoh who proclaimed the sun god Aten to be the sole deity. (Dimont, p. 36-40; Ludwig, p. 13; Roth, 5-8)

While the Hebrews/Israelites dwelt in Egypt, Canaan was contested by the pharaohs and the Hittite empire of Anatolia to the north. Pharaoh Thutmose III finally took Canaan cerca 1470 BCE, but Egyptian rule there was in decline by the time of the Exodus, having merely nominal loyalty of the Canaanite kingdom. (Ben-Sasson, p. 13-4, 27; Roth, p. 6-7)

The Old Testament tells of the Israelite leader Joshua’s conquest of Canaan upon arriving in the land inhabited by the Hebrews centuries earlier. By popular histories, the Israelites simply displaced the Canaanites, but in reality there was probably an amalgamation of the two populations, with the Israelites becoming dominant, especially in the south. After a period of rule by “judges” in a sort of legislative body known as the Sanhedrin (during which time Egyptian rule in the land collapsed completely), a monarchy was established by Saul cerca 1000 BCE. Saul’s successor David greatly expanded the kingdom’s borders—most significantly, taking the city of Jerusalem from the Jebusites. This he made his capital, and established a temple on the slopes of a hill called Mount Zion within the city. At its height, the kingdom stretched from the Euphrates in the east to the Mediterranean in the west; from Phoenicia (modern Lebanon) in the north to the Gulf of Aqaba in the south. The heartland, however, remained the hill country around Jerusalem. The Philistines, a probably Greek-related people who inhabited the southern part of the coastal plain (and give Palestine its name), were subdued although not conquered. David was succeeded by his son Solomon cerca 965 CE, who greatly expanded the Temple, completing its construction cerca 953. (Dimont, p. 52; Encyclopaedia Judaica, p. 9; Ludwig, p. 20-2; Roth, p. 23-7)

But around 930 BCE, shortly after Solomon’s death, the kingdom split into the two entities of which it had really been a federation: Israel in the north, with its capital at Shechem (contemporary Nablus) and a temple at Bethel; and Judah in the south, with both capital and temple at Jerusalem. The outlying territories were mostly lost. It was at this time that composition of what would become the first five books of the Bible (the Torah) began in both kingdoms. Biblical scholars have for generations been parsing the text to determine which chapters were written in which kingdom—the scribes of Judah generally referring to God as Yahweh (“Jehova,” rendered as Lord in English translation) and those of Israel using the plural term Elohim (rendered in English as God). Scholarship is increasingly of the opinion that the inhabitants of the two kingdoms were separate peoples. The northern kingdom is generally considered to have been closer to the Baal-worshiping Canaanites, long ago pushed north by the Israelites. Starting in approximately 790, there was war between the two kingdoms. (Cohn-Sherbok, p. 13-4; Dimont, p. 54-7; Encyclopaedia Judaica, p. 15; Ludwig, p. 52-3; Roth, p. 32)

As the Hebrew kingdoms declined, new powers were arising in Mesopotamia, and making incursions into the western arm of the Crescent. Israel fell to Assyria in 722 BCE, and (by the biblical version) the population was deported to Mesopotamia. Judah, in an alliance with Egypt, maintained a precarious independence. Then Babylon superseded Assyria as the dominant Mesopotamian power and began a new thrust of expansion. Judah’s King Josiah at first supported Babylon as an ally against Assyria. When Egypt switched sides and sent an army to back Assyria against Babylon, Josiah attempted to block its passage through Judah—and was defeated at the Battle of Meggido (Armageddon), 609 BCE. Babylon nonetheless prevailed over Assyria, and then perceived that Judah had been precariously weakened. The Babylonians under Nebuchadnezzar II took Judah in 597 BCE, sacking Jerusalem, destroying the temple, and again (by the biblical version) deporting the population. (In reality, it was likely only the political and priestly leadership class that was deported.) (Dimont, p. 58-61; Roth, p. 35, 43)

By the time of the Assyrian conquest, Israel had moved its capital to Samaria, and those Israelites from this region who were not deported became known as the Samaritans. There is still a small community of Samaritans living today in the vicinity of Nablus on the West Bank, keeping alive elements of the ancient Hebrew religion. (Jewish Encyclopedia; Roth, p. 35)

The deportations mark the beginning of the Jewish diaspora, as well as the point at which the name “Jews” (Yehudim, in Hebrew) first emerged—the exiled people of Judah, traditionally identified as the tribes of Judah and Benjamin. (By the biblical version, the exiles from the north kingdom of Israel—the ten “lost tribes”—were dispersed and disappeared from history.) The seeds of contemporary Judaism were also established in the Babylonian exile; with no temple, “houses of assembly” (beth ha-knesset, later rendered by the Greeks “synagogue”) were established as places of worship, with teachers (later to go by the title rabbi, or master) instead of priests. (Dimont, p. 68; Ludwig, p. 72; Roth, p. 62, 83)

In 539 BCE, Babylon fell to Cyrus the Great of Persia, who allowed the Jews to return to Jerusalem and rebuild the temple (although some remained in Babylon). Under the protection of Persia, Judah (called Yahud by the Persians) again prospered, although no longer as a wholly independent state. A council of elders known as the Gerousia ruled over local affairs. Synagogue and temple, rabbi and priest, now existed side by side—the common people more linked to synagogue and rabbis; the elite to the priests and temple. (Ben-Sasson, p. 191; Dimont, p. 68-73; Encyclopaedia Judaica, p. 19-20)

The fall of Persia to Alexander the Great in 332 BCE meant great change for the whole region, with a Greek ruling class imposed. Alexander’s empire stretched from Egypt to what is now Afghanistan, but fractured following his death in 323 BCE, divided among his leading generals. The land of Judah was for over a century contested between the Ptolemies, ruling from Egypt, and the Seleucids, ruling from Syria. In 198 BCE the Seleucids gained the final victory, taking Jerusalem from the Ptolemies. (Dimont, p. 87; Ludwig, p. 94)

The Greeks called the land Ioudaia (Judea). At first, the Gerousia system continued under Greek rule. But around 175 BCE, the Seleucid ruler Antiochus Epiphanes began a campaign of “Hellenization”—imposing Greek culture and taking measures against Jewish self-government. This led to the rebellion of the Maccabees, a Jewish revivalist movement, which in 141 BCE succeeded in establishing an independent kingdom under the Hasmonean dynasty. The Hasmonean kings succeeded in winning back much of the territories ruled centuries earlier by David and Solomon. However, the kingdom was still precariously situated between the hostile Greek-dominated empires, and at times under official Seleucid sovereignty. Hasmonean king John Hyrcanus waged war against the Seleucids from 134-2 to maintain the kingdom’s independence. The Hasmonean dynasty was a theocracy, with no distinction between kings and priests. It was in this period that codification of the Old Testament was completed. (Ben-Sasson, p. 202-4, 218; Dimont, p. 87-90, 120; Ludwig, p. 107-8; Roth, p. 71)

A civil war in the Hasmonean kingdom between the Pharisees (populists who rejected Hellenization, and favored the rabbis and synagogues) and Sadducees (party of the elite who favored greater integration with the Hellenized world, and stood for the temple and priesthood) was finally exploited by the ascendant power in the region—Rome. (Dimont, p. 92-5)

Rival claimants to the throne appealed to outside powers. When the pro-Pharisee Hyrcanus II sought aid from the neighboring Nabateans, his brother, the pro-Sadducee Aristobulus II, sought aid from the Romans, who had recently completed their conquest of Syria. This was to spell the end of an independent kingdom. The Roman general Pompey skillfully played the brothers off against each other, finally switching sides. It was Hyrcanus who turned Jerusalem over to Pompey in 63 CE, and the followers of Aristobulus were massacred. (Dimont, p. 92-5; Ludwig, 114-5; Roth, p. 86-7)

Hyrcanus was installed as priest-king, but he ruled as a Roman vassal. Judah was officially renamed Judea by the Roman occupation. A Hasmonean restorationist revolt in 40 BCE was aided by the Parthian dynasty of Persia, and put down three years later by the Romans with the aid of the Idumeans (Edomites), a neighboring people who had been brought under Judean rule. Herod, a Judean leader of Idumean lineage, led the forces that retook Jerusalem when the revolt was put down, and was subsequently named “king” by Rome. But Romanization of Judea by this Rome-appointed Herod “the Great” (37-4 BCE) lead to continued unrest. After Herod’s death, Roman procurators (governors) ruled from the new capital the Romans established at Caesarea on the coast; Judea was made a Roman province in 6 CE and formally incorporated into the empire. A reduced Jewish kingdom was allowed to rule under Roman occupation in Galilee—the fertile area around the small inland “sea” of the same name in the north, from which flows the Jordan River. (Herod Antipas, son of Herod the Great and ruler of Galilee, is the one encountered by the adult Jesus in the New Testament.) (Dimont, p. 100-5; Encyclopaedia Judaica, p. 29-34; Roth, p. 94-5; Schürer, p. 118-9)

The vestiges of local autonomy rapidly eroded, and Judea was even for a while annexed to the neighboring and much larger Roman province of Syria. In 66 CE, a Jewish revolt spread throughout Judea and Galilee. The revolution was crushed in 70 CE, with Roman forces under the general (later emperor) Titus sacking Jerusalem and destroying the temple. A band of Jewish partisans known as the Zealots held out at Masada on the Dead Sea for another three years before they too were crushed. (Encyclopaedia Judaica, p. 36-7; Roth, p. 103-10)

In a subsequent rebellion under the leader Bar Kochba from 132-5, Jews succeeded in retaking ruined Jerusalem and the temple site. When the Roman Emperor Hadrian put down the rebellion, he changed the name of the province from Judea to Palestine (to de-emphasize the legacy of Judah), and deported the Jews en masse north to Galilee. There, they retained a degree of autonomy—no longer under a king, but a body of scholars known as the Patriarchate based in the town of Tiberias. Reconstitution of the culture there, and in the wider diaspora, lead to the basis of contemporary Judaism. (Dimont, p. 112; Encyclopaedia Judaica, p. 38; Roth, p. 111-9)

Contrary to the popular impression of a mass expulsion of the Jews from Palestine at this time, many remained in Galilee. There were now far more Jews outside Palestine than within, but this had been the case for at least a century before the deportation, due to Jews following trade routes. The most significant centers of Jewish culture were by then Alexandria in Roman-ruled Egypt and Babylon, where the descendants of Jews from the exile period remained under the protection of the Persian Sassanid dynasty. (Dimont, p. 125; Nathan, p. 35; Roth, p. 120-1)

Hadrian rebuilt Jerusalem after the deportation and renamed it Aelia Capitolina. Jews were barred from living in the city, and were for many years forbidden to even enter it. After Emperor Constantine made Christianity the empire’s state religion in 324, the name Jerusalem was restored, and the city became an important Christian center—although secondary to Alexandria. When the Roman empire split into two following Constantine’s rule, Palestine came within the eastern sphere—the Greek-ruled Byzantine Empire, with its capital at Constantinople (formerly Byzantium and today Istanbul). (Encyclopaedia Judaica, p. 40-4; Nathan, p. 37)

Over the following centuries, Greek culture and Christianity became increasingly dominant under Byzantine rule. Those who clung to Jewish identity, chiefly around Galilee, dwindled. The Patriarchate was abolished in the fifth century. Jews were allowed again to reside in Jerusalem, but the city’s leading families were now Greek and Roman. A Samaritan revolt was put down in 529. (Ben-Sasson, p. 355; Encyclopaedia Judaica, p. 44-5)

The 614 invasion of the Sassanid Persians was for obvious reasons supported by the Jews. Under Sassanid rule, Jerusalem was restored to the Jews, who were armed to defend it. It wasn’t until 629 that the Byzantines succeeded in driving the Sassanids back and retaking Palestine. Jews were again barred from Jerusalem. (Ben-Sasson, p. 362; Encyclopaedia Judaica, p. 47)

But the Byzantine restoration was brief. The Arabs, a chiefly nomadic people of the deserts far to the south of Palestine, were on the cusp of an unprecedented expansion, inspired by Islam, the new religion brought by the Prophet Mohammad. There were already Arab peoples in the Fertile Crescent—the ancient kingdoms of Nabatea (in contemporary Jordan) and Palmyra (in contemporary Syria) were Arab. But from the distant desert towns of Mecca (the religious center) and Medina (the political capital), Arabs were now forging a centralized empire, uniting tribes for campaigns of conquest. (Lewis, 1950, p. 26-7)

The Byzantines virtually invited an Arab invasion of Palestine. They had long subsidized nomadic Arab tribes beyond the Dead Sea as a buffer military force. But after the routing of the Sassanids, they overconfidently ceased these payments. The tribes appealed to their kindred further south, who were just then forging a formidable fighting capacity. (Nathan, p. 42)

The Arabs invaded Palestine in 634 and took Jerusalem four years later. Although there had been a lengthy siege, the surrender of the city to the Arab armies was in the end peaceful and negotiated. Caliph Omar, the second successor to Mohammad, personally toured the city, now holy to three monotheistic faiths. The Arabs called Jerusalem al-Quds, the holy. Islam became the state religion, but Christians and the remaining Jews were tolerated as long as they paid a special tax, the jizya. As “people of the book,” they were considered dhimmis—followers of tolerated religions recognized as having a kinship with Islam. Jews were allowed once again to reside in Jerusalem. Jews, and other subject peoples who had been persecuted by the Byzantines, generally welcomed Arab rule. (Asali, p. 116; Encyclopaedia Judaica, p. 48-9; Lewis, 1950, p. 58)

Arabs became the new dominant class, soldiers becoming settlers with generous land grants. However, the Arabs took over only lands which had officially belonged to the Byzantine state, or to those who resisted them. Landowners who recognized the new government were allowed to keep their properties. There was again probably a general continuity with the pre-existing population in Palestine, with many Christians and perhaps some Jews converting to Islam, inter-marrying with Arabs, and adopting Arab culture. Arabic superseded Aramaic (the vernacular counterpart to the liturgical Hebrew) as the language of the land’s common people, and Greek as the language of administration. (Hebrew would survive as the liturgical language of the Jews; Aramaic still survives today as the common tongue of scattered Jewish communities in the Arab lands.) (Lewis, 1950, p. 57; Nathan, p. 43; Polk, et al., p. 241; Lewis, 1984, p. 76; Roth, p. 121)

The Fertile Crescent naturally became the new center of Arab power, although Mecca and Medina were still revered as holy cities. In 661, Palestine came under the Umayyad Caliphate, which ruled the Arab empire from Damascus, in Syria. It was in the early years of Umayyad rule that al-Aqsa Mosque and the Dome of the Rock (Qubbat as-Sakhrah) were built on the Temple Mount, the site of the old Jewish temple—which had been turned into a garbage dump by the Byzantines. The Dome of the Rock protects the purported site of the biblical Abraham’s near-sacrifice of his son Isaac. Al-Aqsa Mosque commemorates the Prophet Mohammad’s mystical “Night Journey,” in which he is believed to have visited Jerusalem. The complex on the Temple Mount—known as the Noble Sanctuary or Haram al-Sharif—became the third holiest site in Islam, after Mecca and Medina. Immediately below is the Western Wall, the last standing fragment of the Second Temple, and the holiest site for Jews. This remains the geography of the Temple Mount to this day. (Armstrong, p. 46; Hitti, p. 33; Encyclopaedia Judaica, 51-2)

In 750, the Umayyad dynasty was superseded by the Abbasid Caliphate, based in Baghdad, in contemporary Iraq. The following century was the height of the Arab empire’s glory. The empire’s local seat of administration was Ramleh, and Jerusalem’s significance was as a religious center. There was something of a recovery of Jewish culture in the city under the Abbasids, and the Talmudic Academy—Palestine’s most important center of Jewish learning—was moved there from Tiberias in the Galilee. (Encyclopaedia Judaica, 54-5; Lewis, 1950, p. 96)

Egypt gained increasing preeminence in Islamic world as the Abbasids began to decline, and in 878 Jerusalem was taken by the Egyptian ruler Ahmad ibn Tulun. From 941, another Egyptian dynasty, the Ikhshidids, ruled Palestine—again, with merely official loyalty to the Caliphate of Baghdad. In this period of decay, religious conflict emerged in Jerusalem. Episodes of Muslim violence against Christians (including the sacking of the Church of the Holy Sepulcher, purported site of the resurrection of Jesus) occurred repeatedly in the 10th century. (Encyclopaedia Judaica, 54-5; Lewis, 1950, p. 96; Najeebabadi, vol. 2, p. 618)

In 969, the Fatimid Caliphate was established in Cairo by followers of the Ismaili Shi’ite “heresy,” and Palestine finally fell outside the orbit of the Abbisid Caliphate altogether. This brought a century of relief to the Christian and Jewish minorities. But the Fatimids lost Palestine to the Seljuk Turks in 1071. The Seljuks had begun their career as a mercenary force for the declining Abbisids, but were by now the real power in Baghdad—while still recognizing the caliph in name. A Palestinian revolt against the Seljuks was put down with great brutality. (Encyclopaedia Judaica, p. 58-9; Najeebabadi, vol. 2, p. 622-3)

The Seljuks’ barring of Christian pilgrims from Jerusalem prompted the Pope of Rome, Urban II, to call the First Crusade, with knights recruited from across Catholic Europe to take the Holy Land. In 1098, with Crusader armies advancing, the Fatimids retook Jerusalem. But they lost it again in 1099, when Jerusalem fell to the Crusaders after a five-week siege. (Encyclopaedia Judaica, p. 59; Riley-Smith, p. 2-10, 34)

This change of power was different: there was a general slaughter of the city’s populace, with Muslims and Jews massacred and burned alive in mosques and synagogues. In the aftermath, the city was closed to Muslim and Jewish worshipers. The Knights Templar, the most fanatical of the Crusader military orders, established their headquarters in al-Aqsa Mosque. (Encyclopaedia Judaica, p. 60-1)

This period also saw the first major outbreaks of violence against Jews in Europe, who had by then long since arrived via the Mediterranean in France and England. Both these countries saw widespread attacks on Jews in the same paroxysm of zeal that mobilized the Crusades. The Crusaders gratuitously destroyed Jewish villages en route to Jerusalem as well. (Riley-Smith, p. 16-7)

In 1144, a Second Crusade was called to defend Christian Jerusalem as the fractured Islamic world began to gather forces for the counter-attack. The first serious threat to the Crusader state came from Zengi, ruler of Syria to the north. (Riley-Smith, p. 93)

But the real turn-around came in 1171, when the Kurdish warrior Salah al-Din (Saladin) ousted the Fatimids from Egypt, establishing the Ayyubid dynasty and restoring Sunni Islam (the majority tendency, that of the Abbasid Caliphate). The Ayyubids were officially loyal to the Abbasid Caliphate, but Cairo had now supplanted Baghdad as the center of Islamic power. Following the 1187 Battle of Hattin, Saladin drove the Crusaders from Jerusalem. Revenge killings were barred, and the city’s Christian inhabitants (by then overwhelmingly Frankish settlers) were granted safe passage to the rump Crusader state on the coast. A Third Crusade was promptly launched to re-take the city. (Hourani, p. 84; Riley-Smith, p. 84-5)

In 1191, Saladin made a peace deal with the rump Crusader state of England’s Richard the Lion-Hearted, allowing Christians and Muslims alike access to Jerusalem. This peace was broken following Saladin’s death in 1193, when new crusades were launched. (Riley-Smith, p. 118)

In 1229, a Sixth Crusade was organized at the Vatican’s urging by Frederick II, ruler of the Holy Roman Empire, the great confederation of German and northern Italian states. But this time the crusade was cut short by a peace deal between Frederick and Saladin’s successor, the Ayyubid Sultan al-Kamil. This pact established joint Christian-Muslim control of Jerusalem under Frederick’s official if distant rule—for which the Holy Roman Emperor was promptly excommunicated by the Pope. (Encyclopaedia Judaica, p. 67; Hitti, p. 225-6; Riley-Smith, p. 149-51)

This peace persisted until the 1244 invasion of the Khwarazmian Turks, fleeing the Mongol irruption from Central Asia. The Khwarazmians overran Jerusalem, causing much destruction, but were turned back by the Ayyubids before they reached Egypt. However, the struggle against the Khwarazmians lead to the ascendance of the (mostly Turkish) Mamluk military slave caste within Egypt’s political elite. Palestine was meanwhile left in ruin and chaos, although Nablus and other hill towns provided some shelter for refugees from devastated Jerusalem. (Encyclopaedia Judaica, p. 67)

In 1249, when a Seventh Crusade under Louis IX of France (St. Louis) invaded Egypt, the Mamluk “slave dynasty” finally took power, successfully repelling the Crusaders. Palestine was for some years contested by Mamluk Egypt and a rump Ayyubid state in Syria. But in 1258, the Mongols themselves arrived in the Fertile Crescent. The Mongol armies under Hulagu Khan destroyed Baghdad, overran Syria, and penetrated Palestine from the north. It was the Mamluks who turned them back at the battle of Ayn Jalut (En-Harod in Hebrew) before they could reach Jerusalem. Afterwards, Palestine finally came under firm Mamluk rule. (Encyclopaedia Judaica, p. 69; Riley-Smith, p. 160)

The Mamluk Sultan Babyars next seized Syria, expelling both the Mongols and last of the Crusaders in a confused three-way war. The Abbasid Caliphate was formally transfered from destroyed Baghdad to Cairo. Peace was restored, but centralized rule weakened, and feudalism spread. Agriculture in Palestine had virtually collapsed, and settled peoples returned to nomadism. (Encyclopaedia Judaica, p. 69; Najeebabadi, vol. 2, p. 589; Nathan, p. 46-7; Riley-Smith, p. 203-4)

Palestine slowly began to recover under the Mamluks, and Jerusalem was rebuilt. Heavy taxes were imposed on Jews and there were periodic episodes of persecution—the closing of synagogues and so forth. Still, a yeshiva (Jewish seminary) was maintained in Jerusalem, and Jews fleeing persecution in Europe even found refuge in Palestine, arriving on Italian merchant ships. Safed, in the Galilee, was also a significant seat of Jewish culture and learning. (Encyclopaedia Judaica, p. 69-76)

In the closing years of the Crusades, European Jews again became a target—and this time in a far more systematic campaign. In 1215, the Fourth Lateran Council, overseen by Pope Innocent III, mandated that Jews wear identifying yellow badges. The situation worsened as the “Black Death” (bubonic plague) devastated Europe, and Jews were superstitiously blamed. In 1290 England became the first country to expel its Jews by decree. France and various German states would follow—generally amid much violence. While a small number came to Mamluk Palestine, far greater numbers moved east within Europe—to those German states that would have them, and then to Poland and Lithuania. Many would later come under Russian rule as borders shifted. By 1500, the center of Jewish culture had shifted from Western to Eastern Europe. Even where they were tolerated, Jews faced restrictions on where they could live—confined to walled ghettos in Poland and Lithuania. Their villages in Russia would later be confined to a limited “Pale of Settlement.” In the ghettos, they were allowed a degree of self-government. Effectively segregated from the Christian population, they would maintain their own language, Yiddish, a distinct tongue that evolved from German. Hebrew was of course maintained as the liturgical and scholarly tongue. (Ben-Sasson, p. 486-7; Dimont, p. 230-1, 248; Roth, p. 198, 334)

In 1400, a new Mongol irruption from Central Asia, this time under Timur Leng (Tamerlane), ravaged Syria. The Mamluks again successfully fended off the invader, so Palestine and Egypt were spared. But the Mamluk dynasty was greatly weakened by the struggle. (Lewis, 1950, p. 157)

In 1451, the Ottoman Turks took Constantinople, putting a final end to the greatly diminished Byzantine Empire. In 1517, the Ottomans under Sultan Selim I (“the Grim”) established Mamluk Egypt as a vassal state, and officially transfered the caliphate to Constantinople. Palestine, and most of the Arab world, now came under Ottoman rule. Mamluk sway over Palestine waned as the dynasty declined, and the Ottoman Turks became ascendant. (Kinross, 107-10, 170)

Ottoman rule brought another period of relative tolerance and reflorescence of Jewish culture. Sultan Bayezid II (“the Just”) welcomed Jewish exiles from Spain after the expulsion of 1492 to settle in Palestine or elsewhere in his empire. Safed reached its peak as a world center of Jewish learning. (Ben-Sasson, p. 632, 661)

The rebuilding of Jerusalem picked up pace, and Sultan Suleiman “the Magnificent” (1520-66) built a new wall around the city—largely to check the periodic raids of the nomadic Bedouin Arabs. A waqf (trust or endowment) was established to oversee the Haram al-Sharif and other Islamic holy sites, with land grants in the countryside to make it economically self-sufficient. The Temple Mount complex was renovated and the Dome of the Rock restored. After the centuries of turmoil, there was now a long period of peace. The Ottomans would be embroiled in many wars in Europe—chiefly with Austria and Russia—but these did not affect Palestine. (Asali, p. 200-1; Encyclopaedia Judaica, p. 77, 92-100)

Trade with Europe grew, and by the 18th century Palestine’s coastal plain was a major producer of cotton and citrus for export. But real Ottoman control did not extend far beyond the urban centers. There was little permanently settled Turkish class. The land remained largely in Arab hands, and Arabic remained the dominant language. (Asali, p. 214; Encyclopaedia Judaica, p. 91; Hourani, 252, 286)

As Palestine’s economic importance grew, the Ottomans began to take tentative measures to increase their control. But in 1703, after a Turkish governor had been installed in Jerusalem who imposed heavy taxes on the peasants and townspeople alike, an insurrection broke out, led by the prominent Husseini family. It was put down, but thenceforth the governors of Jerusalem were drawn from the local Arab elite, and the heavy taxes rescinded. The nearest center of direct Turkish administration, Damascus, interfered little in Palestine’s affairs. (Asali, p. 215-6)

In 1798, Napoleon Bonaparte established an occupation of Egypt, precipitating a confused four-way war over the country among the French, British, Turks and Mamluks. Eager to extend his control to Syria, Napoleon invaded Palestine, sacking the Mediterranean port of Jaffa and besieging Acre, another port up the coast. In a precursor of later European imperial strategies in the territory, Napoleon appealed for Jewish support against the Arabs and Turks. On April 20, 1799, amid the siege of Acre, he had an order penned, declaring that when he conquered the territory, Jews—who he called the “rightful heirs of Palestine”—would inherit the land. The Jewish notables of Acre spurned the offer, and Napoleon was forced to retreat from Palestine. In 1801, his precarious hold on Egypt collapsed, and Ottoman-Mamluk rule was restored. Palestine remained under more direct Ottoman rule, although with broad autonomy for Arabs (Muslim and Christian alike) and Jews. (Fisher, p. 263; Jerusalem Post, May 20, 2011)

Zionist Colonization Under Ottoman Rule

By the mid-19th century, Palestine, like most of the Middle East, had been a part of the Ottoman Empire for nearly 500 years. People who lived there called the country Filastin, or by the Arabic phrase al-Ard al-Muqadassa—the Holy Land. (Gerner, p. 9)

For centuries, a high degree of local autonomy had been allowed. There was both cultural autonomy for the various religious and ethnic groups, and territorial autonomy for villages and districts. Under the millet system, Muslims, Christians and Jews each had their own leadership responsible for internal affairs within their own community and subject to their own laws. (Lewis, 1984, p. 125)

Village mukhtars (traditional elders) were treated as local administrators, given authority over local affairs in exchange for providing taxes and conscripts for the Turkish army. Informal village militias were also often maintained to protect against Bedouin raids, and tolerated by Turkish authorities. (Sayigh, p. 15)

Villages were generally self-sufficient, with families working subsistence plots of perhaps 100 dunums (25 acres) under a system of land tenure in which some fields were formally the domain of lords or mukhtars in a survival of feudalism, and others were explicitly for the use of common villagers. Wheat, barely, millet, sesame, lentils, olives, figs, citrus and melons were common crops, and most families had goats and other livestock. (Nathan, p. 184, 196)

1834 saw a new Arab uprising in Palestine, after the territory was seized by Egyptian ruler Mohammed Ali—a commander of Albanian origin who had been dispatched by Constantinople to finally oust the Mamluks, and then made his own bid for independence from the Ottoman Empire. Mohammed Ali’s excessive demands for conscripts and other encroachments on village autonomy were resented by the Palestinian Arabs. After he was forced to cede Palestine (and accept Ottoman sovereignty over Egypt), the traditional rights of the villages were restored. (Ayyad, p. 15)

This began to change in the 1840s, however, when the Ottoman Empire’s tanzimat reforms brought centralized administration and taxation, extending the control of the Ottoman capital, Constantinople. This saw the formal abolition of serfdom, with peasants freed from the authoritarian control of local mukhtars. Peasants were no longer bound to the land, or forced to work it as fiefs. But, as old patterns of land use were disrupted, this also resulted in an impoverishment of the villages, and the beginning of a slow movement of the population to the coastal towns. (Morris, 2001, p. 7; Nathan, p. 50)

An 1858 Land Law to regularize property deeds had the actual effect of centralizing control of communal agricultural lands—which had traditionally been worked by peasants without formal title—in the hands of a few wealthy, often absentee, private owners. Lands designated miri—arable lands controlled by the state after being removed from feudal authority—had been de facto communal village lands, and their titling as mulk (private) lands often meant the exclusion of peasant families that had worked them for generations. Musha lands were more formally for the common use of villagers, subject to repartition among families. These were also increasingly transfered to the mulk sector, as families were given the option of privatizing the parcels they had been working. Outlying uncultivated lands—known as mewat—were also claimed by the state and then privatized, even though they had been used informally for pasturing. Many of the new owners were Turks rather than Arabs, and often they were European—with the Ottoman state then under pressure from European powers to allow land ownership by foreigners. Arab peasants were increasingly reduced to the status of tenant farmers—an ironic outcome of their “liberation” from serfdom. (Dowty, p. 59-60; Nathan, p. 50, 184)

Nonetheless, a thriving citrus industry on the coastal plain remained in the hands of local Arabs—usually the effendis, or Arab gentry. And even under greater economic burden, the villages of the fellahin, or peasantry, remained largely self-sufficient. The system of communal apportionment of lands and water, known as masha’, actually survived the new land law—in part because many Arab peasants evaded land registration. While this helped preserve communal traditions, it would also make the villages more vulnerable, as many now lacked legal title to their lands under the new system. (Hadawi, 1963, p. 119; Polk, et al, p. 241; Sayigh, p. 27, 32)

At this time the population of Palestine was 462,500, of which 404,000 were Muslim, 44,000 Christian and 15,000 Jews—or 20,000 by some estimates, as some Jews were not considered Ottoman citizens and may have not been counted. The population was overwhelmingly rural, although the Jews were disproportionately urban, concentrated in Jerusalem, Hebron, Safed and Tiberias. (Dowty, p. 13)

Events far from Palestine meanwhile gave birth to a movement which would change the land’s fate. European Jews had largely achieved “emancipation”—full citizenship rights, and an end to the ghettos—by the mid-19th century. Jewish emancipation was formally embraced by Europe’s Great Powers at the 1878 Berlin Conference. But this sparked a backlash, and the modern ideology of anti-Semitism emerged—viewing the Jews as an alien, un-assimilable and ultimately corrupting Semitic presence in Europe. As revolutionary upsurges threatened the continent’s old monarchies, Jews served as scapegoats, and an assimilationist solution to Europe’s “Jewish Question” seemed less tenable. In 1881, Russian pogroms (from word for “havoc” or “outrage”) began following the March 13 assassination of Czar Alexander II, with hundreds of Jewish villages attacked by right-wing mobs and paramilitaries. Following Alexander II’s reforms, which had allowed Jews access to higher education and posts in the bureaucracy, there was a period of backlash in which some 4 million Jews fled Russia. The reforms were overturned, and the pogroms actively encouraged by the authorities. (Ben-Sasson, p. 823-4; Gross, p. 651-7; Morris, 2001, p. 15-8; Dowty, p. 31, 33)

In the mass emigration of Jews from Russia and Eastern Europe that began at this time, most went to the United States. Some went to Britain, Canada and South Africa. But an organized movement to direct the exodus with the aim of establishing a Jewish national state emerged in response to surgence of anti-Semitism: Zionism. (Nathan, p. 52-3)

The Hovevei Zion (Lovers of Zion) was founded in Poland, with a vision of establishing Palestine as a Jewish homeland. It organized chapters throughout Russia, Poland and Romania to raise funds for emigration. The allied Bilu—an acronym for “House of Jacob, Let Us Go”—was established in Palestine to organize settlements. The First Aliyah, or mass migration of Jewish settlers to Palestine, began in 1882—a year which also saw the publication in German of the first Zionist manifesto, Leon Pinsker’s Self-Emancipation. Aided by wealthy Jewish philanthropists in western Europe, the movement purchased some 100,000 dunams of land for the olim (settlers, “those who ascend”) by 1890, and 200,000 by 1900. Most of the olim lived in the coastal cities, particularly the new city of Tel Aviv that was established near Jaffa. But the program called for the establishment of agricultural settlements as quickly as possible. The Bilu evolved into the Palestine Jewish Colonization Association. (Ben-Sasson, p. 896; Cohn-Sherbok, p. 106-7; Morris, 2001, p. 15-8; Dowty, p. 31, 33)

In 1888, the Ottoman administrators took note of the Jewish immigration and Zionist designs, changing the region’s administrative districts to enhance Constantinople’s control. The entire region had until then been part of a province or vilayet ruled from Damascus, and was generally considered part of Syria. With the reorganization, Palestine was separated from Syria and divided into three districts, centered around Jerusalem, Nablus and Acre. The northern two districts were sanjaqs (internal districts) attached to the Vilayet of Beirut, while Jerusalem, encompassing the southern half of historic Palestine, became a mutasarriflik (independent district) administrated directly from Constantinople. The sparsely inhabited Negev Desert remained under Syrian administration. Officially, Zionist aims at this time were limited to establishing “a state within a larger state”—an autonomous Jewish territory within the Ottoman empire. (Dowty, p. 18, 33)

In 1896, following the Dreyfus Affair in France—in which a Jewish army officer was notoriously framed on treason charges—Theodore Herzl published Der Judenstaat (The Jewish State) in Germany. The book, the first explicit aspiration of Jewish statehood in Palestine, actually made no reference to the Arab inhabitants of the territory. Elsewhere, Herzl wrote that he saw Zionism as bringing economic development to the Arabs of Palestine, and in 1903 publicly called for restraints on the purchase of Palestinian lands from absentee landlords in Beirut, arguing that “poor Arab [tenant] farmers should not be driven off their land.” (Morris, 2001, p. 20-1, 678)

But in 1895 he wrote in his diary: “We must expropriate gently… We shall try to spirit the penniless population across the border by procuring employment for it in the transit countries, while denying it in any employment in our country… Both the process of expropriation and the removal of the poor must be carried out discreetly and circumspectly.” (Morris, 2001, p. 21-2)

“A land without people for a people without land” became the Zionist slogan (actually originating in the memoirs of British politician Lord Shaftesbury). But Russian Jewish writer Asher Ginsberg (pen name Ahad Ha-Am) warned in a Hebrew newspaper in Russia after an 1891 visit to Palestine: “We abroad are used to believing that Eretz Yisrael [the Land of Israel] is now almost totally desolate, a desert that is not sowed… But in truth this is not the case. Throughout the country it is difficult to find fields that are not sowed. Only sand dunes and stony mountains…are not cultivated… If a time comes when our people in Palestine develop so that, in small or great measure, they push out the native inhabitants, these will not give up their place easily.” (Morris, 2001, p. 42, 49; Davis, p. 7)

Ginsberg/Ha-Am favored a “Cultural Zionism” that emphasized the Hebrew language and Jewish cultural renewal in Palestine, and was skeptical of a rush to statehood. But the “Political Zionism” of Herzl, heedless of his warnings, became the mainstream position. (Davis, p. 7; Roth, p. 373)

Zionism was still a minority current within Jewish thought at this time, and Palestine but one option under consideration within Zionism. Jewish agricultural colonies were established in Manitoba, Argentina, Australia and South Africa. There was even a scheme to establish a Jewish state on Grand Island in the Niagara River, off Buffalo, New York. (AFSC, p. 15; Gross, p. 620)

This began to change as the movement was formalized. The World Zionist Organization was founded at the Basel Congress, held in Switzerland in September 1897. “At Basel, I founded the Jewish State,” Herzl boasted. When Ottoman authorities completely rejected establishment of a Jewish homeland in Palestine, the movement opened talks with Britain, which offered territory in East Africa. The Russian wing of the movement especially, led by the young Chiam Weizmann, was most vocal in rejecting the “Uganda Offer,” calling themselves “Zionists of Zion.” Those who were open to a homeland elsewhere than Palestine broke from the WZO to form the “Territorialist” tendency under the leadership of Israel Zangwill. The “Zionists of Zion” held sway over Herzl and the WZO. (Ben-Sasson, p. 901-2; Morris, 2001, p. 23; Dowty, p. 37)

Yusuf Diya Pasha al-Khalidi, patriarch of one of Jerusalem’s leading families, wrote to the chief rabbi of France, appealing to him to pressure for a halt to Jewish colonization, predicting it would lead to violent conflict. He wrote that there were “still uninhabited countries where one could settle millions of poor Jews… But in the name of God, let Palestine be left in peace.” (Dowty, p. 63)

Arabs had reason to fear European encroachment. European colonialism was at this time a growing force in the Arab world. In 1882, a British occupation of Egypt was established, with the Ottomans maintaining only nominal sovereignty there. Although the British had ostensibly intervened to put down an Arab revolt against the Ottoman administrators, they became the real power in Egypt. The Suez Canal—linking the Mediterranean and Red Sea through Egypt, completed in 1869 by a French-dominated company (using Egyptian forced labor)—made the region critically strategic. (Fisher, p. 286-91)

Jews were again scapegoated as revolutionary currents swelled in Russia, and a new wave of pogroms was unleashed in 1903. In the notorious Passover Pogrom, 50 were killed and scores injured and raped at Kishinev. The violence, paradoxically, succeeded in radicalizing Russian Jews, many of whom did embrace anarchism and other revolutionary ideologies. But many fled Russia, and embraced Zionism. The violence prompted the Second Aliyah movement—this one much larger and better organized. The new exodus from Russia brought some 34,000 Jewish settlers to Ottoman Palestine. (Avrich, p. 17; Morris, 2001, p. 25; Dowty, p. 36-7; Yivo Institute for Jewish Research)

The most anti-Semitic elements of the Russian government were pleased by the notion of a Jewish exodus from their country. In 1903, just before he died, Herzl actually received a letter from Interior Minister Viacheslav Plehve, notorious as the mastermind of the pogroms, in which he pledged the Czarist state’s “moral and material assistance with respect to the measures taken by the Zionist movement which would lead to the diminution of the Jewish population in Russia.” (Bober, p. 172-3)

The first kibbutzim (collective settlements) were established in Palestine, building on the moshavot of the First Aliyah, which had been based on private property and exploitation of cheap Arab labor. The kibbutzim were owned in common and sought to be self-sufficient. Menachem Ussishkin in 1904 delineated three methods by which land could be procured: “By force—that is, by conquest in war, or in other words, by robbing land from its owner… by expropriation via government authority; or by purchase.” (Morris, 2001, p. 38-9)

Although Constantinople curtailed Jewish land purchases, baksheesh (bribery) allowed de facto purchases to continue. The new Jewish owners offended local traditions of land use in various ways. Arab shepherds were denied the right of access to what had long been common pasturelands regardless of official ownership. Jews purchased land from effendis—members of the Arab land-owning elite—and then pushed out the poor tenant farmers who had been on the lands for generations. (Morris, 2001, p. 41, 46, 57)

The very first violent conflict between Arab Palestinians and Zionist settlers took place in this era—largely because of this refusal on the part of the settlers to recognize the peasants’ customary rights in the land. For instance, when settlers barred the peasants from grazing their herds on newly bought lands, this naturally provoked incursions, which then escalated to attacks. (Sayigh, p. 44)

The Second Aliyah olim were often socialists, anarchists, atheists and free-thinkers, but even the socialist Poalei Zion organization, led by Polish-born David Ben-Gurion, advocated exclusion of Arabs from the emerging Jewish economy, and a ban on hiring Arab labor. This policy was known as kibush ha’avoda or “conquest of labor.” (Morris, 2001, p. 46, 50-1)

Arab raids on settlements predictably became a constant problem, with houses vandalized and livestock seized. In 1908, the HaShomer (“guard,” or “watchman”) militia was founded to defend the settlements. (Morris, 2001, p. 53-4; Gee, p. 40)

In 1891, a group of Jerusalem Arab notables petitioned Constantinople to halt Jewish immigration: “The Jews are taking all the lands out of the hands of the Muslims, taking all the commerce into their hands and bringing arms into the country.” (Morris, 2001, p. 56)

Arab national aspirations were also emerging at this time. In 1905, Najib Azuri, a Lebanese Christian who had served in the Ottoman bureaucracy in Jerusalem, published in French The Awakening of the Arab Nation, calling for an independent Arab state stretching from Mesopotamia to the Suez. (Dowty, p. 65)

In 1907, the World Zionist Organization founded a Palestine Office in Jaffa to oversee land acquisition and distribution, headed by Arthur Ruppin, who wrote: “Land is the most necessary thing for establishing roots in Palestine. Since there are hardly any more arable unsettled lands…we are bound in each case…to remove the peasants who cultivated the land.” He advocated a “limited population transfer” of Palestinian peasants to Syria. (Morris, 2001, p. 59, 61, 140)

Yet the most ambitious Zionist statement actually foresaw the annexation of Syria itself. Max Nordau wrote that Zionism sought “to expand Europe’s moral borders to the Euphrates.” (Morris, 2001, p. 63)

In 1911, the Turkish governor of Jerusalem, Azmi Bey, in a bid to appease Arab protests, wrote: “We are not xenophobes; we welcome all strangers. We are not anti-Semites… But no nation, no government could open its arms to groups…aiming to take Palestine from us.” (Morris, 2001, p. 62)

A Palestinian-born Jew, Yitzhak Epstein, delivered a lecture on the “Arab question” in Basel in 1905: “We have forgotten one small matter: There is in our beloved land an entire nation, which has occupied it for hundreds of years and has never thought to leave it… We are making a great psychological error with regard to a great, assertive and jealous people. While we feel a deep love for the land of our forefathers, we forget that the nation who lives in it today has a sensitive heart and a loving soul. The Arab, like every man, is tied to his native land with strong bonds.” (Morris, 2001, p. 57; Palestine Remembered)

In direct response, Mose Smilansky wrote: “Either the land of Israel belongs in a national sense to those Arabs who settled there in recent times, and then we have no place there and we must say explicitly: The land of our fathers is lost to us. [Or] if the Land of Israel belongs to us, to the Jewish people, then our national interests come before all else… It is not possible for one country to serve as the homeland of two peoples.” (Morris, 2001, p. 58)

Smilansky was clear in advocating separation from the Arabs: “Let us not be too familiar with the Arab fellahin lest our children adopt their ways and learn from their ugly deeds. Let all those who are loyal to the Torah avoid ugliness and that which resembles it and keep their distance from the fellahin and their base attributes.” (Masalha, p. 7)

Ber Borochov, a prominent Marxist Zionist and founder of Poalei Zion, called for a “Semitic nationalism,” for the olim to learn Arabic, and recognize Arabs as “close to us in blood and spirit.” But such sentiments remained marginal. (Hertzberg, 352; Morris, 2001, p. 58)

As Zionism gained ground, so did Arab calls for independence—initially among the Lebanese Christian elite of Beirut, who launched the watan or “fatherland” movement. In 1877, a new Ottoman constitution had instated a parliament in Constantinople, with representatives from throughout the empire. When the new constitution was suspended following a conservative coup the following year, the hand of Arab independence advocates was strengthened. Many rallied to Abd al-Qadir al-Jazairi, who had been exiled to Syria following a revolt against the French in Algeria. The movement was crushed, and the constitution revived when the reformist Young Turk tendency took power in Constantinople in 1908. But Arabs remained a minority in the parliament even though they believed they constituted a majority in the empire’s populace. The 1908 Ottoman parliament included 147 Turks, 60 Arabs and four Jews (as well as token numbers of Armenians, Greeks, Albanians and Slavs). (Lewis, p. 179; Morris, 2001, p. 26-9)

In Palestine, demographics were changing. By 1914, there were some 60,000 Jews in Palestine, compared to 657,000 Muslims (including Druze, a minority sect), and 81,000 Christians. Some 45 Jewish agricultural settlements had been established. (Morris, 2001, p. 83; Nathan, p. 52)

World War I and the Balfour Declaration

The outbreak of World War I—with Constantinople on the side of the Central Powers—brought disruption of the Ottoman Empire’s trade routes, and harsh privation to Palestine. Henry Morgenthau, the Jewish but non-Zionist US ambassador to the Ottomans, organized a dispatch of aid raised by American Jews to the Yishuv, or community of the olim. The aid was delivered by the US battleship North Carolina in October 1914. Morgenthau also applied diplomatic pressure when the Ottoman authorities began having Jewish settlers deported as enemy nationals later that year; the deportations were halted after several hundred had been shipped to British-held territory in Egypt. (Morris, 2001, p. 85)

Many Jews in Palestine believed that an Allied victory would improve their prospects for a state, and some actively collaborated with the British. In 1915, Jewish settlers established the NILI spy ring which reported to Britain on Ottoman forces in Palestine; two of its leaders would be hanged by Ottoman authorities. (Morris, 2001, p. 87)

One 1915 British parliamentary report read:

The Zionist leaders gave us [Britain] a definite promise that, if the Allies committed themselves to giving facilities for the establishment of a national home for the Jews in Palestine, they would do their best to rally Jewish sentiment and support throughout the world to the Allied cause. [Thomas, p. 9]

The British Gen. Edmund Allenby invaded from Egypt in the spring of 1917—with the participation of a Jewish Legion made up of Zionist volunteers from Palestine, Britain and the US. The Turks, clearly no longer trusting the loyalty of the Jews, had Tel Aviv forcibly evacuated—under the guise of protecting the populace. The city’s mostly Jewish inhabitants took refuge in the Galilee and other inland rural areas. But Allenby took Jerusalem and expelled the Turks from the territory in December; the Jewish refugees returned to Tel Aviv. (Morris, 2001, p. 77; Segev, p. 19-20)

In April 1918, Allenby established the Occupied Enemy Territory Administration (OETA)—which, in a bid to win peace with the Arabs, made no overt moves towards implementing the Zionist policy, and actually curbed Jewish immigration. (Morris, 2001, p. 88-9)

As Allenby’s invasion was prepared, Britain’s rulers began debating the post-war fate of Palestin

Continue ReadingTHE DISPOSSESSION OF THE PALESTINIANS 

IMMIGRATION DETENTION: THE CASE FOR ABOLITION

by Jane Guskin, The Huffington Post

On August 6, 34-year-old immigration detainee Hiu Lui Ng died in Rhode Island, in severe pain from a fractured spine and terminal cancer which went undiagnosed and untreated over the year he spent in federal lockups. Valery Joseph, another immigration detainee, died of an apparent seizure at the Glades County Detention Center in Florida on June 20, just two weeks shy of his 24th birthday. Ng had been living in the US for half his life, since he was 17; Joseph had spent two thirds of his life here, having arrived at age 8. The two men joined a list of at least 80 people who have died in the custody of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) since January 1, 2004.

Since May of this year, investigative stories in the New York Times, Washington Post and CBS News have exposed a pattern of serious medical neglect in the immigration detention system which appears to have been a factor in many of these deaths. (ICE denies the charges, unsurprisingly.)

By focusing on these compelling stories of human suffering, the mainstream media coverage has brought needed attention to the issue of mass incarceration in our immigration system.

Many concerned citizens are now demanding reform, saying that even people facing deportation have a right to basic medical care and humane treatment while detained. Others are less sympathetic, arguing that we shouldn’t spend taxpayer dollars on health care for immigrants.

The obvious question isn’t being asked: why are people detained at all? Why should we spend more than $1.2 billion a year to keep immigrants in prison? What purpose does immigration detention serve?

Officially, immigration detention is not supposed to be used as punishment; the immigration agency can only detain immigrants in order to more easily deport them, so that they don’t “abscond” and evade removal. In reality, the federal government uses immigration detention to punish people for fighting their deportation cases, to pressure them to give up and return to their country of nationality, and to discourage other people from coming to the US to seek asylum.

But these aren’t legally or morally acceptable justifications for detention.

Does it even matter whether people “abscond”? Is it really a problem if immigrants who are supposed to be deported end up staying here with their families—living, working, shopping and paying taxes? When we add up the cost in dollars, and in human lives, is it worth it to ensure that immigrants really leave the US?

On the other side of the globe, Australia has confronted the same question and has decided that the answer is no. On July 29, the Australian government announced it will stop routinely detaining asylum seekers while their immigration cases are pending; under the new policy, only adults who are considered a security risk may be detained—and even then, only as a last resort, and for the briefest possible time.

Back in the US, we seem to be heading in the opposite direction. In 1994, there were an average of 6,785 people in immigration detention on any given day; in 2008, that number is around 32,000 and growing. That’s an increase of more than 470% in less than 15 years.

Do you feel safer, knowing that 32,000 people are behind bars today for the sole reason that they were not born in this country and have been deemed “removable”? Are you satisfied to spend over $1.2 billion a year of your tax dollars keeping immigrants locked up while the prison industry’s profits soar?

Why can’t we just abolish immigration detention, the way debtor’s prison was abolished in the 1800s?

The solution is not “alternatives to detention” like the electronic monitoring devices some immigrants are forced to wear on their ankles. As the Catholic Legal Immigration Network points out, such devices are “overly restrictive in nature and constitute other forms of detention, rather than meaningful alternatives to detention.”

The alternative to detention is simple: no detention.

The government could end detention today by releasing the people who are fighting their cases, and letting everyone else—those who aren’t trying to stay here—choose voluntary departure with a six-month period to make arrangements and leave on their own. (The incentive? Voluntary departure means they could later apply to return here legally.)

How much tragedy would be avoided this way? How much money would be saved?

Debtor’s prison was considered normal once. So was slavery. But normal doesn’t mean right. When slavery was normal (and legal), some reformers advocated for slaves to be treated decently, and not beaten, whipped or otherwise abused. And other people, denounced as radicals at the time, believed slavery was an abomination and organized to stop it.

In the end slavery was abolished, and so was debtor’s prison. Immigration detention can also be stopped, if the voices of opposition become loud enough that Congress is forced to act.

Too many people have suffered for too long under our immigration detention system. How many deaths will it take before we end this abuse?

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Jane Guskin is co-author of The Politics of Immigration: Questions and Answers, published by Monthly Review Press in July 2007. Guskin also edits Immigration News Briefs, a weekly newsletter covering immigration issues. She lives in New York City.

This story first appeared Aug. 27 on The Huffington Post.

From our Daily Report:

Rhode Island: detainee dies in ICE custody
WW4 Report, Aug. 18, 2008
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23-year-old dies in ICE detention
WW4 Report, July 14, 2008
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Reprinted by World War 4 Report, Sept. 1, 2008
Reprinting permissible with attribution

Continue ReadingIMMIGRATION DETENTION: THE CASE FOR ABOLITION 

BIG OIL AND THE BIG EASY

Catastrophe and Counterinsurgency in New Orleans

by Frank Morales, The Shadow

“For years, cities across the nation have been declaring old-style public housing complexes a social experiment gone awry, emptying the buildings and, with a good riddance press of the plunger, blowing them up.”

—Clifford J. Levy, “Storm Forces a Hard Look at Troubled Public Housing‚” New York Times, Nov. 22, 2005

“Vickie Johnston, a 37-year-old New Orleans hairdresser, sneaked into the city a week after the catastrophe only to learn she had lost everything—her clothes, furniture, and irrreplaceables such as correspondence and photos. She voted for Bush twice but feels betrayed by all government. “They knew New Orleans was a fishbowl. They knew,” she said. “Now it’s a toilet bowl. How can they do this to us? Why did they let the water get so high?”

—Washington Post, Sept. 16, 2005

“Louisiana has been joined at the hip throughout its history with US military interests, and the message I want you to take away from today is that we fully support that role.”

—Louisiana Governor Kathleen Babineaux Blanco, Gulf Coast Military Expo, New Orleans, May 6, 2004

The preventable August 29-30 2005 catastrophic drowning of New Orleans and the deaths of some 1,300 people was, to say the least, a case of negligent homicide. Drowned in a sea of indifference, without food and water, 25,000 people waited five days at the Superdome to be rescued after Katrina hit. At this moment, thousands of families are still living the disorienting nightmare of displaced refugees, many trapped in Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) trailers, spewing formaldehyde poison. Unable to pay the cost of their temporary “shelter,” facing the day-to-day fear of eviction, fear of becoming homeless again. Meanwhile, the poor who’ve fought to remain in New Orleans have been forced to endure the demolition of their homes, and the basic right to their private property flagrantly violated. Even the homes of those living in public housing in the poorer sections, many unscathed by the hurricane, are currently the targets of evictions. In short, the displacement continues, a war against the poor grinds on. And yet, we might ask, to what end?

The story of New Orleans, Katrina and its aftermath is a big story. I shall attempt only to sketch an outline of some of its features, raise a few questions. For example, could it be that the “colossal failure” that has typified federal response to Katrina was, in fact, an efficient rendering of and cover for a new military model to catastrophe, a military operation designed to secure and defend oil installations throughout the area? Or, is the unprecedented militarization of New Orleans, under the banner of counter-terrorism, linked inextricably to a domestic counter-insurgency, with American citizens, particularly those who are non-white and poor, as its target? I contend that it is all of these things.

I contend that the “federal response” to Katrina represents an escalation of the tactics of domestic counter-insurgency.

In fact, the unnecessary deaths followed by an unprecedented forcible displacement and scattering of thousands of New Orleans residents, may be seen as an attempt to seize large swaths of the land known as New Orleans in the interests of US elite elements—particularly those wed to the dominant and hyper-militaristic oil barons. In other words, as in Iraq, the human catastrophe of Katrina has all to do with the security of Big Oil. It’s about Big Oil versus the Big Easy.

New Orleans and the Northern Command
Weeks before Hurricane Katrina slammed into New Orleans and the Gulf Coast, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld had a premonition about the hurricane season. According to a Sept. 26, 2005 US News and World Report item, it “turns out that some two weeks before Katrina hit the Gulf, [Rumsfeld] signed a ‘severe weather execution order‚’ that let the Northern Command dispatch officials to hurricane sites on its own, without Washington’s OK. Officials report that the order helped speed military response.”

According to “Hurricane Katrina: DOD Disaster Response,” issued on Sept. 19, 2005 by the Congressional Research Service (CRS), “the details of this order, including the extent of the authority it conveyed, have not been made public.” Interestingly, the “execution order‚” emanates from the Pentagon’s Northern Command, located at Peterson Air Force Base in Colorado. It states (in caps): “THIS IS A CDRUSNORTHCOM EXECUTION ORDER (EXORD) DIRECTING MOVEMENT OF TITLE TEN FORCES WITHIN THE JTF-KATRINA JOA.” CDRUSNORTHCOM stands for Commander, United States Northern Command. Funny thing is, though, it is dated “DTG 140900Z SEP 05″—which would seem to be at odds with the report of the earlier “severe weather” order cited above. In any case, other Pentagon directives regarding domestic operations which impact on DoD response to Katrina are more easily pinned down.

For example, on June 27, 2005, when Katrina was just a gleam in Mother Nature’s eye (or the dark soul of some Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency official in the “weather modification” branch), the Pentagon issued, “for official use only,” Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 3025.dd-M, a 190-page is entitled “Manual for Defense Support of Civil Authorities” (DSCA). It states that United States military “emergency authority” applies “when the use of Military Forces is necessary to prevent loss of life or wanton destruction of property, or to restore governmental functioning and public order…when sudden and unexpected civil disturbances occur,” particularly those “civil disturbances incident to earthquake, fire, flood, or other such calamity…” And further, “if duly constituted local authorities are unable to control the situation and circumstances preclude obtaining prior authorization by the President,” the military is, from their point of view, legally grounded to intervene, in order to restore “public order.”

The maintenance of “public order” and the obsession to suppress “civil disturbance” is also central to the Pentagon’s “Domestic Operations Manual,” issued by their Center for Law and Military Operations. Chapter Four, entitled, “Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances,” sets forth the legal parameters for conducting missions whose goal is the suppression of so-called “civil disorder.” Page 75 states that “the GARDEN PLOT plan provides the basis for all preparations, deployment, employment, and redeployment of Department of Defense component forces, including National Guard forces called to active federal service, for use in domestic civil disturbance operations, in support of civil authorities as directed by the President.” The manual, originally issued back in August 2001, was updated in 2005 to incorporate current US military Northern Command and “homeland defense” alignments.

That New Orleans was to become identified as a “civil disorder” operation—via a kind of mass media morphing into Los Angeles 1992—was codified by none other than Sen. John Warner (R-VA), head of the Armed Services Committee. His Sept. 14, 2005 communiqué to Donald Rumsfeld affirmed, in its opening sentence, that “the extraordinary damage caused to the Gulf States by Hurricane Katrina…was followed by incidents of public disorder.” As we shall see, Pentagon “emergency authority” was to be applied to the “disordered” City of New Orleans—a counter-insurgency operation with hints of martial law. More recently, the Bush junta has taken further steps toward martial law in its rewrite of the Insurrection Act to now allow for the stationing of troops anywhere in the US without the consent of local authorities, at the whim of the so-called Commander in Chief.

In a September 2, 2005 front-page article entitled, “Troops Begin Combat Operations in New Orleans,” the Army Times expressed this very sentiment. The piece opens with the announcement that “combat operations are underway on the streets ‘to take this city back’ in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina.” According to the article, Brig. General Gary Jones, commander of the Louisiana National Guard’s Joint Task Force stated that, “this place is going to look like Little Somalia.” Jones went on to say that hundreds of armed troops were prepared to “fight the insurgency in the city” by launching a “massive citywide security mission” from a staging area outside the Louisiana Superdome. “We’re going to go out and take this city back.” Leaving no doubt, he said that “this will be a combat operation to get this city under control,” as there were, presumably, “several large areas of the city “in a full state of anarchy.”

Consequently, no sooner had Lake Pontchartrain emptied itself into the lowlands of New Orleans, with a little help labeled “massive incompetence,” that Army, Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard and police helicopters filled the sky—”most,” according to Army Times, “with armed soldiers manning the doors.” Armed? Against the flood of suffering humanity below? No, armed ostensibly, as a consequence of the military’s own disseminated reports of having “been shot at by armed civilians,” while “several military helicopters reported being shot at from the ground,” followed by well-disseminated lurid stories of roaming armed gangs, rapes and murders—all, at this point, shown to have been convenient fictions designed to justify the massive police-military build up.

A front-page New York Times report of Sept. 29, 2005, “Fear Exceeded Crime’s Reality in New Orleans,” said that “most [of the] alarming stories that coursed through the city appear to be little more than figments of frightened imaginations.” It stated that New Orleans police superintendent Edwin Compass admitted that he had, in fact, “no official reports to document any murder,” nor “one official report of rape or sexual assault.” In essence, according to the paper of record, “most [of the] shocking statements turned out to be false.”

Nonetheless, scores of military trucks and “up-armored Humvees” would eventually roll in, along with 50,000 plus Army and Air Force National Guard troops from dozens of states, along with a thousand military troops from the 82nd Airborne Division and 1st and 2nd Marine Expeditionary Force, not to mention scads of private rent-a-cop, rent-a-soldier outfits, like Blackwater. Alos mobilized were the Naval Reserve Force, the national reserve command for the Navy; the Marine Forces Reserve; the Eighth Coast Guard District, which is the largest Coast Guard district command, covering 26 states; and the 377th Theater Support Command, which is the largest Army Reserve logistical command. In short, by September 7, a week after President Bush declared a state of emergency for Louisiana and NORTHCOM began to deploy the “forward elements” of what was to become Joint Task Force Katrina, the Pentagon had fielded “assets in the affected area [which] included 42,990 National Guard personnel, 17,417 active duty personnel, 20 US ships, 360 helicopters, and 93 fixed wing aircraft.” (CRS report, cited above)

The chief of the National Guard Bureau, Lt. Gen. H. Steven Blum, was put in charge of “securing” the New Orleans convention center and moving 25,000 people out of the Superdome, where, unable to escape the floodwaters, they’d been directed (forced) to seek shelter. The only thing these people encountered in the ill-prepared stadium was a suped-up soldiery who viewed them as the enemy. According to Blum, “the most contentious issues were lawlessness in the streets, and particularly a potentially very dangerous volatile situation in the convention center where tens of thousands of people literally occupied that on their own. We had people that were evacuated from hotels, and tourists that were lumped together with some street thugs and some gang members that—it was a potentially very dangerous situation.”

Blum, quoted in a Sept. 3, 2005 DoD news transcript and later in an American Forces Press Service report, stated that in “re-taking” the Superdome, “the Guardsmen encountered absolutely no opposition. Not a shot was fired during the effort, and no Guard soldiers were injured.” Their plan was executed “with great military precision.”

“We waited until we had enough force in place to do an overwhelming force,” Blum blurted, saying he “went in with police powers, 1,000 National Guard military policemen,” and “stormed the convention center, for lack of a better term… Had the Guardsmen gone in with less force, they may have been caught in a fight between the Guard military police and those who didn’t want to be processed or apprehended.”

It should be noted that “apprehending people” is a police function, not a military one. The 1878 Posse Comitatus Act prohibits active-duty forces from conducting law enforcement operations within the US. According to Gen. Blum, that’s not a problem. After all, he said, “National Guard troops reporting for duty in the Gulf region to help maintain security are trained professionals, many who serve as civilian law enforcement officers when not on military duty,” and consequently “bring solid expertise to the mission.” In fact, “military police” are “trained badge-carrying law enforcement officers that discharge their duties when called to active duty.” (AFPS, Sept. 1, 2005)

The very first Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, Paul McHale, agreed with Blum, stating in the same AFPS report, that Posse Comitatus “does not cover National Guard members operating under their state governors control.” After all, notes McHale, this “enables Guard forces, who often come from the communities they are serving, to work side-by-side with law enforcement officials in ways active duty forces simply can’t.”

An eight-page policy statement on the subject of “Defense Support of Civil Authorities” (DSCA), issued on the same day as the aforementioned DoDD 3025.dd-M, notes that “all requests by civil authorities for DSCA shall be evaluated by DoD authorities and approved by the Secretary of Defense.” These “requests by civil authorities,” evaluated as to issues of “legality, lethality, risk, cost, appropriateness, and readiness,” result in the launching of military operations, “in accordance with this Directive (3025.dd-M), the DoD Civil Disturbance Plan (‘GARDEN PLOT’) or any other plans or orders published by the DoD Domestic Crisis Manager.”

In other words, it’s likely that the decades-old “GARDEN PLOT” operation, mil-speak code for the Pentagon’s long-standing “civil disturbance suppression” apparatus initiated in 1968, was in effect “operational,” on the ground in New Orleans. The June 27, 2005, “Defense Support for Civil Authorities‰ directive (cited above) was authored by Paul McHale, the Pentagon’s first Assistant Secretary for Homeland Defense.

Terrorism Paranoia on the Bayou
McHale is a busy man. It happens that the Assistant Secretary was at the Hilton Hotel in New Orleans on May 10-11, 2005, three months prior to Katrina, attending the second annual “Gulf Coast Military Expo.” The stated theme of the military expo was “how do we make homeland defense and homeland security seamless?” McHale participated in a panel, along with Dr. Stephen Flynn of the Council on Foreign Relations, author of America the Vulnerable: How Our Government is Failing to Protect Us from Terrorism, entitled, “What are the maritime gaps and how do we address them?” Presumably, they sat in on the next panel, entitled, “What are the land gaps and how do we address them?”

One wonders what “land” and “maritime gaps” they were referring to. Surely any discussion related to “gaps” in the “defense” and “security” of the people New Orleans might have stumbled upon the fact that according to Scientific American (Oct. 1, 2o01), National Geographic (October 2004), and various Congressional and federal (including Department of Homeland Security) studies, the drowning of the city was a disaster waiting to happen. So, whose “security” and “defense” were they talking about?

A sampling of other “military expo” conference participants included Maj. Gen. Bennett Landreneau, Louisiana National Guard, who addressed the “role of the Reserves and the Guard in homeland security and homeland defense.” Susan Maraghy, Lockheed Martin VP for Homeland Security, and James Bernazzani, Special Agent in Charge, FBI/New Orleans, were also present. So was Col. Terry J. Ebert, Executive Assistant to the Mayor for Homeland Security and Public Safety, New Orleans. Last but not least, Michael D. Brown, the recently demoted former Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Emergency Preparedness and Response (better known as FEMA), addressed those assembled as to whether or not “the National Response Plan” was “Up to the Task?” Corporate “expo” sponsors included Raytheon, General Dynamics, and Boeing.

A year earlier, at the inaugural New Orleans “military expo,” in May 2004, Louisiana Gov. Kathleen Babineaux Blanco noted that “in Louisiana we play a critical role in the development and execution of a homeland defense strategy,” given that, “in the Greater New Orleans economy alone, there are 42,000 jobs that are directly connected to the American military, with a $4.5 billion annual impact,” while “the civilian federal government component accounts for 22,000 full-time jobs and an additional $3.2 billion annual impact.” According to the governor, “the oil and gas that comes through our ports and refineries accounts for a huge proportion of the nation’s energy needs,” while “the intersection of road, rail, shipping and airfields represents perhaps the most significant of its kind in our nation today.”

In fact, the governor went on to note that “the Gulf Coast provides the best training areas for the future of homeland defense.” At the end of the day, she stated, “South Louisiana is the gateway to a corridor of 50 million Americans who live in states that are served by the Mississippi River and its tributaries. By any measure, the river system and the Gulf of Mexico are vital to all of us and our futures.” Therefore, she said, “we are hopeful that New Orleans will be named one of our nation’s regional homeland security sites when the decision is made.”

Concluding her statement with a bang, Blanco warned that “international terrorists recently raided oil platforms in the Arabian Gulf.” She added: “Off the shores of the Gulf South, less than 100 miles from where we are sitting today, there are literally hundreds of similar platforms that are exposed. These platforms require constant vigilance to directly protect our nation’s fuel supply… On the subject of national defense I make the argument that Louisiana is strategically positioned to be the major player in the future of homeland security. The natural resources, infrastructure and personnel are already in place… We must resolve to defeat terrorism at home and abroad. And that effort should begin at home.”

The governor may have had a point. A December 2004 Congressional Research Service Report, “Port and Maritime Security,” which delineates the “potential for terrorist attack,” states under the heading of “potential targets” that “terrorists could be expected to target a port that handled a large volume of oil and other goods and that had a densely populated area that tankers passed on their way through a harbor to an unloading terminal,” and that “if terrorists sought major economic damage while minimizing loss of life, they might try the Louisiana Offshore Oil Port, or LOOP, the only US deepwater oil port that can handle fully loaded supertankers, 18 miles off the Louisiana coast.”

What’s more, the Gulf Coast region also houses the US Strategic Petroleum Reserve, 700 million barrels of oil stored under 500 salt domes. It’s also the location of many refineries and distribution points for tankers, barges, and pipelines. According to a New York Times report, “the question of ensuring a secure energy supply has taken on added significance in the last year, as terrorist groups have taken aim at petroleum installations in Iraq and Saudi Arabia, and political turmoil has struck two other large oil exporters, Nigeria and Venezuela. China’s growing appetite for oil has only added to the jitters about the global oil supply.” (Dec. 7, 2004, “Topping Off the Biggest Gas Tank.”)

One attendee at the aforementioned “military expo” might have been especially jittery. Col. Terry Ebbert, USMC (Ret), who during the onslaught of Katrina was the director of the New Orleans Office of Homeland Security, is also the former security director of the Strategic Petroleum Reserves.

The Louisiana Offshore Oil Port is, according to their website, a limited liability company “whose primary business is offloading foreign crude oil from tankers, storing crude oil, and transporting crude oil via connecting pipelines to refineries throughout the Gulf Coast and Midwest.” Some of those oil pipelines cross into New Orleans proper. Is it paranoid to suggest that “terrorists” might consider taking out some of LOOP’s oil terminals and pipelines? Apparently, those expert in “counter-terrorism” don’t think so.

Katrina and 9-11
Accordingly, on Sept. 20, 2005, less than three weeks following Katrina, President Bush appointed Frances Fragos Townsend, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, to lead his administration’s “investigation” into the federal response to the hurricane. Bush’s choice to head such an investigation into “what went wrong” indicates the “counter-terrorist” lens through which the elite view the “consequence management” that is post-Katrina New Orleans. Could it be that the federal response, far from being a “failure,” fits precisely within the context of a finely drawn and deftly executed counter-terror, counter-insurgent operation, executed behind a “natural” catastrophe, a catastrophe which was bound (if not expected) to happen?

The notion gains weight when one examines the curriculum vitae of Frances Fragos Townsend. According to a Dec. 6, 2004 US News & World Report article entitled “A Skilled Survivor,” “it is Townsend who has led the government’s response to numerous terrorism-related threats and crises, first as a national security advisor for counterterrorism, then as President Bush’s new advisor for homeland security.” One area in which he responded was in the area of domestic spying. This past June 2005, President Bush “embracing nearly all of the recommendations of a blue-ribbon intelligence commission,” announced the creation of “a national security service within the FBI to specialize in intelligence as part of a shake up of the nation‚s disparate spy agencies.” (AP, June 29, 2005) The measure, designed to allow for CIA domestic operations via the FBI, is, as the BBC (June 30, 2005) put it, “a domestic spy service.” The AP report notes that the decision to set up such a homeland spy apparatus was made after a three-month review of the commission’s recommendations, “by the National Security Council’s homeland security advisor, Frances Fragos Townsend.”

Townsend, a native New Yorker from Long Island, began her career as a prosecutor, eventually working out of the US Attorney’s office in Manhattan, where she prosecuted corporate and mob cases for Rudy Giuliani. Later, she spent 13 years at the Justice Department in Washington DC, becoming a close confidant and trusted advisor to Janet Reno during the Clinton years. In 1998, at the behest of Reno and former FBI Director Louis Freeh, she took a job at Justice as head of the powerful Office of Intelligence Policy and Review. The OIPR enforces a controversial statute known as the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), under which the FBI or other agencies can obtain special wiretaps and other search and surveillance warrants to presumably track spies and terrorists.

As we’ve come to learn post-9-11, the Bureau was not always good at sharing what it knew, especially with those who might wish to prevent a crime. The USNews.com report cited above noted that “both the Government Accountability Office and the 9-11 Commission have blamed the OIPR in part for the government’s intelligence failures before the [9-11] terrorist attacks.”

The US News report notes that “Townsend developed a unique perspective on al-Qaeda because of her close personal friendship with a legendary FBI agent and al-Qaeda expert named John O’Neill, who, having retired from the bureau, lost his life on Sept.11, 2001, just days after starting his job as security chief at the World Trade Center.” In fact, O’Neill was forced out of the Bureau by those who resented his zeal in tracking al-Qaeda operatives. He reportedly told Jean-Charles Brisard and Guillaume Dasquie, authors of the book Forbidden Truth: US-Taliban Oil Diplomacy and the Failed Hunt for Bin Laden (2002), that “the main obstacles to investigate Islamic terrorism were US oil corporate interests, and the role played by Saudi Arabia in it.” It is unclear whether or not Townsend’s “unique perspective” facilitated the obstruction of O’Neill’s investigation, eventual departure and subsequent silencing on the morning of Sept. 11, 2001.

What is known however is that on Sept. 11, 2005, a week or so before she was given her new post-Katrina assignment, Townsend was a featured speaker at the Monmouth County 9-11 Memorial Dedication program in New Jersey along with Lewis M. Eisenberg, past chairman (1995-2002) of the Port Authority of NY & NJ. One can rest assured that her remarks were both informed and timely; after all, as former FBI chief Robert Mueller noted, “Fran is a true professional, with extensive experience in addressing terrorism. As such, she brings experienced leadership to the war on terror.” (USNews.com, Dec. 6, 2004)

The question is though, what is the relationship between a “counter-terror expert” investigating these matters and the rehabilitation, nurture and care for a million displaced people? What is a counter-terrorism czar doing in New Orleans anyway? What does an NSC insider bring to the table, which the poor are not even allowed to sit at? Is the lens through which Ms. Townsend views her current assignment vis a vis the Gulf Coast the most constructive one? Or more ominously, is her placement meant to secure a post Katrina geo-political strategy for the region that places counter-terror/counter-insurgent requirements ahead of the needs of the former residents’ requirements for land, housing, employment and funds for the reconstruction of their communities? Given the racist “spin” being cast regarding the fitness of the displaced to be guaranteed a right of return‚ is it possible that Katrina facilitated an elite counter-insurgency/displacement operation targeting the people of New Orleans, particularly poor people of color.

Concurrent with focusing her attention on New Orleans, Townsend lead a National Security Council “policy review” dealing with “the road ahead” for “the war on terror.” Citing “a drift in overall terrorism policy,” the Bush administration, according to the Washington Post (May 29, 2005), “launched a high-level internal review of its efforts to battle international terrorism, aimed at moving away from a policy that has stressed efforts to capture and kill al-Qaeda leaders since Sept. 11, 2001, and toward what a senior official called a broader ‘strategy against violent extremism.'” According to the Post, she said “that the review is needed to take into account the ‘ripple effect’ from years of operations targeting al-Qaeda leaders… ‘Naturally, the enemy has adapted,’ she said. ‘As you capture a Khalid Sheik Mohammed, an Abu Faraj al-Libbi raises up. Nature abhors a vacuum.”

In other words, forget about the Osama, let’s criminalize dissenting thought—so-called extremism—instead. To this end, Townsend envisions a “US [that] is expected to look beyond Al Qaeda” to develop a “strategic approach to defeat violent extremism,” in order to “prevent the spread of Islamic jihad.”

Especially we might surmise, at home—in, say, cities like New Orleans, whose people might prove susceptible to “extreme” notions that question the priority of protecting oil infrastructure through a hyper-militarization of the region over the human rights of the citizenry.

Finally, we ought to take note of a Sept. 15, 2004 document, “for official use only,” issued by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), entitled, “How Terrorists Might Exploit a Hurricane.” A speculative “thought experiment” authored by something called the “analytic red cell program” of the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection sector of the DHS, the document analyzes “threats, impact and vulnerabilities” during the “entire hurricane lifecycle.” Noting that “a splinter terrorist cell” of “persons pursuing a political agenda” might “be more likely to exploit a hurricane on site,” it recommends increased security procedures (e.g. identification checks) at evacuation centers and shelters—while advising the “first responder community” to ‘increase identification procedures to prevent imposters from gaining unauthorized access to targets.” Among those who took part in the Red Cell’s “alternative assessment” which was “intended to provoke thought and stimulate discussion,” was the Central Intelligence Agency.

FEMA and Martial Law
The media spin of “massive incompetence” in the face of catastrophe aside, Michael Brown’s FEMA, the disgraced disaster agency recently swallowed up by the Department of Homeland Security, was quite busy orchestrating its role in the counter-insurgent war against the people of New Orleans. This should come as no surprise. FEMA was set up to do just this sort of thing. An unconstitutional construct with secret budgets, FEMA was created by Executive Order 12148 in 1979 and given the authority to organize and lead the government’s response to national emergencies, both natural disasters and “man-made” ones.

In 1982, FEMA issued a joint paper with the Department of Defense entitled “The Civil/Military Alliance in Emergency Management” which specified then-President Reagan’s policies on “emergency mobilization preparedness,” mil-speak for mass round-ups. This was about the time that Oliver North, then assigned to the National Security Council, started serving as NSC liaison to FEMA. According to the Miami Herald, (July 5, 1987, “Reagan Aides and the Secret Government” by Alfonso Chardy) “from 1982 to 1984, North assisted FEMA, the US government’s chief national crisis-management unit, in revising contingency plans for dealing with nuclear war, insurrection or massive military mobilization.”

In this era, FEMA and the DoD staged a number of so-called “readiness exercises” geared to effectuate the “evacuation” and detention of large numbers of people in case of massive civil unrest or national emergencies. According to scholar Diana Reynolds in “The Rise of the National Security State: FEMA and the NSC” (Covert Action Quarterly, 1990), it was during this period that “FEMA and DoD began a continuing tradition of biannual joint exercises to test civilian mobilization, civil security emergency and counter-terrorism plans using such names as ‘Proud Saber/Rex 82’ and ‘Rex-84/Night Train.'” These exercises, according to Reynolds, “anticipated civil disturbances, major demonstrations and strikes that would affect continuity of government and/or resource mobilization. To fight subversive activities, there was authorization for the military to implement government ordered movements of civilian populations at state and regional levels, the arrest of certain unidentified segments of the population, and the imposition of martial law.”

One exercise, code-named “Rex84-Alpha,” included a joint operation that rehearsed a round-up of tens of thousands of Central American refugees in the US, in the event of a US invasion of the region. The “exercise” bears a striking similarity to the current Department of Homeland Security’s Endgame program, a “removal and detention” operation which has resulted in the detaining of many thousands so-called illegal immigrants.

Another chilling scenario, set forth in a June 30, 1982 memo obtained by the Miami Herald (cited above), called for the rounding up and detention of 21 million “American Negroes” and the imposition of “martial law in case of a national uprising by black militants.” The head of FEMA during this period, Louis Giuffrida, fresh out of Army Combat Command, was an old crony of Reagan’s from their days together in California, where they kick-started SWAT (militarized police) and Œcivil disorder suppression‚ training at the California Specialized Training Institute. Giuffrida, obsessed with domestic counter-insurgency methodologies and ideologies, once stated that, “martial rule comes into existence upon a determination (not a declaration) by the senior military commander that the civil government must be replaced because it is no longer functioning anyway,” adding that, “martial rule is limited only by the principle of necessary force.” (Guardian, NY Jan. 16, 1991)

Accordingly, long before the federal government and most aid organizations had arrived on the scene in New Orleans, FEMA had already contracted with Blackwater USA, a Christian fundamentalist-linked, for-hire mercenary outfit active in Iraq, to provide the “necessary force”—more specifically, to “provide 164 armed guards for FEMA reconstruction projects in Louisiana,” according to journalist Jeremy Scahill, writing in The Nation (Oct. 10, 2005). According to Scahill, the “contract was announced just days after Homeland Security Department spokesperson Russ Knock told the Washington Post he knew of no federal plans to hire Blackwater or other private security firms,” stating that they already had enough personnel “to meet the demands of public safety” in New Orleans. Obviously he lied.

So, while FEMA was unwilling to move expeditiously to the tasks of meeting the critical needs of the people, it found time to put 164 armed thugs on the ground “dressed in full battle gear,” who “patrolled the streets in SUVs with tinted windows and the Blackwater logo splashed on the back,” while “others sped around the French Quarter in an unmarked car with no license plates.” At some point, “they congregated on the corner of St. James and Bourbon in front of a bar called 711, where Blackwater was establishing a makeshift headquarters. From the balcony above the bar, several Blackwater guys cleared out what had apparently been someone’s apartment,” throwing “household items from the balcony to the street below.” They also “draped an American flag from the balcony’s railing”—an irony given the fact that Americans fought a revolution in part to put a halt to troops taking over their homes. Incidentally, according to the Nation report, “more than a dozen troops from the 82nd Airborne Division stood in formation on the street watching the action.”

Along with cutting deals with private mercenary outfits like Blackwater, FEMA officials also found time to do a number of other things consonant with their true mission. According to published reports, FEMA turned away experienced fire fighters, turned back Wal-Mart supply trucks, prevented the Coast Guard from delivering diesel fuel, blocked a 500-boat citizen flotilla from delivering aid. According to Bob Herbert, (NY Times, Sept. 15, 2005), “when the out-of-state corporate owners” of a hard-hit Methodist Hospital “responded to the flooding by sending emergency relief supplies, they were confiscated at the airport by FEMA and sent elsewhere.” In another instance, FEMA wouldn’t even let the Red Cross deliver food! Renita Hosler, spokeswoman for the Red Cross, stated to the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette (Sept. 3, 2005) that “the Homeland Security Department has requested and continues to request that the American Red Cross not come back into New Orleans… We have been at the table every single day asking for access. We cannot get into New Orleans against their orders… We have 51 emergency canteens on the ground in the other affected areas, but where the need is greatest, in downtown New Orleans, there just is no access. That is the problem every relief group is facing.”

In fact, the only FEMA person “pre-positioned” in New Orleans when Katrina hit was one Marty J. Bahamonde. In a highly instructive New York Times piece (Oct. 21, 2005), which made use of a series of Bahamonde’ increasingly desperate e-mails to FEMA/DHS officials in DC, we learn that during the early afternoon of Aug. 29, the “north side of the city” was under “11 feet of water in a heavy residential area.” Well, that’s interesting. Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff, said that he did not know about the flooding until Aug. 30, explaining in part why he went to a meeting that day in Atlanta to jump-start the avian flu panic. According to the Times report, on Aug. 31, Bahamonde decided to send an e-mail message directly to FEMA Secretary Brown in which he said, “I know you know… The situation is past critical… Hotels are kicking people out, thousands gathering in the streets with no food or water.” An aide to Brown responded hours later that the director would be at a restaurant in Baton Rouge that night and that “it is very important that time is allowed for Mr.Brown to eat dinner.”

Even more startling, “FEMA News,” out of headquarters in Washington DC, dated Aug. 29, the day Katrina hit, put out the following incredible alert: “First Responders Urged Not to Respond to Hurricane Impact Areas Unless Dispatched By State, Local Authorities.” This despite the fact that FEMA’s 426-page National Response Plan states that “Federal support must be provided in a timely manner to save lives, prevent human suffering and mitigate severe damage,” which “may require mobilizing and deploying assets before they are requested via normal NRP protocols.” In other words, as journalist Chris Strohm pointed out in a Sept. 8 report on the Government Executive website, „Homeland Security had [the] power to bypass states in hurricane response.”

And it‚s not like they didn’t have some time to figure this all out. After all, Bush had issued an “emergency declaration” on Katrina dated Aug. 27. So, first responders were told by FEMA not to respond, while on the ground the agency was deploying mercenaries and blocking access to aid at the gates. But why? In order to facilitate, along with the military, the forced removal of hundreds of thousands of people from the region, abetting the dispersal and resettlement of a whole population through force, herded into detention disguised as “shelter,” only later to be ghettoized in 100,000 trailers scattered across numerous states‚ disenfranchised, situated in remote, undesirable areas, far from home. And after 18 months they throw you out.

The Homeless as Targets of Counter-Insurgency
These “FEMA-villes,” controlled by private rent-a-cops, check points and surveillance, are a form of ghetto-warehousing of vulnerable, traumatized men, women and children. Some historical background: Following the 1967 urban uprisings (“riots”) in over a hundred cities, President Lyndon Johnson created, by way of executive order, a federal commission on “civil disorder.” Meant to uncover both the origins of and antidotes to “riots,” the so-called Kerner Commission, named after it’s chair, former Illinois Gov. Otto Kerner, issued its final report in June 1968, in which it recommended a solution to the urban “riot problem.” It advocated dispersing the poor from the cities. Chapters 16 & 17 of the report stated that: “By 1985, the Negro population in central cities is expected to increase by 68% to approximately 20.3 million… This growth will produce majority Negro populations in many of the nation’s largest cities. The future of these cities is grim.” The study found that “the underlying forces” of “disorder” “continue to gain momentum.”

“Unless there are sharp changes in those cities in the factors influencing Negro settlement patterns within major metropolitan areas,” the report warned, “there is little doubt that the trend towards Negro majorities will continue”—a dangerous trend from the government’s point of view, given that this urban “majority” “plays the most significant role in civil disorders.” The solution, as set forth by the 1968 commission, lies in “creating strong incentives for Negro movement out of central city ghettos.” The aim was clear. By 1985, the population of the urban poor had decreased drastically—they’d been forced out by banks and cops, priced out, drugged, bought and burnt out of the cities in massive numbers.

“As all of us saw on television, there is some deep, persistent poverty in this region [that] has roots in a history of racial discrimination, which cut off generations from the opportunity of America.” Bush said that a few weeks after Katrina hit. “We have a duty to confront this poverty with bold action.” (Washington Post, Sept. 16, 2005) Is displacement of the poor one means of boldly “confronting this poverty”?

On Sept. 23, 2005, in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina and with the looming devastation of Hurricane Rita, President Bush paid a visit to FEMA’s Washington DC offices, in order, presumably, to oversee the managing, monitoring and resettlement of hundreds of thousands of New Orleans refugees—a portion of roughly a million people displaced from 90,000 square miles of the Gulf Coast, who according to Michael Ignatieff (NY Times, Sept. 25, 2005) represent “the largest population of internally displaced people since the Civil War.”

We may infer some of what was discussed from documents issued in the following days. In an Oct. 18, 2005 FEMA communique headlined “Katrina Victims Need to Stay in Touch with FEMA,” Senior Deputy Federal Coordinating Officer Mike Bolch stated that although “we understand that people move around a lot as they adapt to new situations,” the displaced “always need to know current addresses and contact phone numbers.” FEMA was obsessed with its ability to track the displaced—strewn throughout forty states, transported there against their will, with no destination announced.

On his way out FEMA‚s door, Bush made it known that he was heading to the Pentagon’s Northern Command, located in Colorado Springs—the mother of all “domestic war rooms.”

Posse Comitatus and the New Military State
NORTHCOM, the Pentagon’s Northern Command, is responsible for military operations within the United States of America. Set in motion prior to 9-11, the domestic military command oversees all “assistance to law enforcement” and is the executive in any operations dealing with so-called “civil disorder.”

Ostensibly, Bush was stopping in at NORTHCOM, blowing off a pre-planned photo-op in Houston, in order to “better understand the relationship that the federal government’s role is to support state and local governments.” (AP, Sept. 23) “I want to watch that happen,” he said. “It’s an important relationship, and I need to understand how it works better.”

The “relationship” between the military and the police is lawfully governed by the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878, which mandates a clear separation between the two “entities of force.” What Bush wanted to watch, and have the American people acquiesce to, is the process whereby the military becomes the police in America, wherein the complete symbiosis between the military and the police is effectuated—a defining characteristic of military dictatorships.

By coincidence, the day before Bush’s FEMA visit, National Public Radio had aired a Morning Edition “politics & society” piece entitled “Military Ban on Law Enforcement Questioned,” which reminded us that “federal troops assisting local governments with disaster relief,” in New Orleans “are not allowed to engage in law enforcement, according to the 1878 law known as the Posse Comitatus Act.” But “the Bush administration, the Pentagon and members of Congress are considering loosening that longstanding restriction.” Bush stated that “the US military should play a bigger role in major disasters.” The administration, has had Posse Comitatus “under review” for a few years now.

Recent Executive Orders
Finally, just a few months back, on April 23, 2008, President Bush issued Executive Order 13463. The little-noted EO amends two earlier Executive Orders, 13389 and 13390, which, respectively, created the 2005 “Gulf Coast Recovery and Rebuilding Council” and established the position of “Coordinator of Federal Support for the Recovery and Rebuilding of the Gulf Coast Region.” Most prominently, the new EO replaces the “Chairman of the [Rebuilding] Council”—formerly the President’s “Assistant for Economic Policy”—with his “Assistant for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism.”

In a Jan. 31, 2006 statement to a bi-partisan select committee investigating the “Preparation and Response to Hurricane Katrina,” Col. Terry Ebbert had some revealing things to say regarding his response to Katrina. After dutifully offering “public thanks to Gen. Russell Honore, Vice Admiral Thad Allen, Admiral Robert Duncan, Captain Tom Atkin, General William Caldwell and his magnificent warriors from the 82nd Airborne Division as well as the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the other federal law enforcement officials,” for their performance in Katrina, he stated that he and his people had “dedicated great time and effort in planning for hurricanes.” Tellingly, he pointed out that “the basis of our efforts has been to develop effective evacuation plans.”

Continuing his statement, Ebbert noted that “this phase was designed to begin once Contaflow [?] was discontinued and a dusk curfew was to be implemented. The plan utilized RTA buses, moving throughout the city, picking up citizens at preestablished checkpoints and transporting them to the Superdome. All citizens were thoroughly searched by National Guard troops upon entering the dome. Security was provided by both the National Guard and the New Orleans Police Department.” But “further evacuation with federal assets would be required.” According to Ebbert, the plan “was a success.” Building on that success, Ebbert promoted “the Urban Area Security Initiative” “as a mechanism to provide federal funding to specific metropolitan areas having a disproportionate share of the nation’s critical infrastructure and, therefore, at greater risk to attack.” The intent of the program, according to the Colonel, “was and is to enhance the capacity to prepare for, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks employing weapons of mass destruction.”

Ebbert noted: “The four parishes of Orleans, Jefferson, Plaquemines and St. Bernard have been formed into Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) Region One for joint planning, training, and exercising of the Department of Homeland Security defined events. This includes WMD, all acts of terrorism and natural disasters.” This program, according to Ebbert, “also provides a desperately needed and long overdue source of critical funding whereby economically challenged metropolitan areas can substantially increase the level of protection.” Protection from whom? And who is the former director of oil security really interested in defending?

Col. Ebbert concludes by stating that we must “find a way to immediately utilize the only organization with the leadership, command and control capability, equipment and training to accomplish large scale response—the Department of Defense.”

In conclusion, the federal response to Katrina has been a racist military operation in defense of oil infrastructure. As in the case of Iraq and Afghanistan, the people and their suffering mean nothing. Simply put, it’s been about Big Oil versus the Big Easy, a war against the people of New Orleans, a domestic counter-insurgency masked behind the facade of “counter-terrorism.” The right of return, with all the reparations due, to all those forced to leave their homes, is not only the most morally precise remedy, but is also the strategic means through which to reclaim the land called New Orleans, in the name of the people of New Orleans, in the name of peace.

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This story first appeared in the summer 2008 edition of The Shadow, NYC.

See also:

BUSH MOVES TOWARD MARTIAL LAW
2007 Defense Authorization Act Guts Posse Comitatus
by Frank Morales
World War 4 Report, November 2006
/node/2710

From our Daily Report:

NSPD-51: Bush prepares martial law
WW4 Report, May 24, 2007
/node/3940

Ethnic cleansing in New Orleans: it’s official
WW4 Report, Oct. 11, 2005
/node/1166

Iraq mercenaries deployed to New Orleans
WW4 Report, Sept. 11, 2005
/node/1064

Urban “combat” in New Orleans —and ethnic cleansing?
WW4 Report, Sept. 6, 2006
/node/1048

From our Archive:

Homeland Security Act Passes
WW4 Report, Nov. 26, 2002
/static/61.html#shadows1

Pentagon Command Structure Re-Organized
WW4 Report, July 28, 2002
/static/44.html#shadows1

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Reprinted by World War 4 Report, Sept. 1, 2008
Reprinting permissible with attribution

Continue ReadingBIG OIL AND THE BIG EASY 

SHAKE DJIBOUTI

Eritrea Crisis Destabilizes Imperialism’s Horn of Africa Beachhead

by Sarkis Pogossian, World War 4 Report

Last month, with the world’s eyes elsewhere, the Horn of Africa nations of Eritrea and Djibouti briefly went to war. Fighting over the cape of Ras Doumeira and Doumeira Island in Djiboutian territory reportedly left a dozen Djiboutian soldiers dead and dozens wounded. While Eritrea increasingly poses itself as an anti-imperialist vanguard in the region, much smaller Djibouti remains a de facto Western protectorate, hosting both French and US military forces for policing the region. Despite a halt in the fighting, the crisis has not been resolved—and France has already jumped into the fray.

The international community lined up behind Djibouti. As the UN Security Council, Arab League and African Union urged Eritrea to halt military action June 12, French officers stationed in the mini-state told the official Agence Djiboutienne d’Information (ADI) that France was providing Djibouti with military support—and preparing to send more troops, ships and war material. The French Defense Ministry admitted it was developing plans to establish mobile military bases close to the Eritrean border, to hold back an advance by Eritrean forces.

Paris was among the first governments to condemn the supposed Eritrean aggression. Only the US State Department’s condemnation of Eritrea was clearer. A State Department spokesperson referred to the border conflict as an Eritrean “military aggression.” The US Africa Command also has a large military presence in Djibouti. A statement read at the Security Council by US Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad said: “The Security Council calls upon the parties to commit to a ceasefire and urges both parties, in particular Eritrea, to show maximum restraint and withdraw forces to the status-quo ante.”

The Arab League urged Eritrea to withdraw its forces from border areas near Djibouti “immediately” and to respect Djibouti’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Eritrea rejected a fact-finding mission proposed by the League. (Djibouti is an Arab League member; Eritrea is not.)

Eritrea’s Foreign Ministry issued a press release calling the massive condemnation of its military action “baseless and mendacious statements.” When accusations of an incursion first surfaced June 10, Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki told Reuters: “It’s a fabrication… We decline the invitation to go into another crisis in the region.”

Djibouti’s President Ismail Omar Guelleh countered to the ADI: “If Eritrea wants war, it will get it.”

Although it was never reported by the mass media, the Somaliland Times website reported June 15 that at least one Eritrean gunboat was sunk after being hit by a missile. All the crew were believed dead, sources said. It was not known whether the missile was fired by French warships or the Djiboutian navy. Eritrea was reportedly using two gunboats to fire on Djiboutian ground troops attempting to dislodge Eritrean forces from positions they had seized.

Djibouti’s Foreign Minister Mahamoud Ali Youssouf said, “France will send warships in the coming days to the Ras Doumeira area… Our forces remain vigilant.”

In Paris, the Defense Ministry said three French ships were in the region, and two—a helicopter carrier and a frigate—had reached Djibouti’s territorial waters. “For the moment, their mission is to provide logistical, medical and intelligence support—there is no participation in combat,” armed forces spokesman Christophe Prazuck told Reuters.

A week after the apparent border skirmishes, Djibouti accused neighboring Eritrea of again illegally intruding into its territory. Foreign Minister Ali Youssef told AlJazeera June 20 that Eritrean troops crossed the border on the strategic Bab al-Mandeb Strait. “Eritrean troops entered Djiboutian territory and took more land,” he said. “Right now, Eritrean troops are stationed inside Djiboutian territories.”

Youssef said Djibouti was complying with international demands for de-escalation. “The UN Security Council has asked for both countries to withdraw their troops from this area,” he said. “The Djiboutian government has withdrawn its forces up to five kilometers inside Djiboutian land. But Eritrean forces have advanced.” Youssef showed Al Jazeera documents, pictures and maps Djibouti had submitted to the UN, purportedly showing trenches dug by Eritrean troops on Djibouti’s territory.

Some analysts say Eritrea has already effectively claimed the Bab Al Mandab Strait, which guards the entrance to the Red Sea—and critical shipping lanes. Political analyst Mahmoud Taha Towkal told AlJazeera: “There is a new reality. Under recent developments, the Bab Al Mandeb Strait is no longer under the control of Djibouti and Yemen. It is now controlled by three countries: Djibouti, Eritrea and Yemen. It is no longer under the control of the Arab countries.”


Djibouti Between Two Worlds

It was the opening of the Suez Canal (under joint French-British control) in 1869 that turned the Red Sea from a remote backwater to a strategic shipping route. In anticipation of the canal’s opening, France established a protectorate over Djibouti in 1862 to police the Red Sea’s southern mouth. By 1900, it had become a complete colony—known as the Cote Française des Somalis, or French Somaliland.

In 1945, like other French colonies, Djibouti was made an official French territory—but the enclave was still largely ruled from Paris, and deemed particularly critical. On coming to power in 1958, Charles de Gaulle gave each French African territory the option of immediate independence—except Djibtouti.

The drive for Somali self-determination after Somalia became free from Britain in 1960 prompted Paris to hold a referendum on independence in 1967—for which France aggressively mobilized the non-Somali population (mostly Afars and Issas) to vote “no.” After the independence initiative was defeated, France tellingly changed the name of the colony to the Territoire Française des Afars et des Issas. It would be another ten years before Djibouti gained independence—and France would continue to maintain its largest African military force in the former colony.

Since 9-11, the US has joined France in militarizing Djibouti. The US Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) has been operating from Djibouti since December 2002. Some 1,600 US troops are at Djibouti’s Camp Lemonier, France’s largest base in Africa. The troops include infantry and special operations forces from all the services. Helicopters and refueling aircraft are also based there. CJTF-HOA forces have carried out special operations, supposedly against al-Qaeda forces, throughout the Horn of Africa.

In addition to being an imperial military beachhead for policing the region, Djibouti is also slated to become a cultural and financial beachhead for corporate globalization—with a mega-scheme in the offing for a bridge across the Strait of Bab-el-Mandeb between Djibouti and Yemen. This would be an historic first land link between the Arabian peninsula and Horn of Africa.

Middle East Development LLC, the Dubai-based construction company controlled by Tarek Mohammad bin Laden—half-brother of Osama bin Laden—announced last month it is seeking to raise $190 billion to build two new cities in Djibouti and Yemen and a 28.5-kilometer bridge linking them. The new cities would be on the model of King Abdullah Economic City project in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait’s Silk City project, developed in recent years as an investment for fast-accumulating petro-dollars.

Such Persian Gulf heavy-hitters as Qatar’s state-owned Qatari Diar Real Estate Co. and Dubai’s port operator DP World Ltd. and investment company Istithmar PJSC are also sinking money in Djibouti development. Bloomberg reports that the Bechtel Group has also expressed interest in the bridge mega-project.

While elite planners envision Djibouti as as a bridge to bring free markets and high-tech stability from the Arabian Peninsula to the Horn of Africa, it could actually become a bridge to bring the insurgent violence of the Horn back to the Arabian heartland.

Yemen itself is facing both a terror campaign from clandestine Sunni militants on al-Qaeda’s model and a tribal insurgency from Zaydi Shi’ite rebels in the north. In fact, announcement of the bridge mega-project coincided with a major escalation of violence in Yemen. On May 31, government forces beat back an advance by the Zaydi rebels who brought their battle to within 12 miles of the capital San’a. Homes in Bani Heshiash, outside the capital, were destroyed by artillery fire.

That same day, “al-Qaeda Organization in the Arabian Peninsula—Yemen Soldiers Brigades” claimed responsibility for a mortar attack on a refinery in the southern port city of Aden the previous day, which officials said did not cause damage. In addition to both being at war on the government, Yemen’s Sunni and Shi’ite militants also appear to be at war with each other, blowing up each other’s mosques. On May 30, a gunman opened fire in a mosque at Kohal, in Amran northern province, killing at least eight as they knelt for prayer and wounding dozens of others. On May 2, a bomb rigged to a motorcycle exploded outside another mosque in the north, killing at least 12 worshipers.

Yemen has also been shaken by food riots this year—and Djibouti is also facing grave food shortages, the Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS Net) warns. Some 130,000, including 50,000 in Djibouti’s capital, already require emergency food assistance, the network found. FEWS Net also noted that the recent border conflict with Eritrea could aggravate the situation. “Approximately 1,000 people have been displaced in and around the conflict zone, and as many as 22,000 could be displaced, should the violence worsen,” it stated in an alert.

“The situation has remained calm, but both countries are sending additional troops to the area, threatening renewed violence,” the network stated. “The border conflict could have important food security implications for Djibouti and the greater East Africa region.”

Djibouti’s pastoral communities, which rely on Eritrean markets for food, are already affected by the conflict and reportedly fleeing to Khorangar, Obock City, or further inland. A semi-desert state that experiences frequent droughts and imports all its staple foods, Djibouti is classified by the UN as both a least developed and a low-income, food-deficit country—as the region’s elite planners chart futuristic schemes.


Secret War for Somalia

The crisis with Eritrea broke out just as a peace deal between Somalia’s transition government and Islamist rebels was concluded in Djibouti. Although few media accounts made the connection, this was likely not coincidental.

The accord was signed with the opposition Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS)—based in Asmara, Eritrea’s capital, and politically backed by Eritrea. A significant faction of the ARS boycotted the talks, saying there can be no dialogue until Ethiopian occupation troops leave Somalia.

Sheik Sharif Sheik Ahmed, leader of the Council of Islamic Courts, flew to Mogadishu after the accord, saying he signed the UN-mediated peace agreement because it provides a 120-day timetable for an Ethiopian withdrawal from Somalia. But ARS hardliners, led by Sheik Hassan Dahir Aweys in Asmara, say the accord legitimizes the Ethiopian occupation of Somalia.

Violence has continued virtually unabated in Mogadishu since the accord was signed, with scores killed in ambushes and skirmishes. Nonetheless, Somali Prime Minister Nur Hassan Hussein insisted Ethiopian occupation troops would be withdrawn within 120 days of the signing in Djibouti. “The agreement between us and the opposition is a historic one and the Somali government would implement it,” Hussein said.

That may not happen if the hardliners maintain enough of an upper hand within the ARS to keep alive an armed resistance.

Late last year, when Asmara brokered formation of the ARS among the Somali opposition factions, Abu Mansur Robow, ex-deputy defense secretary with Somalia’s ousted Islamic Courts Union, told Mogadishu radio that his Shabaab resistance group has “nothing to do” with the new rebel alliance. Robow said al-Shabaab was “not satisfied” with the Asmara conference. The Shabaab, which probably controls most of the insurgents on the ground in Mogadishu, may now join ranks with the dissident faction of the ARS that boycotted the Djibouti talks.

Somalia is going deeper into crisis. The number of people in Somalia in need of emergency food aid is likely to rise one million from the current 2.5 million in the coming months, the United Nations warns. Mark Bowden, the UN’s humanitarian coordinator for the region, says Somalia faces a worse situation than Darfur.

Hundreds of youths hurled stones and blocked roads with burning tires May 6 in a second day of protests over food prices in Mogadishu, where the price of corn meal has more than doubled since January and rice has risen from $26 to $47.50 for a 110-pound sack. On May 5, tens of thousands took to the streets and five people were killed by government troops and armed shopkeepers.

Continued US intervention in Somalia also fuels popular anger. More than a thousand people demonstrated in Dusamareb, central Somalia, May 4 against a US air-strike that killed an alleged al-Qaeda militant and at least 11 others.

In the May 1 pre-dawn attack, US missiles destroyed the home of reputed al-Qaeda leader Aden Hashi Ayro in Dusamareeb. The attack killed 24 others in the targeted house and nearby homes. “This will not deter us from prosecuting our holy war against Allah’s enemy,” Sheik Muqtar Robow, a spokesman for Ayro’s Shabaab militia told AP via telephone. “If Ayro is dead, those he trained are still in place and ready to avenge against the enemy of Allah.”

A US submarine fired three Tomahawk cruise missiles into southern Somalia March 3, aiming at what the Defense Department called terrorist targets. The missiles hit the town of Dobley, five miles from Somalia’s border with Kenya, partly destroying a house and injuring local residents. The strike was supposedly aimed at Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan, a Kenyan wanted by the FBI for questioning in 2002 terror attacks on a hotel and an Israeli airliner in Mombasa which were claimed by al-Qaeda. Others said the target was Shabaab leader Hassan Turki.

But the continued Ethiopian military presence in the country is probably the greatest source of unrest. In one all too typical incident April 20, Ethiopian troops opened fire on civilians in a street in Baidoa, killing 13 after an explosion there killed two soldiers.

In a May, Amnesty International called for an investigation into the role of the US in Somalia following publication of a report accusing its Ethiopian allies of committing war crimes. The report, “Routinely Targeted: Attacks on Civilians in Somalia,” says Ethiopian troops in Somalia are killing civilians, slitting the throats of insurgent suspects, and gang-raping women. Ethiopia’s government dismissed the report was unbalanced and “categorically wrong.”

In February 2007, the New York Times reported that the US had quietly provided intelligence aid for Ethiopia’s December 2006 invasion of Somalia, which one unnamed Washington official called a “blitzkrieg.” The story by Michael R. Gordon also claimed that a US Special Operations unit deployed in Ethiopia, Task Force 88, had ventured into Ethiopian-occupied Somalia for clandestine missions, and that US military advisors had trained Ethiopia’s elite Agazi Commandos for the Somali invasion.

The “proxy war” between Eritrea and Ethiopia in Somalia may survive the Djibouti accord. And Eritrea’s apparent seizure of Djiboutian territory during the talks may have been an effort to derail them.


Puntland & Somaliland: Autonomy Under Attack

Not all of Somalia is under the control of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and Ethiopian occupation. The northern enclaves of Puntland and Somaliland are de facto independent states, and have been spared the harsh cycle of insurgent and repressive violence which has left thousands displaced from Mogadishu. But these enclaves are now increasingly embroiled in the region’s crisis.

The flag of Eritrea was set on fire June 16 in Garoowe, capital of Puntland, in what local authorities called a protest “to condemn the Eritrean attack on Djibouti.” The autonomous government’s ministers were among those who oversaw the ritual flag-burning amid chants of “Down with Eritrea, Victory to Djibouti!”

Puntland health minister Abdirahman Said Mahmud aka Degaweyne said blood was being donated at blood banks to assist Djibouti’s armed forces, and that livestock had been handed over to Djibouti to be slaughtered for use by its armed forces. Information minister Abdirahman Muhammad Bangah said Puntland was ready to form a united front against Eritrea.

In June 2007, the regional website Geeska Afrika reported that US warplanes based in Djbouti were overflying Puntland in preparation for air-strikes against suspected al-Qaeda fugitives. The report also stated that a US Navy warship shelled the Puntland coastal town of Bargal, killing at least 12 Islamist fighters.

The moves also came amid growing talk that Eritrea was attempting to destabilize Puntland as a step towards destabilizing TFG-controlled Somalia. Puntland President Adde Mussa accused Eritrea of infiltrating both Ethiopian and Somali opposition exiles into the enclave to foment unrest. “The so-called Free Parliament and Union of Islamic Courts members in Eritrea have joined up to pay money to some Puntland government members who were sacked, but Puntland will not be affected by such manipulation continued by that alliance,” he said. Mussa said that the mayor of Bosaso, Qadar Abdi Hashi, and five other local officials were sacked because they received bribes from the “Asmara group”—a reference to Eritrea’s capital—”to create violence and political tension in the region.”

“Puntland troops resisted the invasion carried out by a group of Somali and foreign terrorists,” Mussa added, alluding to further armed conflict in the enclave which the world press have ignored.

Puntland also clashed with neighboring Somaliland in April 2007 over a disputed strip of land along their shared border in the Sanag region. “Puntland forces attacked the town of Dahar around 8:00 this morning,” Somaliland Information Minister Ahmed Hagi Dahir said in a statement. “The attacking forces were supported by 17 technicals and 3 big trucks.” Technicals are pick-up trucks mounted with weapons, the Somali version of a tank. At least one fighter was reported killed.

Somaliland is the former colony of British Somaliland, along the Gulf of Aden and bordering Djibouti. It claims independence from Somalia, and is seeking international recognition of this stance. Puntland and TFG-controlled Somalia to the south together constitute the former Italian Somaliland, which London gave to Rome as a reward for lining up with the Allies in World War I (and took back by military force in World War II). Puntland has not formally seceded, but is effectively autonomous. Puntland and Somaliland have fought for years over the Sool and Sanag regions, partially claimed by Puntland on an ethnic basis. Somaliland says they are part of its territory under the colonial border Britain left. Since the Djibouti crisis, these tensions have again become inflamed—threatening both regions’ status as relatively peaceful enclaves.


Ethiopia: Proxy Faces Blowback

Ethiopia, which invaded Somalia with US support, may itself face destabilization as blowback from its military adventure. On May 29, a little-known Somali group claimed responsibility for a bomb attack that killed three in Ethiopia on the eve of national celebrations marking the 17th anniversary of the current regime’s ascent to power. “We will keep on fighting until we liberate our country from the Ethiopian invaders,” said Haji Abukar, a spokesman for the previously unknown Islamic Guerrillas, after claiming responsibility for the bombing two days earlier at Nagele, 560 kilometers south of the capital, Addis Ababa. “Our fighters will continue their holy war against the enemy of Somalia and we will target them everywhere.” The Guerillas’ statement said: “We are an Islamic group that stands for the liberation of Somalia and have a good relationship with the rest of the insurgents in Somalia.”

The Islamic Guerillas may or may not be linked to the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF)—a secular rebel group of ethnic Somalis fighting for self-rule in Ethiopia’s eastern Ogaden region along the Somali border. The oil-rich Ogaden Basin was the goad of a brief war between Ethiopia and Somalia in the Ogaden Crisis of 1977, when Somalia invaded in support of Ogaden separatists but was driven back after three months of fighting. The ONLF have stepped up their attacks since Ethiopia’s invasion of Somalia—and are facing a brutal counterinsurgency campaign.

The Pentagon’s new Africa Command officially still has no headquarters on the continent, with African governments reluctant to draw terror attacks and accusations of acquiescing with neo-colonialism. For the moment, it remains officially based in Stuttgart. But Djibouti constitutes a sort of de facto African headquarters, and Ethiopia is a close second.

The Pentagon has, astutely, chosen an African American as first chief of the new Africa Command, Gen. William “Kip” Ward—and his first official visit to the continent was, of course, to chief US ally Ethiopia. Meeting with African Union leaders in Addis Ababa last November, Ward explicitly addressed widespread fears of the US establishing a permanent military presence on the continent. “Any notion of a militarization of the continent because of this? Absolutely false; not the case,” said Gen. Ward. “Africa Command is not here to build garrisons and military bases.”

That same day, Somali insurgents dragged the bodies of dead Ethiopian soldiers through the streets of Mogadishu, amid fighting that killed at least 20 and sparked a further exodus from the city. “It is our belief that every individual in Somalia has to participate in the resistance and the defeat of the Ethiopian occupation,” Somali opposition leader Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed told AFP from Eritrea.

Given that the specter of foreign soldiers being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu is obviously redolent of the similar incident involving US troops there in 1993, Washington is wise to be using proxies this time around. But these proxies may have to bear the brunt of the backlash—as the new Djibouti crisis indicates.


Whither Eritrea?

Eritrea prides itself on having fought—and won—against both superpowers, or at least their local proxies. “It’s not easy fighting against regimes supported by superpowers,” Afewerki said in a rare interview with the New York Times’ Jeffrey Gettleman last October. “But we did it.”

The Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) waged an armed struggle against Ethiopia when it was under the Soviet-backed Mengistu Haile Mariam from the mid-1970s through the early ’90s—and then waged a border war with the US-backed Ethiopia of Meles Zenawi from 1997-2000.

Eritrea is a product of Italian colonialism. First establishing a protectorate at Assab on the southern coast in 1882, by 1889 Italy had brought the entire territory under its direct rule—for the first time uniting the Afar, Danakil, Beja and other Muslim peoples of the coastal lowlands with the Tigrinya of the inland plateau. While the highlands had sometimes been under the rule of Ethiopia’s predecessor states such as Axum and the Abyssinian kingdom (and are predominantly Orthodox Christian), the coastal lowlands never were—they were a patchwork of small Muslim kingdoms, which eventually came under Ottoman rule (1557-1865). Italy used Eritrea as a staging ground for annexationist adventures in Ethiopia, which it invaded in 1880 and (more successfully) 1936.

In World War II, Eritrean insurgents and a British expeditionary force succeeded in driving out the Italians. After the war, Britain remained in control of the territory as the UN debated its future. The US, envisioning naval bases on Eritrea’s coast under the compliant Ethiopian regime of King Haile Selassie, strongly backed Ethiopia’s proposal to annex the territory. As a “compromise,” the UN finally agreed to a “federation” in which Eritrea would have broad autonomy under Ethiopian rule. This took effect in 1952. But in 1962, Ethiopia unilaterally abrogated Eritrea’s autonomy, disbanding its assembly and declaring the territory “the 14th province of the Ethiopian Empire”—with the promised US naval base at Kagnew.

When the fall of the Ethiopian monarchy to a leftist revolution in 1974 failed to bring any concessions to Eritrea’s national aspirations after three years, the EPLF took up arms. In the 1980s, the EPLF was allied with Meles Zenawi’s Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), which sought to overthrow Mengistu’s Soviet-backed regime. The twin guerilla movements survived Mengistu’s genocidal counter-insurgency. When Mengistu fell in 1991, Meles Zenawi took power in Ethiopia. Eritrea under the EPLF prepared a referendum on independence—which was overwhelmingly approved in 1993.

But independent Eritrea and “liberated” Ethiopia shortly fell out over border demarcation, leading to the 1997-2000 war. Today arch-rivals, Isaias Afewerki and Meles Zenawi have both been in power since 1991, and have both suppressed opposition—the prior somewhat more thoroughly.

Isaias Afewerki has banned all political parties except his EPLF. While all countries in the region have pretty horrific human rights records, Eritrea has come under special criticism. Amnesty International says thousands of prisoners of conscience are behind bars, and religious minorities (principally Protestant converts) are barred from practicing their faith. Reporters and even musicians have been imprisoned, and especially brutal treatment is meted out for those who resist military service.

Isaias Afwerki’s Eritrea is something of an enigma. Eritrea hosts Somalia’s exiled Islamist leaders even as it has banned female genital mutilation, a barbarity carried out in the dubious name of “Islam.” In addition to offering support and sanctuary to the deposed ICU leaders, Eritrea brokered dialogue among Somali clan leaders who oppose the Ethiopian occupation, leading to the formation of the ARS.

Eritrea is playing an increasingly active role in the region, even deploying peacekeepers to the Chad-Sudan border—while its Ministry of Information attacks deployment of UN peacekeepers in Darfur as “neo-colonialism.” While Asmara hosts the leaders of Darfur guerilla organizations, it has also brokered a peace deal between Khartoum and the Beja rebels in Sudan’s east.

Eritrea is clearly trying to insert itself in the regional game, and build a counter-force to the pro-US Egypt-Ethiopia-Uganda bloc. This necessitates dealing with Islamists like the ICU and the Sudan regime. Yet President Isaias’ speech on the occasion of Eritrea’s 16th Independence Day celebration May 25, 2007 took several swipes at regional rival Ethiopia—while making no reference to Islam. (Isaias himself is of Christian background.)

So the alliance between Somalia’s Islamists and Eritrea’s secular dictatorship would appear to be one of convenience. How long will it last? And is Isaias Afwerki’s regime planting the seeds of its own destabilization?

Ironically, the Eritrean regime initially sought to curry favor with Washington by invoking a mutual Islamist threat in the aftermath of 9-11. Immediately after the 9-11 attacks, Afwerki unleashed a purge, imprisoning several journalists, students and dissidents, accusing them of being al-Qaeda or (paradoxically) Ethiopian agents. In December 2002, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld flew to Eritrea to meet with Isaias Afwerki, becoming the highest-ranking US official to do so since Eritrea won independence from Ethiopia in 1993.

There is a militant Islamist underground in Eritrea. An “Eritrean Islamic Jihad” has launched a few armed actions against what it calls the “Christian regime” and (ironically) the “terrorist regime.” This is believed to be linked to the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF), an early rival to the EPLF which continues to exist in clandestinity. First launched in the 1960s by Muslim Afars from the coast, the ELF was superseded in the late ’70s by the EPLF, led by Isaias Afewerki from the Christian-majority Hamasien highlands. While both groups professed a secular Marxist ideology (as nearly all African armed struggles did in that innocent time), the ELF received aid from the Arab nations, and may now have links to the Islamists.

But the US alliance with Ethiopia inevitably drew Eritrea into conflict with Washington. The split became clear just over a year ago. The Geeska Africa Online news service, reporting from Nairobi in April 2007, quoted Jendayi Frazer, US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, accusing Eritrea of backing the Islamist insurgents in Somalia. “No insurgency group can survive without support from neighboring countries, certainly Eritrea is the country of greatest concern,” Frazer said. She added that while the “global jihadist network” is also supporting the Shabaab insurgents, Eritrea will do “anything that will hurt” its southern neighbor. “This is very much aimed at Ethiopia,” she said after returning to Nairobi after five hours in Baidoa—the first trip to Somalia by a US official in over a decade.

Eritrea dismissed the charges. “The Eritrean government is not disposed to reply to such a statement by an amateur diplomat that does not reflect the US administration’s official stance,” a statement posted on the government Web site said.

Speaking at the end of a visit to Ethiopia in September, Frazer issued the strongest threat yet that Eritrea could be officially labeled a sponsor of terrorism. Frazer said the presence of exiled Somali Islamist leader Hassan Dahir Aways in Asmara was further evidence that Eritrea provided sanctuary for terrorists. Hassan Dahir Uways is officially labelled a “terrorist” by Executive Order 13224 of Sept. 23, 2001.

A report to the UN Security Council last summer found that Eritrea had secretly supplied “huge quantities of arms” to Somali insurgents, in violation of an international embargo. “Somalia is awash with arms,” the Monitoring Group on Somalia said in its report handed in to the Security Council in July 2007 and leaked to the AP. It accused Eritrea of flying shipments of surface-to-air missiles, explosives and other arms to the Shabaab. Eritrean Information Minister Ali Abdu called the accusations a “big lie,” adding: “These allegations are not new and we know where they are coming from. The UN is acting as a megaphone of the United States.” But the report also had criticisms of Ethiopia, accusing its troops of using white phosphorous bombs against insurgents.

Recently Eritrea has clamped down on UN operations on its territory, in retaliation for the failure to implement the border ruling by an independent commission which ended the 1997-2000 war with Ethiopia. Ethiopia has not withdrawn its troops from the disputed border town of Badme, which the commission awarded to Eritrea. Eritrea wants the international community to put more pressure on Ethiopia to comply with the ruling.

Like Sudan, Eritrea is wooing Chinese investment for its resource sector. Eritrea’s Ministry of Mines has granted two exploration licenses to a Chinese base metal company and a joint Chinese-Eritrean gold venture, the Beijing Donia Resources Ltd and the Eritrea-China Exploration & Mining Share Company, respectively.

But the government is emphasizing a drive towards self-sufficiency. The Los Angeles Times noted last October that Eritrea, one of the world’s poorest nations, “walked away from more than $200 million in aid in the last year alone, including food from the United Nations, development loans from the World Bank and grants from international charities to build roads and deliver healthcare.” Afewerki vows he will not lead another “spoon-fed” African country “enslaved” by international donors.

“We need this country to stand on its two feet,” Isaias told the LA Times. Fifty years and billions of dollars in post-colonial international aid have done little to lift Africa from poverty, he said. “These are crippled societies,” Afewerki said of neighbors who he charged rely heavily on donors. “You can’t keep these people living on handouts because that doesn’t change their lives.”

Isaias Afewerki has conscripted about 800,000 of Eritrea’s citizens for the self-sufficiency drive, which the LA Times admitted “so far has shown promising results. Measured on a variety of UN health indicators, including life expectancy, immunizations and malaria prevention, Eritrea scores as high, and often higher, than its neighbors, including Ethiopia and Kenya.”

Official isolation and paranoia may be the price of this policy. “It’s like they have self-imposed sanctions,” the LA Times quoted one diplomat, who feared government retribution if identified. “They’re turning into an Albania or North Korea.”

But the self-sufficiency policy could help Eritrea ride out sanctions and regional war—while Djibouti, a heavily dependant enclave, could prove far more brittle, even with the big guns of Paris and Washington behind it.

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See also:

YEMEN: THE NEXT QUAGMIRE
Washington’s New Terror War Flashpoint?
by Mohamed Al-Azaki
World War 4 Report, September 2007
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From our Daily Report:

Somalia: Islamists attack traditional dance ceremony
WW4 Report, July 1, 2008
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Eritrea crisis worsens Djibouti food shortages
WW4 Report, June 29, 2008
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Special to World War 4 Report, July 1, 2008
Reprinting permissible with attribution

Continue ReadingSHAKE DJIBOUTI 
kyutu

THE GLOBAL ARTICLE 9 CONFERENCE

Japanese Activists Envision “Abolition of War”

by John Junkerman, Japan Focus

While much of Japan was enjoying the extended holiday of Golden Week this year, supporters of Article 9, the war-renouncing clause of Japan’s constitution, were hard at work. The first Global Article 9 Conference to Abolish War drew 15,000 people to its plenary session and concert outside of Tokyo on May 4, while 7,000 gathered on May 5 to participate in a day of symposiums and workshops. The crowds far surpassed the expectations of the organizers, who hastily staged an ad hoc rally in a nearby park for several thousand people who were unable to get into the main arena on the first day.

An affiliated conference in Hiroshima on May 5 drew 1,100 participants, and on May 6 another large arena in Osaka was filled with 8,000 people while 2,500 attended a fourth conference in Sendai. Overall, organizers counted more than 30,000 admissions to the series of events.

The Looming Threat to Article 9

The gatherings took place at a time when Article 9 faces the most serious threat of being abandoned since the postwar constitution was enacted in 1947. Prior to leaving office abruptly last September, then-Prime Minister Abe Shinzo—who had made revising the constitution the paramount goal of his administration—pushed a bill through the Diet that provides for national referendums on constitutional changes. The law, which takes effect in May 2010, started the clock ticking toward a showdown.

With this date in mind, the revision camp formed the Diet Members Alliance to Establish a New Constitution in the spring of 2007 with the explicit goal of “placing constitutional revision on the political schedule.” The alliance now counts 239 current and former members of the Diet in its ranks. Although the overwhelming majority are Liberal Democratic Party members, the group includes 14 members from the opposition Democratic Party of Japan, including party secretary-general Hatoyama Yukio, vice-president Maehara Seiji, and supreme advisor Fujii Hirohisa.

The alliance held its own meeting in Tokyo on May 1, where Abe repeated his hallmark call to action: “The determination to write a constitution of our own is a spirit that will open up a new era.” Japanese conservatives deride the constitution as having been imposed on the country by the post-defeat US occupation, and (together with their present-day American allies) single out Article 9 as a constraint on Japan’s full participation in the strong and deepening military alliance with the US.

This constraint was dramatically highlighted on April 17, when the Nagoya High Court ruled that the dispatch of Japan’s Air Self-Defense Force to Iraq violates Article 9. Transporting armed troops into a combat zone, the court ruled, constituted “the use of force as a means of settling international disputes,” which is explicitly renounced in Article 9. In essence, the court repudiated the government’s decades-long practice of “interpreting” the constitution to allow a steady expansion of the capacity and role of Japan’s armed forces within the framework of American power.

The unprecedented ruling, however, came in the text of the decision and carried no provision for enforcement. It thus left the status quo intact, and the government doggedly pledged to continue the mission to Iraq. Prime Minister Fukuda Yasuo declared, “I have no intention of doing anything in response.”

Partly in backlash against Japan’s first-ever dispatch of the SDF to an overseas combat zone, public support for Article 9 has revived from the postwar lows registered earlier in the decade. In a poll released by the liberal Asahi Shimbun on May 3, 66% of the public favored retaining Article 9, while only 23% supported its revision. This represented a 17% increase in support for Article 9 over a similar poll conducted a year ago. Some polls show majorities in favor of amending other clauses of the constitution, but when the conservative Yomiuri Shimbun conducted its annual poll on the subject in March, it found that support for revision in general had also lost its plurality (42.5% for and 43.1% against) for the first time in 15 years, while revising Article 9 was opposed by a margin of 60% to 31%.

Article 9 on a Global Stage
This renewed support for Article 9 was evident in the spillover crowds that jammed the global conference to celebrate and advocate the renunciation of war. At the same time, the government’s continuing efforts to eviscerate and evade the spirit and substance of the clause, the incongruous reality of Japan’s powerful military forces, and the heavy presence of US military bases on the archipelago were never far from the center of discussion.

The conference aimed to reframe the debate over Article 9 by removing it from the narrow confines of domestic Japanese politics and placing it on an international stage. “The war in Iraq has demonstrated that even the strongest, largest army in the world cannot maintain peace in a single city, Baghdad,” conference organizer Yoshioka Tatsuya noted in his opening remarks. “This tells us that peace cannot be achieved through aggression. The 21st century requires a new system of values, and Article 9 can be Japan’s contribution to the world.”

The conference slogan was “The world has begun to choose Article 9,” and numerous speakers pointed to the examples of Costa Rica and Panama, both of which have constitutions that prohibit standing armies, while more than 20 other, mostly smaller countries around the world likewise have no military forces. Bolivia has drafted a war-renunciation clause in its new constitution, though ratification has been placed on hold during that country’s ongoing political crisis. Meanwhile, Ecuador has drafted an amendment to its constitution that would prohibit the basing of foreign troops on its soil.

“Article 9 continues to inspire many people throughout the world,” declared keynote speaker Mairead Corrigan Maguire, who won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1976 for her efforts to end the conflict in Northern Ireland. “Many of us are concerned to know that there are those who wish to endanger such policies and abandon Japan’s peace constitution. All peace-loving people must unite to oppose such a backward step.”

In another keynote speech laced with the refrain, “Now is the time to put an end to militarism,” Cora Weiss, American peace activist and president of the Hague Appeal for Peace, told the crowd, “I have come to help spread Article 9. Japan is not alone. You have support from around the world.” Suggesting that every time we type a Web address beginning www, we should think “world without war,” she encouraged each of the members of the audience to become “Article 9 ambassadors” and to lobby lawmakers throughout the world to adopt war-renunciation clauses in their constitutions.

Stressing the costs of militarism to the environment, economic development, and human health and security, video messages to the conference were sent by Nobel Peace Prize laureates Wangari Muta Maathai, founder of the Green Belt Movement in Kenya, and Jody Williams of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines.

Among the 150-plus foreign guests attending from 40 countries and territories were soldiers who fought on opposite sides of the war in Iraq who spoke during a part of the plenary session devoted to “Creating a World without War.” Kasim Turki, now a humanitarian aid worker, was a member of the Iraqi Republican Guard when the war began in 2003. He has lost family members and friends to the war. “I was raised to believe that the military defends the people, but it did not. Nonviolence is the only way to defend people.” Aidan Delgado, a former US soldier who was sent to fight in Iraq, became a conscientious objector after witnessing the abuses at Abu Ghraib prison. “Article 9 is international,” he said. “I have decided to walk down the same path.”

Takato Nahoko, a young Japanese aid volunteer who was taken hostage while bringing emergency relief to Iraq in 2003, told the gathering that she believes she was freed and not executed because she spoke at length with her captors about the Japanese constitution and her commitment to nonviolence. “While I would never wish that experience on anyone, it inspires me to think that Article 9 saved my life.”

Other speakers included Tsuchiya Kohken, former chair of the Japan Federation of Bar Associations; South Korean lawyer and human rights activist Lee Suk-tae; former US Army colonel and antiwar activist Ann Wright; and Beate Sirota Gordon, drafter of the equal rights clause of the Japanese constitution. Gordon, now 84 and the only person involved in drafting the constitution still living, spoke in Japanese and told the gathering, “I believe Article 9 can be a model for the entire world.”

A Determined Effort to Broaden the Base
The Tokyo gatherings were held at the Makuhari Messe convention center in the city of Chiba, about an hour from downtown Tokyo. The choice of venue was something of a gamble, not only because of its large capacity and steep rental fee, but because the complex, which is best known for auto shows and trade expos, was unfamiliar territory for the peace movement.

The central organizers of the event were the Japanese NGO Peace Boat and the Japan Lawyers International Solidarity Association, who since 2005 have spearheaded a campaign to promote the values of Article 9 on a global scale, as a concrete means of abolishing war. Given the ambitious scope of the conference, they formed an organizing committee in January 2007 to plan and publicize the events. The committee eventually grew to include more than 60 civil society organizations. Signing on as co-initiators were 88 prominent individuals, led by the writer Ikeda Kayoko, author of If the World Were a Village of 100 People; playwright Inoue Hisashi; popular fashion critic Peeco; and director of the Japan Association of Corporate Executives (Keizai Doyukai), Shinagawa Masaji.

Mobilization for the conference was boosted by the steady growth of the Article 9 Association (A9A) movement. These grassroots associations, created throughout the country in response to a 2004 appeal by Nobel laureate Oe Kenzaburo and eight other prominent intellectuals, now number more than 7,000. Many of these individual groups (as well as more long-standing groups, such as the Peace Constitution League) were active participants in the global conference, although the A9A network itself has a strict policy of not endorsing activities outside of the network.

The A9A movement itself was launched in part to free the defense of Article 9 from the narrow confines of the opposition Socialist (now Social Democratic Party) and Communist parties, which historically were the bastions of the peace constitution but have become increasingly marginalized in recent years. While activists from these parties have been involved in forming some of the A9A groups, the movement has achieved a level of penetration that is unprecedented in the postwar history of Japanese citizens’ organizations. Their advocacy and educational efforts are widely credited with swinging public opinion back to support for Article 9. This is despite the fact that mainstream Japanese media have paid very little attention to the movement, from its very inception.

Strategically, the global conference was an effort to shift the movement from simply defending Article 9 to positioning it as a proactive component of the international disarmament campaign. Japanese activists have drawn inspiration from the 1999 Hague Appeal for Peace, the largest international peace conference in history, which set an agenda for the new millennium under the slogan “It is Time to Abolish War.” Article 9 has since been embraced by the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC), an international network of NGOs formed in 2005 at the urging of former UN secretary general Kofi Annan. Serving as the regional secretariat for GPPAC Northeast Asia, Peace Boat has strengthened its links to many of the international activists who participated in the conference.

The conference also aimed to broaden the base of support for Article 9 among young people, and it was largely successful in this effort. The bedrock of support for Article 9 has traditionally been the generation that experienced the devastation and lack of political liberty during World War II, but with the aging of that generation, the movement to defend Article 9 has struggled to shake the image that it is out of step with the times. But the crowds that gathered at Makuhari were diverse, with heavy participation of people in their 20s and 30s.

 

Peace Boat, which has been organizing round-the-world peace cruises since 1983, is staffed by and oriented to young people, and the group provided the core of the organizing staff and volunteers. Artist Naruse Masahiro designed a coordinated set of images for the conference, including a charming character that was given the nickname “Kyûto-chan” (a pun on “cute” and “kyû”, the Japanese word for nine). Naruse’s son and other young animation artists created a short film that opened the conference.

One youth-centered event was an Article 9 Peace Walk from Hiroshima to Chiba that covered 750 miles in 69 days. Over 7,000 mostly young people participated in various legs of the walk, which culminated in a procession onto the stage during the conference plenary session.

Suzuki Michiru, a 29 year-old woman, started in Hiroshima with plans to walk for a week, but stayed with the march most of the way. Concerned about the environment, but never before interested in the constitution, she was drawn to the upbeat, free-spirited style of the walk: “I began to realize that Article 9 sustains the small joys of our daily lives,” she said after finishing the trek. “We now have to make this Article 9 our own, and to defend it.

Ash Woolson, a 6-year veteran of the US military and one of eleven who walked the entire route, told his fellow marchers about flashbacks of aiming his rifle at Iraqi children. “Nothing good comes from war,” he said. “People say Article 9 is idealistic, but why is it necessary kill each other?”

The first day’s events ended with a live concert, featuring the hit vocalist UA, veteran popular artists Harada Shinji and Kato Tokiko, and the up-and-coming trans-genre group Funkist, fronted by South African-Japanese vocalist Someya Saigo.

A boisterous web account of the Funkist performance reported, “Young and old, Japanese and foreigners, all perfect strangers, linked arms and rocked to the music. The arena became a tight unit and Makuhari Messe heated up. ‘My mother is South African,’ Someya told the crowd, ‘and my father is Japanese. Under apartheid, I wouldn’t have been allowed to come into this world. But now the color of my skin doesn’t matter. We are at peace here tonight. Let’s spread the call for peace from this spot to the entire world.”

Asahi columnist Hayano Toru quoted a pregnant UA on stage: “As one woman, as a mother, as a human being, as a spirit born on this earth, I believe the day will come when we hear the news that all of the wars on this planet have ended.” “Despite the difficulty of their lives,” Hayano commented, “young people, in their own words and ideas, in their own songs, are trying to create a ‘solidarity of kindness.'” Asahi editorial board member Kokubo Takashi, in a separate column, commented on the “lithe and natural words and conduct of those who gathered at Makuhari Messe. The constitution’s Article 9 has spread its roots farther and deeper among young people than we political reporters who regularly cover the Diet would ever imagine.”

Facing the Challenges of Globalizing Article 9
While the mood of the first day was idealistic and celebratory, the second day of symposiums and workshops focused on the problems and prospects of moving toward a world where Article 9 might spread and indeed become the model for “peace without force” that its supporters envision. Sessions were devoted to world conflicts and nonviolence, Article 9 within Asia, peace and the environment, nuclear weapons, and the crisis and future of Article 9. Additional panels focused on women’s involvement in peace-movement initiatives, lawyers’ efforts on six continents, globalization, and disarmament education.

The panel on Asia focused on the contradiction between Article 9 and the US military presence in Asia, in particular its deepening military alliance with Japan. Historian Kwon Heok Tae from Sungkonghoe University in Seoul embraced the “bright side” of Article 9, the model for demilitarization that has led him to establish an Article 9 network in South Korea. But he said it is equally important to acknowledge the “dark side” of the geopolitical context of Article 9: the rising danger of military confrontation in Asia, where all of the major countries have boosted defense spending while historical disputes fester. Article 9 is under attack, but even without revising the constitution, “Japan is a heavily armed nation,” through the combined might of the powerful Self-Defense Force and the US military bases and nuclear weapons. “Why is this situation allowed to persist?” he asked.

Takasato Suzuyo of Okinawan Women Act Against Military Violence noted, “What shapes Japan today is not Article 9, but the US-Japan Security Treaty.” On Okinawa, that treaty is visible to the eye: 75% of US bases in Japan are concentrated on the small main island, many in close proximity to heavily populated cities. “On Okinawa,” she said, “the constitution is being violated every day.” She called for a redefinition of “national security,” to return it to a standard of actual self-defense, with a priority on addressing human needs and guaranteeing respect for human beings.

Joseph Gerson of the American Friends Service Committee pointed to the US strategy of encircling China. The structure of US bases and military presence has been diversified and bolstered, beginning with the stationing of missile defenses in Japan, renewed access to the Philippines and to Vietnamese ports, military cooperation with Indonesia, the continuing status of Australia as the “American sheriff,” and new US bases in Afghanistan and former Soviet republics. Marines are being moved to Guam in an effort to defuse opposition in Okinawa, but the US is seeking to build a new Marine base at Henoko, in the remote northern end of the island, while Guam itself is being transformed into a military hub. He noted that Japan has one of the world’s most advanced destroyer forces and is increasing its ability to project its military forces overseas by obtaining in-flight refueling capacity for its air force and building a small aircraft carrier. “In fact,” Gerson noted, “the two Koreas see Japan as a greater threat than the US. At the same time, Washington and Tokyo have inflamed the North Korean threat, in an effort to change the cultural and ideological context they operate in.”

It remains true that since Japan’s constitution was enacted, no human being has been killed under the right of belligerency of the Japanese state. Article 9, as a pledge to the people of Asia that Japan would never again engage in aggression, has also contributed to keeping peace in the region. But, Kwon pointed out, that peace has been “built on the sacrifice of the people of Okinawa and South Korea.” Within the context of the present system, he added, the fact that young people in Japan have no military obligation and the fact that young people in South Korea do, “are not unconnected. The conclusion to be drawn from this, however, is not that Japan should reintroduce compulsory military service, but that Korea should eliminate it.”

Conference participants drafted a declaration, placing Article 9 in the context of a global disarmament agenda as well as a statement to the G8 countries that will be meeting in Japan in July. Plans are already being discussed for follow-up conferences, perhaps to be held in Costa Rica and elsewhere.

The success of the conference and the international attention focused on Article 9 generated strong enthusiasm and optimism. But for Japanese activists, it also placed in sharp focus the large gap between the potential of Article 9 and the reality shrouding Japan—and the work that remains to be done. After an international participant called for a campaign to award Article 9 a Nobel Peace Prize, conference co-chair Ikeda Kayako responded in her closing remarks, “A Nobel Peace Prize? That’s out of the question. When I think of the actual situation of Article 9 in Japan, when I think of the US-Japan Security Treaty, when I think of Okinawa, all I feel is pain in my heart.”

Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution:

1) Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.

2) In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.

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John Junkerman is an American documentary filmmaker and Japan Focus associate, living in Tokyo. His most recent film, “Japan’s Peace Constitution” (2005), won the Kinema Jumpo and Japan PEN Club best documentary awards. It is available in North America from First Run Icarus Films. He was a co-initiator of the Global Article 9 Conference to Abolish War. Japan Focus associate Douglas Lummis, another co-initiator, contributed to this report.

This article first appeared May 25 on Japan Focus.

Conference statements:

Global Article 9 Declaration to Abolish War
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Global Article 9 Conference Statement to the G8
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RESOURCES

Global Article 9 Campaign to Abolish War
http://www.article-9.org/en/index.html

Article 9 Association
http://www.9-jo.jp/en/index_en.html

Appeal from the Article 9 Association, June 2004
http://www.9-jo.jp/en/appeal_en.html

Article 9 Peace Walk
http://homepage3.nifty.com/peace_walk/Welcome.html

Peace Constitution League
http://www.9joren.net/

Peace Boat
http://www.peaceboat.org/

Japanese Lawyers International Solidarity Association
http://homepage3.nifty.com/jalisa/english/index.html

Hague Appeal for Peace
http://www.haguepeace.org/

Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict
http://www.gppac.net/

Article 9 on YouTube
http://jp.youtube.com/watch?v=SbA5BZE1wEA

See also:

FROM BAGHDAD TO TOKYO
Japanese Anti-War Movement Hosts Iraqi Civil Resistance
by Bill Weinberg, WW4 Report, March 2006
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From our daily report:

Japan to end Iraq mission in 2009?
WW4 Report, May 26, 2008
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Reprinted by World War 4 Report, June 1, 2008
Reprinting permissible with attribution

Continue ReadingTHE GLOBAL ARTICLE 9 CONFERENCE 

GUATEMALA: GENOCIDE PLAINTIFFS TESTIFY

by Thaddeus al Nakba, Upside Down World

Guatemala has received much attention over recent violence and the impunity enjoyed by its perpetrators. Some organizations state that almost 15 people are murdered daily in Guatemala, mostly in the capital. These numbers are often compared to the levels of violence during the 36-year civil war in Guatemala (1961–1996). However, what many analysts forget to mention is that during the nearly four decades of internal armed conflict, the vast majority of the violence occurred under the brutal dictatorships of Efraín Ríos Montt and Romeo Lucas Garcia (1980–1983). These four years saw a military campaign of genocide perpetrated against the indigenous Maya populations. To compare the present with this past is unfair to the victims and survivors of the genocide. Thus far, only one perpetrator has been successfully prosecuted. The current situation of impunity has roots in the violence of the past. Guatemala will never be able to solve problems of the present without first addressing the violence of the past.

Judge Opens Suspended Court Case for Río Negro Massacre

What crime did the women and children commit?
– Juan, 25 March 2008

On December 19, 2007, a landmark legal trial commenced in Salamá, Baja Verapaz, when a local judge announced the continuation of a case suspended since October of 2004, charging six former members of the Xococ Civil Defense Patrol (PAC) with murder for their roles in the March 13, 1982 massacre of 177 women and children from Río Negro. The six accused are being charged by the Guatemalan state-appointed public prosecutor (Ministerio Publico) and by a local war survivors’ organization, the Association for the Integral Development of the Victims of the Violence Maya Achí (ADIVIMA).

Previously, in the same court case, three leaders of the Xococ PAC were sentenced to death in October 1999, later commuted to 50 years imprisonment, for their roles in the massacre. It has marked the only time in which Guatemalan military or paramilitary men responsible for the violence during the scorched-earth campaigns under dictators Romeo Lucas Garcia and Efraín Ríos Montt have been convicted in a court of law. This despite the hundreds of massacres committed and tens of thousands of innocent indigenous people murdered during the regimes.

Since the reopening of the court case, the six accused have given their declarations and have been cross-examined by the prosecution and defense. According to ADIVIMA’s lawyer, Edgar Peréz, the accused attempted to paint a picture of their subordination to the Army and Commander [José Antonio] Solares. Essentially, they said in their declarations that they only followed orders. Some even claimed they never arrived in Río Negro, despite witness testimonies negating this claim.

Río Negro be Dammed
The majority of the witnesses in the Río Negro massacre currently call Pacux “home.” Pacux is a “model village” (also called “strategic hamlet” and “pole of development”) set up by the Guatemalan army and the National Institute of Electricity (INDE) for the residents transplanted by the large reservoir created by the mega-project known as the Chixoy Hydroelectric Dam. The state never truly consulted the 23 affected communities throughout the planning and development stages, despite embarking on the project as early as 1975. It certainly never asked for their permission.

Through the influence of INDE, army incursions began almost immediately in communities to be affected by the mega-project. Supporters expected to profit immediately from the endeavor. The goal was simple: Get the people out as quickly as possible. The first massacre in Río Negro occurred as early as March 4, 1980, when a military policeman acting as a security guard for the dam opened fire on a crowd of campesinos protesting his presence in the region. Seven protestors were killed. The INDE security guard was lynched.

Army and state violence and terror only increased in the aftermath, especially against leaders of campesino organizations opposed to the project. The military often used the excuse of looking for the lynched soldier’s weapons when they raided houses and kidnapped outspoken residents, who were later found dead or remained missing. In fact, four months after the massacre, two leaders of the community, Evaristo Osorio and Valeriano Osorio Chen, went missing as they headed for a meeting in the capital with INDE officials. With them they carried their only copies of official documents of the promised compensation by INDE for the residents. They had previously handed over the property titles of the residents to INDE officials. Their bodies were found later with evidence of torture. The documents were stolen and INDE denied ever receiving the land titles.

The Guatemalan army and INDE labeled the rural Maya Achí people of Río Negro “subversives” and “guerillas” due to their refusal to be forcefully relocated for the dam. Río Negro residents quickly learned that not only would INDE and the Army not respect their civil rights; any democratic resistance to their displacement would only be met with terror and violence.

Most Río Negro residents attempted to avoid the increasing state terror by fleeing their ancestral homeland to other regions. This usually entailed resettlement to Pacux, with its cramped houses and poor, arid land provided by INDE in its “agreement” with the people. But when the residents saw the true conditions of life in Pacux, combined with INDE’s refusal to meet its part in the compensatory agreement with the affected residents, resistance only continued.

The state responded with four massacres in an eight-month period in 1982, which killed at least 440 Río Negro residents, the vast majority of the population (Historical Clarification Commission-CEH. Annex I: Book I. Illustrative Case No. 10: “Massacre and Elimination of the Community of Río Negro”).

When all residents were either dead, hiding in the mountains, or resettled in the military colony of Pacux, the construction of the hydroelectric dam began as planned, with the financial support and tacit approval of the “international community.” Throughout the violence directed at the Maya Achí population in Río Negro, the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank continued financing the Chixoy Hydroelectric Dam until as late as 1985.

Scorched Earth and Genocide
The state violence directed at the Maya Achí people of Río Negro, Rabinal, Baja Verapaz was not an isolated policy in the region. The Guatemalan Foundation of Forensic Anthropology (FAFG) estimated that between September of 1981 and August of 1983 there were 5,000 extra-judicial assassinations by the Guatemalan military and its death squads out of 22,753 registered people living in the Rabinal municipality. Of the over one-fifth of the population murdered in the 28 massacres in Rabinal, it is estimated by the UN-sponsored truth commission, la Comisión de Esclarecimiento Histórico (CEH), that 99.8% were indigenous Maya Achí.

On a national level, the State campaigns were also directed almost exclusively at the indigenous Maya populations of the Guatemalan highlands during the scorched-earth campaigns of the early 1980s under dictators Montt and Garcia. The CEH revealed that the majority of the 626 massacres committed in rural Mayan villages during the 36-year internal armed conflict were executed under these two brutal military regimes.

According to the CEH, some of the alarming results of the 36-year civil war included: 150,000 refugees in Mexico; 1.5 million internally displaced; 50,000 disappeared; and over 200,000 killed. Of the over 200,000 civilian murders, the CEH estimated that 132,000 were committed under the scorched-earth campaigns of Garcia and Montt. In their 1999 report, “Guatemalan Memory of Silence,” the CEH placed 93% of the blame in the hands of the Guatemalan army and its death squads and declared the state-sponsored violence against the indigenous Maya people to be “genocide.”

March 13, 1982: Desert March to Pacoxom
One of the most horrific consequences of the state violence against indigenous Mayan peoples occurred on March 13, 1982 in Río Negro. According to witnesses, at around 6 AM no less than 10 Guatemalan army soldiers, accompanied by 50 Xococ civil patrollers and military commissioners, invaded the small fishing and farming village of Río Negro. The battalion entered residents’ homes, carrying an array of weapons, including Israeli Galil assault rifles.

Once inside the homes, the armed militia demanded to know where the men were hiding and the guns stashed. There were no men in Río Negro that day. The patrollers tied up the women and beat them when they replied that the men had previously been killed in the February 13 massacre of 74 people attempting to collect their confiscated identification documents in Xococ. Some of the soldiers and patrollers raped the younger women inside their own homes while others dragged the residents out of their houses and led them to a local school, promising them a party.

Once the residents were forcefully gathered at the school, soldiers and patrollers led some of the women and children to nearby abandoned houses and gang-raped them. The patrollers and soldiers especially targeted young girls who had not yet given birth since they were considered “pure.” They also specifically targeted pregnant mothers and small children, especially if they complained of hunger, thirst, or exhaustion. The armed men had previously ransacked the houses and taken the residents’ food.

Many of the hostages and their captors waited at the school while the last of the residents were rounded up. When everyone was captured, the troops led them to a trail headed towards a mountaintop known by locals as Pacoxom. On the trail, some of the captives rested at a large nance tree, where one of the first recorded murders took place. Two Army soldiers brutally assaulted 94-year-old Andrés Iboy Uscap. They kicked him in the chest, wrapped him in a costal (coffee sack), and threw him into a deep ravine. According to witness testimonies, after the murder of Iboy, most captives understood their fate.

After their brief stay, the women and children continued walking along the path in a column heavily guarded in front and back by soldiers and patrollers. Most of the Río Negro residents were forced to walk to a large conacaste tree, about one mile from the school. While waiting at the tree for the arrival of the rest of the battalion, the armed squadron took out a stolen cassette player and played marimba music. According to one witness, the soldiers forced the women to dance, saying: “Now you are going to dance, like you have danced for the guerrillas.” The soldiers and patrollers next grabbed young girls out of the group and raped them.

Throughout the entire two-mile hike along the path to Pacoxom, under the sweltering sun with no shade, the hostages continually asked for water and food. The armed men responded by beating and whipping the women and children with sticks and ropes. Some of the hostages were tied up and mocked for their misery during the hike. Some of the raped girls were forced to walk naked. Witnesses spoke of both internal and external scars from the physical and emotional abuse directed at them by the patrollers, including the six men now accused of the crime. According to one testimony recorded by the CEH, “the majority of the women were naked, raped, and there were women who were only days away from giving birth, but these babies were born purely from blows.” (CEH, Book III, p. 31).

March 13, 1982: Massacre at Pacoxom
When the captives finally reached the mountaintop of Pacoxom in the scorching sun of the early afternoon, there was no food or water to be found—at least for the suffering Río Negro residents. Instead, soldiers dynamited and forced the women to dig into the rocky soil with pickaxes, creating a large hole centered in the small ravine. When the armed battalion was satisfied with its size, they turned their energy towards the defenseless civilians.

Army soldiers and Xococ patrollers separated the women into two groups. One group was organized into mothers and their young children; the other into older girls and young women not carrying babies. To ensure no one would escape, the perimeter was well guarded and many hostages tied up.

After insulting and torturing the civilians with clubs and whips made of tree branches and rope, the massacre began. All of the Río Negro residents were made to lie down on the ground, faced down, so that they could not witness the atrocities taking place around them. The men took women and girls out of the groups, usually four at a time, and brutally raped them, sometimes torturing and beating them unconscious if they weren’t deemed virgins. Afterwards they were slain.

The mass execution lasted hours. As it continued, the aggressors didn’t bother hiding the slaughter and permitted the children to watch their sisters and mothers raped and murdered. Throughout the massacre, the valley below echoed with the shouts, cries, and pleas of the women and children being insulted, tortured, raped, and murdered by their executioners. Witnesses hiding in the mountains verified this at the trial.

One witness, Jesús Tecu, described how one of the PAC leaders, the convicted Pedro Gonzalez Gómez, wanted to kill a young mother, Vicenta Iboy Chen, and became enraged when she tried to protect herself by throwing a rock in his direction. According to Tecu, Gonzalez took out his machete “and gave her two swings to her back” where she carried her baby. “Half fell to the ground, with the other half still wrapped around the back of its mother.” Vicenta fell to the ground where he “gave her two more machete blows to the neck.”

In February of 2008, Tecu also described the actions of another patroller, the accused Pablo Ruiz Alvarado:

He had one woman, Tomasa, faced down, with the rope fastened around her neck in the form of a tourniquet… but she didn’t die and her body quivered. So he killed her and continued beating her with a garrote, like she was a savage animal… Then he took her by the feet and dragged her to the ravine…

One of the other accused, the PAC leader Francisco Alvarado Lajuj, earned the nickname “don Quebrado” (the Severer) for his viciousness in killing innocent women and children in Río Negro. Their methods were so brutal that rumors circulated around the region that the Xococ patrollers licked the blood of their victims from their machetes.

Through witness testimonies and forensic evidence gathered at the Pacoxom exhumation, the variety of murder methods during the large-scale massacre has been well documented. Most of the young women and girls were killed by strangulation with rope and garrotes, by decapitation with machete blades, by blows to the head with sticks and clubs, or by bullets to the head with firearms. According to witnesses and forensic anthropologists at the trial, almost all of the young children were hung, beaten, bludgeoned by machete, shot, or had their feet tied together and were flung against jagged rocks and tree stumps.

After the executions, the bodies were thrown down a small ravine. According to some of the younger witnesses, a number of the victims were still alive, gargling blood and quivering when they landed on top of other bodies in the makeshift grave. The ravine was filled with bodies of the women and children by 5 pm. According to witnesses who arrived in the aftermath while hiding in the mountains, the dogs ate many of the remains before they could be covered with dirt.

At least three people escaped the butchery after their capture. Bruna left her 4-month-old baby, Jesusa, near her mother and successfully evaded her captors by running from the shots fired by the Army and the PAC. She hid for months in the forest. On March 5, 2008, she described her interaction with her mother and her thoughts of her fateful decision to flee:

[I said] “Mama. How it hurts, mama, what they are doing… Mama, I don’t want to die like this. I´m going to flee…” So I asked my mom to stay with my baby, but she didn’t want to receive her. I dropped her on the ground because she wouldn’t take her… And I fled… I still think of my girl, but I didn’t want to die…

Slavery in Xococ
After the mass execution, the Xococ patrollers carried 18 children as “virtual slaves” to their homes in Xococ. Some of the captives were as young as four years old. Many of the young children who were carried to Xococ survived because their mothers influenced their executioners to carry their sons and daughters away in order to raise them as their own. Most of the patrollers obliged, but only after executing the youngsters’ mothers in front of their eyes. One witness, José, recalls one terrible incident during his March 6 testimony:

My mom was already dead. So I began walking towards Río Negro, but was intercepted by a patroller… There was still the screaming of women and children and gunshots of the patrollers and soldiers… At 5:00 everything went silent. Everyone [from the PAC] selected their kid to carry to their houses, but one child was not elected… Jesús tried to bring his little brother [Jaime] but a patroller [Pedro Gonzalez Gomez] grabbed him out of his arms and tied a rope around his neck and carried him like that. He then threw him in the ravine against the rocks.

Along the path to Xococ, the children heard PAC members openly bragging about how many women and children they had killed. Meanwhile, the young captives remembered how they were hungry, thirsty, and tired during their forced trek. The young hostages recalled in detail how they did not eat until they arrived early the next morning in Xococ. According to the witnesses there was a meal prepared for all of the combatants, including Commander Solares, at the Catholic Church in Xococ, site of the February 13 massacre.

Adjusting to life in Xococ was extremely difficult for the young children of Río Negro. The kidnapped children were dispersed throughout the village, often living with the murderers of their family members. The children were depressed and had difficulties eating and sleeping due to their trauma. The Xococ patrollers arbitrarily changed many of their names and often instructed them to call them “mom” and “dad.” They weren’t allowed to go to school, and even the youngest were forced to labor in the fields or the house like adults. The Xococ families treated the children cruelly, beating and torturing them at a moments notice. One witness even showed his scars to prove the torture he endured.

While living with their “new” families in Xococ, Río Negro witnesses recalled how the accused and other Xococ patrollers returned to Río Negro shortly after the massacre to carry off “war booty,” such as animals, personal possessions, and other things of value. The Xococ PAC members often sold the animals or clothing in nearby markets or gave some of the goods to the military leaders in the Rabinal military detachment. One witness told the court how she was beaten in her Xococ home when she started to cry after seeing her murdered family members’ clothing being carried off to nearby markets.

Younger witnesses remembered how the men often had their wives pack food for them in the early morning so that they could go on “trips.” Witnesses remembered the men leaving for such “trips” on the morning of May 14 and September 14, the days of the massacres in nearby Los Encuentros and Agua Fría, where many refugees from Río Negro had fled.

When the men returned from their “trips” they often held meetings in their homes where the Río Negro children lived. Witnesses remember the men congratulating one another on their missions and then communicating with the military commissioners and local army commanders. One witnesses recalled being saddened after one of the accused bragged about decimating the community of Agua Fría. The witness had family members who had taken refuge there. At least 92 civilians were burned in their houses or shot on September 14 in Agua Fría, while on the same day, in the community of Los Encuentros, 79 people were murdered with guns and grenades and dozens more carried away in an army helicopter never to be seen again. Most of the victims were Río Negro residents attempting to escape the violence.

Many witnesses choked down tears as they described their time in Xococ as an absolute nightmare. Many lived for up to four years as virtual slaves in Xococ before being rescued by real family members living in the military colony of Pacux.

Justice?
In 1999, the UN-sponsored truth commission, la Comisión de Esclarecimiento Histórico (CEH), declared that the five massacres of Río Negro residents and the extrajudicial and arbitrary assassinations of residents following the massacres demonstrated the cruel intention of the Guatemalan army to displace or obliterate the community of Río Negro. It further stated that the state’s intention to fully or partially destroy the residents and community of Río Negro was genocide, under Article II of the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (CEH 1999: Conclusions, Chapter II: pp. 108-123).

The real architects of the repression, the assassinations, the violence, and the massacres of Río Negro and of other indigenous communities have not been charged with any crime. None of the military officials who planned, ordered, or participated in the massacres of Río Negro have had to face any court of law. Captain Solares and his commanders have not been arrested, despite a warrant issued in April of 2003. According to ADIVIMA, Solares continues to collect his pension check from the Guatemalan military at his house outside of Salamá, Baja Verapaz.

Neither Romeo Lucas Garcia nor Efraín Rios Montt, the architects of the scorched-earth campaigns during the early 1980s that resulted in hundreds of massacres of indigenous Maya communities similar to what took place in Río Negro, have had to give declarations in a court of law, despite two genocide cases against their high commands.

The Guatemalan state has thus far ignored its own culpability and responsibility in the massacres of Río Negro. The state-owned energy company, INDE, responsible for implementing the resettlement of affected residents and of other compensatory agreements, never fulfilled its promises after the written contract and land titles were conveniently stolen from the community during the violence. INDE, since privatized, has essentially ignored its commitment to the people.

Neither the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, nor the dozens of international governments on the boards that approved financing the mega-project, have had to pay any compensation or face any charges for their complicity in the massacre of innocents.

That’s not to say no justice has been served. Eight indigenous Maya Achí men (the convicted Carlos Chen López died of diabetes), perpetrators of one of the worst massacres during the scorched-earth campaigns of dictators Montt and Garcia, live in their Guatemalan prison cells.

However, the real leaders of the massacre and other massacres throughout the country enjoy the comfort of Guatemalan impunity. Many of the Río Negro victims believe this is because they aren’t indigenous Maya. Jesús Tecu declared in his closing statement on February 19 in the current legal trial: “There is only justice carried out against the indigenous people accused… [F]or those who are the material authors of these crimes, there’s nothing.”


Some of the names of the witnesses were changed due to reasons of security. The testimonies were translated and transcribed to the best of the author’s abilities.

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Thaddeus al Nakba is an international human rights accompanier for the Network in Solidarity with the People of Guatemala (NISGUA).This article is dedicated to the Río Negro victims and their families, including little Jesusa.

This story first appeared May 7 on Upside Down World.

From our daily report:

Guatemala: convictions in Río Negro massacre
WW4 Report, June 1, 2008
/node/5578

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Reprinted by World War 4 Report, June 1, 2008
Reprinting permissible with attribution

Continue ReadingGUATEMALA: GENOCIDE PLAINTIFFS TESTIFY 

BOLIVIA AFTER THE WATER WARS

Struggle for a “Social-Public” Sector

by Susan Spronk, Upside Down World

In the month of February, an unusual plight fell upon the city of La Paz. Torrential rains that hit the region ruptured the water main that services the wealthiest zone of the city, leaving the residents of the Zona Sur without water for several days. While it is common for residents in poor barrios not to have access to piped water, upper and middle class residents are accustomed to hearing the gush of clean, running water every time they open the tap. Seeking someone to blame, gold-ringed fingers pointed immediately to the “incompetent” management of the public water company, resurrecting debates about privatization put temporarily to rest by the “Water Wars” of 2000 and 2005.

Bolivia has played a starring role in the history of neoliberal water privatization. Images from the Cochabamba Water War—the popular insurrection against the multinational water company run by American construction giant Bechtel in April 2000—have been beamed into screens and television sets across the planet. The defeat of Bechtel is widely credited as the first great victory against corporate globalization in Latin America. The demand for public water that emerged in the Cochabamba Valley eventually diffused to El Alto, the poor city neighboring La Paz, where a three-day civil strike organized by local neighborhood organizations in January 2005 forced then-President Carlos Mesa to cancel the contract with French multinational, Suez. Because of these struggles, the world has also looked to Bolivia for alternatives to privatization.

Eight years after Bolivia’s first Water War, however, the unsatisfactory performance of the two water companies that were returned to public control raises questions about the viability of the public-state alternative in “weak” states of the global South.

Moving beyond the Privatization Debate
In the 1990s, two opposing positions on the question of private sector participation emerged within the literature on the water sector: those who embraced private sector participation and those who defended state forms of ownership and control. The trouble with this debate is that it presents “public” (read: state) and “private” forms of provision as polar opposites. In Bolivia, water justice activists have articulated a third position which suggests that the “public”/”private” debate misses the point. According to this view, the barriers that impede access of the poor to water services—poverty and political powerlessness—are likely to persist whether the water company is publicly or privately owned. It is therefore not enough to simply return water to public hands.

Given the poor performance of many public water companies, water justice activists in Bolivia stress the importance of collective ownership and popular democracy as the means by which to improve utilities. As Oscar Olivera, one of the spokespersons from the Bolivian water justice movement argues, “the true opposite of privatization is the social re-appropriation of wealth by working-class society itself—self-organized in communal structures of management, in neighborhood associations, in unions, and in the rank and file.”

As of yet, however, the water justice movement in Bolivia has come short of achieving its goals of democratizing the water companies based upon this notion of communal ownership and control. Indeed, the struggle for “social control” within the renationalized water utilities in La Paz-El Alto and Cochabamba have provoked the negative reactions of key power holders in the local political economy, including international financial institutions, and the municipal and central governments that have impeded progress.

The New Water Company in La Paz-El Alto

While the government promised to cancel the privatization contract in the neighboring cities of La Paz and El Alto in January 2005, it took over two years for the government to follow through. The key stumbling block was the government’s fear that Suez, the French multinational that controlled the private consortia, would retaliate with a multi-million dollar lawsuit in an international investment court, similar to the one launched by Bechtel in 2002. After two years of closed-door negotiations, the government gave Suez a golden handshake and formed a temporary water company, called “EPSAS”, to take its place.

In the sweetheart deal signed in January 2007, the Bolivian state paid Suez and other shareholders US$5.5 million to compensate them for their lost investments. The government also assumed at least US$9.5 million of company debts owed to agencies such as the International Financial Corporation (the private sector lending arm of the World Bank), the Inter-American Development Bank and the Andean Development Corporation. Half of the company’s income now goes to paying debt, which has seriously impeded the cash flow.

Hence, the company had difficulty coming up with the money to make emergency reparations to solve the water problems of the Zona Sur in February. In short, having already sucked the company dry, Suez has no need to go to launch a lawsuit in international court: It has already been compensated for financial “damages” despite the fact that it made at least US$1.5 million per year during the course of the contract, plus being paid another $1 million “management fee” by the local consortium.

The EPSAS is intended to be a transitory company, but the deadline by which time it was to be replaced passed some months ago. The government struck an inter-institutional commission, which includes participation by FEJUVEs (Federation of Neighborhood Councils) in La Paz and El Alto, the two mayors, and representatives from the Water Ministry, to evaluate proposals for a new water company. As time has passed, the FEJUVE-El Alto, which was once the most militant member of the commission, has lost much of its steam.

Shortly after the water war, the FEJUVE-El Alto proposed a model for a “public-social company” with a very high level of popular participation, including a popular assembly with elected delegates from all regions of the city which would formulate the policy of the water company. Facing pressure from the mayors of La Paz and El Alto and international donor agencies—all of whom favor the formation of a public-private partnership—the proposal has slowly transformed into a “light” version with a minimal level of public participation. According to Felipe Quispe (no relation to the Aymara leader, “el Mallku”), the representative of the FEJUVE-El Alto on the commission, the FEJUVE-El Alto now has a rather minimal demand: that one representative from each neighborhood organization is included on the board of directors of the new water company.

While political pressure from politicians and donor agencies is partly to blame for the FEJUVE’s decision to water down the proposal, it is also the result of internal strife that has considerably weakened the organization’s capacity for collective action since the election of the left-of-center Movement toward Socialism (the MAS) in December 2005. As a long-time observer of Bolivia social movements, Raquel Gutiérrez observed in a recent interview that social movements in Latin American countries in which left governments like the MAS have been elected are “in a bit of a gray moment.” She provides two reasons for the uncertainty which prevails amongst community leaders: “One, the governments in power and the policies that they are implementing are perceived by practically everyone as insufficient. Two, the movement’s struggles, and the emergence of what seemed like a new form of politics, of direct participation, of assembly, of a horizontal process of gaining consensus via extensive, multi-level deliberation, of virtually holding our own destiny in our hands, hit a wall.”

The politics of cooptation related to hierarchical political structures have also affected the FEJUVE-El Alto. The MAS appointed Abel Mamani as the head of the newly created Water Ministry in January 2006. Upon his appointment, Manami was immediately criticized for using the organization as a launch pad for his own political ambitions and turning his back on the social movements responsible for his fame. Carlos Rojas, who served on the same FEJUVE executive as Abel Mamani (2004-2006), comments that the legal status of the new “public” company is ambiguous: “Aguas del Illimani [the private consortia controlled by Suez] never really left. The new water company has the same administrative structure as the private company: It employs the same people; it is registered under the same number; it has the same bank account as the old company.”

Indeed, the EPSAS is a sociedad anónima (equivalent to a “limited” company in English). As such, it is not wholly “public”: EPSAS has two private shareholders and it is regulated by commercial instead of public law. Disconcertingly, the cost of a potable water connection has gone up from $155 to $175 under the new administration.

When I asked why the FEJUVE-El Alto has not kicked up much fuss about the fee hike, Rojas explained that the government has effectively neutralized the new leadership by buying them off with promises of political appointments and economic resources. For example, the FEJUVE is rumored to have purchased a new vehicle with money received from the government that is used by the executive.

Over his two year term, Mamani’s performance as Water Minister has been the subject of much controversy. In November 2007, a number of scandals implicating Mamani hit the press. He was promptly dismissed under a cloud of suspicion. The leaders of FEJUVE-El Alto immediately demanded that Mamani be replaced by another leader from El Alto. Instead, the government chose Walter Valda as interim minister, whose experience in the water sector is with campesinos in Chuquisaca. The inter-institutional commission has not met since the change of leadership in November. The question as to how or whether the EPSAS will be replaced hangs in the air.

Cochabamba Water War: “We Won the Struggle but not the War”
After Cochabamba’s Water War, “social control” was supposed to resolve the problems with corruption that have historically plagued public utilities. While the city water company’s former board of directors was staffed exclusively by professionals and politicians, since April 2002 three members elected from the macro-district sit on the board. However, the many problems that have historically plagued public utilities have remained unresolved with a minimal degree of “social control.”

Over the past eight years, the public water company in Cochabamba, SEMAPA, has gone from one crisis to the next. Since the company was returned to public hands after the Water War of 2000, two general managers have been dismissed for acts of corruption. The most recent general manager, Eduardo Rojas (2006-2007), was even worse than Gonzalo Ugalde (2002-2005). While both used the company as a botín politico (political booty), filling the company with their family members and friends, Rojas tended to hire white-collar workers (consultants and secretaries) who work at high salaries but do not provide a public service, while the latter mostly hired blue-collar workers to repair and expand the infrastructure. Due to these and other problems, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) cancelled the payments of an $18 million loan, the first part of which was to be dedicated to the “modernization” of the company. The utility is once again scrambling for finances in order to maintain and expand the city’s water and sanitation system.

On a more positive note, there are two important signs of that things might improve. First, there are signs of renewal in the water workers’ union. For over twenty years, the SEMAPA union was controlled by a “union mafia.” Union leaders were suspected of running a system of clandestine connections that was estimated to cost the utility almost $100,000 a month in lost revenue. A small group of employees have been working to democratize the union. Largely thanks to their efforts, the head of the union was fired in October 2005 for organizing an illegal strike that aimed to protest the dismissal of the corrupt general manager. For the first time in over twenty-five years, the elections that were held to replace him were conducted using secret ballot. Members also had a choice between two platforms of candidates. Nine out of ten members turned out to vote; over 70% of the members voted for the new leadership who expressed their commitment to union democracy.

Second, the association of community water systems of the poor, southern zone of the city (ASICA-Sur) has made a lot of progress in the past few years. ASICA-Sur has temporarily withdrawn from the struggle to reform SEMAPA, instead dedicating itself to the task of building water systems in poor areas that lack networked water services. Recently, ASICA-Sur has secured financing from the European Union to build secondary water networks in Districts 7 and 14. According to Abraham Grendydier, these systems will be administered by independent user groups, which will buy water in bulk from the public water company. In the short term, the initiatives of ASICA-Sur risk furthering fractioning the system, which is more accurately described as an “archipelago” than a network. In light of the numerous problems with SEMAPA, however, ASICA-Sur has made tactical decisions that will eventually help achieve the goal of “water for all.”

Given the problems confronted by SEMAPA in the past years, the local perception is that if SEMAPA serves as a model for anything it is for what can go wrong in a public water company. As Norma Barrera, one of the employees who have been working to reform the utility, put it, “The whole structure of the company needs to be changed from top to bottom. Putting a few good people at the top is not going to change anything when the structure is rotten to the core.” Amongst activists, opinion is divided regarding the main culprit. For some, it is the fact that the mayor controls the budget. For others, it is the problem of corruption and the lack of capacity of the citizen directors. Efforts to outline alternatives and debate the future of the public water company continue.

Conclusion
While the local results of the Cochabamba Water War may have been disappointing, its impact on the private sector rippled across the globe. Beginning in 2002, large multinational water companies announced that they were retreating from the poor countries of the global South, preferring instead to focus their investments in more lucrative markets. Indeed, the majority of privatization loans approved by the World Bank in 2006 for the water and sanitation sector were located in China. In the face of this global market shift, water justice activists in Latin America, widely considered to be both a birthplace of neoliberalism and its alternatives, can afford to be less defensive and critically scrutinize the failings of both private and public water companies.

It is undeniable that reform of the local state and public utilities are required in order to extend universal services. Examples of public water utilities suggest that there are several factors that help to determine success which have thus far been lacking in Bolivia. Public companies are more likely to perform well when they are subject to pressure from well-organized user groups, but as the Cochabamba example demonstrates, this is not enough. The presence of democratic trade unions with a “public service ethos” is also important, since it is ultimately the workers who execute the decisions. Perhaps most importantly, however, quality water services require large amounts of public investment. The progressive municipal government of Paco Moncayo in Quito, Ecuador, for example, expanded potable water services from 65% to almost 98% within only seven years thanks to a cash injection from the government and international sources. The water company, EMAAP-Q, is publicly owned and operated and considered one of the five best public water companies in Latin America.

Since most social movement efforts have necessarily focused on the problems with privatization, the factors that determine quality public management are poorly understood. Now that the multinationals are in retreat, however, there is more political space to discuss real alternatives.

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Susan Spronk is currently conducting research on the role of trade unions in water companies in Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru.

This story first appeared April 29, with footnotes, on Upside Down World.

See related story, this issue:

POLARIZING BOLIVIA
Santa Cruz Votes for Autonomy
by Ben Dangl, Upside Down World
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See also:

BOLIVIA: NEW “WATER WAR,” VIOLENT LAND CONFLICTS
from Weekly News Update on the Americas
World War 4 Report, January-February, 2005
/boliviawater

From our daily report:

Bolivia: Bechtel surrenders
WW4 Report, Jan. 24, 2006
/node/1528

Bolivia: Evo appoints rads to cabinet
WW4 Report, Jan. 24, 2006
/node/1529

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Reprinted by World War 4 Report, June 1, 2008
Reprinting permissible with attribution

Continue ReadingBOLIVIA AFTER THE WATER WARS 

THE LANDOWNERS’ REBELLION

Slavery and Saneamiento in Bolivia

by Alexander van Schaick, Upside Down World

In recent weeks, cattle ranchers and landowners in Bolivia’s Cordillera province, located in the south of the department of Santa Cruz, resorted to blockades and violence in order to halt the work of Bolivia’s National Institute for Agrarian Reform (INRA). As a referendum on departmental autonomy for Santa Cruz draws near, the conflict calls into question the central government‚s ability to enforce the law in the Bolivian lowlands.

The dispute centers on the region of Alto Parapetí, south of the provincial capital of Camiri, where INRA is currently trying to carry out land reform and create an indigenous territory for the Guaraní indigenous people. Additionally, it claims various communities of Guaraní live and work on white or mestizo-owned ranches in conditions of semi-slavery.

For nine days landowners and their supporters blockaded major highways and virtually sealed off Alto Parapetí. The blockades continued until Bolivia’s vice minister of land, Alejandro Almaráz, left the region on April 18. At the end of February, Ronald Larsen, a major landowner in Santa Cruz, and other ranchers took Almaráz hostage at gunpoint for
several hours when he and other government officials tried to enter the region.

An Incomplete Land Reform

In the 1990s and up to the present, the Guaraní Nation and Bolivia’s other lowland indigenous peoples mobilized to force the national government to recognize their right to their ancestral territories. In 1996, the first administration of Gonzalo “Goni” Sánchez de Lozada passed a land reform law that gave Bolivia’s indigenous people the opportunity to claim their “communal territory of origin” (TCO).

The 1996 law—Ley No. 1715—reorganized the country’s land law and agrarian reform institutions. It also established INRA to resolve land conflicts and issue titles through a process called saneamiento. In this process, INRA would establish property limits, to look into whether property owners had obtained land legally and to investigate whether they were putting their land to socially or economically productive use. (Latifundios, or huge tracks of idle land used to speculate on rising land prices or as liens to obtain loans, are banned by the Bolivian constitution.) Finally, INRA would resolve land conflicts through mediation and legal processes, title TCOs for indigenous people, and establish parcels of state-owned land for distribution. In the end, landowners would own land with clear title. INRA was to carry out saneamiento throughout all of Bolivia between 1996 and 2006.

But after ten years, INRA had only completely finished the saneamiento process for 10% of its goal. Over half of the land INRA sought to have titled had not even begun the process. According to critiques from indigenous and campesino (peasant farmer) organizations, saneamiento was characterized by corruption, a lack of transparency and participation, and a bias in favor of large landholders.

In 2006, the administration of president Evo Morales pushed through several laws (particularly No. 3501 and No. 3545) in order to improve the saneamiento process for the benefit of peasants and indigenous people. Among other changes, the new laws attempted to improve the control indigenous and peasant organizations can exercise over the process, tightened restrictions on what constitutes the productive use of land, and gave INRA the authority to nullify property rights of landowners found to use workers in a system of servitude, captivity, forced labor, or debt peonage. INRA and the Vice-ministry of Land have also been much more active under Morales: in the first two years of his administration, INRA has finished the saneamiento process for 10.2 million hectares, as opposed to 9.2 million completed by the previous five presidents in the nine years since INRA’s founding.

One of the groups that has benefited the least from the saneamiento process has been the Guaraní people, Bolivia’s third largest indigenous group. Guaraní communities populate Bolivia’s Chaco, an arid region that spans parts of the Departments of Santa Cruz, Chuquisaca, and Tarija. Only between 5 and 10 percent of the land demanded for TCOs by Guaraní communities has been granted, whereas other lowland indigenous groups have received much higher percentages of their demands for communal land.

The Asamblea del Pueblo Guaraní (APG) has made claims to INRA territory in Alto Parapetí since 1996. Only in February of this year did INRA start the process for the titling of a TCO “Alto Parapetí,” totaling 157,000 hectares of land. Through the saneamiento process, INRA will catalogue what of this 157,000 hectares is available for future Guaraní use and what land is being used in a legal fashion by existing property owners.

INRA also will investigate which landowners have workers in conditions of servitude. According Law 3545 and its governing rules, the state does not recognize the legal property rights of a landowners’ estate if he or she is found to have one or more persons working under conditions of modern-day slavery or servitude. If this is the case, the estate becomes state land that the government, in the case of Alto Parapetí, will include in the formation of a TCO. (Article 4e of Law 3545 requires that the state guarantee that people formerly subjected to a labor regime of peonage, captivity, forced labor, or servitude have access to land.) At the end of the saneamiento, INRA will give land titles to the Guaraní community and all existing, law-abiding landholders.

The APG, the national organization of the Guaraní nation, backed Evo Morales and his Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) party during the elections of 2005. It hoped that a MAS government would respond to its demands for the territorial reconstitution of Guaraní ancestral lands. The results have been mixed: while Guaraní communities have received far more land than under previous administrations, the APG feels like the current government can do better. One of the key conditions for the Guaraní Nation’s continuing support of the Morales administration may be the successful titling of the TCO “Alto Parapetí” and the liberation of Guaraní “captive” communities in the region.

“Now Blood Will Run”
Conflicts in Alto Parapetí between INRA and large landowners began in February of this year. On February 12, INRA issued a decree committing to title a TCO “Alto Parapetí” for the APG. Beyond the recuperation of territory for the APG, the creation of a TCO would provide the base for the liberation of Guaraní families living in servitude on large landowners’ estates in the area. According to a report released by the Swiss Red Cross and the Bolivian Ministry of Justice in 2006, there are ten “captive” Guaraní communities in Alto Parapetí that live under a system of semi-slavery: Yaiti, Yapui, Yapumbia, Recreo, Itacuatía, Huaraka, Bajo Carapari, Alto Carapari, La Colorada y Tartagalito.

INRA initiated the process of saneamiento by another decree on February 26. Vice-minister of Land Alejandro Almaráz and the national director of INRA, Juan Carlos Rojas, came to Camiri to personally supervise the launch of saneamiento with the participation of the Guaraní community.

The reaction to the start of saneamiento from the landowning and cattle ranching sector was swift and severe. On February 28, a group of 50 to 100 landowners and their supporters forced INRA officials out of their office, which they preceded to sack. They demanded that the land titling process in Alto Parapetí be halted. After the incident, the Mburuvicha Guasu (Grand Captain) of the Guaraní community in Alto Parapetí, Félix Bayanda, condemned the ranchers for trying to stop the saneamiento process:

“This is [an] abuse from the cattle ranchers, who don’t want to recognize the existence of enslaved communities and who misinform the people,” he said. “The Guaraní people are prepared to defend our communities‚ demand to end once and for all the servitude and enslavement of our people. The Assembly of the Guaraní People will fight for their demands and we will initiate mobilizations in Santa Cruz, Chiquisaca and Tarija.”

In spite of the threats, INRA also reiterated its commitment to carrying out the saneamiento, as required by the law. Following the incident, on the evening of February 29, Vice-minister of Land Almaráz, INRA director Rojas, APG president Wilson Changaraya, and other INRA officials entered Alto Parapetí. Their goal was to notify property owners that the saneamiento process was commencing. According to an interview with Almaráz and accounts published in the press, as the INRA vehicle drove by the property “Caraparicito,” a large cattle ranch owned by an American, Ronald Larsen, they came across a tractor blocking the road.

A group of landowners surrounded their vehicle, led by Larsen, who was armed with a revolver and a rifle. Larsen proceeded to shoot out the tires of the INRA vehicle to prevent the escape of the land reform officials. He reportedly yelled, “Now we are going to carry out community justice on you.” He ordered the INRA vehicle to be dragged onto his property with the tractor. Later, he bragged to Almaráz that he had shot and killed three robbers that had come on to his property and no authority had ever found out. Another local landowner, Lino Medrano, allegedly threatened “No one is going to leave here alive, now blood will run.” Two members of the INRA team escaped to Camiri, where they obtained reinforcements who returned and freed the remaining INRA officials after their eight-hour ordeal.

Interestingly, no immediate action was taken against Larsen. According to Almaráz, witnesses are giving testimony before the public prosecutor of Camiri in order to bring a case against Ronald and Duston Larsen for sedition, criminal association, impeding and extorting official government activity, attempted murder, aggravated robbery, and kidnapping.

Conflicts Escalate
After being released, Almaráz and Rojas called for dialogue in an attempt to reengage the small producers of the region. INRA issued public statements explaining that the saneamiento would not negatively affect any property owners with under 500 hectares of land. They convened an INRA meeting on March 10 in order to engage all the actors affected by the saneamiento process. Most large landowners, however, boycotted that meeting, and are still refusing to participate in any INRA-sponsored dialogue.

On March 11, the President of the Unión de Productores Agropecuarios del Sur (the local cattle rancher and farmers association), Juan Carlos Santistevan, issued a press statement saying that the cattle ranchers of the Cordillera would give their lives to protect their land and to oppose the creation of a Guaraní TCO in Alto Parapetí. According to statistics published by the Vice-ministry of Land, Santistevan owns 1,885 hectares in the area.

Tensions boiled over again on April 4, when Almaraz, Rojas, representatives of the APG, and several dozen national police once again tried to enter Alto Parapetí through the municipality of Lagunillas. According to statements and testimonies from INRA, Guaraníes, and Almaráz, the group was on the way to participate in a meeting convened by the APG in the Guaraní community of Itacuatía. The week prior, over 450 Guaraní traveled to Itacuatía for the meeting before landowners essentially sealed off the area. Once again, the convoy was halted as they tried to pass by the property of Caraparicito. Duston Larsen, son of Ronald Larsen, and a group of people armed with sticks, rocks, and guns violently prevented them from passing. Police officers dispersed the crowd; however the convoy still could not pass.

On April 5, various sectors in Alto Parapetí allied with the landowners issued a declaration, “Cordillera de Pie,” which accused the government and INRA of attempting to violently enter Alto Parapetí the previous day. The document also demanded:

“That the vice-minister of land, national director of INRA, technical personnel and police contingents halt the abuses and illegalities that they come to commit against our people and that in the term of 24 hours they definitively abandon the province of Cordillera in order to avoid other consequences which, if they do occur, will be the unique and exclusive responsibility of the government.”

Almaráz, however, reiterated that government officials and the INRA team would remain in Camiri until the saneamiento process had been completed.

On April 9, landowners and their supporters blocked major interdepartmental highways between the city of Santa Cruz and Camiri, between Camiri and the southern departments of Chuquisaqa and Tarija, as well as all entrances into Alto Parapetí. Although the landowners originally declared the blockades would be lifted after 24 hours, they continued until April 18 when Almaráz finally left the region.

Both sides on the conflict mobilized their supporters. The APG issued a statement declaring a state of emergency for the Guaraní Nation and convoking representatives from all 26 Guaraní Capitanías (districts):

“The Guaraní Nation will not renounce its social, political, economic and cultural rights to the recuperation and consolidation of its territory, natural resources and Indigenous Autonomy; thus, it declares a state of emergency and calls the 26 Captains and the social organizations allied with the Guaraní Nation and other sectors, to join the fight to defend the Guaraní Nation‚s historic demand of Territorial Reconstitution and liberation of enslaved families.”

On the other hand, the government has reported that at least several hundred members of the proto-fascist Unión Juvenil Crucenista traveled to Camiri to support the blockades.). The Union Juvenil Crucenista is a “youth” organization widely considered to be the violent arm of the Comité Cívico Pro-Santa Cruz, a powerful association of the elites in Santa Cruz.

A little over a week after their first attempt, they tried to enter Alto Parapetí again. At 4:45 PM on Sunday, April 13, Almaráz, Rojas, Changaray, INRA officials, and several dozen Guaraní, without police escort, tried to pass a blockade in the town of Cuevo again trying to reach the community of Itacuatía. According to Almaráz, in Cuevo, a crowd of several hundred landowners, townspeople and members of the Unión Juvenil Crucenista threw a hail of rocks at the convoy to repulse them. As the convoy tried to return to Camiri, landowners and their supporters ambushed them, partially blocking the road and firing guns. They prevented several trucks from passing. Those people unfortunate enough to be left behind were forced out of their trucks, threatened, and beaten with sticks and rocks.

According to the mayor of Cuevo, Sonia Guthrié, a supporter of the landowners’ blockade, the group of INRA vehicles “entered firing their guns in the air. Later, with violence and slingshots, they managed to get beyond the first blockade. But, then we organized ourselves and in the Matadero zone we were able to stop them. They ran off towards the woods.” She displayed two rifles and six other guns taken from a vehicle carrying Guaraníes as proof of the group’s hostile intent. Members of her retinue have made press statements claiming that Vice-minister Almaráz is trying to form armed guerilla groups in the Chaco in order to “train a FARC in the Cordillera.”

Almaráz rebuked this claim saying, “nobody from the Vice-ministry or INRA had guns. I don’t know what the Guaraní had, but I didn’t see any of them with guns.” In response to the version of events given by Mayor Guthrié, Almaráz pointed out that the vast majority of people injured in the incident were Guaraní or government employees. The Bolivian state information agency, ABI, published a list of 46 people injured in the incident by hospital in which they received treatment; 11 suffered “grave” injuries and 35 “light” injuries. Juan Carlos Rojas, national director of INRA, was listed as gravely injured.

The government also published a list of five people who have “disappeared.” Several people, including the APG’s lawyer, testified to having been captured, taken back to Cuevo, and tortured, at least one of whom was whipped and beaten in the town’s plaza. The crowd also looted and destroyed several government vehicles. According to the landowners, five of their supporters in Cuevo were lightly wounded.

The government temporarily has suspended saneamiento activities and recalled Almaráz to La Paz. By doing so, it hopes to diffuse tensions and allow an inter-institutional commission of human rights organizations, the press, and the religious community to enter the region in order to investigate rights abuses and open dialogue. Nevertheless, a negotiated, peaceful resolution to the conflict will be difficult to achieve.

Freeing Slaves or Grabbing Resources?

Both sides in the dispute over the saneamiento of Alto Parapetí have very different views of why the conflict is happening. The government claims that the saneamiento process and the creation of a TCO represents the way in which various Guaraní communities living in a system of semi-slavery can be freed and assured a sustainable rural livelihood. The landowners and their supporters maintain that the issue of slavery is a red herring invented by the MAS government and that the saneamiento is part of larger processes by which the government hopes in the future to gain control over local hydrocarbon resources and dissolve the municipalities in the region.

Numerous Bolivian and international human rights organizations have published reports on the existence of systems of semi-slavery on estates in the Chaco. Estimates vary, but at least 600 Guaraní families live in such conditions in the departments of Santa Cruz, Chuquisaca and Tarija. These families have no land of their own and live in communities located on the estates of their masters. In the documentary “Quiero ser libre, sin dueño” (“I want to be free, without a master”), produced by the Bolivian Ombudsman’s office and the Ministry of Justice, dozens of Guaraníes give dramatic testimony to conditions on estates in Chuquisaca. Although treatment varies, interviewees testify to working for their masters over 12 hours a day for between ten cents to two dollars a day (far below what they legally should receive); sometimes workers receive no pay at all, only second-hand clothes and food. Debt slavery is common, where debts supposedly incurred by the Guaraní to their masters (sometimes passed down from their parents) effectively negate their pay. Child labor and corporal punishment are widespread.

Local Guaraní leaders express their frustration that they have nowhere to turn. Local authorities are either landowners or under the landowners’ influence, and previous governments turned a deaf ear to their plight. According to the Fidel Cejas, captain of Alto Parapetí, “In all of the district of Alto Parapetí nobody treats our brothers well and it’s sad to think about the abuse: psychological, physical, even the rape of the daughters of our brothers, and assassinations as well. Complaints have been made, but the authorities don’t carry out justice when such complaints are made.”

For many Guaraní interviewed in the documentary, a community’s access to its own land to cultivate represents the path to freedom, dignity, and the recuperation of culture and language. In the past, the Centro de Investigación y Promoción de Campesinado (Center for the Research and Promotion of Peasants, or CIPCA) and Catholic organizations have liberated several Guaraní communities in servitude by given them land purchased from landowners. Government and NGOs hope saneamiento will solve the problem.

The most vocal support for the landowners in Alto Parapetí has come from agricultural and cattle producers’ associations and local Cordillera politicians. They have also received full support from prominent figures in Santa Cruz. Given the sensitivity of the semi-slavery issue, these powerful politicians’ willingness to back the landowners indicates the extent to which the Cruceña landed elite occupies or influences the institutional spaces of power in Santa Cruz.

The Comité Cívico Pro-Santa Cruz, the strongest non-governmental political organization in Santa Cruz, has come out strongly behind the landowners in Alto Parapetí. Branko Marinkovic, president of the Comité, stated in reference to the events of April 13, “In no way do we accept this kind of violence, we ask the president to call back his functionaries because they will not conduct saneamiento with violence and the organization of paramilitary groups to make Bolivians fight each other.” Although different groups have played the deciding role in the Comité at different times, Gisela Lopéz, a journalist and former editor who covered land issues at El Deber, Santa Cruz’ paper of record, explains that:

“The Comité Cívico Pro-Santa Cruz has a long history of real civil struggles of the region and for the region, but in the last 20 years, it has been ‘taken over’ by the cruceño power elites, groups that have controlled the principle institutions in Santa Cruz (telephone, electricity, and water cooperatives, among others). And, now, the Comité Pro-Santa Cruz is lead by a huge landowner (Marinkovic) who utilizes the Comité for the defense of his particular interests and has been chosen to defend the landed elite from the current government of Evo Morales.”

Marinkovic is not only a major landowner in Santa Cruz, he also owns one of Bolivia’s biggest cooking oil companies.

Rubén Costas, the prefect (or governor) of Santa Cruz, also has supported the struggle of landowners in Alto Parapetí. Costas is one of the leading opponents of the Morales government and previously served as president of the Comité Civico. He counts on the political support of landowners and is considered to be close to Marcelino Apurani, the far-right sub-prefect of Cordillera province. According to reports by Bolpress, Apurani played a divisive role in a February meeting between INRA and landowners, where he attempted to sabotage dialogue and push landowners in a radical direction against saneamiento.

The landowners and their allies have presented their resistance to saneamiento as a fight to defend their land and to maintain Departmental control over hydrocarbon resources. They have seemingly successfully portrayed the conflict in the media as another struggle of the people of Santa Cruz against the impositions of the Morales government. They claim that if INRA creates a TCO for the Guaraní in Alto Parapetí, it will set the conditions for the Guaraní to later create an autonomous indigenous territory if the new Bolivian constitution passes its referendum vote. If these things come to pass, they argue that the Department or the municipality “lose control” over the oil and gas resources in the TCO and that the municipalities in Alto Parapetí would dissolve. These concerns are most succinctly put in the document “Cordillera de Pie”:

“WE WILL NOT ALLOW, under any circumstances, actions or activities of agrarian reversion, expropriation, reorganization or the creation of new community lands of origin supported in the illegal law 3545 and its regulations, that attempt to take control of the petroleum, aquifers and gas reserves of our department, cut and destroy municipal jurisdictions and confiscate individual and collective productive private properties.”

Government officials have responded that the creation of a TCO would have no effect on the amount of money the municipalities would receive from hydrocarbons. Subsoil resources pertain to the State, so the taxes on oil and gas exploitation that are redistributed to municipalities (such tax money also goes to universities, departments, and the national social security system) would not be changed.

Regarding the issue of servitude, the landowners and many of their allies claim there are no captive communities in Alto Parapetí and that such claims are merely stories invented by the MAS government to legitimize their hidden agendas.

Another landowner demand is that the saneamiento be halted until after May 4, the day of the vote on the controversial Santa Cruz “Autonomy Statutes.” Although in a July 2, 2005 referendum a majority of Santa Cruz’s residents voted in favor of regional autonomy, no legal framework exists for establishing what regional autonomy means or how it should be established. Nevertheless, a set of “Autonomy Statutes” were written up by a group of “legislators” appointed by the Departmental Prefect with the strong backing of the Comité Civico and agro-business associations. The Departmental Electoral Court in Santa Cruz set May 4 as the date when the statutes will go to referendum. The National Electoral Court, Bolivia’s highest decision-making body on such matters, ruled the referendum outside the law and ordered the departmental court to cease and desist its actions. The Departmental Electoral Court, however, has refused to comply.

Article 102, one of the articles relating to land policy in the Autonomy Statutes, states that:

“Property rights over land, the regulation of rights, the distribution, redistribution and administration of lands in the province of Santa Cruz are the responsibility of the Provincial Government and will be regulated through a Provincial Law by the Provincial Legislative Assembly.”

The authority to carry out saneamiento would thus be transferred from the central government to the departmental government and, by extension, into the hands of the landed elite. While it is doubtful that the government of Evo Morales will recognize the Autonomy Statutes’ legality, it is easy to understand why the large landowners of Alto Parapetí would seek to postpone saneamiento until after May 4. Effectively, the landowners may have won on this front. As this article goes to press, one week remains before the referendum and it appears unlikely that the government will restart saneamiento beforehand.

Ronald Larsen: Gringo Instigator of the Landowners‚ Uprising?

One of the more bizarre aspects of the conflict is the controversy surrounding Ronald Larsen, the landowner of US citizenship who reportedly sequestered Almaráz and others at gunpoint on February 29. According to documents released by government sources, Larsen’s story goes back to 1968, when, after fighting in the Vietnam War, he came to Bolivia where he has lived since without residency on a tourist visa. His son, Duston Larsen, who was captured on Bolivian TV leading the group that violently prevented INRA from passing Lagunillas on April 4, was chosen to be “Mister Bolivia” in 2004. Duston also appeared as himself in the popular Bolivian comedy “Quién Mató a la Llamita Blanca.”

The Larsens have been among the leaders of the resistance to saneamiento in Alto Parapetí. During the Banzer dictatorship of the 1970s, Ronald Larsen began consolidating properties in Santa Cruz, eventually becoming one of Santa Cruz’s biggest landholders. He and his family hold at least 57,145 hectares of land in Santa Cruz although discrepancies between records held by INRA and the Agrarian Superintendent may mean he own an additional 10,000 hectares. In Alto Parapetí the Larsen family holds at least 15,777 hectares of land in five different properties. According to Bolpress, Larsen also has strong links to the right wing in Santa Cruz, having wined-and-dined with Rubén Costas and Branko Marinkovic among others on his estate in the Cordillera.

Minister of Rural Development Susana Rivero claimed on Bolivian state TV that in preliminary interviews with INRA Larsen admitted that a Guaraní community lives on his property and performs services for him, apparently not knowing that such a labor relation means that this community is in “captivity” according to Bolivian law.

More Conflict on the Horizon
Larsen aside, the conflictive situation in Alto Parapetí has highlighted a disturbing trend that is becoming increasingly common in Santa Cruz: the willingness of the landed elite to use violence to halt land reform, and the central government’s inability to protect their supporters in the indigenous community as well as their own employees from such violence.

Thus far, the saneamiento has gone nowhere. Given the state’s weakness in Santa Cruz and the level of resistance put up by landowners over the past months, the Morales government will face an uphill battle if it again tries to carry out its land reform agenda in Alto Parapetí. Making matters worse, the May 4 referendum on the “Autonomy Statutes” will likely pass (although with high abstention rates; its opponents are boycotting the vote). This will give landowners additional rhetorical ammunition, even though the central government will not recognize its legality.

The government may be banking on the Inter-institutional Commission and a different Parliamentary commission to release reports verifying systems of servitude in Alto Parapetí. A clear, unequivocal statement from the commissions confirming the existence of captive communities might give the government the legitimacy to use force to carry out the saneamiento. Given the large landowners‚ trenchant resistance to losing their way of life and privilege, it seems unlikely that any accord that does justice to the Guaraní community will be reached through dialogue. More violent conflict may be on the horizon.

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Alexander van Schaick is currently a Fulbright Scholar in Bolivia. Until recently he also was an organizer for the IWW in New York City.

This story first appeared April 28, with footnotes, on Upside Down World.

See related story, this issue:

POLARIZING BOLIVIA
Santa Cruz Votes for Autonomy
by Ben Dangl, Upside Down World
/node/5579

From our daily report:

Bolivia polarized on eve of autonomy vote
WW4 Report, May 4, 2008
/node/5439

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Reprinted by World War 4 Report, June 1, 2008
Reprinting permissible with attribution

Continue ReadingTHE LANDOWNERS’ REBELLION 

POLARIZING BOLIVIA

Santa Cruz Votes for Autonomy

by Ben Dangl, Upside Down World

A vote for autonomy in Santa Cruz, Bolivia, was passed by approximately 82% of voters on Sunday, May 4. The vote endorses a move by Santa Cruz to, among other things, gain more control of gas reserves in the area and resist the central government’s break-up of large land holdings. Clashes during the vote in Santa Cruz left 35 injured. One man died from asphyxiation due to tear gas fired by police forces. The vote and conflict marks a new phase in the polarization of Bolivia, and a new challenge for the region.

However, various aspects of the autonomy vote weaken its legitimacy. The Bolivian Electoral Court, the Organization of American States, the European Union, Bolivian President Evo Morales and other South American leaders have stated that the vote is illegal. The national average for voter abstention in Bolivian elections is 20-22%. In the Santa Cruz referendum on May 4, the rate of abstention was 39%. This abstention percentage added to the number of “No” votes means that at least 50% of Santa Cruz voters did not support the autonomy statute, according to Bolpress. The organizers of the vote in Santa Cruz hired a private firm to count and collect the votes, and voters reported widespread fraud and intimidation across the department. In some cases, ballot boxes arrived in neighborhoods with the “Yes” ballot already marked.

The Santa Cruz autonomy movement’s architects and leaders are right-wing politicians, wealthy business owners and large landholders. The autonomy statute voted on calls for increased departmental control of land, water and gas. This would potentially block Morales’ plans to break up large land holdings and redistribute that land to small farmers. The application of the autonomy statute would also mean a redirection of gas wealth from the central government to the Santa Cruz government. Such a move would run counter to the new draft of the constitution passed in December of 2007, which states that the Bolivian people are the owners of the nation’s natural resources, and that those resources should be managed under largely state control. This draft constitution is set to be voted on in a referendum sometime this year.

Morales announced a partial nationalization of gas reserves in Bolivia on May 1 of 2006. The subsequent renegotiated contracts have led to $2 billion a year in government revenues, an increase from $180 million in 2005, according to IPS journalist and political analyst Franz Chávez. This revenue for the Morales administration could be put at risk, particularly if autonomy referendums in the departments of Beni, Pando and Tarija pass in the coming weeks. Tarija is a department producing approximately 80% of Bolivian gas. Autonomy for these four departments is to include the ability to sign new gas exportation contracts with foreign entities. However, Brazil and Argentina, two of the biggest importers of Bolivian gas, continue to support the Morales government and do not officially recognize the autonomy referendums. This would likely cut off pro-autonomy departments from negotiating new gas exportation deals.

In addition to economic powerhouses such as Argentina and Brazil, the leaders of Venezuela and Ecuador have also come out against the autonomy vote in Santa Cruz. Rafael Correa, the president of Ecuador, commented on the autonomy movement in his weekly radio program: “This is not just Bolivia’s problem, and we aren’t going to allow it. Nobody is going to recognize this illegal referendum. It’s a strategy to destabilize progressive governments in the region.”

The Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA), a coalition of progressive governments in Latin America, made a declaration stating that the countries in ALBA “reject the destabilization plans that aim to attack the peace and unity of Bolivia.” It stated that ALBA nations would not recognize “any juridical figure that aims to break away from the Bolivian national state and violates the territorial integrity of Bolivia.” This support is important for Morales, as it shows he is not alone in the region and has backing from major nations in negotiating with the Santa Cruz autonomy movement.

In the current draft of the Bolivian constitution, passed in the constituent assembly in December 2007, stipulations do exist for various forms of autonomy and decentralization to develop for departments as well as indigenous groups. Bolivian Foreign Minister David Choquehuanca said, “We’re not against autonomies, but rather support constitutional, legal autonomies that strengthen the country’s unity. In Bolivia there’s an attempt to use a legitimate and democratic instrument as voting for an anti-democratic, anti-constitutional objective.”

President Morales and other leaders and analysts in the region have denounced US interference in Bolivian affairs, stating that Washington is supporting the autonomy movement in Santa Cruz through USAID funding and the National Endowment for Democracy. Thomas Shannon, the US State Department’s top Latin American diplomat said in an interview with the Madrid newspaper El País: “We are committed to the territorial unity of all the countries of the region… At the same time we are in favor of the expression in a democratic manner of the interests of the different groups and sectors.”

Meanwhile, the Morales government is moving ahead with planned changes. On May 1 of this year the government took over the Italian-owned Entel company, the largest telephone company in Bolivia. The government had accused the company of failing to expand their phone network sufficiently. At the same time, Morales announced a $6.3 million deal with Repsol, a Spanish oil company. During a May 1 speech, Morales said “we are consolidating the energy nationalization. The Bolivian state has 50% plus one share of the capitalist, or so-called capitalist, companies.”

In spite of the opposition in Santa Cruz, Morales’ support throughout the country remains strong. A poll conducted in Bolivia on May 5 by Ipsos Apoyo, Opinión y Mercado indicated that Morales has a 54% approval rating, down just 2% from March.

Though the goals of the autonomy movement may not be realized for some time, the May 4 vote increases tensions in an already polarized nation. Bolivian Vice President Alvaro Garcia Linera suggests this conflict is a part of the historic changes that Bolivia has been going through since the election of Morales.

“What’s interesting is how important the struggle for identity has become—the importance of asking ‘Who are we?’ to place ourselves in the world,” Linera explained to the Associated Press. “The crisis unites us,” he said. “Today the elite have to think, ‘What do I have in common with my maid?'”

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Benjamin Dangl is the author of “The Price of Fire: Resource Wars and Social Movements in Bolivia,” (AK Press). He is an editor at UpsideDownWorld.org, a website on activism and politics in Latin America.

This story first appeared May 8 on Upside Down World.

RESOURCES

Bolivia: Santa Cruz Autonomy Statute Violates Constitution
by Franz Chávez, InterPress Service, May 2, 2008
http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=42220

Undermining Bolivia
by Benjamin Dangl, The Progressive, February 2008
http://www.progressive.org/mag_dangl0208

See also:

SANTA CRUZ DIVIDED
Report from the Streets on Referendum Day in Bolivia
by Alexander van Schaick and David Bluestone
Upside Down World, May 8, 2008
http://upsidedownworld.org/main/content/view/1270/1/

FEAR AND LOATHING IN BOLIVIA
by Ben Dangl, Upside Down World
World War 4 Report, January 2008
/node/4904

From our daily report:

Bolivia: right-wing mob humiliates indigenous leaders in Sucre
WW4 Report, June 1, 2008
/node/5577

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Reprinted by World War 4 Report, June 1, 2008
Reprinting permissible with attribution

Continue ReadingPOLARIZING BOLIVIA