BOLIVIA: LAND REFORM DECREED

from Weekly News Update on the Americas

On June 3, Bolivian president Evo Morales Ayma signed decrees instituting a large-scale national agrarian reform program. In a ceremony in the eastern Bolivian city of Santa Cruz, Morales handed out the first titles under the new program, distributing 30,000 square kilometers of state-owned land to indigenous campesino communities in what he called the start of a “true agrarian revolution.” Thousands of representatives of indigenous, campesino and social organizations attended the ceremony in the city’s Chiriguano Plaza.

Morales called Bolivia’s 1953 agrarian reform “insufficient” and said his new program is broader and deeper. On June 6, Alfredo Rada, deputy minister of coordination with the country’s social movements, announced that the program would redistribute 2.2 million hectares of land over the next four months. About 20 million hectares–a fifth of Bolivia’s total land area–is expected to be redistributed over the next five years.

In addition to handing out land parcels, the government will provide subsidies, credits and equipment to small-scale agricultural producers under the reform plan. In his June 3 speech, Morales also pledged his government’s support for “ecological products” and called for turning Bolivia into an “organic country” which produces crops without chemical fertilizers or pesticides.

While the reform program’s initial distributions involve state-owned land, Morales said his government will also confiscate private lands that are deemed non-productive. He denied accusations by large-scale landowners that their lands are being stolen. In talks with those business sectors, Morales said, he asked them to prove such claims and they declined. “They, their grandparents, have stolen our land for 500 years,” said Morales. “They have to give the lands back to their original owners.” (BBC News, June 4; Resumen Latinoamericano, June 7; La Jornada, Mexico, June 7; El Nuevo Herald, Miami, June 10 from AP)

The federation representing large-scale landowners in the eastern Bolivian departments of Santa Cruz, Beni and Pando violently opposes the land reform. When its leaders walked out of talks with the government during the week of May 29, they warned that their members would form paramilitary “self-defense” groups to protect their estates from confiscation. (BBC News, June 4; LJ, June 7)

Santa Cruz governor Ruben Costas also tried to fight the agrarian reform by announcing his own reform plan on May 23, allegedly with the goal of distributing land to campesinos and indigenous people in Santa Cruz, the country’s largest and most economically powerful department. The national government called Costas’ plan illegal and unconstitutional. (LJ, June 7) On June 9, the Santa Cruz business sectors named Costas as their representative for possible land reform talks with the Morales government. (LJ, June 10)

According to a public statement from the Confederation of Indigenous Peoples of Bolivia (CIDOB), the Morales government’s new land reform decrees were developed in consensus among Bolivia’s indigenous and campesino organizations and were approved in the National Agrarian Commission. Federations representing large-scale farmers and ranchers were invited to participate in the Commission but declined, said CIDOB.

The Commission was established under Law 1715, the National Agrarian Reform Institute (INRA) Law, pushed through in October 1996 by the government of then-president Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada despite fierce protests by campesino and indigenous sectors. The latest decrees, which must still be approved by Congress, modify Law 1715 and, according to CIDOB, seek to correct “injustices and illegalities” in decrees promulgated in May 2005. One of these, Decree 28140, created a new form of property–“forest property”–favoring powerful economic sectors in eastern Bolivia. (CIDOB Statement, June 9) Decree 28140 was one of 46 decrees issued by President Carlos Mesa Gisbert on May 17, 2005, a day after mass protests began against his administration. He was forced from office three weeks later, on June 6. (National Department of Social Communication)

SANTA CRUZ: LANDOWNER INSTIGATES CLASH

Over the weekend of June 3, Bolivian businessperson Luis del Rio hired a group of Ayoreo indigenous people, armed with bows, arrows and sticks, to attack other indigenous people allegedly squatting on property he claims to own in Ascencion de Guarayos, in the eastern department of Santa Cruz. The Ayoreo–who were apparently drunk during the attack–burned the squatters’ makeshift homes, the alternative news agency Bolpress reported. Two indigenous people were wounded. (La Jornada, June 7; El Nuevo Herald, June 10 from AP; Confederacion de Pueblos Indigenas de Bolivia-CIDOB statement, June 9)

Vice President Alvaro Garcia Linera said on June 9 that neither Del Rio nor the squatters have any property titles for the land in Guayaros, and that both groups will be evicted. Speaking in Santa Cruz, Rural Development Minister Hugo Salvatierra accused the Guarayos deputy mayor and the mayor of El Puente of “inciting violence among indigenous people.” Salvatierra said the two municipal officials also sought to kidnap a national government commission investigating land invasions in the area, in order to “aggravate the problem.” (LJ, June 10)

The Confederation of Indigenous Peoples of Bolivia (CIDOB) accused large landholders of creating a “false conflict” in Guarayos, “making it seem as if the Ayoreo people are in confrontation with the campesinos, which is not true.” According to CIDOB, “Once the Ayoreo brothers have been tricked by land speculators taking advantage of their economic need, they are hired and paid to defend the lands of those who claim to be the owners–without proving it–of land occupied by Ayoreos and campesinos.” (CIDOB Statement, June 9)

A similar land conflict involving Ayoreo indigenous people who were hired as thugs took place May 8-12, 2005, on the Los Yuquises estate in Santiesteban province, in Santa Cruz. See WW4 REPORT #110.

ORURO: ONE DEAD IN URBAN EVICTION

On June 9, a land conflict erupted in Oruro department in southwestern Bolivia when police agents and soldiers moved to evict hundreds of members of the Homeless Movement (MST) from urban properties on the outskirts of the city of Oruro, the departmental capital. The MST had been occupying the properties, which belonged to private owners and the departmental government, for a month and a half. Police agents and soldiers used tear gas and rubber bullets to dislodge the squatters, who responded with rocks, sticks and dynamite, according to a report from the Erbol radio network. At least 10 squatters were treated in a local hospital for injuries; one police agent was killed by a bullet. More than 30 people were arrested by the Technical Judicial Police (PTJ). (La Jornada, Mexico, June 10; El Nuevo Herald, Miami, June 10)

Oruro governor Alfredo Aguilar said he ordered the eviction based on a court order. Alfredo Rada, deputy minister of coordination with social movements, expressed the national government’s support for the action taken by Oruro authorities. (ENH, June 10) Rada said the government talked with the MST to try to find a solution, “but we found an intransigence among the representatives and we decided on the eviction. We knew the risks, but we had no alternative but to restore legality.” (LJ, June 10)

Presidency Minister Juan Ramon Quintana said the police agent who died was a “member of the Battalion of Private Physical Security.” Rada said the agent was dressed in civilian clothing during the operation. “The circumstances of the death are under investigation,” said Rada. (ENH, June 10 from AP)

Quintana denied that the police had used firearms, “not even rubber bullets.” The use of lethal weapons “does not fit within the logic or the policy of our government; the maximum use of chemical agents was ordered for this task,” said Quintana.

The MST responded to the eviction with a protest march on the evening of June 8, and 70 of its members began a hunger strike at the offices of the Departmental Workers’ Federation (COD). (LJ, June 10)

Quintana blamed the Oruro violence on the right-wing Democratic and Social Power (Podemos) party led by ex-president Jorge Quiroga, which he accused of working with elements of the “radical left” in an effort to erode support for the ruling Movement to Socialism (MAS) as the July 2 elections for a Constituent Assembly draw near. (AP, June 11)

The Constituent Assembly, which will have the task of rewriting Bolivia’s Constitution, is scheduled to begin sessions on Aug. 6. (Resumen Latinoamericano, June 7) Congress approved the law convening the Constituent Assembly on March 4, Morales promulgated it on March 6 and candidates for the Assembly’s 255 seats had to be registered by April 3. The MAS is set to benefit from the short timeline, since only political parties, duly recognized citizen groups or undefined “indigenous peoples” can offer candidates. Any social organization lacking such status would have had to obtain–in less than a month–signatures representing 2% of registered voters on a departmental or national level. (“Bolivia: Proceso Abierto,” article by Raquel Gutierrez & Luis A. Gomez, April 30 via Resumen Latinoamericano, June 9, AP, June 11)

From Weekly News Update on the Americas, June 11

——

Weekly News Update on the Americas
http://home.earthlink.net/~nicadlw/wnuhome.html

See also WW4 REPORT #122
/node/2031

“Bolivia: Evo launches ‘land revolution,'” June 6
/node/2057

——————-

Reprinted by WORLD WAR 4 REPORT, July 1, 2006
Reprinting permissible with attribution

Continue ReadingBOLIVIA: LAND REFORM DECREED 

CENTRAL AMERICA: TICOS PROTEST CAFTA

from Weekly News Update on the Americas

Thousands of workers from Costa Rica’s Social Security Institute, Electricity Institute, National Insurance Institute and other companies marched in San Jose on June 7 to oppose the US-sponsored Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA) and to protest a recent Constitutional Court decision annulling a series of benefits public workers had won through collective bargaining. According to the march organizers, 15,000 people participated.

The unionists said the court decision was intended to “smooth the way for CAFTA.” “The first victims of this CAFTA are the labor rights we’ve won,” National Association of Public and Private Employees (ANEP) general secretary Albino Vargas told the ACAN-EFE wire service. “With CAFTA, Costa Rica will have to agree to downgrade its labor legislation with the rest of the Central American countries, which means taking away rights from those who won them through struggle.” Costa Rica signed on to DR-CAFTA, but it is the only signatory nation whose legislature hasn’t ratified the agreement. President Oscar Arias, who was inaugurated on May 8, is a strong supporter of the accord. Arias was on a visit to Europe on June 7, and Vargas charged that the new president would be holding a “chat” with the International Labor Organization (ILO) in Europe while his country is “violating labor rights.” (La Nacion, Costa Rica, June 7)

The march came two weeks after a May 24 armed robbery at the office of the country’s largest labor organization, the Rerum Novarum Workers Confederation (CTRN). [Rerum Novarum is an 1891 papal encyclical on worker’s rights.] Unidentified assailants burst into the office in the morning and held pistols to the heads of two union staffers. The intruders robbed all the staffers present of their personal possessions, and then searched the office, taking a computer which had the text of a complaint the union was filing with the ILO. The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) wrote to Arias demanding an “exhaustive” investigation of the incident to find the authors of these “intimidating and threatening” acts. (Yahoo de Argentina, June 5 from Europa Press; Upside Down World, June 7)

GUATEMALA: BREAK-IN AT WOMEN’S GROUP

On May 28 or 29 robbers broke into the central office of the Women’s Sector (Sector de Mujeres) organization in Guatemala City, stealing cell phones and the fax machine, rifling through files, and leaving traces of blood close to the windows and on the floor. In its 12 years of operation, Women’s Sector has organized and spoken out against violations of women’s rights and reported on the government’s failure to implement parts of the 1996 peace accords. It is one of the organizations sponsoring a legal action challenging the constitutionality of Guatemala’s participation in the Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA). (La Semana en Guatemala May 29-June 4; Guatemala Human Rights Commission/USA urgent action, June 5)

The Women’s Sector office was robbed again two weeks later, apparently on June 6. This time the intruders destroyed furniture and left a piece of glass covered with blood, apparently to intimidate the staffers. Sandra Moran, a member of the group, said the new break-in might be connected to a comparison Women’s Sector made between the current wave of murders of women in Guatemala and the methods used by paramilitaries during the country’s 36-year civil war. Another organization, the National Union of Guatemalan Women (UNAMG), reported that its office in Chimaltenango was also robbed in the early morning of June 6. The intruders stole computer equipment with important information and searched through desks. (Guatemala Hoy, June 7; La Jornada, Mexico, June 8)

On June 5–before the second break-in at the Women’s Sector–the Guatemala Human Rights Commission (GHRC)/USA asked for letters to Guatemalan president Oscar Berger Perdomo (e-mail: presidente@scspr.gob.gt, fax +502 2251 2218) and Attorney General Juan Luis Florido (fax +502 251 2218), with copies to GHRC-USA (e-mail: ghrc-usa@ghrc-usa.org), urging a thorough investigation and noting that the government is required under the peace accords to “take special measures to protect those persons or entities working in the field of human rights.” (GHRC-USA urgent action, June 5)

From Weekly News Update on the Americas, June 11

GUATEMALAN SENIORS ON HUNGER STRIKE

On June 5 some 35 Guatemalans between the ages of 60 and 95 began a liquids-only hunger strike in front of the Constitutional Court (CC) in Guatemala City to protest an effort to overturn the Law of the Older Adult, which would guarantee a minimum pension for seniors. As of June 13, 32 of the strikers remained in the encampment living on water and some liquid nutrients, although at least 25 had been taken at various times to a public assistance center. “We’d rather die of hunger here in front of the CC than on our knees waiting for the government to take pity on us,” Hector Montenegro, 70, president of the National Association of Older Persons Without Social Coverage (ANPTESCS), told the Spanish wire service EFE. This was reportedly the first mass hunger strike ever carried out by Guatemalan seniors.

Congress passed the law last year, but President Oscar Berger vetoed it November. A technical error in the veto allowed the law to be restored, but the CC suspended it in early June, before it had gone into effect, so that the court could consider a challenge to the law’s constitutionality by private attorney Rafael Zetina, who claimed the government lacked resources to pay the pensions and that the law would encourage “vagrancy.”

The law mandates a monthly pension of 578 quetzales (about $76). According to Zetina and the government, about 60,000 older Guatemalans qualify and the pension will cost the government an extra $35 million. ANPTESCS calculates that the total additional cost is about $31.5 million, which the group says can be covered by 1.85% of the Value-Added Tax (IVA, a sales tax). (El Nuevo Herald, June 5 from AP; Prensa Latina, June 9; Univision TV, June 13 from EFE)

In the early morning of June 19, police agents forcibly removed a group of seven hunger strikers who had encamped in front of the Presidential Office in solidarity with the protesters at the CC. “There were probably more than 50 [agents], and they dragged away the little old ladies,” ANPTESCS president Montenegro said. “They took them to the general hospital.” Rosa Maria de Frade insisted that the police took the protesters “because they showed symptoms of dehydration, but it was a mutually agreed-on action.” The Guatemala Human Rights Commission-USA (GHRC-USA) reported that some of those refusing to go were beaten, and that Ramiro Ortiz, 84, said police clubbed him on the back. (ENH, June 19; GHRC-USA urgent action, June 12)

As of June 20, the encampment at the Presidential Office had grown to include some 60 seniors. “We are putting up with hunger, heat and rain to see if President Oscar Berger will pay attention,” said 68-year-old Regina Morales. “We won’t leave here until we talk with the president,” others said.

The Presidential office was the target of two other protests at the same time. Students from teacher training schools marched to the office beating on drums to protest the addition of a year to their course of studies and what they said was a disguised plan to close down government-run teacher education schools and privatize the process. Another group of protesters were demanding legal titles to lands they had settled on; one of the leaders, Roly Escobar, said the government had promised them the titles two and a half years earlier. Some 380 settlements are registered in the capital’s metropolitan area for the legalization process, according to the National Coordination of Community Residents and Marginalized Areas; a total of 567 settlements are registered nationally. “The lack of seriousness of the executive has led to more than 800,000 families not having a legalized place to live,” Escobar said.

The three simultaneous protests caused a traffic jam, tying up hundreds of vehicles in the Historic Center for more than an hour. (Prensa Libre, Guatemala, June 21)

GHRC-USA is asking for letters to President Oscar Berger (fax: +502 2251 2218) and Interior Minister Carlos Vielman (fax: +502 2362 0237, e-mail: ministro@mingob.gob.gt), with copies to GHRC-USA (ghrc-usa@ghrc-usa.org), to demand an investigation of the June 19 police operation and to urge the authorities to guarantee the rights and safety of all the elderly protesters and the organizations supporting them. (GHRC-USA urgent action June 23)

From Weekly News Update on the Americas, June 25

NICARAGUA: STUDENTS PROTEST FARE HIKES

A decision by Managua bus cooperatives at the beginning of May to raise fares from about $0.15 to about $0.18 set off a month of violent clashes between Nicaraguan riot police and students demanding a lower fare. The cooperatives insisted that the rising cost of fuel forced them to increase the fares and that they could hold the fares down if the government provided a subsidy of about $1 million a month. The national government of right-wing president Enrique Bolanos and the Managua government, headed by Dionisio Marenco of the leftist Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN), blamed each other for the failure to provide the subsidy.

A similar dispute over fares in March and April in 2005 followed almost exactly the same pattern. This year’s confrontations are taking place during the run-up to Nov. 5 presidential and legislative elections, which will pit pro-Bolanos candidates against FSLN candidates.

The violence reached a high point in the week of May 22, when university and high school students battled riot police for five consecutive days. At least 10 people were seriously injured as students used rocks and home-made mortars against police using rubber bullets and tear gas. On May 24 bus drivers began attacking protesters outside the National Autonomous University of Nicaragua (UNAN) Managua campus, shooting a student in the thigh and using metal tubes and bottles to beat a young free-trade zone factory worker they mistook for a student. The students burned two buses during the week and seriously damaged three more with rocks. (Nicaragua News Service, May 23-9; Prensa Latina, May 27; La Prensa, Managua, May 23, 25; El Nuevo Diario, Managua, May 23, 24, 25)

After a brief truce, new confrontations broke out between police and students on May 31, during which students captured an agent from the anti-riot police and held him at the National Engineering University (UNI) until a mediator could arrange a release. A meeting between leaders of the students, transportation cooperatives and unions on May 31 failed to secure an agreement. On June 2 two people wearing hoods burned a vehicle belonging to the government’s Highway Maintenance Fund (FOMAV) near the UNAN campus, but it was not clear whether they were students.

Also on June 2, Gustavo Porras, general secretary of the National Workers Front (FNT), announced that students, workers and social organizations had agreed to hold a march together on June 6 to pressure the government to provide a permanent solution by allocating a transportation subsidy. Porras said the march would be followed up with sit-ins at various locations on June 7. (PL, May 31, June 2)

EL SALVADOR: PROTESTERS BLOCK HIGHWAYS

Thousands of Salvadorans protested the two-year anniversary of the election of rightwing president Antonio Saca by marching and blocking highways throughout the country. The largest protest was in San Salvador, where at least 25 activists were arrested. Actions also took place in Ahuachapan, Cojutepeque, Sonsonate, La Union, Sensuntepeque, Morazan, Guatajiagua, Chalatenango, San Vicente and Usulutan. (Adital, June 2)

From Weekly News Update on the Americas, June 4

——

Weekly News Update on the Americas
http://home.earthlink.net/~nicadlw/wnuhome.html

See also WW4 REPORT #122
/node/2034

——————-

Reprinted by WORLD WAR 4 REPORT, July 1, 2006
Reprinting permissible with attribution

Continue ReadingCENTRAL AMERICA: TICOS PROTEST CAFTA 

“BIONOIA” Part 4

Dengue in Cuba, West Nile in New York:
When Mosquitoes Come Home to Roost

by Mark Sanborne

In previous installments in this series, we discussed the wartime use of infected fleas and lice to spread plague (definitely by Japan in China and maybe by the US in Korea), and the possibility that the pandemic of tick-borne Lyme disease was a result of secret biowar research at Plum Island, NY. But there’s another bug that has vectored its way into the history of biological warfare, and it’s one that almost everyone on the planet is intimately familiar with: the hated mosquito.

The US biowar establishment, it turns out, has long been interested in using the blood-sucking insects as vectors to transmit diseases to designated human populations. A particular favorite is the dime-sized Aedes aegypti mosquito, which has the talent of infecting people with potentially deadly yellow and dengue fevers. In fact, there is unnerving evidence that the US sought to conduct mosquito vector tests on unwitting foreign subjects, and that it may have used the knowledge it gained in such “experiments” to launch a stealthy mass attack on a civilian population, with far-reaching though little-recognized consequences.

A disturbing but fascinating article, “US Attempted to Test Biowarfare in Haryana,” appeared in an Indian newspaper, the Deccan Herald, on Nov. 5, 2002. It is worth quoting in its entirety:

Admission by the United States that it released Aedes aegypti mosquitoes in a Pacific island in 1965 as part of its biological warfare test programme has vindicated the Indian government’s decision to close down a similar US-sponsored mosquito project in India in the early 1970s, scientists say.

Indian scientists who had worked on the project say the latest revelation has convinced them that they were unwittingly helping the US biowarfare research under the cover of a public health programme to control malaria. NP Gupta, former director of the National Institute of Virology, told PTI that the then prime minister Indira Gandhi “acted correctly” and at the right time by ordering closure of the project before the planned massive release of Aedes aegypti mosquitoes in 1975 at Sonepat, Haryana. The Sonepat project aimed at finding out the range and survival of these mosquitoes and how they dispersed and penetrated homes and other places once release from the centre of town.

Three weeks ago, the US Defense Department de-classified documents listing as many as 46 secret biological and chemical weapons tests conducted at the height of the Cold War. In one such trial, codenamed Magic Sword, Aedes aegypti mosquitoes that transmit yellow and dengue fevers were released off the coast of Baker Island [in the Pacific] to obtain information on mosquito biting habits, mosquito trap technology and operational and logistical problems associated with the delivery of mosquitoes to remote sites.

Mr. PK Rajagopalan, a senior medical entomologist who was on the staff, said the Sonepat project had identical aims (as the one conducted in Baker Island) except that that it was planned on a very large scale using hundreds of thousands of mosquitoes reared at a special facility in New Delhi built with funds from the US Public Health Service routed through the World Health Organization (WHO).

Prior to its closure, the US project in India drew media criticism and a parliamentary committee probe was conducted due its preoccupation with the Aedes aegypti species that causes yellow fever, a disease which does not exist in India.

Apparently the U.S interest in development of yellow fever as a biological warfare weapon was sustained even after President Nixon supposedly ended the biological warfare program in 1970, says Gupta. Only this time the trial was conducted outside the United States in a developing country under the umbrella of the WHO, he says. Rajagopalan is also surprised at the different standards employed by the US. Baker Island was unpopulated and remote from the mainland, the trial used informed volunteers and the mosquitoes were eradicated after the trial was over. No such plans existed for the proposed release in Sonepat, whose entire population of half a million was to become unwilling volunteers while the Indian Council of Medical Research (ICMR) was in the dark about the real intention behind the release experiment, said Rajagopalan, who retired from an ICMR institute.

Colathur Golpalan, who was ICMR director general at that time, said the US project was permitted by his predecessor and he was not responsible. “It was I who saw to the closure of the project,” he said in a telephone interview.

Ms. Indira Gandhi stopped the trial and ordered the project closed on the advice of an expert committee despite mild protests from WHO and denial by the US State Department that the project had anything to do with biological warfare. But according to Gupta, the latest revelation that the Baker Island release was indeed a biological warfare experiment vindicates the closure of the US project in India.

Aside from the breathtaking audacity of the US subterfuge, the Sonepat project also provides further evidence for critics who claim that the WHO and other UN and international (as well as domestic) agencies have long been (and still are) stocked with “experts” who cooperate closely with the US military-intelligence complex. Such cozy covert relationships raise the possibility that Washington may have succeeded in hoodwinking other developing countries into actually allowing mosquito vector tests on their territory under the guise of malaria control. Declassified Cold War documents also indicate that US Army biowarriors at Fort Detrick, MD, conducted A. aegypti release experiments at military bases in Florida and Georgia in the late 1950s, and that war planners had determined that mosquito-transmitted yellow fever, a mostly tropical disease, could be a suitable bioweapon to employ in southern parts of the Soviet Union.

But if, as suggested, such vector tests actually did lead to a stealthy mass attack on a civilian population, where might that have occurred? Round up the usual suspect: Yes, Cuba.

CUBA AND DENGUE: MADE IN THE USA?

As noted in Part 2 of this series, from the 1960s onward Cuba appears to have been on the receiving end of an unremitting barrage of biological attacks hatched in the U.S. and carried out by anti-Castro terrorists—and even directly by State Department spray planes flying over Cuban territory. The list of targets is impressive in its Nazi-like thoroughness: sugar, tobacco, pigs, cattle, coffee, citrus, dairy cows, chickens, turkeys, rabbits, beans and other vegetables, bananas, and honey bees, to name more than a few.

Of course, some of the outbreaks may have occurred naturally, and it’s often difficult to conclusively prove one way or the other—that’s one of the great advantages of biowarfare. But many of the incidents involved infections, parasites, and blights never before seen in Cuba, and sometimes were firsts for the Western Hemisphere. And they weren’t all aimed at plants and animals—we also noted the outbreak of hemorrhagic dengue fever in 1981 that infected over 340,000 Cubans and killed 158, most of them children. The vector for the disease: that uncomplaining workhorse, A. aegypti.

“We share the people’s conviction and strongly suspect that the plagues that have been punishing our country, especially the hemorrhagic dengue, could have been introduced into Cuba, into our country, by the CIA,” Fidel Castro declared in a July 26, 1981, speech celebrating the Cuban revolution, during which he dealt at length with the public record of US biowar efforts and attacks. “We urge the United States government to define its policy in this field, to say whether the CIA will or will not be authorized again—or has this already been authorized?—to organize attacks against leaders of the revolution and to use plagues against our plants, our animals, and our people.”

The State Department responded that charges of Washington’s involvement in the dengue outbreak were “totally without foundation… The Cuban revolution is a failure, and it is obviously easier to blame external forces than to admit those failures.” But whatever one may think of the Cuban revolution, the fact remains that the health care system it created prevented the hemorrhagic dengue pandemic from turning into a complete catastrophe, as it likely would have in almost any other Latin American country.

“In 1981, we faced the gravest health situation ever to have confronted our country, with tens of thousands of persons hospitalized, and over 10,000 in shock and bleeding,” a Cuban health official told a Havana trial hearing evidence about the US role in the outbreak, held in July 2003 as part of Cuba’s compensation claim against the United States.

Due to the disease’s high mortality rate, medical authorities expected a minimum of 3,000 fatalities in the first few weeks, yet Cuba’s model response—combined with what one pediatrician called “collective thinking”—kept the death toll remarkably low. (In fact, Cuba’s effective approach to the dengue outbreak was subsequently adopted by the Pan American Health Organization.)

So, aside from means, motive, and opportunity, what else indicates the US may have been behind the outbreak? Let’s start with the fact that it was the first major epidemic of hemorrhagic dengue in the Americas in nearly a century. Then there are the odd particulars: the epidemic began with the discovery of simultaneous clusters of infections in three widely separated parts of Cuba (Cienfuegos, Camaguey, and Havana) that then spread like wildfire, and none of the initial victims had recently been away from home or been in contact with international travelers who might have carried the disease and transmitted it to the local mosquito population.

Oh, and how about a confession? In 1984, Eduardo Arocena, head of the Omega-7 terrorist group, on trial in the US for the murder of a Cuban UN diplomat, affirmed that his group—and he personally—had introduced “germs” into Cuba, including dengue, as part of the US biowar against Castro. (He was convicted of the murder, and revealed as an FBI informant, leading to the collapse of his group.) Previous reports had indicated Cuban terrorists also smuggled the African swine flu virus into the country in the late 1970s, forcing the slaughter of all of the island’s pigs.

Cuban counter-revolutionaries are known for their braggadocio, even in court, and in the case of the 1981 dengue pandemic it’s unclear how they could have smuggled the thousands of pre-infected A. aegypti mosquitoes into Cuba that would have been necessary to spark the outbreak. (How many mosquitoes can be crammed into a large suitcase or packing crate—or even a diplomatic pouch?)

Dengue is an arbovirus (i.e. transmissable only by insects) and cannot be transmitted between humans—each victim requires their own mosquito bite. Though one insect can infect multiple victims, it’s likely that, based on the number of Cuban afflicted, several hundred thousand mosquitoes would have had to be released to achieve the desired effect, putting the scale of the operation suspiciously in line with that of the aborted Sonepat test project. For that reason, it seems more likely that the mosquitoes were somehow dispersed from the air, dropped like covert paratroopers behind enemy lines—and indeed, the locations of the three initial outbreaks were all close by international air corridors.

THE LAW OF UNINTENDED (?) CONSEQUENCES

According to the Centers for Disease Control, dengue (pronounced “DEN-ghee”) “is the most important mosquito-borne viral disease affecting humans; its global distribution is comparable to that of malaria, and an estimated 2.5 billion people live in areas at risk for epidemic transmission.” Tens of millions of people are infected with dengue fever (DF) annually. However, while debilitating and terribly painful (it’s not known as “break-bone fever” for nothing), DF infection is relatively short-lived and fatalities are rare. But each year sees several hundred thousand cases of the more virulent dengue hemorrhagic fever (DHF), leading to tens of thousands of deaths among those who develop the related dengue shock syndrome (DSS)—a mortality rate of about five percent in most of the world, though it can be much higher in more undeveloped areas.

And here’s where it gets even more interesting, and frightening. There are four types of DF (DEN-1, 2, 3, and 4), and getting one type does not give the victim immunity from contracting the other types. In fact, it is known that contracting one version after having earlier been infected with another can make the victim particularly prone to developing the much more dangerous DHF/DSS.

Following World War II, mass spraying of insecticides targeted against A. aegypti succeeded in eliminating most major DF epidemics in the Western Hemisphere, though the spray campaign waned in the 1970s due to environmental concerns. By 1970, only DEN-2 was present in the Americas. Suddenly, in 1977—two years after the Sonepat project was cancelled—DEN-1 appeared in Jamaica (where another U.S. bete noire, the socialist Michael Manley, was in power) and then Cuba, the first major dengue outbreak in the country since 1944. Though it was a milder version that didn’t lead to DHF and caused no deaths, it was widespread and helped lay the epidemiological groundwork for a subsequent hemorrhagic outbreak. (A 1978 serologic survey indicated that 45% of the Cuban population had been infected with DEN-1, whereas before 1977 only 2.6% had antibodies for the virus. That’s quick work.)

Then in 1981, a “new” strain of DEN-2 exploded onto the scene in Cuba, and this one, insidiously piggy-backing on the 1977 pandemic, did lead to a mass hemorrhagic outbreak of DHF and DSS, the first in the hemisphere since the turn of the century. The CDC says the deadly new strain was from Southeast Asia, where the disease is endemic and is the leading cause of hospitalization and death among children. But Cuban and other researchers are more specific: they say it is identical to one known only from a 1944 outbreak in New Guinea. In which case, the odds of such an obscure strain suddenly appearing in multiple places in Cuba by “natural” causes seem slim indeed.

(There were reports that the all of the personnel at the US Navy base at Guantanamo were vaccinated against dengue prior to the 1981 outbreak and thus were not infected. While the medical literature notes that currently there is still no publicly available vaccine against dengue, a Google search also indicates that a modern vaccine was first produced in the late 1970s and early 1980s by the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research and GlaxoSmithKline Biologicals—and the Pentagon has never been shy about giving its troops experimental drugs, as it did with anthrax vaccine in the first Gulf War.)

In the years following 1981, Cuba launched a rigorous program of A. aegypti eradication, vector control, and medical surveillance to keep dengue in check, though there were further smaller outbreaks in Santiago de Cuba in 1997 and Havana in 2001-2 that were contained with limited casualties. (While there is no evidence that the origins of these particular epidemics were suspicious, some have speculated that they may been designed to hurt Cuba’s growing foreign tourism industry.)

Meanwhile, in the years following the 1981 outbreak, the virulent strain of “imported” DEN-2 that caused it proceeded to metastasize rapidly throughout the Caribbean to Mexico and Central and South America. By 2003, 24 countries in the Americas had reported confirmed cases of hemorrhagic dengue where it was previously unknown, and potentially deadly DHF is now endemic in many of these countries. (The U.S. itself gets an estimated 100 imported cases of dengue a year.) If, as the evidence strongly suggests, both the 1977 and 1981 Cuban pandemics were spawned in Washington—or more specifically, Fort Detrick, MD—then the resultant devastating effects on the hemisphere as a whole are staggering to contemplate. It would represent state bioterrorism on an almost unimaginable scale.

Is this an example of the law of unintended consequences? One can only hope they were unintended, though it’s hard to see how they could not have been foreseen. Evidently, for those in a position to know, the “gain” was deemed to be worth the risk.

THE ARRIVAL OF WEST NILE

Which leads us to our last stop on Bionia’s skeeter hit parade. Remember the West Nile virus, way back in those halcyon pre-9-11 days of 1999? It made a particularly big impression on those of us who live in the New York City metropolitan region, where the disease made its first appearance in the Western Hemisphere in August of that year. Lucky us.

The first case of human infection occurred in Queens on Aug. 2. By the end of the year, there were a total of 62 cases and seven deaths in the region from the mosquito-borne illness, most of them older people with compromised immune systems. More alarming for many was the initial “cure” imposed by the administration of Mayor Rudolf Giuliani: mass spraying of the insecticide malathion, a likely carcinogen. This writer was among the many who had to dodge inside to escape swooping, spraying helicopters in Brooklyn and Queens, while some residents walking the late-night streets of Manhattan were actually hosed in the face with the poison from passing trucks.

West Nile is a member of the genus flavivirus, along with our new friends dengue and yellow fever, though WN is much less of a global health threat. About 80% of those who contract West Nile show no symptoms and are unaware they are infected, while others display mild, flu-like symptoms. In the few worse cases it can lead to deadly encephalitis and meningitis, and in fact its initial appearance was misdiagnosed as St. Louis encephalitis.

Transmitted by mosquitoes and other vectors, particularly birds, WN has since spread quickly across the country, and by 2003, 45 states and the District of Columbia had reported human cases. By 2005, a total of 19,625 cases and 882 deaths were reported by the CDC, considerably less than the annual toll from the common flu. (However, the number of those infected but undiagnosed or without symptoms probably numbers in the hundreds of thousands.) More alarmingly, while direct human-to-human transmission was initially ruled out, in 2002 it was discovered that the virus could be transmitted through donated blood, organ transplants, breast milk, prenatal exposure, and occupational exposure.

Another spooky attribute of WN is its propensity to kill birds, its most common host. An unusual number of dead birds, particularly crows, were evident around the tri-state area for a while before they were connected to the West Nile outbreak. The virus was first discovered in 1937 in Uganda, and the African variety does not affect bird or animal hosts. Other mild outbreaks occurred in Israel in the 1950s the South Africa in the 1970s, but beginning in the mid-1990s a string of more serious epidemics occurred in North Africa, Israel, Italy, Russia, and Romania that included large die-offs of local bird populations. This seems odd, because it’s generally not in the evolutionary interest of a virus to kill off its main host that gets it from place to place.

Was this creepy entourage of dead crows some sort of designer harbinger for the end of the millenium? (Perhaps an engineered Avian flu will be the Antichrist.) Is it evidence, as some observers have suggested, that the virus—which has long been held in government labs here and around the world—was modified genetically as part of some shadowy biowar project?

THE USUAL SUSPECTS

Our last installment dealt at length with the questionable history of the Plum Island Animal Disease Center, located off the North Fork of eastern Long Island, particularly in regard to its possible propagation of tick-borne Lyme disease. Considerable evidence was cited from a 2004 book, Lab 257: The Disturbing Story of the Government’s Secret Plum Island Germ Laboratory, by Michael Carr, who also weighed in on the West Nile question. He wrote that Plum Island researchers were already studying the WN virus at the time of the outbreak (officials deny this), and cites the death of 18 horses in eastern Suffolk County near Plum Island in August 1999 as evidence that the North Fork was the epicenter of the epidemic.

The official story is to blame international air travel, as if that’s something new. It’s suggested that a WN-infected traveler (yet another Patient Zero) from the Middle East arrived in New York and was bitten by a local mosquito or two, who then went on a major feeding binge and spread the disease to both birds and humans far and wide. Or perhaps a few infected mosquitoes somehow hitched a ride to New York on a jet and wreaked havoc when they escaped into the environment. Or maybe an infected bird was imported or somehow made its way across the ocean. But questions of geography persist: How could such sole-source vectors initially manage to infect both horses at one end of Long Island and humans at the other end, in Queens, but very few people in between? (Though later Suffolk County did develop one of highest rates of West Nile, as it did with Lyme disease in the 1970s.) Just as in the case of the simultaneous appearance of dengue in three widely separated parts of Cuba, here is a hint of the hand of man, not nature.

Or maybe it was just an “accident.” If Plum Island (i.e. the US underground biowar complex) was somehow the source of the West Nile outbreak and/or Lyme disease, were the releases somehow inadvertent, or were they in fact something far more sinister—that is, stealthy mass attacks on domestic civilian populations? Again, considering the apparent US role in spreading a deadly version of dengue fever in the Western Hemisphere, it’s hard to give “them” the benefit of the doubt.

In fact, the idea that the arrival of West Nile was a potential bioterrorist event was knocked around quite a bit by media pundits early on in the outbreak, though the short list of official suspects should not surprise anyone. In a recent web search for “West Nile and biological warfare,” these were the first four stories that came up: “West Nile Virus—Is Castro’s Bioterrorism Threat Being Ignored?”; “Castro Weaponizes West Nile Virus”; “Iraq and Cuba – Fitting Pieces in the West Nile Puzzle?”; and “West Nile Virus: Part of Hussein’s Plan—via Cuba?” This US intelligence disinformation campaign, spread by NewsMax and several right-wing Cuban-American web sites, while predictable, is at least as fanciful as a story on the CDC’s web site positing that Alexander the Great may have died of West Nile virus encephalitis.

Some accounts at the time did take note of the embarrassing fact that the CDC had provided samples of West Nile and a host of other potential biowar agents to Saddam Hussein’s then-friendly regime in the mid-1980s. While the strain delivered to Iraq was different than the one that turned up in New York, NewsMax declared that “experts have confirmed that Saddam has the ability to mutate viruses and other biological agents.” (Sounds like he’s one of the X-Men.)

But it wasn’t only right-wingers who weighed in on the subject. In the October 11, 1999 edition of The New Yorker, Richard Preston wrote a lengthy story headlined “West Nile Mystery: How Did It Get Here? The CIA Would Like to Know.” It cited the concerns of unnamed intelligence analysts, and referred to an excerpt of a book entitled In the Shadow of Saddam published in the April 6, 1999, Daily Mail, a London tabloid. The author, who called himself Mikhael Ramadan, purported to be have been one of Saddam’s body doubles before he escaped from Iraq, and claimed his boss bragged to him in 1997 that Iraq had developed a strain of WN that was “capable of destroying 97% of all life in an urban environment.”

Preston acknowledged that the claims “sounded crazy,” but went on to suggest that there might be at least a germ of truth behind the story, displaying only slightly more skepticism than the American press later did in the trumpeting of Iraq’s nonexistent WMD threat during the run-up to the 2003 invasion. So here’s a final suggestion for all those official experts out there: Next time an incidence of possible bioterrorism pops up on the media’s radar, try to avoid the usual projection of guilt upon the empire’s victims, and instead take a look in the mirror.

RESOURCES:

Granma International on Cuban Dengue outbreak
http://www.granma.cu/cubademanda/ingles/demanda13-i.html

CDC official history of dengue (note: read between the lines)
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dvbid/dengue/

Medical Service Corp. International hisotry of dengue
http://www.mscionline.com/projects/diseases/dengue.htm

“West Nile Mystery,” by Richard Preston, The New Yorker, Oct. 18 & 25, 1999
http://www.newsmakingnews.com/artwestnilenewyorker.htm

CDC on Alexander the Great and West Nile Virus
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/eid/vol9no12/03-0288.htm

From our weblog:

“Desert Storm vets demand Rumsfeld resignation,” Oct. 21, 2002
/static/56.html#iraq15

“Is Baghdad next?” Oct. 20, 2001
/static/4.html#shadows2

See also:

“Bionoia,” Pt. 3, WW4 REPORT #121
/node/1898

——————-
Special to WORLD WAR 4 REPORT, July 1, 2006
Reprinting permissible with attribution

Continue Reading“BIONOIA” Part 4 

CENTRAL AMERICA: ANTI-CAFTA MOBILIZATION

from Weekly News Update on the Americas

MAYDAY ANTI-CAFTA MOBILIZATION

As they did last year, many Central American workers marked May 1 with demonstrations protesting the Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA), a US-sponsored trade bloc composed of Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and the US. Many marchers also expressed solidarity with hundreds of thousands of immigrant workers demonstrating the same day in the US.

More than 20,000 workers, indigenous people, unionists, women and older people marched in Guatemala City, burning US flags and effigies of US president George W. Bush and Guatemalan president Oscar Berger. “The DR-CAFTA is a plague that will kill the people who live in extreme poverty,” campesino leader Daniel Pascual told the ACAN-EFE wire service. “Today is a day of Latin America inside the US,” said Jose Pinzon, a leader of the General Workers Central of Guatemala (CGTG), one of the country’s largest labor federations. The more than 1.2 million Guatemalans living in the US sent $3 billion back to Guatemala in 2005; some 60% of them are reportedly undocumented. US restaurant chains in Guatemala City’s historic center seemed empty as workers honored a boycott of US products in support of immigrants’ demands. (La Nacion, Costa Rica, May 1)

Thousands of Honduran workers, students, campesinos, indigenous peoples and others marked May 1 in 10 different cities to oppose DR-CAFTA, to show support for immigrants in the US and to commemorate the 52nd anniversary of a strike against the US-based Chiquita Brands and Standard Fruit companies which revitalized the Honduran labor movement at the time. “No unionist consumed any product from US companies today. This way we showed the empire, the US, how important we Latinos are to the US economy,” said Carlos H. Reyes, leader of the Popular Bloc, which is made up of more than 40 different grassroots and leftist organizations. According to official statistics, nearly a million Honduran live the US and one half are undocumented. Popular Bloc supporters blocked avenues and roads in a number of the cities where they marched. (La Prensa, Tegucigalpa, May 1)

Hundreds of Salvadoran workers marched in San Salvador in a demonstration sponsored by labor unions, grassroots organizations and the leftist Farabundo Marti Front for National Liberation (FMLN). Workers in El Salvador are “trampled on every day,” Nidia Diaz, an FMLN deputy to the Central American Parliament (PARLACEN), told Radio Maya Vision. This and the lack of job opportunities is what provokes the migration of Salvadoran workers to the US, she said. (La Nacion, May 1)

In Nicaragua, unions and organizations affiliated with the leftist Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) led a march to the Colonia Primero de Mayo in eastern Managua to protest the 16 years of neoliberal economic policies promoted by right-wing governments that followed the FSLN’s electoral defeat in 1990. The FSLN is gearing up for Nov. 5 presidential and legislative elections. Organizers estimated that more than 3,000 people participated in the march. (La Prensa, Managua, May 2; El Nuevo Diario, Managua, May 1)

According to organizers, more than 5,000 Costa Ricans from 300 organizations marched in San Jose in a protest against DR-CAFTA. Costa Rica signed on to DR-CAFTA in 2004 but its legislature has not yet ratified the treaty; the legislatures of all the other signatories have completed the ratification process. “[T]he central goal of the protest is to show our opposition to the free trade agreement in order to defeat it,” Jesus Vazquez, president of the Association of Secondary School Teachers (APSE), told the ACAN-EFE wire service. “No to TLC” and “TLC=Poverty” were typical signs, using the Spanish initials for “free trade agreement.”

The march included an organized presence from the lesbian-gay rights movement, following the decision of the First Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual and Transgender National Conference, held in Heredia province near San Jose on April 28-30, to issue a declaration against DR-CAFTA. At the march Abelardo Araya, president of the Diversity Movement, cited DR-CAFTA’s “negative effects,” especially on access to medicines. The movement was also calling for an end to labor discrimination. “[O]n many occasions homosexuals experience firings, persecution [and] harassment and even have problems advancing professionally,” he said. (La Nacion, May 1)

Hundreds of workers marched in Panama City in two separate marches by the Confederation of Workers of the Republic and the Public Servants Federation. In contrast to other Central American protests, support for immigrants in the US was not a theme in Panama; and Panama is not a signatory to DR-CAFTA. Instead, marchers demanded a referendum on the $5 billion plan for expansion of the Panama Canal and improved workplace safety. The day before, a Costa Rican immigrant construction worker identified as Luis Araya had fallen to his death from the 23rd floor of a building under construction. (El Nuevo Herald, Miami, May 1; El Siglo, Panama, May 1)

From Weekly News Update on the Americas, May 14

GUATEMALA: UPRISING BRINGS ACCORD

On April 20, Guatemalan Mayan indigenous campesino and grassroots organizations grouped in the National Indigenous and Campesino Coordinating Committee (CONIC) began a national uprising to press a series of popular demands, including land rights and an end to discrimination and social injustice. In Escuintla, more than 100 people blocked the road leading to Puerto Quetzal; in Coatepeque, 100 more gathered; in the community of El Zarco, in Retalhuleu, more than 400 people blocked the road; in Mazatenango more than 500 people marched. Teachers protested in Chiquimula and Salcaja, Quetzaltenango, while campesinos protested in San Julian Tactic, Rio Polochi, Santa Catarina and Charca. In western Guatemala, protesters walked to the capital from San Lucas Sacatepequez. In Guatemala City, teachers gathered in Zone 9 and thousands of campesinos marched to Congress. Market vendors also marched.

The government responded to the mobilization with repression in all locations. Police fired tear gas grenades and guns at the demonstrators; one death was reported, several people were wounded and more than 27 people were arrested. (CONIC Statement, April 20 via Adital)

Later on April 20, after seven hours of negotiations, Vice President Eduardo Stein reached an agreement with CONIC to open a dialogue with labor, campesino and grassroots organizations on the movement’s demands. In exchange, CONIC agreed to suspend the protests. The agreement was reached with the mediation of human rights ombudsperson Sergio Morales. (Prensa Libre, Guatemala, April 21; Guatemala Hoy, April 25)

Meanwhile, Carlos Arriaga of the National Coordinating Committee of Campesino Organizations reported that on April 24, campesinos were violently evicted from the La Verde farm in San Andres Villa Seca, Retalhuleu. (GH, April 24)

——

Weekly News Update on the Americas
http://home.earthlink.net/~nicadlw/wnuhome.html

See also WW4 REPORT #121
/node/1905

——————-

Reprinted by WORLD WAR 4 REPORT, June 1, 2006
Reprinting permissible with attribution

Continue ReadingCENTRAL AMERICA: ANTI-CAFTA MOBILIZATION 

ECUADOR: PROTESTERS WIN; OXY GETS THE BOOT

from Weekly News Update on the Americas

Some 5,000 people marched in Quito on May 9 to demand that the government cancel its contract with the US oil company Occidental Petroleum (Oxy) within 15 days, and end all negotiations on the Andean Free Trade Agreement which the US is promoting with Ecuador, Colombia and Peru. Most of the marchers came from Ecuador’s Amazon region and were also demanding approval of a law that would increase oil revenues to the six Amazon provinces by $0.50 per barrel. A group of about 100 protesters broke through police lines at the Carondelet presidential palace and tried to sing the national anthem in front of Independence Monument. But 300 riot police agents attacked the group, shoving journalists and spraying several protesters with some kind of colored liquid tear gas. (El Diario- La Prensa, NY, May 10 from EFE; Altercom, May 9)

On May 10, Eduardo Delgado of the Common People Movement and Luis Macas of the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE) filed a lawsuit against Energy Minister Ivan Rodriguez Ramos for illegitimate omission of public authority for having failed to cancel Oxy’s contract. (Altercom, May 10)

According to Britain’s Financial Times, Petroecuador, the state oil company, sought to revoke Oxy’s operating contract because the US company improperly transferred a 40% interest in its fields to EnCana of Canada in 2000. In March of this year, the Ecuadoran government rebuffed Oxy’s offer to settle for a package worth more than $1 billion in back taxes, social programs, investments and extra revenues in return for a seven-year extension in its operating contract. Occidental is now thought to have upped the offer to $1.7 billion. On May 8, Energy Ministry Rodriguez gave Petroecuador until May 22 to negotiate an agreement. (FT, May 10)

On Sept. 13 of last year, EnCana announced it had reached an agreement to sell all of its interests in Ecuador for approximately $1.42 billion. (EnCana News Release, Oct. 26, 2005)

Government negotiator Manuel Chiriboga said on May 13 that Ecuador’s talks with the US government over the Andean Free Trade Agreement (AFTA, or TLC in Spanish)—suspended at the end of March—were unlikely to resume. Uncertainty over the legal battle with Oxy and attempts to reform Ecuador’s hydrocarbons law have been stumbling blocks in the negotiations, said Chiriboga. Chiriboga also said the US has engaged in sneaky tricks; in the case of Colombia, the final text of the treaty differed from what Colombian negotiators had agreed on. (Prensa Latina, May 13)

From Weekly News Update on the Americas, May 14

On May 15, Energy Minister Rodriguez announced that Petroecuador was canceling its contract Oxy. The decision to cancel the contract–and reject an offer from Oxy to settle the case—was based on the fact that Oxy had violated the terms of its contract by transferring 40% of its shares in Block 15 in the Ecuadoran Amazon to EnCana on Nov. 1, 2000. Cancellation of the contract means Oxy must immediately return to Petroecuador all the areas under its control, as well as hand over without cost and in good condition all equipment, machinery, installations and transportation etc. used in its oil operations in Ecuador.

Humberto Cholango, leader of Confederation of the Peoples of Kichua Nationality of Ecuador (ECUARUNARI) called the decision a triumph of the indigenous and social movements. The next step is the nationalization of Ecuador’s oil, said Cholango. Before Oxy leaves Ecuador, the company should be investigated for environmental damages in the regions where it operated, warned Esperanza Martinez of the grassroots environmental group Accion Ecologica.

The US Embassy was said to be pressuring hard behind the scenes for a settlement that would allow Oxy to stay; the cancellation of Oxy’s contract is expected to further chill negotiations between Ecuador and the US over the Andean Free Trade Treaty, stalled since March. Rejection of the trade pact is another major demand of Ecuador’s grassroots movements. (Servicio Informativo “Alai-amlatina,” May 16) In a statement on May 16, the Office of the US Trade Representative (USTR) said it was “very disappointed with Ecuador’s decision” to cancel Oxy’s contract. USTR spokesperson Neena Moorjani told CNN: “At this time we don’t foresee new conversations” with Ecuador over the trade pact. Moorjani said the administration of US president George W. Bush would ask Ecuadoran president Alfredo Palacio for “immediate explanations” and details about how Oxy would be compensated. (El Barlovento, Mexico, May 16, quotes retranslated from Spanish)

On May 18, Petroecuador assumed 100% control of Oxy’s oil fields in Ecuador. Oxy reported the previous night that it had transferred all its Block 15 operations to Petroecuador, and that on May 18 a technical unit would take over operations of the Limoncocha wells in Sucumbios province. Oxy has meanwhile filed an international trade suit against the Ecuadoran government with the World Bank’s International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes in Washington. (El Barlovento, May 18)

From Weekly News Update on the Americas, May 21

——

Weekly News Update on the Americas
http://home.earthlink.net/~nicadlw/wnuhome.html

See also WW4 REPORT #121
/node/1904

“Ecuador Boots Oxy,” May 24
/node/1999

——————-

Reprinted by WORLD WAR 4 REPORT, June 1, 2006
Reprinting permissible with attribution

Continue ReadingECUADOR: PROTESTERS WIN; OXY GETS THE BOOT 

BOLIVIA: OIL AND GAS NATIONALIZED

from Weekly News Update on the Americas

On May 1, in a ceremony at the San Alberto oilfield in Carapari, Tarija department, Bolivian president Evo Morales Ayma signed supreme decree 28.701, ordering the nationalization of the country’s hydrocarbons resources. “The looting is over,” Morales announced as he ordered the armed forces to seize control of all the oil and gas fields. With the decree, the Bolivian state “recovers the property, possession and total and absolute control of these resources,” said Morales. Foreign companies now have six months to renegotiate their oil and gas contracts with the government; in the meantime they must give up control of their facilities and channel all sales through the newly refounded state oil company, Yacimientos Petroliferos Fiscales Bolivianos (YPFB). Morales also ordered the confiscation of the shares necessary to guarantee more than 50% state control of the oil companies operating in Bolivia. (Resumen Latinoamericano, May 1; New York Times, May 2)

“If the negotiations do not go well, we could go to the next step, expropriation,” said energy minister Andres Soliz Rada. He said companies would be compensated. But the first step, said Soliz, is an audit of foreign company documents. “It’s time to open the black boxes of the petroleum companies.” (NYT, May 4)

Nationalization of Bolivia’s resources, especially gas and oil, had become the main consensus demand of the country’s grassroots movements following the popular protests that ousted ex-president Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada. Sanchez was responsible for selling off the country’s hydrocarbons to transnational corporations at extremely unfavorable rates for Bolivia. The contracts were never ratified by Congress, as the Constitution requires, making their legality questionable. (Resumen Latinoamericano, May 1)

At a May 4 summit in the northeastern Argentine province of Misiones, the presidents of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil and Venezuela confirmed their interest in moving together towards regional energy integration. The meeting was called to discuss the impact of the Bolivian nationalization. After a three-hour meeting, the four presidents held a joint press conference in the Casino Hotel in the town of Puerto Iguazu. Argentine president Nestor Kirchner said it was “one of the best meetings” he has taken part in as president.

The gathering was called by Brazilian president Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva; Brazil’s Petrobras is the largest foreign investor in Bolivia’s natural gas industry. A full 67% of the gas consumed by industry in Sao Paulo, Brazil’s industrial and financial center, comes from Bolivia. Before the nationalization, Petrobras had control of Bolivia’s two refineries, its biggest gas fields, a chain of gas stations and a pipeline running from Bolivia to Brazil. Petrobras will now have to negotiate a new contract, at a higher price. Although the presidents did not discuss prices, they acknowledged that they had agreed that gas supplies would be guaranteed. (Inter Press Service, May 4 via CorpWatch)

From Weekly News Update on the Americas, May 14

——

Weekly News Update on the Americas
http://home.earthlink.net/~nicadlw/wnuhome.html

See also WW4 REPORT #117
/node/1433

“Bolivia hosts hemispheric indigenous conference,” April 9
/node/1838

——————-

Reprinted by WORLD WAR 4 REPORT, June 1, 2006
Reprinting permissible with attribution

Continue ReadingBOLIVIA: OIL AND GAS NATIONALIZED 

COLOMBIA: URIBE RE-ELECTED, REPRESSION ESCALATES

from Weekly News Update on the Americas

Right-wing Colombian president Alvaro Uribe Velez was re-elected in the country’s first round of elections on May 28, eliminating the need for a second round. With 80% of the vote counted, Uribe had 62% of the vote; his closest rival, left coalition candidate Carlos Gaviria, had 22.18%. The third place candidate, Horacio Serpa of the Liberal Party—Uribe’s old party—had less than 12%. Three other candidates were far behind: former Bogota mayor Antanas Mockus with 1.12%; former justice minister Enrique Parejo with 0.37%; and medical doctor Carlos Rincon with 0.17%.

Uribe is the first president to be re-elected in Colombia in over 100 years. Congress amended the Constitution to allow reelection in late 2004; that amendment was upheld by the Constitutional Court on Oct. 18, 2005.

No electoral incidents were reported, although the army claimed five guerrillas were killed as they were preparing explosive attacks in Cali (Valle del Cauca department) and Tame (Arauca). A bus rigged with explosives was allegedly deactivated in Tolima department. In San Calixto municipality, Norte de Santander department, near the border with Venezuela, civilian authorities reported that two soldiers were killed and three wounded in a clash with leftist rebels from the National Liberation Army (ELN) who were allegedly trying to attack a polling place. (AFP, May 28)

CAUCA: GRASSROOTS SUMMIT ATTACKED

Starting on May 14, nearly 15,000 indigenous, campesino and African-descended people from the north of Cauca department in southwestern Colombia gathered in the Guambiano indigenous territory of La Maria Piendamo for a summit of organized grassroots sectors building strategies of resistance against constant human rights violations, the signing of the Andean Free Trade Treaty with the US and the repressive “democratic security” policy of President Alvaro Uribe Velez. More than 50,000 people gathered at other sites in southwestern Colombia on May 15 to participate. More than 2,000 Nasa, Guambiano and Embera indigenous people and Afro-Colombians held an eight-kilometer march to the main government buildings in Cali. (Minga Informativa de Movimientos Sociales, May 15; Comunicaciones ONIC Boletin, May 15)

On May 15, agents from the Mobile Anti-Riot Squad (ESMAD) of the National Police used tear gas and rubber bullets against summit participants who were carrying out a protest blockade of the Panamerican highway near Mondomo municipality in Cauca. At least five people were wounded and 10 people were arrested, including two members of the Interchurch Commission of Justice and Peace. A newborn baby was affected by the tear gas. The ESMAD agents were joined by agents of the Highway Police and troops from the National Army’s Jose Hilario Lopez Battalion and the 19th Brigade’s Meteodoro Battalion. After the initial attack, the protesters withdrew and regrouped 500 meters down the road, where ESMAD agents resumed the attack with tear gas, sparking three fires in the area. The agents also destroyed a house where summit participants were storing their belongings. (Prensa Libre, alternative communication project of the grassroots movement of southwestern Colombia, May 15 via Servicio Prensa Rural; Report from Organizaciones Sociales, May 15 via Servicio Prensa Rural)

At the same time, police used tear gas and truncheon blows to disperse more than 3,500 campesinos who were demonstrating in front of the National Training Service (SENA) building in Popayan, capital of Cauca department. According to the National Indigenous Organization of Colombia (ONIC), two people were wounded by bullets, including Emer Achicue, of Tambo municipality in Cauca.

According to the Only National Agricultural Union Federation (Fensuagro), security forces arrested campesinos in San Juan de Arama as they marched on May 15 through the Lower Ariari region of Meta department, from Puerto Toledo to Villavicencio. Security forces also blocked a mobilization of indigenous people and campesinos heading from different areas of Putumayo department toward the municipality of Pinunas Negras. (Report from Organizaciones Sociales, May 15 via Servicio Prensa Rural) In Narino department, Esmad agents and army troops have tried to block Awa indigenous people from mobilizing in two locations. (ONIC Boletin, May 15)

On May 16, army troops, police and ESMAD riot agents backed by four helicopters attacked the summit in La Maria Piendamo, bombarding participants with tear gas and weapons fire. Security forces apparently fired directly at members of the Cauca indigenous guard–an organized community defense force armed only with traditional staffs—and also targeted infrastructure sites such as community kitchens, food storage warehouses and lodging areas. Pedro Coscue, an indigenous guard member from the Corinto indigenous reserve, was shot to death, and 78 people were wounded–32 of them seriously—while another 36 people were arrested and more than 10 were disappeared. [Note: Pedro Coscue’s last name was given in different sources as Poscue, Pascue or Soscue.] (Comunicaciones ONIC Boletin, May 16; Radio Nizkor, May 17) Over all, in Cauca, Narino, Valle and Meta departments, government repression against summit participants left more than 100 people wounded, and more than 30 people detained and disappeared. (Asociacion Nacional de Usuarios Campesinos Unidad y Reconstruccion-ANUCUR, May 17 via Minga Informativa de Movimientos Sociales) The indigenous organizers responded to the violence by extending the summit indefinitely, and calling for national and international solidarity. (Radio Nizkor, May 17)

The social movements are asking that messages be sent to Colombian officials demanding guarantees for the lives and physical and psychological safety of the participants in the Summit of Social Organizations; guarantees for the rights to free movement and protest; and dismantling of the ESMAD. Send messages to President Uribe at fax +571-566-2071 or auribe@presidencia.gov.co; Vice President Francisco Santos at fsantos@presidencia.gov.co; Defense Minister Jorge Alberto Uribe at fax +571-222-1874 or siden@mindefensa.gov.co, infprotocol@mindefensa.gov.co or mdn@cable.net.co. For more information, see the websites of the Association of Indigenous Councils of Northern Cauca (ACIN) http://nasaacin.net/ and ONIC http://onic.org.co/.

(Report from Organizaciones Sociales, May 15 via Servicio Prensa Rural)

From Weekly News Update on the Americas, May 21

META: ARMY KILLS 10

On April 15, troops from the Colombian Army’s Mobile Brigade No. 12 began a massive military operation in the area of the Puerto Nubia School in the village of Sanza, San Juan de Arama municipality in the southern department of Meta. Using explosives and machine gun and rifle fire, the army attacked a house where some 50 civilians—including many children and older adults—had taken refuge next to the Puerto Nubia School. The civilians screamed in panic and called out to the army to stop shooting, but the troops kept firing. One mother who survived the attack said the soldiers appeared to be on drugs as they kept shooting in all directions.

The army’s gunfire killed at least eight people at the house, including 12-year old Yorladys Osorio Gonzalez, whose 13-year-old sister, seven-year-old sister and both parents were also wounded in the attack. One of the soldiers apparently broke down in tears at the sight of the victims; he called the killing an error, saying the army had no information that there were civilians in the house. The other victims were Rafael Pinzon, Gerardo Rios and four members of the Prieto family: 15-year old Weymar Prieto, his brother, Audom Prieto, their father, Floriber Prieto and a cousin, Jesus Prieto. Two more residents were apparently killed elsewhere: residents saw the body of Alexander Medina, a minor, floating down the Sanza river but were unable to recover it; they did recover the tortured body of a woman with a coup-de-grace shot to the head from the river. Residents are unsure whether she is Rubiela Castillo, who disappeared a day before the military operation, or another village resident named Nina.

About 50 residents of the village were detained by the army on April 16; as of April 27 they remained disappeared, and the army was still not allowing anyone–not even the International Red Cross–into or out of the area. There are rumors that the detained residents have been already murdered and presented as rebels killed in combat.

Corporacion Reiniciar is urging letters to President Alvaro Uribe Velez (uribe@presidencia.gov.co), Vice President Francisco Santos (fsantos@presidencia.gov.co) and other officials, demanding a full investigation, punishment for those responsible, and an explanation of the whereabouts of the disappeared. For more information and a full list of officials to contact, see http://www.dhcolombia.info/. (Corporacion Reiniciar, April 30 via Red de Defensores No Institucionalizados de Colombia)

From Weekly News Update on the Americas, April 30

BARRANCABERMEJA: ACTIVISTS MURDERED

Yamile Agudelo Penalosa, a 26-year old member of the Popular Women’s Organization (OFP) from the Colombian city of Barrancabermeja, in Santander department, was brutally tortured, raped and murdered. Her body was found in the Barrancabermeja municipal trash dump, on the road leading to the village of Llanito, on March 22; the body was identified two days later by her parents, OFP member Marisabel Penalosa and Alfonso Agudelo. Her face had been destroyed and one of her ears was cut off. The OFP has not accused any armed group of responsibility for the killing, but notes that Yamile Agudelo was assigned to one of the OFP’s community soup kitchens in Barrancabermeja, and that the city is controlled by rightwing paramilitaries. (OFP Communique, March 25 via Colombia Indymedia; Vanguardia Liberal, Bucaramanga, March 26; Yahoo Noticias, March 28)

On April 2, armed assailants shot to death Daniel Cortez Cortez, a member of the Sintraelecol union, while he was working in the Montoyas village of Puerto Parra municipality, Santander department. Cortez was an active union member throughout his nearly 16 years working at Electrificadora de Santander, the departmental electric company. He was murdered in a place completely controlled by the allegedly demobilized members of the supposedly disbanded rightwing paramilitary United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC). The assailants also apparently robbed Cortez’s pay. (Communique from Unitary Workers Federation-CUT, Barrancabermeja Committee, undated, via Resumen Latinoamericano, Apil 8)

From Weekly News Update on the Americas, April 9

——

Weekly News Update on the Americas
http://home.earthlink.net/~nicadlw/wnuhome.html

See also WW4 REPORT #120
/node/1805

“Colombia: army fires on indigenous protesters,” May 16
/node/1975

——————-

Reprinted by WORLD WAR 4 REPORT, June 1, 2006
Reprinting permissible with attribution

Continue ReadingCOLOMBIA: URIBE RE-ELECTED, REPRESSION ESCALATES 

THE POLITICS OF THE FARC INDICTMENT

A “Secret Formula” Against Colombia’s Guerillas?

by Paul Wolf

The US State Department has developed the secret formula to dismantle the armed groups of Colombia’s war. Or so it believes. It is believed that the demobilization of 28,000 members of the paramilitary United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) was the result of threatening its leaders—notably Salvadore Mancuso and Don Berna—with extradition to the US.

Fear of extradition, accompanied by promises of amnesty, convinced large numbers of paramilitaries to lay down their arms, confess their crimes, and put their faith in the government to restore order in Colombia.

Now, the same strategy is being tried on the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), an insurgency with roots in Colombia’s civil conflict of the 1940s (“La Violencia”) and greatly influenced by the Cuban revolution. The FARC has grown over the decades, despite concerted efforts by the Colombian and US governments to destroy it, including the use of death squads, forced displacement of its supporters, and the most modern technologies of surveillance and counter-terrorism.

Top 50 FARC Leaders Indicted

On March 29, US Attorney General Alberto Gonzales announced the indictment in the US of the top 50 leaders of the FARC on drug charges. According to the indictment, the FARC not only taxes Colombian coca growers, but also operates cocaine processing laboratories, and enforces a monopoly on the purchase of the drug in areas it controls. According to Gonzales, and to Justice Department press releases, the FARC is responsible for 50% of the world’s cocaine, worth more than US $25 billion.

This staggering figure cannot represent the true income of the FARC, however. The FARC has an estimated 18,000 fighters—this would be more than one million dollars per guerrilla. That’s a lot of money for people who live in the jungle, sleep in hammocks, and live on a diet of yucca, rice and chicharĂłn (pork fat).

A different estimate was made by the Information and Financial Analysis Unit of the Colombian government’s Ministry of Land, which it is said that the FARC receive about 30% of their income from drugs: 8.5 million US dollars per year in “tribute” from coca farmers, and about 3 million from the sale of cocaine.

Even multiplying this figure by the ten years the US says the FARC have been in the cocaine business, the US estimate exceeds that of Colombia by a factor of 200. The US government has offered $75 million in rewards for information leading to the capture of FARC leaders.

Same Evidence, Different Defendants

The FARC indictment supercedes the 2002 indictment of “Negro Acacio”, a case that has languished in DC District Court for the last four years. The new evidence apparently implicating the Estado Mayor (central command) of the FARC, consists of captured documents, witness testimony, and intercepted radio transmissions which allegedly show the complicity of the FARC leadership in the production and trafficking of vast quantities of coca paste and cocaine. The physical evidence, however, is the same “five or more kilograms of a substance containing a detectable amount of cocaine” in the original indictment of 2002.

In addition to Negro Acacio, several other FARC members are already on trial in the US for drugs and terrorism, including Carlos Bolas, Simon Trinidad, and Omaira Rojas (“Sonia”). According to the DEA, three others await extradition at Combita prison: Jorge Enrique Rodriguez Mendieta (“Ivan Vargas”), Erminso Cuevas Cabrera (“Mincho”), and Juan Jose Martinez Vega (“Gentil Alvis Patino”). These three are accused of having significant personal involvement in the production and trafficking of thousands of kilograms of cocaine.

While one might assume that Colombia would agree to their extradition, Colombia does not recognize the 1982 extradition treaty with the US, and has the discretion to either extradite or not. Colombia might try to use the threat of extradition to put pressure on the FARC to demobilize. At Gonzales’ press conference in March, the first thing said by Colombian Ambassador Andres Pastrana was that “[t]he indictment of 50 leaders of the FARC guerrillas is a decision taken by the Department of Justice of the United States.” This appears to leave the door open for Colombia to negotiate this point, if the FARC have any interest in it.

The belief that the FARC leaders fear extradition, and can be convinced to demobilize, is held by the US, but not the Colombian government. This is clearly Washington’s policy, and not Bogota’s. Nevertheless, Colombia is likely to go along with it, since its own policy is to defeat the insurgency through pressure and force of arms.

The indictment describes the FARC as being substantially in control of most of the cocaine production in Colombia. While it has been acknowledged for many years that the FARC tax the coca trade, and fight with the AUC to control rural parts of Colombia, the indictment accuses the FARC of operating cocaine laboratories, as well as killing coca growers who sell to anyone other than themselves. It does not, however, accuse the FARC of trafficking drugs outside of Colombia, although guns-for-drugs transactions have allegedly occurred on the Colombia-Brazil border.

All of these prosecutions will have to overcome a serious hurdle; that is, in order for any extradition to be valid, there must be some connection between the crime and the United States. In the case of drug trafficking, the defendants must intend that the drugs are shipped to the US. Even if it is true that the defendants have produced hundreds of thousands of kilograms of cocaine, as the indictment alleges, if they didn’t know, or didn’t care where the drugs went, then they would not have had the intent to send the drugs to the US, and could not be extradited here.

If there is no intentional connection with the United States, no US law would have been violated. In this respect, the threat of extradition may be an empty one. On the other hand, the threats of being held in solitary confinement for many years, and of inadequate legal representation in the face of a government with unlimited prosecutorial resources, are very real. Even the well-known FARC guerrillas Simon Trinidad and Sonia have been represented by public defenders with limited resources. For example, in Sonia’s case, the defendants were provided with over 100 compact disks of intercepted communications to review themselves in prison, to prepare their own defense, and more than 10,000 documents that the prosecution might use in the trial. In the Trinidad case, between 20-25 witnesses will be flown up from Colombia to testify in the drug trafficking trial alone.

The Prosecution of Simon Trinidad

Simon Trinidad, the well-known negotiator for the FARC during the peace process of the Pastrana administration, was captured in Ecuador two years ago, and extradited to the US on charges of drug trafficking, kidnapping, and providing material support to a terrorist organization. The case has attracted the attention of the Latin American press, but none whatsoever in the US, despite the fact that the case will test numerous traditional legal principles as applied in the new paradigm of the “war on terror.” It also appears that Trinidad will be the first of the FARC members to be prosecuted in the new program announced by Gonzales, although nowhere in the FARC indictment does Trinidad appear in the leadership of the FARC organization.

The first case against Trinidad stems from the crash or shoot-down of a surveillance plane operated by California Microwave, a US military contractor. After a firefight at the crash site, three North Americans were taken captive by the FARC, who are still holding them. To date, the prosecution has not tried to show that Simon Trinidad gave the order to shoot down the plane. Neither is there any evidence that Trinidad was involved in the decision to take the North Americans as prisoners. It appears that Trinidad’s only involvement in the incident was to travel to Ecuador to try to arrange their release, supposedly in concert with the UN.

It would be hard to find Simon Trinidad guilty under these facts. Any crime, even one involving a conspiracy, requires that the defendant have the necessary mental state to commit the crime. The intent to commit one crime, such as rebellion against the government, cannot be substituted for the intent to commit another, nor can the commission of one crime be the basis of guilt for another crime requiring a different intent merely because the harm flowed from the first crime. In other words, if Simon Trinidad was not involved in taking the North Americans captive, his efforts to negotiate their release should not make him criminally liable for their capture.

A second argument, already made by Trinidad’s public defenders, is that the incident occurred in the context of an armed conflict. Taking prisoners in a war is not a war crime. Ironically, the prosecution has emphasized the fact that Trinidad is seen in various photos wearing a FARC uniform, as evidence of his membership in the group. The US contractors, accused by columnist Robert Novak of working for the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), did not wear uniforms, and their surveillance of the FARC could be considered as espionage. As a lawful combatant in uniform, Trinidad would be entitled to the protection of the Geneva Conventions, while the US contractors, as spies, would not.

Judge Thomas Hogan, who is hearing the case, however, has ruled that because the United States is not at war with the FARC, Trinidad is not entitled to combatant immunity.

One interesting development in the case will be whether the defense is able to learn, from the court-ordered production of US government documents, what exactly the contractors were doing flying over the Colombian jungle. Was the surveillance plane looking for coca plants, or intercepting FARC radio transmissions and reporting on FARC positions? If the latter is the case, then the defense will have the opportunity to prove at trial that the US was participating in the war between the Colombian government and the FARC.

Of course, these arguments do not apply to the drug trafficking charge against Trinidad. Drug trafficking is still a crime during a war. Trinidad’s drug trafficking trial will begin shortly after his kidnapping trial ends, sometime around January of 2007.

Disregarding the Defendant’s Human Rights

Simon Trinidad is being held incommunicado, and without access to his lawyer, in Washington, DC. As these hearings progress, numerous other legal cases against Trinidad are proceeding in Colombia, where he is being tried in absentia. This is in clear contravention of his basic rights, guaranteed by the International Convenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).

Article 14(3)(e) of the Covenant guarantees the right to “be present in the proceeding and to defend personally or to be assisted by counsel of his choice.” Nevertheless, Judge Hogan has said that under the US Constitution, the rights to be present in a criminal proceeding, and to have effective legal representation, do not apply to proceedings outside of the US. Hogan has failed to consider that international treaties like the ICCPR have the force of law in US courts, regardless of whether provisions of the US Constitution apply.

The public defenders assigned to Trinidad’s case had to sign agreements with the US government, called Special Administrative Measures, promising not to communicate any information between their client and the outside world. These measures clearly violate the defendant’s right to counsel. One might ask whether attorneys agreeing to these conditions are a part of the problem, particularly when Trinidad’s chosen lawyer, Oscar Silva, is not permitted to meet with him unless an FBI agent is present.

The case is full of problems with evidence, the jurisdiction of the court, and the political nature of the charges. But most important are the fundamental rights of the defendant. Trinidad has the right to be present for the cases against him in Colombia, and to have an attorney of his choice where he is judged.

Mistake to Ignore These Cases

Although the FARC may benefit from boycotting Colombian elections, or from enforcing a “paro armado” (armed blockade) in concert with union strikes, it makes an error if it ignores the trials of its own members. The FARC should defend them in court. Regardless of the fairness or political nature of the trials, they do provide a forum for the FARC to explain its policies and make the case that it is an insurgent group rather than merely a drug trafficking organization. If the FARC doesn’t make these arguments, no one will. The trials will proceed with or without the participation of the FARC, and even the most liberal observers will have little to say as FARC members are minimally defended by overworked attorneys paid by the US government. It seems unlikely that the FARC will be intimidated by the new extradition program, or that any demobilization will be forthcoming, but this doesn’t mean the FARC should simply ignore what is happening.

——

Paul Wolf is an attorney in Washington, and may be contacted at paulwolf@icdc.com.

SOURCES:

Report of the Unit of Financial Information and Analysis (Uiaf) of the Treasury Department, cited in “El Transito de las Farc al narcotrafico” (The Passing of the FARC to Drug Trafficking), Colprensa, March 25, 2006

“United States Charges 50 Leaders of Narco-Terrorist FARC In Colombia With Supplying More Than Half Of The World’s Cocaine,” US DEA press release, March 22, 2006.

See also:

“COLOMBIA QUAGMIRE DEEPENS
FARC Indictments Spell Escalation in Andean Oil War”
by Peter Gorman
WW4 REPORT #121, April 2006
/node/1901

——————-

Reprinted by WORLD WAR 4 REPORT, June 1, 2006
Reprinting permissible with attribution

Continue ReadingTHE POLITICS OF THE FARC INDICTMENT 

THE WEALTH UNDERGROUND:

Bolivian Gas in State and Corporate Hands

by Benjamin Dangl

Years before the arrival of the Spanish, Bolivia’s indigenous people used “magic water” to cure wounds and keep fires going. With the invention of the automobile in the 1880s this black liquid took on a new importance. Since then, the oil and gas has been more of a curse than a blessing for the Bolivian people. On May 1 of this year, the history of these resources entered a new phase.

Bolivian President Evo Morales announced that the oil and gas will be nationalized and put into the hands of the state-run oil and gas company, Yacimientos PetrolĂ­feros Fiscales Bolivianos, (YPFB). Though what this nationalization plan truly entails may not be known for weeks, the move raises the question: will state control of resources be more beneficial to the Bolivian people than corporate control?

“Property of the Bolivian People”

“The time has come, the awaited day, a historic day in which Bolivia retakes absolute control of its natural resources,” Morales said in a speech from the San Alberto petroleum field, wearing a white helmet from YPFB. Nearby a banner hung that said, “Nationalized: Property of the Bolivian people.” The day the announcement was made thousands converged to celebrate the nationalization in La Paz’s central Plaza Murillo.

The decree bumps up Bolivia’s share of profits coming from two major gas fields, San Alberto and San Antonio, from roughly 50% to 82%. These fields, which represent 70% of Bolivia’s natural gas, are currently owned and operated by Brazil’s Petrobras, Spain and Argentina’s Repsol and France’s Total. Smaller fields will continue with the same tax arrangement which allots 50% to the government. Within 60 days, YPFB is to control oil and gas production, exploration, and distribution. Within 180 days, foreign companies are obliged to sign renegotiated contracts which give more control to the state. If they refuse to renegotiate, they have to leave the country. The new decree does not call for the total expropriation of foreign assets. It does involve a mandatory sale of most assets in the oil and gas industry to the government. The state will seize the assets of those companies which refuse to renegotiate contracts. Bolivian Vice President Alvaro Garcia Linera said that by 2007, these changes will increase the government’s annual income by $320 million.

In order to establish the new terms of operations and tax rates, the decree includes an audit of all oil and gas companies working in Bolivia. The state will recover 51% of shares from five companies which were carved out of the privatization of YPFB in 1996, when many of the current contracts were drawn up. Bolivian officials contend that these contracts are unconstitutional because they were not ratified by congress, which is required by Bolivian law. In this light, the nationalization is a return to constitutionality.

From September to October in 2003 massive protests took place against a plan to export Bolivia’s gas to the US for a meager price. Government repression against the mobilizations resulted in an estimated 80 deaths and hundreds of injuries. In the end, the protests forced President Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada to resign. The current nationalization plan is in part a response to pressure from this grassroots movement.

“We are moved because the nationalization of hydrocarbons has been one of the fundamental demands of the mobilizations of October 2003 and May and June 2005. For us, it’s homage to the fallen of October,” Edgar Patana, the executive secretary of the Regional Workers’ Central of El Alto told ZNet journalist Jeffrey Webber. “It’s an historic act that, hopefully, in the following months, will bring the country more revenue, to relieve unemployment, and make more jobs available.”

Morales, along with other newly elected left-leaning leaders in Latin America, came to power on a platform which promised a change from the structural adjustments pushed by the International Monetary Fund and free market economic policies which favored the interests of foreign corporations over the welfare of the people. Instead of bringing about the promised development and progress, thirty years of such policies has plunged the region into the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression. By following an unconventional path, Venezuela and Argentina have become the fastest growing economies in the region in recent years. Morales’ nationalization may produce similar results. As Bolivians know, business as usual has had a devastating effect on their country, which is the poorest in South America.

The Case for Nationalization of Oil and Gas in Bolivia

History illustrates that an oil and gas industry run by YPFB is a feasible and lucrative option. In 1937, during the government of David Toro, the state-run company was created. From then until 1940, YPFB produced 882,000 barrels of oil which was more than Standard Oil had produced in 15 years of operations in Bolivia. In 1953, the company produced enough to take care of the national consumption of oil. For over 60 years, YPFB generated enormous funding for the government. It explored, exploited, built ducts, refining plants. From 1985-1995, YPFB was the main source of economic support for the state. The highest amount YPFB exported was 55.7% of total exportation in 1985. Through YPFB, the technology and expertise was developed to sustain an infrastructure which is still intact to this day. The success and experience of the company contributed to the population’s recurring demands for nationalization of oil and gas.

“People have the hope that after all of this history of misery, exploitation of the natural resources, the gas could be the basis for a modernization of the economy. Not just to be utilized as energy, but also a basis for a future of industrialization,” Carlos Arze of Bolivia’s Center for Labor and Agricultural Development (CEDLA) explained in an interview in his office in La Paz, where large windows looked over the city. The key element to this industrialization is the rising cost of oil and gas.

As the amount of global gas reserves decrease, the demand will increase, putting Bolivia in a good position to financially gain from the business if the state takes advantage of its position as a major gas producer. According to Gregorio Iriarte in his book El Gas: Exportar o Industrializar?, in 2020, the US will demand 50% more gas than it uses currently. Meanwhile, the gas reserves in Argentina will end in 17 years and Chile depends primarily on Argentina for their gas. Brazil is hugely dependent on Bolivian gas. Over time, there will be more interest in Bolivia as a gas producer. Studies have shown that in 1997 the amount of gas in Bolivia was estimated to be 5.7 trillion cubic feet. In 2003, that figure rose to 54.9 trillion. It’s likely that more gas will be discovered in the coming years.

There is a general feeling in Bolivia that to sell most of the gas to the exterior is a poor use of the resource. The gas and its derivatives could be better used by the impoverished Bolivian population. Before it is processed, natural gas has methane, propane, ethane, butane and other gases in it. It can also be used to produce fertilizers, explosives, plastics, heat and electricity. The resource could be used in industries, kitchens and energy plants. Even if all of the houses and kitchens in Bolivia had access to gas, it wouldn’t use even 1.5% of the reserves.

For decades, gold, rubber, tin and other raw materials from Bolivia were sold for a low price. Foreign companies profited from the industrialization of these raw materials and sold them abroad for a much higher price, while Bolivia remained impoverished. This took place, Iriarte explained, under the argument that “Bolivia requires investments and work” and that “those who oppose the sale of the gas, oppose development…. In practice, the biggest benefits of the sale are the transnational companies that transport, liquidize and commercialize the gas.” He argues that the gas needs to be industrialized in order to use it in Bolivia and to export it for a higher price. He suggests the price of gas to private companies needs to be raised so it can stimulate the Bolivian economy.

Arze explained that there were various demands in the gas conflicts of 2003, all of which revolved around the slogan, “recuperate the gas to industrialize it.” People wanted to improve their own access to the resource:

“Whereas there are 6-7 barrels of oil [used] per capita in Argentina, Chile—in Bolivia we have around two, and we have a large reserve of energy. Natural gas, which is the most important hydrocarbon in our reserves, only arrives to 1.5-2% of the population, of the families of Bolivia. There is not a network of consumption. More than 90% of the gas is exported. And of the 10% that is left, a very small amount enters the network of domestic use. Most of this goes to the thermo-electric plants, where they generate electricity with this. The electricity is also in private hands, in Spanish hands. And the electricity is very expensive. It doesn’t arrive to most of the population, especially to rural areas. In rural areas there is very small amount of people who have access to electricity, and even less to gas. They are still living as if in medieval times…so the people are far from the benefits of this use of energy [that we have]. People want access to the gas in order to improve their standard of living.

People also want cheaper access to gas-related products, such as diesel for tractors and agriculture. In Bolivia, more than half of the diesel used is imported from abroad. Diesel could be produced from natural gas in Bolivia, and offered at a lower price to farmers.

State vs. Corporate Ownership

In Morales’ nationalization plan, the management of the oil and gas goes to YPFB. This leaves the question: how will the industry operate without foreign investments? Arze explained that foreign corporate investment is not needed to expand the gas industry in Bolivia. In fact, he argues, corporate control and investment of the resources has so far has had the opposite effect. As for transportation, foreign companies have mainly created gas ducts to other countries for exportation, and there are no new gas ducts for international users. For example, the biggest gas duct to Brazil is 40 times bigger than the one that goes to La Paz. The older ducts created by YPFB are in disrepair and cause regular environmental problems. When the Brazilian oil and gas company Petrobras bought three of the state refineries, they didn’t invest anything into them.

Foreign investors have placed more emphasis on making money by selling to external markets than developing the infrastructure in Bolivia for national use and industrialization. The technology needed for industrialization has not been provided, and what infrastructure that does exist is in poor condition. The result is that the country with one of the largest gas reserves in the region has some of the worst distribution and industrialization methods for its own citizens.

Arze emphasizes the role of the state in what infrastructure Bolivia does have. “The areas with the most reserves were discovered by YPFB more than 15 years ago.” However, at the time, YPFB lacked enough funding from the government to utilize the discovery, and it went into the hands of foreign corporations. “The state created an infrastructure that up to today continues, and created many technical experts that are currently working for private companies. The state did this with a small amount of financial resources.” This business was given up to foreign companies, and the government, in a sense, turned its back on the highest priced market in the world.

Says Arze: “Now we develop something like 20 times more gas than before. Is it possible to find [financial] resources? Is it possible to improve the terms of our negotiation with other companies and countries? I think so. Right now the world market is good for us because of the high price of oil; the gas market is becoming more important. There is also an energy crisis in the region. Chile, Brazil, Uruguay, Paraguay and Argentina need gas. And who has the gas? Bolivia. So Bolivia could negotiate for better conditions. Now, the state, in the immediate moment, probably doesn’t have sufficient capital [for industrialization]. But if the business of gas and oil is the best in the world, something which has caused invasions, could one find better negotiations for the country? I think so.”

By renegotiating with companies, raising the taxes and royalties which companies pay, Arze believes the Bolivian government could significantly increase the money it makes from the oil and gas industry. It could then use that funding to recuperate YPFB, which had operated well years earlier which a much smaller budget.

The new nationalization plan could, as Morales has promised, end up being the “solution to the economic and social problems of the country.” However, much still depends on how the corporations and the Bolivian people respond once the dust settles.

——

Benjamin Dangl is the author of The Price of Fire: Resource Wars and Social Movements in Bolivia (forthcoming from AK Press, 2007). He edits UpsideDownWorld.org, a website uncovering activism and politics in Latin America, and TowardFreedom.com, a progressive perspective on world events.

This story originally appeared in Upside Down World, May 7
http://upsidedownworld.org/main/content/view/282/1/

See also:

“THE PROGRESSIVE MANDATE IN LATIN AMERICA
Bolivia, Evo Morales and A Continent’s Left Turn”
by Benjamin Dangl & Mark Engler
WW4 REPORT #121, May 2006
/node/1902

——————-

Reprinted by WORLD WAR 4 REPORT, June 1, 2006
Reprinting permissible with attribution

Continue ReadingTHE WEALTH UNDERGROUND: 

EVO SEIZES THE GAS

Bolivia’s Nationalization by Decree

by Gretchen Gordon

The smell of gas hangs strongly in the air as a crowd of flag-waving Bolivians celebrate outside the Petrobras Gualberto Villaroel oil and gas refinery. A state worker clad in a tan work suit and hardhat props a wooden ladder against the front wall of the refinery just beneath the blue metal letters that read PETROBRAS, and ascends the ladder as the crowd looks on.

He carries a laminated banner with the name “Yacimientos Petroliferos Fiscales Bolivianos,” or YPFB, Bolivia’s former state oil and gas company, essentially privatized in the mid-1990s through a process called “capitalization.”

“Take down the placard!” someone yells from the crowd. “Throw it in the trash!” someone else shouts, making a rhyme with the Spanish words. (ÂĄSaque el letrero!, ÂĄQue lo pone en el basurero!)

As the worker struggles a bit to secure the banner over the blue letters, someone in the crowd observes, “No, they’re not going to take it down, just cover it over.”

As the banner is secured, someone calls out, “ÂĄQue viva Bolivia! ÂĄQue Viva la nacionalizacion!”

“ÂĄQue viva!” the crowd erupts in response.

It’s Monday, May 1, not coincidentally International Workers Day, and the Bolivian government has just declared the nationalization of oil and gas by presidential decree.

Though the “nationalization” and “recovery” of Bolivia’s oil and gas resources has been the main political issue in the country for the last several years, the Supreme Decree 28701 read publicly by president Evo Morales on Mayday came as a surprise to Bolivians and foreign investors alike. During the government’s first 100 days, several policy options have been floated regarding the restructuring of the oil and gas sector; however no clear comprehensive policy has been put forward until now.

Nationalization by Decree

Under the main goal of recovering “the property, possession, and total and absolute control” of oil and gas resources for the state, Decree 28701 contains five principal measures:

* Declaration of the state as the agent empowered to commercialize, set conditions, volumes and prices for internal consumption, export, and industrialization, and to take “control and direction” of all aspects of oil and gas production and distribution.

* Establishment of a 180-day time period for the re-negotiation of contracts to bring them in line with the oil and gas law 3058 passed last year.

* Recovery of 51% of the shares of five capitalized companies, carved out of the state company in 1996.

* Increase of the tax and royalty level from 50% to 82% for companies operating in Bolivia’s two largest gas fields (Petrobras, Repsol and Total).

* An audit of investments and earnings for all other oil and gas companies operating in Bolivia to determine their future tax rate and terms of operation.

While the discourse of the day is powerful—punctuated by the imagery of the securing of the country’s 56 oil and gas fields and two refineries by the Bolivian military—the real extent and impact of the government’s policy are not yet clear.

The recent oil and gas debate in Bolivia has shown that the term “nationalization” is open to definition and interpretation. Since Morales’ landslide electoral victory and “democratic revolution” last December, the government has consistently maintained that their “nationalization” does not involve expropriation, as traditionally understood by the term. The decree in fact does not confiscate private infrastructure or expel foreign companies as some in Bolivia have demanded. The plan to recover 51% shareholding of the capitalized oil and gas firms is seen by some as insufficient, due to the fact that the holdings of these companies were under 100% YPFB control prior to the privatization of the mid-1990s. Others criticize that the new restructuring is too similar to the oil and gas law passed during the Carlos Mesa administration, rejected by social movements as inadequate. Jaime Solares, the leader of Bolivia’s Labor Federation, has criticized the decree as a “partial” nationalization and renewed the demand for the state to take “absolute control” through confiscation without compensation.

At the same time, many see the government’s plan as the key to much-needed economic development and as a means of recovering state sovereignty in a country that historically has been managed in the interests of foreign capital. “The recovery of the oil and gas resources is what Bolivia is counting on to be able to develop,” explains Roberto Delis, an YPFB employee participating in the refinery “takeover.” “Now those resources are going to be returned so that they serve Bolivia.”

The potential increase in government revenues through the elevation of tax and royalty rates from 50% to 82% will be very significant for this impoverished nation, but is an unexpected move by a government which previously was exploring more cautious options. The figure of 82% is also highly symbolic in that it is the inverse of the 18% tax rate put in place during the privatization process in 1996. What the companies were putting in their pockets as recent as a year ago, will now be what Bolivia keeps for itself.

Many aspects of the decree, however, remain to be determined and its true impact will depend on the details of its implementation over the coming months. The mechanism for the recovery of majority shares in the capitalized companies remains unspecified, as does the treatment of the 54 fields not impacted by the tax rate increase. The government calls the decree “flexible and consensual.” However, they have made it clear that those companies unwilling to play by the new rules of the game will not be allowed to remain in Bolivia.

Domestic business interests have reacted with concern, though without marshalling a strong challenge. Many support the concept of recovering greater state control, but fear economic instability and warn against the possibility of costly international litigation by transnational companies. The response by foreign investors has been strong, though still not completely bellicose. Brazilian President Lula called the move “unfriendly,” while Spain’s Zapatero expressed his “profound preoccupation.” Brazilian Petrobras and Spanish Repsol are two of Bolivia’s largest foreign investors. Many companies, however, are keeping their comments reserved.

Government Takeover?

From La Paz’s main plaza, in a skillfully orchestrated event weaving together the nationalistic historical memory of Bolivia’s previous two oil nationalizations (1937 and 1969) with the class themes of International Workers Day, President Morales addresses a crowd of thousands urging Bolivians to come together to defend this new endeavor.

Meanwhile, back at the Gualberto Villaroel refinery outside Cochabamba, Saul Escalera, the director of Industrialization for YPFB, addresses the crowd from the bed of a red pickup truck. Announces Escalera:

“We will now engage in a symbolic entrance of YPFB technicians in which we will give official notification [to Petrobras] that as of this moment this refinery will be administered by YPFB.”

Escalera asks the crowd to refrain from trying to enter the refinery, warning that such an action could jeopardize the nationalization process. As the group of around fifteen technicians and representatives pass through the front gates of the plant, a military band strikes up the national anthem as the crowd sings. Young soldiers proceed through the gates carrying a giant Bolivian flag.

Returning back through the front gates after several minutes, with little fanfare, Escalera notifies the crowd, “We have now recovered this refinery…You may now all return home.”

With the waning notes of a brass band, Bolivia’s “nationalization without expropriation” advances, as has Morales’ broader “democratic revolution,” without violence or disruption, and to the great surprise of most onlookers.

The question which remains is how much will a profound change for Bolivia require the old system to be dismantled, and how much, like refinery placards, can more pragmatically be covered over with something new.

——

Gretchen Gordon is a research associate with the Democracy Center in Cochabamba, Bolivia.

This story originally appeared May 2 in Upside Down World
http://upsidedownworld.org/main/content/view/274/1/

See related story, this issue:

“THE WEALTH UNDERGROUND: Bolivian Gas in State and Corporate Hands,”
by Benjamin Dangl
/node/2028

——————-

Reprinted by WORLD WAR 4 REPORT, June 1, 2006
Reprinting permissible with attribution

Continue ReadingEVO SEIZES THE GAS 

9-11’s HIDDEN VICTIMS

New York’s Hero Rescue Workers Face Kafkaesque Nightmare

by Joe Flood

An hour after Flight 175 crashed into the South Tower of the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, the men of FDNY Engine Company 240 received orders at a nearby command post to enter the building and help evacuate survivors.

“As we were walking there it began to collapse and we were caught in the debris field,” says fireman Thomas Dunn. “You could see absolutely nothing, we thought the building we were next to collapsed and that we were trapped…the only way I knew we were still outside was when I felt a car door next to me.”

Dunn was nearly as close when the North Tower fell a half hour later, and spent the rest of the day searching for survivors. He had to go to the hospital that evening for an ankle injury, but was back the next day and every day that week searching, whether he was on duty or off.

“We lost a chief from the firehouse, about twenty guys I knew, my two best friends,” he says. “It took over everything.”

Nearly five years later Dunn has developed asthma, coughs when he speaks and has serious acid reflux, the most common symptoms of what has become know as the “World Trade Center Cough.” For almost four years after the collapse he was able to stay on the job, fighting the cough and shortness of breath, and taking medication for the acid reflux. But last year he had a severe asthma attack and was pulled off of active duty, probably for the rest of his life.

“I haven’t gotten the letter yet, but I’ve been told that I will be given limited status service, light duty. I can work, but only at a desk.”

Dunn is just one of the growing number of city employees—including fire-fighters, police, construction workers, even office workers and a deputy mayor—to develop serious medical problems from exposure to toxic dust at Ground Zero.

So far the death of one relief worker, Detective James Zadroga, has been officially attributed to exposure to toxins at the site, but union officials attribute dozens more deaths to Ground Zero.

“We’ve lost three people in the last two years, people with respiratory problems,” says Patrick Bahnken, president of the Uniformed EMTs and Paramedics Local 2507. “Everyone knows what it’s from. One paramedic with no asbestos exposure in her life died from mesothelioma,” a rare form of cancer whose only known cause is asbestos exposure. “But no one is willing to say it’s from the Trade Center.”

A recent Fire Department study, published April in the American Journal of Respiratory and Critical Care Medicine, found that in the single year following 9-11, fire-fighters suffered an average loss of lung capacity equivalent to 12 years of normal fire-fighting, and found that other Ground Zero workers showed signs of similar losses.

“We had baselines for all firefighters based on annual medical exams,” says Thomas Von Essen, who was Fire Commissioner on September 11. “It’s a good comparison to show this particular guy was fine before September 11, and now he’s not. A lot of construction workers and other workers don’t have that.”

The worst effects, though, were found in emergency workers who were at the site when the towers collapsed.

“It was terrible. The debris, we were choking on it. I had my mask with me but it wasn’t on when the tower fell,” says Dunn. “The face-piece itself was filled with debris, so when I put it on and took a breath I got all dust and almost threw up. I tried to clear out the mask, put it back on and started breathing OK, but no one else had masks, so I shared it with cops and EMS.”

For the first few days only surgical masks were available to workers at the WTC site, and even when enough respirators arrived, many workers did not wear them all the time.

“If 25 percent of people were wearing them at one time, that was a lot,” says Jonathan Bennett, public affairs director of the non-profit New York Committee for Occupational Safety and Health. “I’ve worn respirators and it is hard work. Communication is impossible with them. People who normally wear them have hand signals that they’ve developed on the job. Wearing them eight hours is a real challenge, and wearing them for those 12-hour shifts they worked… I’m not going to say it’s impossible, but it’s a lot to ask.”

“Looking back, it was a mixed bag,” says Von Essen. “Some people didn’t wear the masks all of the time, some people didn’t wear them at all. It was very warm, and hard to communicate. I’m not sure how we could have prevented it. ”

Von Essen experienced breathing trouble himself after working at the site.

“I had some breathing problems at first, but they didn’t linger. I’ve developed asthma since.”

A former firefighter, Von Essen says that it’s hard to tell whether the asthma was from the WTC or accumulated damage from years of smoke inhalation.

“I was leaning towards it anyway. Some firefighters my age might have been predisposed, certainly anyone who was a smoker,” he says. “But we’re going to have many terrific firefighters that suffer.”

It will be years, doctors say, perhaps decades, before the full extent of the health problems created by the WTC collapse are known. The thousands of rescue workers who risked their lives and their long-term health on September 11 and the days that followed nearly all say they have no regrets, and would gladly do it again. But many who have become sick as a result of their work are being forced to navigate an overburdened bureaucracy that some unions, employees and workers’ compensation experts are calling disorganized and too restrictive.

Rudy Washington, a deputy mayor under Rudolph Giuliani who became sick from exposure at Ground Zero, made news recently over his worker’s compensation claims. City lawyers first denied Washington’s claims—then, when Washington won in court they appealed the decision. When the news went public in mid-May, Mayor Michael Bloomberg asked city lawyers to revisit the case, and they promptly withdrew the appeal.

Washington won his case on the merits and pulled no strings to have his case upheld; in fact he turned down an offer of assistance from Bloomberg months ago. Yet hundreds of city employees find themselves in a predicament similar to the one Mr. Washington was extricated from, and are not confident they will have any extra help form the Mayor’s office

“Each case is different and it’s all an uphill battle,” says EMT union president Bahnken. “As these cases begin to rise this is not a problem that will go away.”

New York State’s worker compensation laws require that employers pay for lost wages and medical expenses incurred on the job. In the case of an injury, workers have two years from the date of the injury to file a claim; with an “occupational illness” they have two years from the onset of symptoms or diagnosis of the problem. In Washington’s case, his claim was at first denied by the city’s legal department because they treated his respiratory illness as an injury, and he missed the two-year deadline to file for it.

While few would argue that Washington’s breathing problems, which developed years after his exposure to toxic dust at Ground Zero, are the same as a slip-and-fall injury, New York defines an occupational illness as only an infirmity which is common to an employees’ line of work. Lung cancer, for instance, is considered an occupational illness for city fire-fighters, but the policy is ambiguous for EMTs and non-uniformed workers.

“An asbestos worker who comes down with lung cancer related to asbestos 20 years later would qualify,” says John F. Burton Jr., a lawyer and economics professor at Rutgers University who specializes in workers’ compensation. “But as the statute is interpreted, someone like an office worker with lung cancer, or a deputy mayor, would not.”

In Washington’s case, the city paid for his short hospitalization after 9-11. Because the city paid for an injury incurred on the job, this exempted him from the two-year time limit on filing a workers’ comp claim. The court accepted this, but the city appealed on what Bloomberg called a “technicality”—prompting the city to drop the case.

But many workers have not been so fortunate. The New York Times reported May 23 that 290 people have filed claims after the deadline, and as further illnesses arise (some can take years and even decades to develop), that number is likely to increase.

In Albany a bill has been introduced which would eliminate the two-year deadline for all 9-11 workers, giving them six months from when they first notice symptoms to file workers’ comp claims—essentially treating 9-11-related health problems as occupations illnesses rather than injuries. Last year a similar measure was passed in Albany applying to disability pensions, lowering the burden of proof that certain illnesses were caused by work at the Ground Zero site. But the future of the workers’ comp bill is unclear.

The two-year limitation is only one of a number of bureaucratic hurdles faced by sick workers, like EMT Paul Adams. Adams was near the Trade Center crash site when the South Tower fell, helping twelve people out of the debris, and spent the day rescuing and treating victims.

“That afternoon I collapsed, I couldn’t breathe,” says Adams, 39, who has been an EMT since 1991. “They sent me to Mt. Sinai [hospital] in Queens with lacerated pupils and breathing problems, and after 6 hours I was discharged.”

Five months later Adams started having trouble breathing, and a medical examination turned up lung problems. Because EMTs work for the Fire Department, Adams went before the FDNY’s medical review board, which declared him permanently partially disabled and unfit for active duty. He filed for worker’s compensation and a disability pension. Police and fire-fighters have their own pension plans, but EMTs must go through the New York City Employees Retirement System (NYCERS) for their pensions.

“I went to NYCERS and went to see their doctor. Not even two minutes into the exam and they denied me,” says Adams. “I’ve got one board telling me I’m too sick to work, another telling me that I can work.”

NYCERS director of operations Linda Chiariello says that she sees no problem with the medical board’s review process.

“EMTs are our employees, examined by our medical board,” she says. “I’m not familiar with the FDNY’s board, but there is nothing wrong with our process.”

As for EMTs like Adams who are not allowed to return to active duty but have been denied a disability pension, Chiariello says there are opportunities to have the case revisited.

“If our medical board denies disabilities, they could to the board of trustees, make an appeal, or file a lawsuit,” she says. “There are a lot of opportunities, this is all spelled out in the administrative code and retirement and social security law.”

Adams says he is considering a lawsuit, but is concerned about what will happen while it is being decided. For the last 18 months he has been out of work. Worker’s compensation benefits have paid his medical bills to this point but they are about to expire, and without pension benefits, Adams says he’s not sure how he’s going to pay those bills, or get private insurance with a pre-existing conditions.

“I use three inhalers, and medication I have to take the rest of my life. It’s not the pension money I want, it’s the benefits,” he says. “I know I’m going to get worse in the long term, I don’t know how I’ll pay for it.”

Adams does have the option of returning to work on light duty, but says he doesn’t want a desk job.

“I can’t climb a set of stairs without getting out of breath,” he says. “I’m not going to sit light duty for another ten years in a building breathing recycled air, it’s not what I became an EMT for. I don’t want to seem like I’m greedy. My concern isn’t money, only medical coverage, that’s all.”

Firefighter Dunn finds himself in a similar limbo. While he has been declared unfit for active duty, he hasn’t received a disability pension and unless something changes, the 33-year-old will be on light duty for the foreseeable future.

“It seems like the rules changed,” he says. “Before if you failed your lung capacity test they put you right out on disability. Now it’s different.”

A group of fire-fighters suing the Fire Department are alleging just that. Since 9-11, they say, the department has made it much harder for fire-fighters to receive a disability pension. Attorney Eric Sanders has filed suits for 16 fire-fighters denied disability, and is in the process of filing 12 more.

“Pre 9-11, when firefighters failed pulmonary tests, they were given their three-quarters pensions,” says Sanders. “Post 9-11 you have fire-fighters taking multiple tests and failing. The FDNY’s own doctors say they are failing, and the pension board is denying them. All these firefighters are in legal limbo, they can’t work and they can’t retire.”

Increased public attention stemming from the Rudy Washington affair, new laws, and lawsuits may smooth the path for those seeking compensation for their health problems and get benefits to those who truly deserve it. In the meantime, many city employees are left wondering about what medical problems may lie in store for them, and how they cope financially.

“I wouldn’t change anything, I would do the same thing again,” Dunn says of his efforts are Ground Zero. “I don’t blame the city or the job, but I want some answers. If I can’t be a fireman anymore I need to move on.”

——

A version of this story will appear in the Summer issue of The Shadow, the Lower Manhattan anarchist sporadical.

See also:

“9-11’s LINGERING TOXIC MENACE:
‘Redevelopment’ at Ground Zero Hits New Yorkers With Double Whammy,'”
by Wynde Priddy
WW4 REPORT #108, April 2005
/9-11toxicmenace

“NYC: firefighters sue over WTC illness,” April 27, 2006
/node/1890

“Supreme Court shafts 9-11 widows,” Jan. 19, 2006
/node/1512

“9-11 heroes get shafted,” June 7, 2005
/node/582

——————-

Special to WORLD WAR 4 REPORT, June 1, 2006
Reprinting permissible with attribution

Continue Reading9-11’s HIDDEN VICTIMS 

INTERVIEW: SAMIR ADIL

President of the Iraqi Freedom Congress

by Bill Weinberg

Samir Adil is president of the Iraqi Freedom Congress (IFC), a new initiative to build a democratic, secular and progressive alternative to both the US occupation and political Islam in Iraq. Adil, who fled Iraq in 1995 after being tortured in Saddam’s prisons, returned after the US invasion to help build a secular resistance movement. He recently traveled to the US in a tour of several cities organized by the American Friends Service Committee, in which he met with numerous anti-war organizations and attended the Labor Notes Conference in Detroit. On the night of May 9, after a presentation at the Paulist Center in Boston, Samir Adil spoke by telephone with WW4 REPORT editor Bill Weinberg over the airwaves of New York’s WBAI Radio.

BW: Samir, what kind of reception have you been getting on your tour?

SA: Well, I came to United States because, as you know, the one picture that’s left in the media, the corporate media, is just the fighting—the American occupation and the political Islamist groups or the nationalist groups. But the other perspective in Iraq—I mean the secular movement—nobody mentions it. Nobody mentions the workers’ movement, the student movement, the women’s movement. All of them now joined under one umbrella called the Iraqi Freedom Congress, the IFC, which I am a representative of. But the people [in the US] haven’t any information about this secular movement.

There is one slogan raised by the anti-war movement: end the occupation. But what is the future of Iraq after the occupation? What do we want? There is a no answer of this question. So this is a great chance to hold presentations and speeches in different cities in the United States.

I met really great people and they told me, “We didn’t know about anything about a secular movement in Iraq.” Not just the secular movement in Iraq but in all the Middle East, too. And I told them, your enemy and our enemy is one, the anti-human enemy: This is what happened on September 11 in New York and Washington, and the same is happening today in Iraq. Innocent people in Washington and New York paid the price, and other innocent people are paying the price now in Iraq. The enemy is the American administration’s policies and the political Islamism policy, and we have to work together to build this front from Washington to Baghdad to end all of these inhuman policies. We believe without this international movement, especially in the United States, we can’t defeat these inhuman policies and establish a secular and non-nationalist government.

BW: Well, what makes this position problematic for a lot of people in the United States, I think, is the perception—which of course both Bush and the jihadists have done their best to cultivate—that they oppose each other, and that you have to be on one side or the other. Whereas you take a position that rejects both of them as representing an “inhuman” policy, as you put it.

SA: Well, unfortunately, the anti-war movement just focuses on the crimes of the occupation. Iraqi society has been suffering from the occupation and from the crimes of the political Islamists and nationalist groups, but the anti-war movement has just one slogan: end the occupation. But today when I am talking about our perspective, our alternative, we get a positive response from the people. I think most of the people in the United States [until now] didn’t face the question about Iraq after the occupation, because the American administration has a campaign of propaganda. They say, “Our forces must stay in Iraq to prevent sectarian war, and there is no alternative for the Iraqi society.”

This is a kind of hypocrisy, because everybody knows the occupation’s policy created this sectarian war, created the situation. They created it by imposing ethnic and nationalist divisions on Iraqi society. And when the people in the United States get the word that there is a secular movement for a democratic society in Iraq, that can rebuild civil society, can bring stability and security and build a brighter future for Iraqi people, build a secular government like in the West—then the American people can join us in this human movement. And we can defeat these policies.

BW: Well, you blame the Bush administration for bringing about the situation of ethnic and sectarian conflict. But I would imagine that even the most hubristic of the neo-cons who literally wanted to divide Iraq up and to Balkanize it into separate mini-states—I would say that the situation is out of their hands at this point, and what’s happening in Iraq now is beyond even what they wanted.

SA: Well, after three years of occupation, we have five million Iraqi people below the poverty level. That is the last report from the United Nations and human rights organizations…

BW: As opposed to how many before the occupation?

SA: Before, we had the sanctions, but the figure did not exceed two million people. Now after three years of occupation, it has increased to five million people. After three years of occupation, now the young people, between 20 to 25, are going to sell their kidney for between 900 to 1,200 US dollars.

BW: Sell their…?

SA: Sell their kidney.

BW: Sell their organs.

SA: Yes, sell their organs. After three years of occupation, if you visit Baghdad, or any city in Iraq, you see a mountain of garbage. Three years of occupation and there is no electricity in many districts in Baghdad, and summer is coming, and the temperature is going up to 50 or 55 Celsius,. After three years of occupation, the number of women selling their bodies to feed their children is increasing day by day. And after the three years of occupation, the Iraqi people are starting to say, “We don’t want freedom, we don’t want prosperity, even if we have to live by bread and water—but we want security. We want our lives, to survive.”

Iraqi society is like a jungle. I swear to you, the Amazon jungle is better than Iraqi society. You can kill anyone, in the front of the police, for 100 US dollars. In just one day in the Ashab area, they killed 14 men, just because their name is Omar, which is a Sunni name. Those people didn’t do anything, just their name was Omar. In Basra, in two days they killed 76 men, women and children, just because they are Sunni. In another part, they kill anyone named Haider or Ali, which are Shi’a names. This is the situation in Iraq. The forces of the interior ministry—they’re attacking places like al-Adamiyya, which they describe as a Sunni area, right in front of American forces… And the people in al-Adamiyya are arming in self-defense and fighting with the police. This is the situation, this is the reality in Iraq.

BW: Where is this taking place?

SA: Al-Adamiyya. An area in the middle of Baghdad. Just two or three days ago, armed groups attacked the hospitals in Baghdad and Basra, killed all of the doctors and the nurses and all of the sick people. This is the situation in Iraq. And now on American [TV] stations they are saying “We must stay in Iraq to prevent sectarian war…” Two years ago, this sectarian war had already started! But they didn’t mention it. Two years ago, they established the organization “To Kill Kurdish People.” That is the name of an organization, announced in a public statement—To Kill Kurdish People! And hundreds of people have been killed because they are speaking the Kurdish language, not Arabic language…

One year ago, the Zarqawi organization began putting up checkpoints on the road north from Baghdad, just 100 kilometers, and they stop the car and ask for the ID. If the ID is Sunni, they can go ahead—if the ID is Shi’a, they cut off his head and throw the body [by the roadside]. And this checkpoint was there for many months, not far from an American base, just a few kilometers–but because those groups didn’t attack Americans, the Americans didn’t get involved in this situation. This is happening every day, and day-by-day it is going worse and worse and worse.

And everybody knows this situation was created by the occupation. Before the war, when they held the London confidence, the American and the British governments brought all of the ethnic and sectarian parties and charted the new division of Iraq’s society—you are a representative of the Shi’a, you are a representative of the Sunni, you are a representative of the Kurdish. And after the occupation they established an ethnic-based government council, and gave legitimacy to this division by the new constitution. Before the last election, we asked that people don’t participate, because this election would only deepen the ethnic conflict; they only take your fingerprints to give legitimacy to all of the crimes committed by the occupation, and to the division, the nationalist conflict. And five months after the election, you can see, there is no government. Before there was no government, too—just in the Green Zone. But now we have a jungle society, and the people are organizing for self-defense, because nobody takes care about them. Every day in Baghdad people are killed because of their ethnic identity, killed by suicide bombings, and all the neighborhoods and workplaces and marketplaces are turned into a battlefield. This is the situation in Iraq. And more than one million have escaped from Iraq to Iran, to Syria, to Turkey, looking for security.

BW: Refugees, you mean? Really, a million?

SA: Yeah, one million, perhaps more. There are 250,000 just in Syria.

BW: Well, there’s very little awareness of this. They’re not, presumably, in camps like traditional refugees as we think of them, so they’re sort of invisible…

SA: Yeah.

BW: Are you able to travel freely around Iraq?

SA: No, no, I always have a bodyguard with me, and it is not easy. Because I have criticized the political Islamists, the nationalists and their crimes. There is a fatwa from the Sadrist group, for more than one year now, to assassinate me. The leaders of our organization always travel with bodyguards, and the reason is our agenda and our slogan and our perspective.

BW: Tell us about the activities of the Iraqi Freedom Congress and some of the member organizations.

SA: Especially last month, after February 22—I think everybody heard about the explosion of the Shi’a holy places—after that date, all of the leaders of the parties that are pro-America escaped from the cities and went to the Green Zone. Only the leaders of our organization, the IFC, have stayed in the cities to mobilize people. We issued a statement that met with a wide response: “No Sunni, no Shi’a, we believe in human identity.” Ordinary people distributed hundreds of thousands of copies in the streets.

And in many places, we work to prevent ethnic cleansing. We are working in areas like Husseinia in Baghdad, holding meetings where the people announced, under the IFC banner—”Everybody can live in this area, nobody has the right to ask you if you are Sunni or Shi’a or Kurdish, or Christian or Muslim. Everybody can believe anything they want, this is a personal thing, and anybody can believe any religion, or be atheist.” We are also working in Kirkuk and Basra and Nasiriyah. We are starting to establish a presence in Karbala and Najaf, the holy places of the Shi’a. We are working with doctors to establish volunteer clinics in these areas. Because the aim of the IFC is to rebuild civil society. We are organizing people to collect the garbage, all the civil services…

In Basra we just held a meeting with the union leaders. As you know, 40 percent of the leadership of the IFC are union leaders. Maybe you read my open letter to the oil union leaders who joined IFC last month. You can go to our website and see my open letter, sending my congratulations to them because they joined IFC…

BW: Which union is this?

SA: The oil workers union in the south of Iraq. This will bring our movement many steps forward. Because we are the civil resistance, and we are preparing a general strike in the oil sector to confront the occupation policy, and halt this ethnic cleansing in the different cities of Iraq.

BW: So you’re doing both community work, attempting to establish these secular autonomous zones in the cities, and also working with organized labor, particularly in the oil industry. And then student groups are also involved, I believe…

SA: Yeah. Just last year, there was a student uprising against the Sadrists and all of the Islamist groups at Basra University. And now the students’ organization grows more strong day by day. At Baghdad University and other universities many students are joining the IFC—individually or through their student union. We believe students and the youth can be a big force against the occupation and against the sectarian war.

BW: Well I’m sure that you saw today’s news. Quite ironically, they did manage to form a government, they agreed on a new prime minister, Nouri al-Maliki, and I suppose they wanted to put a very optimistic spin on it—and that same day there was a horrific suicide bombing in Tal Afar in the north, 17 civilians blown up at a marketplace. So the IFC is taking a position of not collaborating with the actual government in Iraq. What exactly are your reasons for this position of non-collaboration?

SA: There is no difference between al-Maliki or al-Jaafari. Al-Maliki was the vice deputy of [outgoing prime minister Ibrahim] al-Jaafari, and led efforts to eliminate Sunnis. You can’t imagine anything is going to change. The same characters—[President Jalal] Talabani, the representative of the Kurdish nationalist party, or [Vice President Tareq] al-Hashemi representing the Sunnis. As long as the government is an ethnic and nationalist government, every part of this government will be looking for its interest, not the people’s interest. I can give you one example. You know, last year at the funeral of King Fahd there was a big argument between al-Jaafari and Talabani and [then-Vice President Ghazi] al-Yawar on who was to go to Saudi Arabia and represent Iraq. And in the end, nobody could accept the other and there were three separate delegations…

There will be no security, no stability, without ending the occupation, and without establishing a secular government, a non-nationalist government…

BW: Maliki was involved in paramilitary activities, you say?

SA: Yeah, yeah, he led a committee to eliminate the Sunni people from the society, especially those who supported the Saddam regime.

BW: But his Dawa party is portrayed as a more moderate Shi’ite element, compared to the Sadr and Badr militias…

SA: Yes, al-Maliki and al-Jafari are from the Dawa. But they gave the Ministry of Interior to the Badr group.

BW: That’s right…

SA: So Dawa created this ethnic cleansing in the different cities in Iraq.

BW: But this extremely sinister-sounding committee to eliminate the Sunnis was linked to the Dawa party, or…

SA: Yeah, the Dawa party. It is an official committee.

BW: I would imagine it would have to be clandestine. So you’re saying all the Shi’ite parties were complicit in the attacks on Sunnis…

SA: Yes.

BW: Maybe you could tell us a little bit about yourself, Samir. What’s your personal story?

SA: I was born in Baghdad in 1964. After I graduated from the university I began working underground to oppose the Saddam regime. I was captured in 1992. I was in the prison for six months, and after an international campaign to release me, I stayed in Iraq for one more year. I didn’t want to leave Iraq. But Saddam’s regime asked me many times to work with them, and I refused, and I knew they were planning to capture me again. It was then that I escaped from Iraq.

BW: What activities resulted in your being imprisoned?

SA: We established a Marxist organization and we were working underground with the workers at that time, planning for the workers to get their own union. But Saddam’s government, through informants, captured us and six months we stayed in the jail. And because I was one of the founders of the organization, I was for 25 days under torture.

BW: My goodness. What was the name of the organization?

SA: In English, it would be the League for the Liberation of the Working Class.

BW: That was one of the precursor groups to the Worker-Communist Party?

SA: Yes. The Worker-Communist Party would be established July 21, 1993.

BW: So you were trying to organize an independent labor movement.

SA: Yes.

BW: And for this you were arrested and tortured?

SA: Yes. You know, in Iraq at that time, anybody who worked outside the Ba’ath party—this meant you are against the party, and this was illegal. But our friends in the Canadian Labor Congress sent off a letter to Saddam asking that he release us—me and six others I was arrested with. After that campaign, they released us—but then every week I had to go to the main intelligence office in Baghdad. They asked me to work with them, I refused many times, and when I felt they were planning to capture me again, I escaped to the north of Iraq, outside of the control of the government.

BW: The Kurdish zone.

SA: Yeah. I stayed three years and then I escaped by an illegal way to Turkey. And I stayed in Turkey for two years, and then with the help of the UNHCR I left to Canada. I arrived in Canada on July 5, 1995.

BW: So, when you were in prison—did you even come before a judge? Were you ever formally charged with a crime?

SA: No, I was held without charge.

BW: So it was extra-judicial, so to speak. And for three weeks you were under torture and very harsh conditions.

SA: Yeah, for 25 days I was under the torture. I still have a problem with my left side, and with my hearing…

BW: You first got into contact with the Worker-Communist Party when you arrived in the Kurdish zone, in the north?

SA: Yeah, in the Kurdish zone.

BW: Can you tell us something about the Worker-Communist Party and what it believes?

SA: There are two communist parties in Iraq. One is the Communist Party of Iraq, which was with the Soviet Union, and is now part of the American process in Iraq and part of the government. But the Worker-Communist Party of Iraq is different from this kind of communism. The Worker-Communist Party of Iraq has criticized the Soviet Union, China, Albania, Cuba; they said that the Soviet Union and China are not socialism, it’s a capitalist state. And the Worker-Communist Party of Iraq was positioned against the sanctions, against the wars—the Second Gulf War [1991] and Third Gulf War [2003]. And we are now positioned against the American-led process in Iraq and the occupation and political Islam. And the Iraqi Freedom Congress is a project of the Worker-Communist Party of Iraq to save Iraq society from this abyss.

BW: What’s exactly the relationship between the Iraqi Freedom Congress and Worker-Communist Party of Iraq?

SA: As I said, Iraqi Freedom Congress began as a project of the Worker-Communist Party of Iraq. But now, after one year of this project, the Worker-Communist Party is just a member, like any party or organization. And our manifesto calls for every organization and every party to be a member of IFC if their manifesto does not have a contradiction with the Freedom Congress. For example, no Islamist party could be a member of the Iraqi Freedom Congress, because we have in our manifesto full equality between men and women. This is a contradiction with all of the agendas of the Islamist parties. After one year, there are many members, some more nationalist, some more Islamic. And Worker-Communist Party of Iraq has a right to build its faction and work to bring the policy of the IFC to the left. And the nationalist faction can work to push the policy of the IFC to the right. Yes, I am a member of the Worker-Communist Party of Iraq, but as leader of the Iraqi Freedom Congress, my duty is now to make a balance between right and the left in IFC.

BW: What groups would constitute the right of the IFC?

SA: If you look at the leadership of the Iraqi Freedom Congress, there are many people who are Muslims, who believe in Islam and pray, but also believe in the agenda of the IFC to establish a secular government. We also we have a Christian; and we have Communists and atheists. But all of the leadership believe in human identity, non-religious government, non-nationalist government, one Iraqi society with one identity—human identity.

BW: So the leadership is not entirely constituted by followers of the Worker-Communist Party, then?

SA: No, no. The Worker-Communist Party has a minority in the leadership, not a majority. The majority are independent people.

BW: And you returned to Iraq from Canada, to organize the IFC.

SA: Yes, in December 2005.

BW: Bringing the conversation back to where we began it: You say there’s a reluctance among activists in the United States to address the question of what happens after the occupation—that we see our responsibility ends with merely calling for bringing the troops home. And I think part of the reason for that is that Bush used this propaganda that we’re going to “liberate Iraq,” it was “Operation Iraqi Freedom.” So I think there is some legitimate wariness on the part of anti-war activists to the notion that it’s any of our business to “liberate” Iraq. And there’s a failure to draw a distinction between intervention to “liberate Iraq” (quote-unquote) and solidarity—trying to actually provide some human solidarity to the forces in Iraq that are trying to liberate their own country. You follow me? So this raises the question of what’s the best way to pose the issue so that people understand…

SA: Well, today I had an interview with the Boston Globe newspaper and they asked me the same question: if American forces go out, won’t there be chaos in Iraq? I said, “It is not chaos now?” It is chaos now. When you can be killed for 100 US dollars, this is not chaos? When people are killed just because of their [religious or ethnic] identity, this is not chaos? This is US propaganda. They ask me again, “You are against the political Islamist groups? If American forces were out of Iraq, then political Islam will get power.” I said, “Who brought political Islam in Iraq? Not the American forces, not the American occupation? Who put political Islam in power, who gave legitimacy to the Islamic constitution, who brought this order in which women and Sunni and Christians are second-class citizens?” If you go to the south of Iraq, controlled by the Shi’a militia, if you go to a government building in Basra, you see a big picture of Khamenei, the cleric of Iran. Music prohibited. Alcohol prohibited. Men and women doctors separated in the hospital. Jeans prohibited in Najaf. And if you go to the west of Iraq, the areas controlled by the Sunni militia, chewing gum prohibited…

BW: Chewing gum?

SA: Yeah, chewing gum prohibited.

BW: Why chewing gum?

SA: I don’t know why chewing gum prohibited, this is the rule of the Taliban, al-Zarqawi—the Sunnist group. And also, imposing the cover, the hejab, on women. And men must wear their beard a certain way. I don’t know if you remember my beard, but I have a short Western-style beard…

BW: You have sort of a goatee, as I recall it.

SA: Yes, and if they catch you shaving like that they will shave you with a stone and cut your head! This is going on every day in Ramadi. And they say if Americans go out, then political Islam gets power! Political Islam has power now! And the American administration has brought all these armed gangs to our society! If the American occupation leaves, first thing, we end the justification of the political Islamist groups to attack innocent people. When we end the occupation, they cannot justify their crimes. We can face all of these gangs. There is another perspective, another movement, that can rebuild society, that can establish security and stability, can establish a secular government. After 10 days in the United States, I believe if we show the American people this perspective, this alternative, we can stand together against the American administration and the propaganda of George Bush.

BW: Well, one response which I frequently get when I tell people about the existence of a civil resistance in Iraq, is: “Well, it’s a very nice idea, they’re very idealistic, but they’re doomed. And they have no chance to bring about any kind of change for the better because the ethnic and religious extremists are the people who have the power and have the guns.”

SA: Well, first thing. Till now, you know, the history of Iraqi society is a civilized one. And all of the crimes are happening by the sectarian parties, not by the ordinary people, and there is a very strong resistance against the ethnic conflict. But this is not a guarantee. I must tell you frankly, if a movement like IFC is not involved in this situation, Iraqi society could fall into a sectarian war and be like Kosovo and Rwanda and Lebanon. And we are facing a financial problem. All of the sectarian groups are supported by Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia. But our movement doesn’t get any support—only from the international human movement, from the anti-war movement.

You ask me, how to face the ethnic cleansing without the gun? I would like to tell you, every single house in Iraq has three guns and four guns. But if IFC were to mobilize these people to use their guns, [it will be] to prevent sectarian war, not to go to kill his neighbor because he is Shi’a or Sunna. We can defeat this ethnic cleansing. And now we have experience, organizing in many areas in Iraq, especially Baghdad and Kirkuk. We can organize and educate and mobilize people to never use those guns against their neighbor, never use them to kill innocent people because of their identity, only use them for self-defense. This is what we are doing in Iraq now.

BW: You acknowledge that there is at least a possibility that if the US leaves, things could continue to get worse?

SA: You know, if the American forces stay in Iraq, the situation is only going worse and worse…

BW: Right. I’m not making an argument for the US forces staying, but I think it’s important to recognize that at this point the situation is so bad, it could continue to deteriorate regardless of whether the US stays or the US goes. And I think activists in the United States—speaking as one—need to realize that our government’s actions created this ghastly situation and therefore our responsibilities to the Iraqi people do not end when the US occupation troops leave.

SA: This is I want to tell you. This is what pushed me to come to the United States. Our movement can prevent the sectarian war, can end the catastrophic situation, but we need support from the United States people; we need support from the West—all of the movements, the human movements, progressive movements in the world. We can do this; this is our job. We have a clear agenda, we have a clear program, and the people join us day-by-day, thousands of people. But we don’t have financial support, unfortunately, and we don’t have the moral support, unfortunately, from progressives outside Iraq. Nobody has heard until now that there is a secular movement in Iraq, a libertarian movement in Iraq. We want to tell the people of the United States there are people in Iraq thinking like them, thinking of a better life, thinking to build a democratic society, to give a human identity to this society. And they can trust this movement, we can do it if the occupation leaves of Iraq. Because, I say again, without the occupation, these sectarian gangs couldn’t continue their behavior. Because their justification would be gone.

BW: I understand it’s your special dream to establish a satellite television station, which would be a voice for secular progressive forces not only in Iraq but throughout the region.

SA: Yeah.

BW: And our friends in the Movement for Democratic Socialism in Japan have already started to raise money for this project.

SA: As you know—you participated in the international conference in solidarity with the IFC in Tokyo on January 28 to 29–a resolution was passed there to support this project, and our Japanese friends are working hard to achieve this. And I think we are going to open our satellite TV maybe in July or August…

BW: That soon? Of this year? Why, that’s a month and a half away!

SA: We got a very positive response from them and they told me just two days ago they want me to visit them in Japan after I finish my tour of the United States to have a meeting and arrange everything. We believe our movement is about to advance many steps forward. Because just as the people of the United States are victims of the media, victims of Fox News, so people in the Middle East are victims of al-Jazeera. But if we get this Iraqi Freedom Congress satellite TV, we can mobilize people. People in Iraq are waiting to hear another voice, a new voice, a human voice. Unfortunately, we have 12 satellite TV stations in Iraq, and they are all nationalist and ethnic TV, every day educating the people how to hate your neighbors because they are Sunni or Shi’a; how to hate your sister because she’s woman; how to educate your children to become suicide bombers. This is Iraqi satellite TV. If we get on satellite TV, there will a big change in our movement and our society.

BW: Samir Adil of the Iraqi Freedom Congress, I hope that the rest of your tour in the United States is very productive, and best of luck back in Iraq. And please, do stay in touch with us.

SA: Thank you very much.

Transcription by Melissa Jameson

RESOURCES:

Iraqi Freedom Congress (IFC)
http://www.ifcongress.com/

Letter from Samir Adil to the Leaders of the Southern Oil Trade Unions
http://www.ifcongress.com/English/News/mar06/union-leaders.htm

IFC statement to US anti-war forces
/node/1746

AFSC page on Samir Adil’s US tour
http://www.afsc.org/iraq/news/2006/04/beyond-dictators-and-occupation-way.htm

See also:

“HOUZAN MAHMOUD INTERVIEW:
The Iraqi Freedom Congress and the Civil Resistance,”
WW4 REPORT #120, April 2006
/node/1798

“Iraqi civil resistance leader confronts Richard Perle,” May 15
/node/1966

———————–
Special to WORLD WAR 4 REPORT, June 1, 2006
Reprinting permissible with attribution

Continue ReadingINTERVIEW: SAMIR ADIL