CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT ROCKS BOLIVIA

Deadly Violence as Draft Charter Approved

from the Andean Information Network

Meeting in a military academy on the outskirts of Sucre, Bolivia’s Constituent Assembly approved a new draft constitution late Nov. 24 with the support of 136 of the 255 delegates—with little presence by the conservative opposition. Protesters demanding greater autonomy for in Bolivia’s lowland east and a change of the national capital from La Paz to Sucre—traditional seat of the old oligarchy—meanwhile battled security forces, in violence that left three dead that weekend. The reform process initiated by President Evo Morales and his Movement to Socialism (MAS) is now being assailed as illegitimate by large swaths of Bolivia’s political elite. The Andean Information Network, based in Cochabamba, provides this report.

The chaotic conflict over the seat of the capital escalated over the weekend of Nov. 23-5, leaving three people dead and 200 wounded. The constitutional assembly’s refusal to reopen discussion about the capital issue sparked the protests. The protests once again turned violent with the assembly’s subsequent approval of a draft of a new constitution with the presence of only MAS representatives inside a military installation. Protests by civic groups spread from Sucre to Santa Cruz, Cochabamba and Tarija but, following the established cycle of conflict, the violence in Sucre has at least temporarily subsided. The issues raised by the clashes and the future of the new constitution will have a profound effect on future political developments, as opposing sectors have become even more firmly entrenched in their positions.

As in the January conflict in Cochabamba, the actions of the MAS government and those of Sucre leaders have exacerbated the situation. Both groups blame their political opponents for the violence and deaths, while neither has backed down or apologized. It is important to note, though, that the Bolivian military did not participate in efforts to control the protests, which could have led to a higher death toll. The police force has formally withdrawn from Sucre to Potosi after pro-Sucre protesters destroyed police vehicles and sacked police installations.

It is difficult to establish with precision the details of the conflict as the mainstream press has shown a bias in favor of pro-Sucre protesters and journalists have denounced physical abuse from police and threats from unidentified sources.

Suspended assembly reconvenes at military base

During the past three and a half months, attempts to reconvene the Constitutional Assembly in Sucre have been repeatedly thwarted by pro-Sucre protesters demanding the shift of the nation’s capital from La Paz to their city. Lowland departmental governments and other opposition groups support Sucre’s demand, apparently in an attempt to weaken the MAS power base. Beyond the political issues, moving the capital to the small, colonial city would be impractical and costly. The Sucre Civic Committee and a Pro-Sucre umbrella organization have repeatedly called for protests to put the capital issue on the assembly’s agenda and to prevent the assembly from meeting until it does so. The sometimes violent protests, which included beatings of some MAS assembly members, have made it impossible for the sessions to take place. The continual delays have increased pressure on MAS to comply with their campaign promise of a new constitution, as the Dec. 14 deadline to finish proceedings quickly approaches.

Although the assembly planned to convene on Nov. 9, pro-Sucre protesters burned tires and the door of the assembly headquarters the night before the scheduled meeting. The protesters also surrounded the building and detonated dynamite and firecrackers. The assembly leadership called off the meeting citing safety concerns. In response, pro-MAS social movements vowed to go to Sucre to defend the assembly and the new constitution. On Nov. 14 protests prevented another attempt to reinstate assembly proceedings.

On Nov. 23, MAS Assembly leadership transferred the proceedings to a military installation on the outskirts of Sucre from the centrally located theater the assembly has met in for the past fifteen months. The government declared the transfer legal and justified the move due to the lack of a guarantee of safety for assembly members. However, the change of location infuriated protesters and opposition groups, and the conflict escalated.

MAS aggravates conflict by approving a preliminary constitution

While protests raged just outside the base and throughout the city of Sucre, 136 MAS and allied party assembly members present at the military base voted to approve a draft of the constitution. At the Nov. 24 meeting just 139 of the 255 assembly members attended the meeting representing ten of the sixteen assembly political parties. Opposition members refused to attend the assembly session.

The approved text incorporates articles previously consented to by committees as well as MAS (majority) versions of articles on contentious issues. Preliminary reports suggest that topics in the draft include: the four levels of autonomy proposed by MAS (departmental, indigenous, municipal, and regional), state ownership of natural resources, a unicameral legislature, basic services such as water to be administered by public entities, a multiethnic plurinational state, free healthcare and education, the right to private property, the condemnation of large landholdings, the possibility of consecutive re-election of the president and vice president, the creation of referendums to revoke the mandates of elected leaders, referendums to approve international accords, and the intensification of the decentralization process.

MAS political opponents and opposition civic groups immediately announced that they will not accept the new constitutional draft. The protests that began Nov. 23 intensified and continued through the night of Nov. 25.

During the clashes four people died as a result of the protests. Although the National Police commander stated that no police officers used lethal weapons, news footage showed what appeared to be both plainclothes police officers and civilians with firearms.

* Gonzalo Durán Carazani, a 29-year-old lawyer and Sucre resident, died of a bullet wound in the chest near dawn on Nov. 24. According to Minister of the Presidency, Juan Ramon Quintana, the bullet that killed Duran was from a small caliber weapon, such as a .22, and was not fired by the security forces. Official autopsy reports have not been released.

* Juan Carlos Serrudo, a 25-year-old carpenter and Sucre resident died from the impact of a tear gas canister in his chest as protesters attempted to enter Traffic Police headquarters on Nov. 25.

* José Luis Cardozo, a 19-year-old university student received a bullet wound to the head on Saturday and died the morning of Nov. 26.

* Media reports vary on the number of wounded though it appears to be between 100 and 200 and Sucre hospitals are at capacity.

* Police had announced that protesters lynched Officer Jimmy Quispe Colque on Nov. 24 and threw his body into a ravine. On Nov. 27, Officer Quispe was found alive and had been in hiding in Potosi.

Pro-Sucre protesters attack police installations

Protesters attacked the governor’s office, police installations, and the prison. At the jail, protesters burned police vehicles and freed over 100 prisoners, although alternate accounts suggest that the police liberated them, fearing that protesters would set fire to the building. As the attacks against the police worsened, National Police Commander Miguel Vasquez lamented that Sucre civic leaders did nothing to impede or dissuade their followers from attacks on police property. He further stated that the police had no political position and that since their safety could not be guaranteed, the police forces present would leave Sucre and remain in Potosi until further notice.

Journalists denounced that police insulted and hit them, complaining that they were not reporting the dead and wounded in the police force.

After the police withdrawal, the Sucre Civic Committee called for people to calmly return to their homes. Due to the lack of police presence and unstable peace in the city, protests may begin again and rapid investigations appear improbable.

Placing the blame

Both MAS supporters and the opposition continue to deny any responsibility for the conflict, and continue to rely on inflamed rhetoric to blame their opponents instead of proposing compromises or solutions. MAS representatives blamed “fascists” from the opposition for instigating the protests. In a speech on Nov. 25, President Morales requested a full investigation of the protests and lamented that the citizens of Sucre “have been totally manipulated by groups that do not want the profound changes the new constitution will bring.” He stated that the opposition had raised a series of issues in an attempt to close the assembly, including the two-thirds voting regulations, private property and the location of the capital. “But the capital issue is the worst; without a doubt, it’s a [legitimate] demand of two departments, and we respect that, but now they’ve turned it into purely political issue.”

Government Minister Alfredo Rada blamed Sucre civic leaders Jhon Cava and Jaime Barron for the deaths. Cava and Barron in turn demanded a trial for Rada, who they claimed was unwilling to negotiate and came to command the repression of the protesters.

In a statement to the press, opposition leader Jorge Quiroga dramatically asked that President Morales not follow the “bad example” of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez. He went on to reject the MAS-approved draft of the constitution stating that it “is worth as much as used toilet paper… A constitution approved in a barracks by MAS members…stained with the blood of the people has no value, it is worth as much as the decrees that [dictators] García Meza and Arce Gomez sent from the barracks.” Quiroga did not make reference to the dictatorship of Hugo Banzer, for whom he later served as Vice President.

The governmental and business leaders of six of Bolivia’s nine departments called a work stoppage for Nov. 28 to protest the constitution approved by MAS, and blaming President Morales for the violence in Sucre. Santa Cruz business leader Branco Marinkovic stated, “We have nothing to do with the violence, the only one responsible is president Morales who sent the armed forces and police to repress his own people. He gave the order to kill and now wants to wash his hands like Pontius Pilate.”

Mediating the conflict?

It is unclear what the role of national human rights monitors has been in documenting the violence. The Human Rights Ombudsman, who is attending a conference in South Africa, offered to mediate in the conflict. A request for dialogue and investigations from the ombudsman will most likely be rejected by pro-Sucre groups, who perceive him to be too closely allied with the national government.

The Catholic Bishops conference has also emitted a statement offering to mediate, stating, “We ask that the political, social and civic leaders provide guidance to their rank and file by overcoming their biases to work for the pacification and well-being of the nation.” Opposition leader Jorge Quiroga’s request for Church mediation will likely lead MAS supporters to reject their offer.

As in previous conflicts, anti-MAS forces have called for intervention from international organizations, hoping that they would chastise the Morales administration. Santa Cruz Prefect Ruben Costas called for UN- or OAS-led investigations and intervention in the conflict. According to the Bolivian Government Information Agency, a spokesperson for the UN confirmed that the organization would intervene only in response to a specific request from the Bolivian government. A UN press release requested that all sides abstain from violence and seek consensus. The Minister of the Presidency discounted OAS intervention as unnecessary. In short, there appears to be no organization or entity that all sides in the conflict trust sufficiently to mediate in the increasingly polarized conflict.

Protests delay assembly further

After the Nov. 24 vote, Assembly president Silvia Lazarte said that the assembly would be on hold indefinitely until a special commission produces a proposal about contentious issues. According to assembly procedures, the next step is an article-by-article vote by the entire plenary. Then a revised draft must be approved by a two-thirds majority of the entire assembly. In a popular referendum, Bolivian citizens will vote between the majority and minority article proposals for any article that does not achieve a two-thirds approval. A second referendum will occur to approve the entire constitution. It’s unclear whether or not the assembly will stick to these procedures, and its approved timeline is unclear. Referring to the approval process, Lazarte stated, “all of this will be defined once I call a meeting of the assembly leadership.”

What will happen in the coming weeks remains unclear. The steps taken by MAS to move the process forward and to approve the preliminary text of the constitution in absence of opposition may create greater difficulties and frictions. With the December 14 deadline fast approaching, it remains to be seen whether the opposition will reenter the process. If the opposition continues to boycott the process, the assembly cannot approve anything by two-thirds, and thus every one of the 408 articles would have to be sent to the Bolivian public for approval. This would create almost insurmountable logistic difficulties in a referendum and could result in the further erosion of the legitimacy or the termination of the constitutional assembly.

The future of the constitutional process and a return to political stability in Bolivia depends on the ability of competing forces and interests groups to seek compromise. There is an acute need to enter into a genuine dialogue about how to peacefully coexist, instead of merely retreating to await future opportunities for conflict. Sadly, recent events suggest that this possibility is becoming increasingly distant.

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This story first appeared Nov. 26 on the Andean Information Network, and was also run by Upside Down World
http://upsidedownworld.org/main/content/view/1018/1/

See also:

BOLIVIA: END OF THE NEW SOCIAL PACT?
Fears of “Civil War” as Constituent Assembly Deadlocks
by Federico Fuentes, Green Left Weekly
WW4 REPORT, September 2007
/node/4363

From our weblog:

Bolivia: right-wing strikers pledge more protests
WW4 REPORT, Dec. 1, 2007
/node/4727

Bolivia: deadly unrest over autonomy plan
WW4 REPORT, Jan. 12, 2007
/node/3027

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Special to WORLD WAR 4 REPORT, Dec. 1, 2007
Reprinting permissible with attribution

Continue ReadingCONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT ROCKS BOLIVIA 

VENEZUELA’S CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM:

A Threat to What Was Won Through Struggle

from El Libertario, Caracas

This is the editorial from the November edition of the Venezuelan anarchist journal El Libertario, analyzing the controversy over the pending constitutional reform, from a position harshly critical of both the Hugo Chávez government and the conservative opposition. In El Libertario’s view, the conflict is between rival sectors of Venezuela’s elite for control of the country’s lucrative energy resources—with the Chavista sector now making a grab for total power. This translation provided by El Libertatio was slightly edited by WW4 REPORT.

Once again we must consider the dilemma of whether to participate or not in the electoral contest, this time with the difference that it is not a case of choosing a candidate but rather constitutional norms. This situation requires careful reflection. We have a ruling party that accepts en masse the reforms proposed by the Boss and increased embarrassingly in a premeditated manoeuvre by a servile National Assembly. The absurdities of the original constitutional reforms [of 1999] were so many that it set the scene for the comical debate which has resulted in a plastering of equally aberrant additions. There is no serious debate of content and reasons, only discourses that are submissive to the tyrant, without any other sustaining logic than the desire to keep him in power. On the other hand, the institutional opposition stumbles in the darkness, not knowing how to confront it, relying on discourses and spokesmen from the past. They content themselves with showing through the media a small part of the absurdities that the Constitutional Reform contains—precisely those parts that threaten their own narrow interests, such as the rule changes of the political game—without any clear position or concrete campaign.

Thus, we suggest that faced with the alternatives of either voting for the rejection of the Constitutional Reform or abstaining, it is better to renounce participation in the Referendum and promote abstention. The timid questions that arise from the grassroots supporters of the Chavez regime clearly demonstrate the general [low] level of analysis and understanding of the proposals, highlighting the infantilization of the discourse promoted equally by the leaders of the militaristic pseudo-left in power and the right-wing and social democrat opposition.

We can partially see the logic behind the rush to change what up until recently has been sold as the “best constitution in the world.” The oil bonanza allows the executive to increase its broad client network in readiness for the coming electoral showdown. In addition to this is the clear opportunism by which, bypassing proper electoral norms, the Government conducts its “Yes” campaign, forcing the support of public sector employees and everyone else who is dependent on public finance. The precariousness and lack of independence of the electoral process is illustrated by the trajectory of the last head of the CNE [National Electoral Council], Jorge Rodríguez, who is now Vice-President.

We believe that with or without voters, the Reform will be passed. However, through abstention it is possible to make it illegitimate, even when it is [technically] legal. A very low number of voters in the coming poll would be a way of debilitating the regime from making any further moves, demonstrating that there is no “revolution” in popular participation, but rather a deepening of presidential personalism. If you believe that this is unimportant because the Government will consolidate its power anyway (which will happen regardless), or because people prefer to be on the winning side even when its victory is deceitful or fraudulent, remember that there is always a space to negate the validity of the leadership due to its illegitimacy. An illegitimate Government, despite maintaining itself in power, dissolves the tacit relationship of obedience that the population bestows upon it, removing, even if partially, the collective acceptance of its activity, and thus the implementation of its mandates have to based increasingly on the authoritarian exercise of power.

A significant abstention would mark the separation of the people, their aspirations and desires from those who hold State power, breaking the voluntary servitude that makes it possible to govern. It would also highlight the failure of the State as an institution that manages collective life… Of course the transition from the current situation to a clear and coherent horizon of social justice and liberty will not be achieved in a short period of time. The avoidance of shortcuts and a focusing on the reconstruction of intransigent and autonomous grassroots social movements is, without doubt, a long road, but it is also the most realist. A first step in this direction would be a complete understanding of what confronts us in this country, a perspective that is both realist and utopian, which will not be found in the ballot boxes this December.

It is also relevant to consider the situation after the ineluctable ratification of the Reform. From January 2008, new powers granted by the National Assembly to the President, based in the approved constitution and through the mechanism of the Ley Habilitante (which gives Chavez the ability to pass laws without recourse to Congress) will be established. It will be necessary to withhold efficiency from the offensive prepared by the ruling party in order to have absolute power…. We underline the fact that Governmental and State actions to imprison public opinion in their own hands have already begun. This process implies a set of measures tending towards silencing dissidence, criminalizing protest, squashing any sort of opposition to the State and leading the country in an authoritarian manner, ready to punish dissenting attitudes…

The State’s economic boom is not exclusively subordinate to the price of a barrel of oil… The plans for social support are financially backed up by the current surplus of funds, but if this ceased to be the case, due to the overwhelming financial liabilities of the state, it would be necessary to employ regressive policies that would negatively affect the population such as devaluations, tax increases, cutbacks in the Misiones program [grassroots development initiative] and other measures… These factors will generate social conflicts that will be suffocated by different repressive means according to each case.

Faced with this panorama, those of us who don’t renounce liberty and social justice must prepare ourselves to confront a general increase of coercion and collective control. This must be done without becoming paranoid; we know that we are not faced with the military government of Myanmar but rather an expression of neo-militarism as an efficient model for maintaining the despotic domination of Venezuelan society, in the service of the global energy market. All of this suggests that we must prepare ourselves for the escalation of repression, legitimized by the constitution that will be approved in December and that will consecrate the architecture of the totalitarian State. Moving beyond the conservative and reactionary elements of the media-driven opposition, the social struggle must confront the governmental Leviathan by developing new, creative and unexpected forms of organization and resistance.

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This article first appeared in the November issue of El Libertario, Caracas
http://www.nodo50.org/ellibertario

RESOURCES

Text of the Ley Habilitante
Venezuelan Ministry of Popular Power
http://www.mintra.gov.ve/legal/leyesordinarias/leyhabilitante.html

Misiones Bolivarianas
Venezuelan Ministry of Popular Power
http://www.misionesbolivarianas.gob.ve/

See also:

FREE SPEECH IN VENEZUELA
The case of RCTV and the fictional democratization of communication
from El Libertario, Caracas
WW4 REPORT, July 2007
/node/4155

From our weblog:

Venezuela destabilization document emerges: real?
WW4 REPORT, Dec. 1, 2007
/node/4726

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Reprinted by WORLD WAR 4 REPORT, Dec. 1, 2007
Reprinting permissible with attribution

Continue ReadingVENEZUELA’S CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM: 

VENEZUELA’S CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM:

What’s at Stake

by Sujatha Fernandes, ZNet

On Sunday Dec. 2, Venezuelans will return to the voting booths to ratify or reject two slates of constitutional reforms, 33 of which have been proposed by President Hugo Chávez and 36 additional reforms made by the National Assembly. Included in the proposed reforms to Venezuela’s 1999 constitution are an increase in the presidential term from six to seven years and a removal of the two-term limit, a shortening of the work week to 36 hours, the suppression of the right to information during national emergencies, the elimination of the autonomy of the central bank, increased funding for communal councils, the creation of new forms of collective property, the requirement of gender parity in positions of public office, and the recognition of Afro-Venezuelan groups, in addition to indigenous groups included in the previous reforms.

This mixed bag of proposed reforms has provoked polarized reactions across the country, and from international observers. The familiar cries of “dictadura” (dictatorship) coming from the opposition camp are no surprise, but the student protests coming out of the main public and private universities of Caracas, and the renegade voices within Chávez’s own administration have caused some confusion over where the fault lines lie. Some social movements supporting Chávez have been concerned that retrogressive proposals are mixed together with progressive reforms, making it difficult to campaign and vote on the issues as a bloc. What is at stake in Venezuela’s upcoming reform referendum? Does the outcry over the reforms signal yet again the frustrations of a thwarted opposition in its ongoing tussles with the government, or is there something more at play?

It is important to understand the anatomy of the various social forces who have thrown their hat into the ring. The long-term anti-Chavista camp, opposed to the proposed reforms, is divided over what strategy to take to the reform referendum. Some opposition parties, including Primero Justicia, Un Nuevo Tiempo, and the Christian Democratic COPEI have begun a campaign to encourage people to vote “No” to the reforms. By contrast, the National Resistance Command, which includes opposition parties such as Acción Democrática (AD), Alianza Bravo Pueblo and Bandera Roja called for a boycotting of the referendum and have mobilized people in the streets for their cause, although the AD retracted this position and joined the “No” campaign just a few days later. Like in earlier moments, the opposition’s indecisiveness and its inability to come to a united decision about how to confront Chávez has weakened its political impact.

In a surprising move, Chávez’s former Defense Minister Raul Isais Baduel who had played an important role in restoring Chávez to power during the 2002 coup, also came out against the constitutional reforms and urged people to vote “No” in the upcoming referendum. The former army commander described the changes as a “coup d’état” that would concentrate further power in the hands of the president, saying that there was no need to overhaul the 1999 constitution. Some were concerned that the defection of a senior military figure could have an impact on the armed forces, but so far there is no indication that this should be the case. It also seems that Baduel’s opposition stems from his concerns over the proposed changes to Article 328, which would require changes to the structure of the Armed Forces.

Resistance to the reforms has also come from opposition-identified student protesters from the large public Universidad Central de Venezuela (UCV), as well as private institutions such as the Andrés Bello Catholic University and the Universidad Simón Bolívar (USB). During October and early November, students marched four times to the National Assembly, the National Electoral Council (CNE), and the Supreme Court to demand that the referendum be stopped. The students attacked security forces with rocks and bottles, breaking down security barriers, and starting fires, and the forces responded with tear gas and water cannons, producing violent clashes in the streets that received national and international coverage. Pro-Chávez students organized counter-rallies to protest in support of the reforms. The pro- and anti-Chávez student activists are divided along class lines, with aspiring upwardly mobile or privileged elite students forming the core of the large demonstrations that are opposing the reforms.

The violence between anti-Chávez and pro-Chávez students reached a climax on Nov. 7, when a group of opposition students returning to the UCV from a rally surrounded the School of Social Work, a traditionally left-wing division, and held a siege of the building where 123 pro-Chávez students and staff had been making posters and planning their activities for the “Yes” campaign. In the opposition-controlled media, the events were falsely reported as a case of masked gunmen who opened fire on peaceful opposition student protesters.

On the day that the National Assembly approved the set of proposed reforms to go before a public referendum, José Manuel González, the president of Fedecámaras, the Venezuelan business association, announced that “Venezuelan democracy was buried today.” Opposition parties and media, the business federation, Gen. Baduel, and opposition-identified students all frame their disapproval of the reforms as a concern that democracy is being eroded. This framing is consistent with the charges that the opposition has leveled at the Chávez government from the start, and is in keeping with their limited notion of democracy as procedural democracy.

Procedural democracy, derived from Western experiences of representative government, is based on the rule of law, free and fair elections, and a separation of powers between the executive, legislative, and the judicial branches of government. At the time of the drawing up of the 1999 constitution, opposition critics complained that the executive branch was being expanded at the expense of other branches. The opposition expressed concerns that Chávez threatened judicial autonomy by intervening in the court system through disbarring judges and increasing the size of the Supreme Court, and that he had unduly increased the power of the military. They continue to make the same charges against the current proposed reforms to expand the presidential term by a year and remove limits on holding office, saying that this concentrates power in the executive.

Yet this focus on procedural democracy functions as a means of protecting hierarchies of existing power. The abstract concepts of the rule of law, separation of powers, and procedure inherent in liberal discourse assume the participation of rational, autonomous individuals who share equality under the law, without taking into account the tremendous inequalities in Venezuelan society. For marginal sectors, the liberal logic of procedural democracy can not be easily reconciled with histories of discrimination in a class and racially stratified landscape. Some have argued that the greater power being given to the executive may indeed be necessary in order to bring about the redistribution of social wealth and property that could alter the entrenched class structure.

At the same time, some in the Chavista camp are also uneasy about the reforms, albeit for different reasons. In October, community media activists from the National Association of Free and Alternative Media (ANMCLA) had expressed concern over the proposed changes to Article 337, which would remove the right to information of citizens during states of emergency. The move was justified by the Chávez government as a response to the manipulation by the media that took place during the 2002 coup. But activists from ANMCLA see the proposed restrictions on the right to information during times of emergency as dangerous recourse to a tool that has been used by powerful sectors throughout Latin American history to detain, persecute, and silence the population. The revolution should not be defended through censorship, argue ANMCLA, but rather through millions of voices on the air, as demonstrated during the 2002 coup.

The Agency of Alternative News (ANA), the ANMCLA agency that provides an alternative news source to the government-controlled Bolivarian Agency of News (ABN), also circulated a piece written by UCV Sociologist Javier Biardeau that questioned the route of constitutional reform as a means to effect changes in Venezuelan society. Referring to reforms in the legal arena as a “minefield,” Biardeau argues that constitutional reforms are a limited means to transform the state in a transition towards socialism. He concurs with journalist and blogger José Roberto Duque, who acknowledges that the constitutional reform is an attempt to accelerate and deepen the revolutionary process, but that for the moment it has only succeeded in sparking some dramatic exchanges without really touching any powerful interests.

The path of constitutional reform by plebiscite that has been taken by the Chávez government has also closed off other, more inclusive forums for the discussion of changes to the constitution. Rather than having a small group of representatives decide on the proposed reforms and then put them to the people in a referendum, Biardeau argues that it would have been preferable to convoke another Constituent Assembly to allow for a public debate and the broad participation of a range of social movements and popular groups. Through the proposed reforms, argues Biardeau, “21st century socialism” is being decreed from above rather than democratically debated and given substance from below.

As can be seen from the criticisms coming from social movements and commentators supportive of the Chávez government, it is possible and necessary to criticize the state’s attempts to monopolize power, not in the name of a procedural democracy, as the free-market proponents of the opposition would have it, but rather in the name of a substantive democracy that puts decision-making power in the hands of people organized within communal councils, assemblies, and popular organizations. On this account, “participation” is not limited to campaigning and mobilizing people to vote in the recall referendum on articles that have already been decided by a small group of representatives. It aspires to a local level of decision-making that would have people themselves determine the content of their laws and institutions.

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This story first appeared Nov. 11 on ZNet, and was also run by Upside Down World
http://upsidedownworld.org/main/content/view/1000/68/

From our weblog:

Venezuela destabilization document emerges: real?
WW4 REPORT, Dec. 1, 2007
/node/4726

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Reprinted by WORLD WAR 4 REPORT, Dec. 1, 2007
Reprinting permissible with attribution

Continue ReadingVENEZUELA’S CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM: