CIVIL WARS, NORTH AND SOUTH

Perspectives on Colombia from the US Civil War

by Paul Wolf, Upside Down World

On February 4, up to a million Colombians participated in public demonstrations against the FARC insurgency. Organized by supporters of President Alvaro Uribe Velez, the call of the day was to denounce the terrorists.

The propagandistic depiction of guerrilla terrorism is being used to mobilize advocacy of an equally indiscriminate and destructive counter-terrorism. In Colombia, there is a self-righteous condemnation on every conceivable ground of those who oppose the government, a total war against those openly associated with the insurgency, as well as a secret diplomacy that seeks to lure moderates into co-optation and support for the regime. Those caught in the middle are asked to choose sides.

Colombia has endured an uninterrupted, low-intensity civil war since about 1948. Even before then, Colombia’s history since its independence was one of civil war interrupted by periods of peace. And yet, despite hundreds of thousands of casualties in the last sixty years alone, the government denies the existence of an insurgency within its borders. Too weak to seize power, but too strong to defeat, the rebels have now been recognized by neighboring Venezuela as belligerent armies. A review of the application of International Humanitarian Law to the US Civil War provides a surprising perspective.

Flashback to the US Civil War

[T]he Federal Army has made no progress in subduing the Insurgent States. — I agree with you that the time is come for offering Mediation to the United States Government, with a view to the recognition of the Independence of the Confederates. I agree further that in case of failure, we ought ourselves to recognize the Southern States, as an Independent State.

Letter from British Foreign Minister Lord John Russell to British Prime Minister Lord Palmerston, Sept. 17, 1862.

British recognition of the Confederacy was never to materialize. Only a month after this was written, and after news of the Northern victory at Antietam was received, and Lincoln’s preliminary Emancipation Proclamation heard round the world, the British Cabinet “doubted the policy of moving, or moving at this time.” One can hardly imagine what might have happened if the Cabinet had moved earlier.

Francis Lieber was a nineteenth-century liberal author of a textbook on international law. A German immigrant, Lieber had been a slave-owner while teaching law at South Carolina College. After attending Columbia College in New York, he became enlightened to the idea that slavery was immoral, and became an outspoken advocate for the Union cause. Three of his sons fought in the US Civil War, on different sides. One of them, a Confederate, died in the battle of Williamsburg.

After the US Supreme Court’s decision in The Prize Cases, recognizing the rebellion in the United States as a civil war, both sides attempted to apply the laws of war, but these rules were not well known. Lieber’s article, “Guerrilla Parties Considered in Reference to the Laws and Usages of War,” soon attracted the attention of the Union Army. After revision by a board of army officers, it was published by the War Department in 1863 as General Orders No. 100, “Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field.” Known as Lieber’s Code, it has been revised and renamed several times, including as the Hague Regulations of 1899 on the “Rules of Land Warfare.” In 1956 the US Army renamed it the “Law of Land Warfare, Basic Field Manual 27-10.” Lieber’s article was the first codification of what is now called International Humanitarian Law, or the laws of war. It’s noteworthy that the first systematic classification of the laws of war was made in the context of a civil war. Lieber wrote:

I had no guide, no groundwork, no textbook. I can assure you, as a friend that no counsellor of Justinian sat down at his task of the Digest with a deeper feeling of the gravity of his labor, than filled my breast in the laying down for the first time such a code, where nearly everything was floating. Usage, history, reason, and conscientiousness, a sincere love of truth, justice and civilization, have been my guides; but of course the whole must be still imperfect.

One of the most basic principles of Lieber’s Civil War code was that enemy troops were to be taken prisoner, if possible, rather than killed. Troops could refuse to give quarter “only by [order of] the commander in great straits making encumberment by prisoners impossible.”

The rebels were to be treated as prisoners of war when captured. The Code defined combatants in fairly broad terms. Not only captured enemy soldiers, but civilians attached to the enemy army, high ranking officials of the enemy government, and diplomatic agents without a safe conduct could be legally taken as prisoners of war. Hostages, if taken, “rare in modern war,” must be treated as prisoners of war, but chaplains, doctors, and nurses should be left free unless detained for special reasons, in which case they should be exchanged. The North had threatened to treat officers and crew of Confederate privateers as pirates, but this was never carried out, perhaps due to threats of retaliation. It would have been illegal to treat them as pirates, since they were members of a belligerent force.

Even had they engaged in piracy, though, the North would have been obligated to treat them as prisoners of war. An interesting example occurred in 1885 in the District Court of New York, when Judge Brown held that a vessel of Colombian insurgents, captured on the high seas by the US Navy and condemned for piracy, was engaged in “an expedition technically piratical” when captured. The judge released the vessel under the mistaken belief that the Secretary of State had recognized the belligerency of the Colombian insurgents. (US v. Ambrose Light, 1885)

Lieber’s Code provided for, but did not require, the exchange of prisoners. The North and South did exchange prisoners on the initiative of President Lincoln, although the North agreed to these exchanges rarely, taking advantage of the South’s manpower shortage. Deserters, if recaptured, could suffer death. An uprising by the inhabitants of an occupied area constituted a crime, and could be punished in the courts martial of the occupier. Scouts in disguise, armed prowlers, war rebels in occupied territory; spies, traitors, and war traitors; voluntary guides, and guides proven to have intentionally misled, could be punished by death if caught in the act.

The placing of bounties on the heads of enemy leaders was considered a war crime. “Civilized nations look with horror upon offers of rewards for the assassination of enemies as relapses into barbarism.”

Lieber’s Code, as applied in the Civil War, also recognized the principles of the laws of war concerning property. Public property of the enemy could be appropriated. “Strictly private property” would be protected in occupied territory, but the “victorious invader” retained the right to tax the people or their property and to appropriate property such as homes, land, boats, and even churches for temporary and military uses.

The US Civil War resulted in numerous court battles over the ownership of property after the war, and reparations to be paid for property taken by one of the belligerents. It was held after the war, in courts in the United States, Great Britain, and international arbitral tribunals, that the United States was not, as a rule, responsible to foreign states for property losses or other injuries to their nationals caused by the Confederates, even if the foreign state had not recognized the belligerency of the South. In this way, the North had limited its civil liability through the recognition of belligerent status to the Confederacy.

By Civil War Standards, Venezuela’s Recognition was a Hostile Act

“Unless justified by necessity, [the recognition of belligerency by a third state] is always and justly regarded as an unfriendly act and a gratuitous demonstration of moral support to the rebellion.”

General Grant’s message to the US Congress, December 7, 1875

Venezuela’s recognition of the belligerent status of Colombian FARC and ELN rebels indicates, at the very least, that rebels found in Venezuela would not generally be extraditable if they had not violated the laws of war. For extradition to occur, the crime must be a crime in both countries. This is called the principle of dual criminality. Lawful acts of war, when committed by belligerents, are not crimes.

Secondly, the formal recognition of belligerent status to Colombian guerrillas opens the door for Venezuelan diplomacy with the government and the rebels on equal terms. In some respects, this is what Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez is doing now, as unofficial mediator of Colombia’s negotiations with the FARC.

Third, and what should be obvious after reading this article, is that Venezuela has provided the FARC with a forum to argue for the legitimacy of most of its practices, which are condemned all over the world—yet do not violate the laws of war, at least as conceived by Francis Lieber and applied in the US Civil War. If the FARC were a belligerent force, it would have the legal right to tax the part of the country it occupies. It could imprison those who did not pay the tax. It would have the right to detain high-ranking government officials, and diplomats traveling through its territory without safe conducts, as prisoners of war. It would have the right to execute captured intelligence agents. A prisoner exchange would be a perfectly reasonable thing to propose. None of this would be considered hostage-taking.

Even the FARC’s taxing of coca growers within its territory would not be a violation of the laws of war. Presuming the FARC were a belligerent occupying force, it could legalize coca. Coca leaves are already legal in many countries in South America, most notably Bolivia and Peru. Bolivian President Evo Morales was elected by coca growers, and he has at various times proposed legalizing cocaine. Presumably, Bolivia has not done so because it does not want to be isolated internationally. The point of all this is that growing coca or taxing coca growers is not a war crime.

On the other hand, the government’s placing of “dead or alive” bounties on the heads of guerrilla leaders, in the words of Francis Lieber, is a relapse into barbarism.

As a neutral state, Venezuela is under no obligation to assist the government of Colombia in its war against the insurgents. In fact, it is prohibited from doing so. This is quite removed from the ordinary cooperation between states in matters of law enforcement. And, to the dismay of many observers, it could indicate a willingness on the part of Venezuela to support the insurgents, in some way short of illegal intervention.

Colombia follows the lead of the United States, which in the case of third world insurgencies, equates revolutionary violence with terrorism. Any act by the revolutionaries is inherently terrorist. Any response by the established government is inherently counter-terrorist. But it’s hypocritical and moralistic to ask revolutionary groups to adhere to higher moral standards than those accepted by states. It is also unrealistic and unjust to insist that victims of state terror acquiesce in their repression.

Respect for the principle of self-determination of people, and the duty of states to develop self-government in their non-self-governing territories are basic tenets of the United Nations Charter. When self-rule is denied, the result can be violent revolution. This is the basic problem in Colombia, not terrorism.

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Paul Wolf is a lawyer in Washington, D.C. practicing international human rights law. Permission to reprint this article is granted. Much of it is based on the scholarly research of Richard Falk.

RESOURCES:

Richard Falk, ed., The International Law of Civil War (Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, US, 1971)

See also:

BOLIVAR’S SWORD
Venezuela’s Recognition of the Colombian Insurgency
by Paul Wolf
WW4 Report, February 2008
/node/4963

From our weblog:

FARC commander killed in raid on Ecuador; Chávez warns of “war”
WW4 Report, March 2, 2008
/node/5185

FARC free four more hostages
WW4 Report, Feb. 29, 2008
//node/5169

Uribe exploits mobilization against FARC
WW4 Report, Feb. 7, 2008
//node/5055

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Reprinted by World War 4 Report, March 1, 2008
Reprinting permissible with attribution

Continue ReadingCIVIL WARS, NORTH AND SOUTH 

CANADA’S “OPEN SECRET”: DEEP COMPLICITY IN THE IRAQ WAR

by Richard Sanders, Coalition to Oppose the Arms Trade

A Canadian Brigadier General, Nicolas Matern, has just arrived in Baghdad. This former commander of Canada’s Joint Task Force 2 counter-terrorism unit is the deputy commander of the US 18th Airborne Corps and he now reports to Lt. Gen. Lloyd Austin III, who leads the 170,000-strong Multi-National Corps—Iraq. Its primary task is to conduct “offensive operations to defeat remaining non-compliant forces.”

Matern is the third Canadian Forces (CF) general to help lead a command group overseeing the US-led war in Iraq. His predecessor, CF Maj. Gen. Peter Devlin was the Deputy Commander General of the Multi-National Force—Iraq since December 2006.

Prior to Devlin’s posting, which started in January 2004, CF Maj. Gen. Walt Natynczyk commanded ten brigades totaling 35,000 troops stationed throughout Iraq. When Gov. Gen. Adrienne Clarkson gave Natynczyk Canada’s Meritorious Service Cross, her office extolled his “pivotal role in the development of numerous plans and operations [which] resulted in a tremendous contribution to…Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, and…brought great credit to the Canadian Forces and to Canada.”

It may come as a surprise to most Canadians—including many peace activists in this country, that Canada is even involved in the Iraq war. Even more shocking may be the news that the provision of top CF personnel to command posts in Iraq is but one example among many contributions that the Canadian government has made to this US-led war.

Unfortunately, the Liberal government’s 2003 pretense that Canada was opting out of participation in Iraq has been repeated so many times that it has become accepted as the truth. Even when presented with multifarious examples of Canada’s complicity in this war, some Canadians are loath to believe it. The fact that the Canadian government has been a major player in the Iraq war since its very inception, also directly contradicts the powerful national myth that Canada is a global force for peace.

This Canadian myth has taken on the appearance of a state religion and some of its faithful adherents demonstrate a strong reluctance to question it. This is evident in [social networking site] Rabble’s online “left-wing discussion forum” (called Babble) where a debate has raged since the publication of an earlier version of this article appeared in Vancouver’s Common Ground magazine (February 2008).

While many Canadians, even some on the “left,” have difficulty accepting the reality that Canada is deeply engaged in the Iraq war, this fact was admitted early on by then-US Ambassador to Canada, Paul Cellucci. On March 25, 2003, during the “shock and awe” bombardment of Iraq, Cellucci gratefully acknowledged to members of the posh Economic Club of Toronto, that “ironically, Canadian naval vessels, aircraft and personnel…will supply more support to this war in Iraq indirectly…than most of those 46 countries that are fully supporting our efforts there.”

Although Cellucci’s statement merely scratched the surface of Canada’s initial “support” for the Iraq war, at least he let the cat out of the bag. As then-Secretary of State Colin Powell had explained a week earlier, “We now have a coalition of the willing…who have publicly said they could be included in such a listing…. And there are 15 other nations, who, for one reason or another do not wish to be publicly named but will be supporting the coalition.”

Canada was, and still is, the leading member of this secret group, which we could perhaps call CW-HUSH, the “Coalition of the Willing to Help but Unwilling to be Seen Helping.”

The plan worked. Most Canadians still proudly believe that their government refused to join the Iraq war. Nothing could be further from the truth. Here are some of the ways in which our government joined the fray:

Protecting and Supporting the Coalition Navy:
Thirteen hundred Canadian troops aboard four of Canada’s multi-billion dollar warships escorted the multinational fleet, including US aircraft carriers, through the Persian Gulf and right up to the shores of Kuwait, thus putting them safely in place to bomb Iraq. Besides performing such “force-protection operations,” Canadian frigates also contributed vital “fleet-support” functions to coalition warships.

Leading the Coalition Navy:
Canadian Rear-Admiral Roger Girouard commanded Coalition Task Force 151, leading 20 warships from six countries during the “shock and awe” bombardment of Iraq which killed thousands of innocent people.

Providing War Planners:
At least two dozen Canadian war planners working at US Central Command in Florida were transferred to the Persian Gulf in early 2003 to help oversee the war’s complicated logistics.

Helping Coordinate the War:
Canadian military personnel, working aboard American E-3 Airborne Warning and Control System warplanes, helped direct the electronic war by providing surveillance, command, control and communications services to US war-fighters.

Providing Airspace and Refueling:
Countless US warplanes carrying troops and equipment have flown over Canada, to and from the Iraq war. With as many as two or three such flights a day and carrying about a thousand US troops to battle, many such warplanes were allowed to refuel in Gander, Newfoundland.

Providing Air Transport:
At least three Canadian CC-130 military transport planes were listed by the US military as helping supply coalition forces during the Iraq war.

Freeing up US Troops:
Canada’s major role in the Afghan war has freed up many thousands of US troops for deployment to Iraq.

Providing Ground Troops:
At least 35 Canadian soldiers were directly under US command, in an exchange capacity, on the ground, participating in the invasion of Iraq.

Facilitating US Weapons Testing:
Two types of cruise missiles (AGM-86 and -129) and the Global Hawk (RQ-4A) surveillance drone, used in Iraq, were tested over Canada.

Depleted Uranium (DU) Weapons:
Canada is the world’s top exporter of uranium. Our government pretends that Canada’s uranium is sold for peaceful purposes only, but absolutely nothing is done to stop the U.S. from using DU in their weapons. America’s A-10 Wart Hog warplanes have fired DU munitions in Yugoslavia, Afghanistan and Iraq, while each cruise missile contains three kgs of DU ballast.

Providing RADARSAT Data:
Eagle Vision, a US Air Force mobile ground station which controls Canada’s RADARSAT-1 satellite and downlinks its data was used from the start of the Iraq war. Since December 2007, RADARSAT-2 data has also been available to US warfighters in Iraq.

Diplomatic Support:
Then-Prime Minister Jean Chrétien supported the right of the US to invade Iraq, although Kofi Annan said it was an illegal occupation. Chrétien “urged Canadians…not to criticize the US for attacking Iraq,” saying that to do so “would comfort Saddam Hussein.”

Training Iraqi Police:
Canada has spent millions sending RCMP officers to Jordan to train tens of thousands of cadets for Iraq’s paramilitary police force.

Training Iraqi Troops:
High-level Canadian military personnel joined the NATO Training Mission in Iraq to train the trainers of Iraqi Security Forces who are on the leading edge of the US occupation. A Canadian colonel, under NATO command, was chief of staff at the Baghdad-based training mission. Canada was the leading donor to this centre, providing an initial $810 thousand.

Funding Iraq’s Interior Ministry:
Canada provides advisers and financial support to this Ministry which has been caught running torture centers. Thousands of its officers have been withdrawn for corruption, and it has been accused of working with death squads that executed a thousand people per month in Baghdad alone during the summer of 2006.

Military Exports:
At least 100 Canadian companies sold parts and/or services for major weapons systems used in the Iraq war. For example, Quebec-based SNC-TEC sold millions of bullets to the US military forces occupying Iraq. General Dynamics Canada, in London Ontario, sold hundreds of armoured vehicles to the US and Australia. Between October 2003 and November 2005, these troop transport vehicles logged over 6 million miles in Iraq. And, Winnipeg’s Bristol Aerospace sells cluster-bomb dispensing warheads used by US aircraft in Iraq.

Canada Pension Plan (CPP) Investments:
The CPP forces working Canadians outside Quebec to invest their pension money in hundreds of military industries, including most of the world’s top 20 weapons producers. These CPP investments include the leading prime contractors for virtually all the major US weapons systems used in Iraq.

So, the next time a proud fellow citizen tells you that Canada didn’t join the Iraq war, refer them to this article and then remind them of Mark Twain’s famous qwip: “It ain’t what you don’t know that gets you into trouble. It’s what you know for sure that just ain’t so.”

—-

This article first appeared on the website of the Ottawa-based Coalition to Oppose the Arms Trade (COAT).

RESOURCES:

Common Ground magazine
http://commonground.ca/

Babble
http://www.rabble.ca/babble/

From our weblog:

Kandahar carnage; Canada sends in the drones
WW4 Report, Feb. 24, 2008
/node/5130

From our archive:

The invasion begins
WW4 Report, March 23, 2003
/static/78.html#iraq1

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Reprinted by World War 4 Report, March 1, 2008
Reprinting permissible with attribution

Continue ReadingCANADA’S “OPEN SECRET”: DEEP COMPLICITY IN THE IRAQ WAR 

THREATENED GROVES OF GALILEE

Palestinians Struggle for Land and Dignity—Inside the Green Line

Ramzi Shahadeh” title=”Ramzi Shahadeh” class=”image thumbnail” height=”100″ width=”75″>Ramzi Shahadeh

by Saady Abu-Hatoum, Arab Association for Human Rights

In the United States and other Western countries, the symbol of the campaign for nuclear disarmament has gradually become a recognized emblem of peace. In the Middle East, however, peace is symbolized by a dove bearing an olive leaf. This symbol has its origins in the Biblical story of Noah, who stayed in the ark until he sent out a dove to see whether the flood was over. When the dove returned to the ark with an olive leaf in its beak, he understood that the waters had receded and the ark could be opened.

In Middle Eastern culture the olive tree has become the main symbol of stability, tranquility and peace. The olive tree also symbolizes the eternal bond between humans and the land. On November 13, 1974, when Yasser Arafat spoke at the UN Assembly in New York for the first time as the representative of the Palestinian people, he famously commented: “Today I have come bearing an olive branch and a freedom fighter’s gun. Do not let the olive branch fall from my hand.”

Palestine has always been closely associated with the olive tree. The native Palestinians admired the olive for its splendid appearance, with its fresh green leaves and powerful roots that can penetrate rocks, and for the diverse properties of olives and olive oil. Olives are used as a staple food item, while olive oil is used for lighting, moisturizing the skin, curing various ailments and wounds, and strengthening the skin and muscles. Olives were also used to manufacture ink and soap. The olive tree has a remarkable capacity to bear fruit over hundreds and even thousands of years. In the Galilee and Jerusalem there are some olive trees that are over two thousand years old and which still bear fruit.

The unique qualities of the olive tree made it an emblem of the Palestinian people’s struggle against the Israeli occupier, a symbol of sumoud (steadfastness) in the face of draconian occupation, and a metaphor for the people’s deep roots in the land—roots that cannot be torn up by any external power. In the occupied territories many cases have been seen in which olive trees have been uprooted by bulldozers on the pretext of “security,” in order to expand settlements or build the “separation barrier”—and always at the expense of Palestinian land. For Palestinians, the uprooting of olive trees symbolizes the effort by Israel to tear up the Palestinian people’s deep roots in the land. Such acts carry an implicit message from the Israeli side: “You have no roots here and no rights to this land.” Uprooting olive trees also symbolizes the trampling by Israel of any chance for peace and calm in this small piece of land.

The incident detailed in this report offers a powerful illustration of Israel’s attitude toward the Arab citizens in terms of the usurping of land and the uprooting of olive trees.

On June 14, 2007, bulldozers from the Ministry of the Interior and the Israel Lands Administration uprooted dozens of olive trees belonging to the residents of the Arab village of al-Mashhad in the Galilee, claiming that the land had been confiscated in favor of the Jewish city of Nazareth Illit (Upper Nazareth). Several members of the Shahadeh family (one of the landowning families in the village) were arrested when they attempted to enter their land after the police had surrounded the area. The uprooted trees were left in the orchard, and the next day the landowners and some of the residents of al-Mashhad replanted the uprooted trees, along with new saplings. Since this incident the residents have established a protest tent on the site, with a permanent presence at all times. Khalid Kraim, a member of the Popular Committee Against the Confiscation of the Lands of al-Mashhad, comes from a family that owns one of the plots of land earmarked for confiscation. Kraim explains, “We established the protest tent to prove to all of those who are planning to usurp our land that the owners will not let this happen again. With the help of our relatives and some of the residents of the village we defended our land, taking turns guarding around the clock. We want to prevent any attempt by the authorities to come here again and damage the area.”

On January 15, 2008, approximately six months after the first incident, the residents left the protest tent, assuming that time had passed and the issue had been forgotten. The very same day, in a carefully planned operation, a large police force arrived, accompanied by bulldozers, and uprooted over 400 olive trees.

The land in question covers an area of approximately 16 acres. According to the Nazareth Illit municipality, it was confiscated in 1976, but the confiscation was never executed. In 1996, Israeli Interior Minister Chaim Ramon decided to nullify part of the confiscation order. Two years ago a hearing on the issue took place in the high court. The original landowners argued that the confiscation order had become obsolete after remaining unexecuted for such a long period. The court decided that the land would not be returned to its owners, but should be left as a green area, as stated in the confiscation orders and the outline plan for the district. The court added that the owners should be permitted to work the land and to enter the area during the olive harvest.

The Nazareth Illit municipality is basing its position on steps taken in 1976 when the campaign began to confiscate tens of thousands of acres of Arab-owned land in the Galilee. Since then, thousands of acres of land in the Galilee have been confiscated from the residents of the Arab communities of Ein Ma’ahal, al-Mashhad, Kafr Kanna, Raineh, and Nazareth. The land has been confiscated on the basis of the decision of the Israeli finance minister, applying emergency legislation that empowers the minister to confiscate land for the general good. Commenting on the attitude of the state toward the Arab citizens, Khalid Kraim notes: “We are totally convinced that Israel was established on the lands of our people, which was expelled from its land. This is an accomplished fact. Why should I, as a citizen, have to feel as if I am only a citizen on a short-term basis? No Arab living in the state of Israel can know what to expect in the future.”

The campaign to “judaize” the Galilee

The land confiscations were accompanied by the preparation of the so-called “Koenig Document,” authored by Israel Koenig, who served for 26 years as the director of the Northern District in the Israeli Ministry of the Interior. Published by the newspaper al-Hamishmar in 1976, the document included a plan to usurp and confiscate Arab land and to alter the demographic balance in the Galilee with the goal of “judaizing” the area. The plan also discussed other aspects, such as encouraging Arabs to emigrate; strengthening the obstacles limiting admissions to university among Arabs; and creating an Arab political party that would function as an arm of the government among this population. It is interesting to note that in an interview with the Israeli daily Haaretz a few years ago, Koenig stated that a friend of his, “a rich Christian from Nazareth,” still thanks him for convincing him to emigrate to Canada many years ago. Koenig convinced his friend to leave by telling him that “things will never be good here for your children.”

At the beginning of 1976, encouraged by this document, the Israeli government began a new campaign to usurp land from Arab citizens on an enormous scale, particularly in the Galilee, as part of the plan to judaize the area. The confiscation plan in the Galilee covered a total of some 5,000 acres of land, and created profound anger among the Arab population. Prior to the announcement of the confiscation plan many Arab citizens had deluded themselves into believing that after successive Israeli governments had already confiscated most of the land belonging to the Arab population between 1948 and the late 1960s, no further blows would be imposed. The Galilee Development Plan published in October 1975 by the Ministry of Agriculture made no attempt to hide the national objective of the “development” it envisaged: “A particular problem in the Galilee is that the Jewish population constitutes a minority compared to the non-Jewish population. In 1973 there were 147,000 non-Jews and 62,000 Jews … The current situation in terms of the demographic balance between the Jewish and non-Jewish population must be changed by means of a long-term program …”

In 1976, action began to implement the plan. Over the year some 5,250 acres of land belonging to the Arab population were confiscated in favor of the state of Israel.

The National Committee for the Protection of Arab Land decided to call a general strike for March 30, 1976 and to organize demonstrations against the usurping of land. The largest demonstrations took place in Sakhnin, Arabeh, and Dir Hanna. The protests began peacefully but soon descended into violence after the police opened fire with live ammunition. After the Israel police realized that it could not control the demonstrations it turned to the army, which killed four demonstrators (two more demonstrators were killed by the police). Three of the victims came from Sakhnin. These events came to be known as Land Day, and on March 30 each year the Arab population marks Land Day with strikes, demonstrations, and processions in memory of these events.

A large proportion of the Arab-owned land in the vicinity of Nazareth Illit was confiscated over the years. This land now forms part of the Jewish city of Nazareth Illit. The Arab citizens were told that the grounds for the confiscation orders were security reasons. Khalid Kraim comments, “The Israel Lands Administration claims that the confiscation implemented in 1976 was for security reasons. It is true that an IDF base was established in the area during this period, but this was probably just a propaganda move to justify the security grounds for confiscation, since just one year later the [Israeli army] vacated the base.”

Although 30 years passed since the confiscation decision of 1976, some of the land was never actually confiscated. The landowners continued to hold and use the land. Nazareth Illit had no need for these reserves of land at the time—a fact that proves the absence of any real need for the confiscation. Now, however, the Israeli authorities are attempting to implement the decision in order to continue to expand the Jewish neighborhoods in the area, and particularly the Har Yonah neighborhood of Nazareth Illit, at the expense of land seized from the village of al-Mashhad. The decision ignores the fact that these areas form part of the land reserve of the Arab population in the region. The land is privately owned by Arab citizens, and has been seized in order to build new neighborhoods to house Jewish immigrants, mainly from the former Soviet Union. Khalid sadly comments, “Why is a resident of al-Mashhad forbidden to stand on his land, to farm it and to care for his trees, while someone who just arrived from Russia goes out jogging in the morning with his dog on our land?”

Jew or non-Jew, that is the question
When David Ben Gurion was asked about the possibility that Palestinian refugees might return to their homeland in Palestine, he replied: “This land belongs to two people—to the Arabs who live in it, and to Jews all over the world.” This statement by the first prime minister of Israel and the key architect of the Zionist ideology in the state of Israel is still highly relevant. The political and social approach of all the Israeli governments over the past 60 years argues that the Palestinians who remained on their land in 1948 are to become Israeli citizens and receive Israeli identity cards, while emphasizing that not a single refugee will be permitted to the land seized in the same year. At the same time, Israel welcomes all the Jews of the world with open arms, providing ongoing personal assistance during their first years in the country.

Jewish immigrants receive grants to facilitate their initial absorption in “Zion,” mainly in the form of an “absorption basket,” customs discounts, support from the Jewish Agency for Israel in arranging migration and payment of the flight ticket to Israel. One of the main areas of help is assistance in housing, implemented through public housing and a system of mortgages, loans, and rent aid. As each wave of Jewish immigrants has arrived, new neighborhoods and communities have been built throughout the country. In central Israel, the Negev, and the Galilee, neighborhoods and communities have been built on land that was formerly owned by Arabs.

The early 1990s was the peak period in terms of the construction of new neighborhoods. This period saw the largest wave of Jewish immigration in the past forty years (636,805 immigrants arrived, constituting 53 percent of all immigrants during the period 1989-2005).

The Har Yonah neighborhood of Nazareth Illit is an example of a neighborhood built specifically to house new immigrants arriving in Israel. Construction work began in the early 1990s, and the neighborhood now has a population of 10,000, including veteran Israeli Jews, Jewish immigrants (approximately 70 percent), and a small number of Arabs. The neighborhood is situated on the ridge of Mt. Yonah, between the Arab communities of Ein Ma’ahal, Raineh, al-Mashhad, and Kafr Kanna—the communities affected by the confiscation campaign of 1976.

The Arab village of al-Mashhad, with a population of 6,900, is situated next to the new neighborhood. Most of the villagers have low socioeconomic status (in 2005, the average income of salaried employees in the village was NIS 3,563, compared to the national average of NIS 7,324). Due to the miserable reality imposed on the village by the state, al-Mashhad is effectively under siege, surrounded on all sides, without any prospects for development. The village is bordered to the south by Road No. 79, the highway from Nazareth Illit to Haifa. To the west the village borders on Moshav Zippori, a Jewish community established on the land of the villages of Jabl al-Kharub and Safuriya, which were destroyed during the Nakba of 1948 (part of Zippori was built on land belonging to al-Mashhad). Zipporit Industrial Zone also lies to the west of al-Mashhad. Although the industrial zone is separated from Nazareth Illit (some seven kilometers away) by the Arab village, it forms part of the area of jurisdiction of Nazareth Illit. To the north the village borders on the Arab village of Kafr Kanna, and to the east on the neighborhood of Har Yonah, which forms part of Nazareth Illit.

Prior to the confiscation orders, the village of al-Mashhad included a total of 2,767 acres of land. This has now been reduced to some 1,825 acres, of which just 207.5 acres are earmarked for construction. Khalid Kraim stands on his land, pointing at the village: “There is a serious housing problem in the village. Many people leave the village because their land has been taken, or because they cannot obtain building permits. Even some of the landowners here from the Shahadeh family live in the [neighboring] village of Raineh because they cannot get permits to build on their land.”

<em>Mahmud Shahadeh</em>” title=”<em>Mahmud Shahadeh</em>” class=”image thumbnail” height=”100″ width=”72″></a><span class=Mahmud Shahadeh

Mahmud Shahadeh, the head of the family, recalls their previous naiveté: “Even after we heard about the confiscation of land in the 1970s, it had no affect on us as we worked the land. We kept on farming, plowing, and planting, until the bulldozers from the police and the Israel Lands Administration arrived in March.” Aged 85, Mahmud is the oldest of the landowners. He was among those arrested during the first assault on the area by the Israel Lands Administration, and comments: “They have no shame at all … They arrested my sons and me just because we wanted to enter our land and stop them destroying our olive trees. How can they arrest someone whose age is the same as their grandfathers?”

Ramzi Shahadeh, another landowner in the village, compares his own situation with that of the new immigrants living in the adjacent neighborhood of Har Yonah: “I wished we had the same life as they do in Nazareth Illit in terms of the services they receive—roads, cleaning, and parks for their children. Even the idea of comparing al-Mashhad and Nazareth Illit is a joke. For example, if I want to take my children to play then we go to the parks in Nazareth Illit, because in al-Mashhad there isn’t a single acre of land zoned for parks.” Shahadeh continues: “I feel as if I were living in South Africa, while alongside me is a European or American city. What’s even more annoying is that for 25 years we have been trying to get permits to build on land that belongs to us, while a new immigrant who arrives from Russia or Europe gets a home and space to live in a few hours after getting off the plane.”

“What happened in 1976 won’t be repeated”
The olive tree is one of the most common trees in Palestine. The reason for this is that the tree forms a key part of Palestinian folklore. Almost every Palestinian family that owns some land begins by planting olive trees. The tree also symbolizes the culture of the Palestinians and forms part of their history and their bond with the land and with nature. Over time, the olive tree also came to play a central part in the Palestinian economy.

The olive trees on the lands of al-Mashhad serve three large families (a total of some 350 residents), most of whom are peasants (fallahin) whose main, and often sole, occupation is caring for the land. Last year, the Shahadeh family managed to produce almost 70 tin cans of olive oil from a two-acre plot; this plot accounts for about one-third of the total area belonging to the family in which olive trees were uprooted.

Mahmud Shahadeh comments: “I’ve tended to the olive trees for 30 years, making a living for my family. In just two hours, the police destroyed all that I have worked for.” Khaled, Mahmud’s son-in-law, continues: “We come from a family of fallahin that makes its living from the land. One tin can of olive oil costs about NIS 700 this year, so a simple calculation shows that we lost almost NIS 49,000 (approximately US 13,500), not to mention that fact that the three families also use olives and olive oil for their own personal consumption.” Khalid emphasizes that this constitutes the family’s main source of income: “I never heard my father or grandfather mention buying olives or olive oil from anyone else. It scares me to think that we might have to use olive oil we bought from elsewhere.”

“We are law-abiding citizens and all we want is to live on our own land like human beings. Yet Israel treats us like second-class citizens or criminals,” Khalid says. “It reminds us all of words like ‘transfer.’ Every day we hear of Muslim or Christian cemeteries being demolished in the Palestinian villages from 1948. What we are demanding is the liberty and democracy we are entitled to as citizens. If citizens in Israel have rights, then they must also be granted to the Arab population.” Khalid speaks openly, expressing his belief that all the Arabs in Israel feel that the state says one thing while doing something completely different: “Israel puts on a fine white dress, but underneath is a black morass of racism and discrimination.”

Ramzi seeks to send a message of determination and anger through the Arab Association for Human Rights: “On behalf of the landowners, the Shahadeh family, and the residents of the village of al-Mashhad, I want to send a message to people everywhere—the Jewish National Fund, to the Nazareth Illit Municipality, to the Members of Knesset and the government, and to the residents of Israel. We don’t want the events of 1976 to repeat themselves, but I have to say that not one meter of land will be taken from us unless we die on our lands. We do not hold any hatred or racist feelings toward anyone. We just want to resolve the matter in a just way. If not, there will be no turning back. We don’t have anywhere else to live or to build our homes. We are a family that makes its living from agriculture and we have no other land to farm. Either we will die or we will live in peace with the neighboring cities without our lands being harmed. I repeat: what happened in 1976 won’t be repeated.”

This story emphasizes once again the way in which Israel tramples on everything that this region and place symbolize for the Palestinian residents, the indigenous inhabitants of the land. Uprooting olive trees in an Arab village and the goals and motives that lie behind such actions constitute a deviation from nature, changing the natural landscape of the village and the surrounding area. Israel attempts to alter the natural indigenous character of the land in order to build European-style residential areas, in a setting in which these do not belong. In order to create this alternative environment, Israel must uproot the olive tree—the central emblem of Palestine and the symbol of peace. This reality underscores the heavy price paid by the indigenous inhabitants of the land for the establishment of a Jewish state in “Zion.”

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This report is the second in a series of Discrimination Diaries by the Arab Association for Human Rights (HRA), shedding light on the rights situation of Palestinians in Israel. It first appeared Feb. 14 on Electronic Intifada. All images by HRA.

See also:

PICTURES FROM PALESTINE
by Ellen Davidson and Judith Mahoney Pasternak
WW4 Report, January 2008
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Reprinted by World War 4 Report, March 1, 2008
Reprinting permissible with attribution

Continue ReadingTHREATENED GROVES OF GALILEE 

PHANTOM REPUBLICS

Kosovo’s Independence Reverberates Across Eurasia

by Rene Wadlow, Toward Freedom

The self-proclamation of independence by Kosovo may be the last act in the division of former Yugoslavia, or it may be one step in a new chain of territorial adjustments. There are calls in Republika Srpska, the Serb unit of the Bosnia-Herzegovina federation, for its integration into Serbia. There have also been discussions among Serbs of the partition of Kosovo with the area north of the Ibar River joining Serbia.

There are some calls for Albanian-majority areas of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to be attached to Kosovo (which will soon be written in the Albanian style as Kosova). There have long been discussions in Albania of a “Greater Albania” which would attach to Albanian Kosovo, part of Macedonia and part of Albanian-populated Greece.

There is also the impact of the example of Kosovo on the other phantom republics born of the break up of the Soviet Union: Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia, Nagorno-Karabakh between Armenia and Azerbaijan, Transnistria in Moldova—and, if not completely crushed, Chechenya in Russia.

Spain has led the “no to Kosovo recognition” within the European Union, fearing that the Basque country would be infected by the secessionist germs, and Cyprus follows, fearing that the Kosovo example will give legitimacy to the Turkish-dominated part of the island. Both Russia and China opposed recognition of Kosovo during the emergency meetings of the UN Security Council on February 18-19: Russia because it supports the position of Serbia, China because “Kosovo today—Tibet tomorrow”.

I had always been optimistic that good sense and compromise could prevent violence and the break-up of Yugoslavia. Thus, I followed events closely, if sadly. I had been among the first to raise the issue of Kosovo in the UN Commission on Human Rights in 1988 when Slobodan Milosevic had not yet come to power but was already using the difficulties of the Serbian minority living in Kosovo as his vehicle for gaining attention. As a banker who had spent much of his working life in the USA, Slobodan Milosevic was proposing some mild but difficult economic reforms that were not a royal road to power. It was in 1989, at the massive celebrations of the 600th anniversary of the 1389 Battle of Kosovo against the Ottoman Turks that, observing the warm reception given to his speech by the gathered Serbs, Milosevic found the theme that would make him Serbia’s leader.

The 1974 Yugoslav Constitution made Kosovo an autonomous province with its own parliament, presidency, judiciary and constitution. The Kosovo representative in the federal Yugoslav structure had a place in the rotating Yugoslav presidency where he could—and did—vote differently from Serbia’s representative. During the 1970s and early 1980s, the Serbs accused the Albanians of trying to push them out of Kosovo. Partly as a result of resentment over Kosovo, Milosevic was elected president of Serbia in 1989, a post he retained until 1998 when he was elected president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

In 1989, Milosevic abolished the provisions of the Serbian constitution that made Kosovo autonomous. He fired tens of thousands of Albanians from their jobs, suppressed Albanian-language education and controlled the territory with heavy police presence. The Albanians in Kosovo led by Ibrahim Rugova, a university professor of literature influenced by Mahatma Gandhi’s “constructive program,” created parallel education, health, social services and economic structures for the Albanians.

However, the 1995 Dayton Agreement, facilitated by the USA to end the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina, seemed to give international sanction to mono-ethnic states, to de facto partition on ethnic lines and to population transfers. After Dayton, there were few theoretical arguments against the creation of an independent Kosovo state. However, Kosovo was not discussed directly at Dayton, and no suggestions were made for improving the socio-political situation.

The failure of Dayton to discuss Kosovo led to the conviction among some Kosovo Albanians that “non-violence does not work” and that violence was the only way to get international attention. Thus, the Kosovo Liberation Army was created as an armed militia in 1998. As all Yugoslavs were trained in guerrilla tactics, a heritage from the Second World War, it was relatively easy to put an armed militia together. Serbs and Albanians considered collaborators were killed, leading the Serb government to send in heavy-handed army and police forces. Hundreds of thousands Albanian refugees fled to Albania and Macedonia, ultimately leading to a 78 day NATO-led war against Serbia—followed for nearly 10 years by a UN-led administration of Kosovo.

Since June 1999, the UN administration, in cooperation with the European Union, provided a certain stability for Kosovo’s two million people: some 120,000 Serbs, about 80,000 “other,”—mostly Rom, often called “Egyptians” locally given the myth that they had come from Egypt (they are originally from north India). The rest of the population is Albanian. The UN and the European Union spent a good deal of money each year to keep the public service afloat. However, there was too much uncertainly about the future for there to be economic development. An estimated 60% of the population are considered unemployed, and many families live on remittances from family members working abroad. The drug trade and prostitution have become Kosovo specialties, though one finds Kosovo Albanians in all trades throughout Western Europe. Many Serbs from Kosovo who had family in Serbia have already left, especially the young.

The drain on UN and European Union resources led to a strong feeling in UN circles that some sort of “final status” for Kosovo had to be found. The task fell to Martti Ahtisaari, a former president of Finland who has often served as a UN “trouble shooter.” But even a skilled mediator has his limits. No common position between the government of Serbia and the elected officials of Kosovo could be found. Thus, an international script was written, even if all the US television script writers were on strike: Kosovo would make a unilateral declaration of independence followed the next day by recognition from the USA and leading European Union states. Then, other states would follow, especially from the Islamic countries.

Given Russian opposition to Kosovo independence and opposition from a minority of EU members, Kosovo will not be able to join the UN (membership requires a Security Council resolution.) Certain types of contracts and agreements with the European Union will also be impossible since there needs to be consensus. It is not clear at this stage if Russia will push the other phantom republics to ask for international recognition of their independence. The issue of the creation of new states will be on the international agenda for some time.

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Rene Wadlow is the representative to the United Nations at Geneva of the Association of World Citizens, and the editor of the journal of world politics Transnational Perspectives.

This story first appeared Feb. 18 on Toward Freedom.

From our weblog:

Albanian authorities have power to brutalize Serbs —but not control Kosova’s borders
WW4 Report, Feb. 26, 2008
/node/5151

Montenegro secession: Balkans still re-balkanizing
WW4 Report, May 22, 2006
/node/1993

Kosova independence leader Ibrahim Rugova dead at 61
WW4 Report, Jan. 22, 2006
/node/1521

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Reprinted by World War 4 Report, March 1, 2008
Reprinting permissible with attribution

Continue ReadingPHANTOM REPUBLICS 

ROMA DEMAND REMEMBRANCE

Czech Republic Intransigent on Honoring the Forgotten Holocaust

by Gwendolyn Albert, WW4 Report

PRAGUE — As has been amply documented over the 15 years of its existence, the Czech Republic has a poor record when it comes to protecting the rights of members of the Roma minority. Unfortunately, this does not apply only to present-day victims of rights abuses, but even to the memory of Roma who perished on Czech territory during the Nazi occupation.

Under the Nazi Protectorate, camps at Lety (in Bohemia) and Hodonin (in Moravia) were used to round up Roma families and force them to work before sending them to Auschwitz, part of the Nazi Holocaust machinery. The camp at Lety was particularly infamous, as the local commander, on his own initiative, stole the prisoners’ rations for sale on the black market and starved and tortured the camp occupants. When conditions deteriorated such that a typhus outbreak threatened the surrounding area, the Nazi Protectorate closed the camp. It is estimated that 95% of the indigenous Czech Roma perished in the Holocaust.

In the 1970s, the communist state of Czechoslovakia established a pig farm on the site of the former camp, which eventually grew to its present capacity of 15,000 animals. Local people set up their own private memorials to the victims of Lety near the mass gravesites in the forest, but no official recognition of the tragedy that had occurred there was ever made during communism.

After the Velvet Revolution of 1989 and the Velvet Divorce from Slovakia in 1993, researchers found extensive documentation of the crimes committed at Lety in local archives. Books were published and survivors and their descendants were found and interviewed, despite official claims that no one was left alive who could remember the camp. War crimes charges were filed against one of the camp command, but the man died before justice could be served. A brief period of international press about the farm spurred the Czech government to make the first of what would become more than a decade of clumsy attempts at damage control around the pig farm.

While President Vaclav Havel’s office commissioned a memorial for Lety (without consulting survivors, unfortunately) and erected it in 1995, other parts of the Czech government had a different idea of how to deal with the fact of a pig farm on a Holocaust site. The farm, still in state hands, was quickly privatized, complicating what could have been a very simple process for its relocation. Visitors to the memorial site are greeted by the stench of animal excrement. The Committee for the Redress of the Roma Holocaust (VPORH), the Lety survivors’ organization, holds a memorial ceremony there every May 13 (the day Havel first unveiled the monument in 1995); in recent years, the farm has turned off its ventilation system on that day in order to prevent the stench from being noticeable to the government dignitaries, diplomats and demonstrators who tramp down the unpaved path to the memorial site every year.

In the intervening decade, numerous governments have come and gone, each tiptoeing up to the problem and then shying away from resolving it, for various reasons. The biggest reason is general anti-Roma sentiment among a large part of the Czech electorate and the perception that moving the farm will somehow be providing the Roma with special treatment. This lack of leadership on the part of the Czech authorities has led to such a deterioration of the meaning of the site to Czech society that right-wing extremists have demonstrated at Lety against the farm being removed for the past two years.

The European Parliament called for the pig farm to be removed in 2005. Late last year, as part of a larger proclamation on the Roma in the EU, the EP singled out the Czech Republic in its resolution, reiterating its call for the government “to abolish the pig fattening industry on the former concentration camp in Lety.” The Czech Republic is under some pressure to resolve this and other issues before it takes up the Presidency of the EU Council in January 2009, and has therefore recently established a Working Committee on the Roma Holocaust, chaired by Human Rights and Minorities minister Dzamila Stehlikova.

This committee includes representatives of several ministries, the Czech human rights commissioner, the head of the Czech Government Council for Roma Community Affairs, the owners of the farm (a firm called AGPI), regional government officials from South Bohemia, members of the South Bohemian Roma community, and the Committee for the Redress of the Roma Holocaust (VPORH)—the Lety survivors’ organization that has been agitating for the removal of the farm for more than a decade now. Unfortunately, expropriation of the farm and its relocation have so far been off the table, and the proposals that are being made concern everything but this fundamental issue.

Over the public dissent of VPORH president Čeněk Růžička, whose family members lost their lives at Lety, some of the committee members recently announced a proposed “solution” for the Lety site that does not involve removing the farm at all. Designed by AGPI together with the South Bohemian regional government and involving an investment of CZK 50 million (US$3 million), the proposal is to develop yet another memorial adjacent to the farm—despite the fact that a memorial already exists at the site. Some members of the present-day South Bohemian Roma community on the committee—none of whom lost any relatives at Lety during the war, as their roots are in Slovakia (and none of whom were elected by their community to play this representative role)—were approached by the South Bohemian regional government to lend their support to this scheme. They have done so.

The creation of a difference in opinion between the South Bohemian Roma on the committee and VPORH has shifted the burden of “reaching consensus” on what to do about Lety to those with the least power to actually make a decision, and serves the purpose of creating a “dispute within the Roma community” for the press and others to lament. This tactic keeps the real issue—desecration of a Holocaust site and the Czech state’s responsibility for remedying it—from being discussed.

To observers of Roma-related matters in this country, this tactic comes as no surprise. As in many other matters, from segregation in education to access to “social housing,” the Czech government is following its longstanding practice of shifting to local and regional officials what should be a matter for resolution at the highest level—not the least, because it concerns the need for the country as such to manifest respect for human rights and recent European history.

In an interview on Czech radio Feburary 4, the performance of both Czech MEP Jan Brezina (Christian Democratic Union-Czech People’s Party) and South Bohemian regional governor Jan Zahradník (Civic Democratic Party)—both part of the ruling coalition—was a classic example of how confused politicians’ reasoning can become when they try to defend the indefensible and are ignorant to boot. The Lety survivors would never and have never questioned the fact that Nazi Germany bears ultimate responsibility for the Holocaust—but MEP Brezina portrayed the group’s focus as an attempt to deny Nazi responsibility. This has been interpreted as an effort to make Lety a German problem, not a Czech one—so that the Germans can be asked to foot the bill for the pig farm’s removal. The pig farm, however, was placed in that location by the Czechoslovak state, and cannot be considered the responsibility of any state other than the Czech Republic.

Brezina spoke in this interview about the Czech camp staff at Lety as if their “plight” in running the camp for their Protectorate overlords was comparable to the suffering they inflicted on their victims. It has been well-documented that the cruelty, sadism and mismanagement that led to the death of hundreds at Lety, many of them children, was due to the initiative of the camp commander and his lackies, not to any orders from on high; one of the great ironies of the Lety story is that after conditions there deteriorated such that a typhus epidemic threatened the surrounding area, the Protectorate authorities actually shut the camp.

MEP Brezina’s expression of sympathy for the camp guards precisely echoes sentiments expressed by extreme right-wing parties such as the National Party (NS)—which demonstrated in memory of the Czech guards at Lety at last year’s commemorative service, and which has recently founded paramilitary units called the National Guard. The National Party chair, Petra Edelmannova, is infamous for using the term “final solution” in her propaganda regarding the Roma.

At a February 21 meeting of the Working Group on the Roma Holocaust, voices of reason were expressed from various ministerial officials in support of the survivor organization’s contention that the farm has no business on such a site. These voices also oppose the expensive plan for yet another memorial in sniffing range of the farm. After reaching consensus on recommendations to the government that it perform minor improvements to the existing memorial, however, the group did not set a date for discussing the pig farm’s removal. A real solution to this problem seems as out of reach as it ever has.

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See also:

ROMA FACE COERCIVE STERILIZATION
“Verging on Genocide” in the Czech Republic?
by Gwendolyn Albert, WW4 Report. August 2007
/node/4283

From our weblog:

Czech courts indemnify Romani woman for forced sterilization —at last
WW4 Report, Oct. 16, 2007
/node/4566

Neo-Nazis kill Czech anti-fascist
WW4 Report, Jan. 28, 2008
/node/4992

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Special to World War 4 Report, March 1, 2008
Reprinting permissible with attribution

Continue ReadingROMA DEMAND REMEMBRANCE 

Thank you to our readers!

Dear WW4 Report Readers:

Last month, we admitted that we were at an existential crisis, and that if our Winter Fund Drive failed to raise $2,000, we would have to cease publication. Today our total stands at $2,485, exceeding our modest goal. We thank all of our readers who came through for us. We hope not to have to threaten our demise again! We only ask each of our regular readers to send at least some token amount once a year. Please accept that we do so only in order to be able to continue our work.

Some news: the publication of Petro-Imperialism: the Global War on Terrorism and the Struggle for the Planet’s Oil has been put off to the end of the year by request of our publisher Shadow Press so as to include an analysis of the incoming administration. So those who pledged $25 or more will be receiving their premiums at the end of the year. The first ten who pledged between $15 and $25 will be receiving their premium, Iraq’s Civil Resistance Speaks, forthwith.

Thank you for your patience, and your support! We won’t forget you.

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Continue ReadingThank you to our readers! 

ZAPATISMO IN NEW YORK CITY

by Michael Eamonn Miller, NYC Pavement Pieces

Marcos in Manhattan” title=”Marcos in Manhattan” class=”image thumbnail” height=”100″ width=”75″>Marcos in Manhattan

The noisy, bustling streets of upper Manhattan known as “El Barrio” bear scant resemblance to the farmlands of Chiapas, Mexico’s poorest, southernmost state. But three decades of Mexican immigration to New York have subtly transformed the neighborhood, establishing ties between the two communities and injecting new, sometimes controversial, ideas into the fight against gentrification in El Barrio.

No group demonstrates these ties or this controversy as strikingly as Movement for Justice in El Barrio (MJB). Founded in December 2004 by tenants fighting eviction from their East Harlem apartment building, MJB now considers itself a “Zapatista” organization—a name normally reserved for armed revolutionaries fighting for their indigenous Mayan lands in Chiapas. But to the extent that the affiliation has brought new methods of grassroots democracy and community organization to East Harlem, MJB’s brand of Zapatismo holds promise for a neighborhood undergoing rapid gentrification.

Gentrification affects many of New York’s poorer neighborhoods, not just El Barrio. Loosely defined as an influx of money and development, gentrification causes the displacement of low-income families by wealthier ones, its critics argue. As New York crime rates have fallen over the past 15 years, parts of the city once shunned by young, wealthy professionals have become targets for development. In neighborhoods like El Barrio, where many poor families have only recently arrived in the US, the potential for rapid change—and displacement of the poor—is even greater. Across New York, rising rents have led to confrontations between landlords and tenant organizations, between the tenants’ need for affordable housing and the owners’ property rights. In this clash of philosophies, New Yorkers’ homes are at stake.

“Gentrification is a fact of life,” argues East Harlem landlord Scott Zwilling.

“People look at me and say ‘the big, bad owner kicked me out,'” Zwilling said. “But if it wasn’t me buying the property and raising the rent, there would have been 10 others ready to do the same thing.”

But gentrification is neither inevitable nor desirable, according to Movement for Justice in El Barrio.

“What initiated the organization was the housing crisis,” said MJB founder Juan Haro. Fearful of eviction, tenants in five East Harlem buildings approached Haro for help. “People were trying to figure out how to combat the effects of gentrification,” he said.

Since 2004, MJB has grown to more than 380 members in 25 buildings around El Barrio. One key to this growth has been MJB’s link to the Zapatistas—a connection that, while intuitive for some members, may surprise Americans who remember 1990s images of masked Zapatista peasants clutching rifles.

MJB’s embrace of Zapatismo began in summer 2005. Far from a publicity stunt, the move was “organic,” Haro said.

“What happened early on was we began an internal discussion to learn about different social movements based in the US and abroad,” explained Haro. “Zapatismo made sense because most of our members are Mexican.” One of the group’s first meetings coincided with the “Sixth Declaration of the Lacondan Jungle,” a Zapatista call for an international campaign against neoliberalism and repression. “Our members read the declaration and got very excited,” Haro said.

El Barrio has had a large Hispanic population since the 1950s. But today’s neighborhood reflects recent national immigration trends. Just as Hispanics are now the largest minority in the US—growing from 9 to 12.5 percent of the population from 1990 to 2000—they have risen from 32 to 55 percent of the population in El Barrio since 1970, according to US Census and city government statistics. Meanwhile, the makeup of Hispanics in El Barrio has also changed. While Puerto Rican flags can still be seen on neighborhood murals and in shop windows, El Barrio’s cultural and political movements increasingly reflect its growing Mexican population.

But MJB’s affiliation with the Zapatistas goes beyond mere cultural connections, instead relying upon the perception of a common enemy and a shared solution.

Like the Zapatistas in Chiapas, MJB sees neoliberalism—free trade and unregulated international businesses—as the underlying problem. In New York, MJB members argue, the gradual weakening of rent control laws fits this neoliberal pattern and has led to gentrification.

After MJB’s early campaigning against local landlord Steve Kessner, he sold all 47 of his buildings to a London-based investment bank, Dawnay, Day. It was an important but Pyrrhic victory for MJB. Unlike Kessner, “Dawnay, Day has from the outset been very explicit about what they are trying to do,” Haro said.

“It’s not our goal to kick people out of their homes,” said Michael Kessner, director of operations for Dawnay, Day in New York and a relative of former owner Steve Kessner. “But obviously we’re out to make a profit, too.”

“Movement for Justice is out to serve their own interests,” Kessner said, describing MJB as “very confrontational” and only representing a small percentage of Dawnay, Day’s tenants.

At the heart of the disagreement are Dawnay, Day’s business practices since buying the apartments in March.

Dawnay, Day has aggressively tried to replace tenants in rent-controlled apartments with those willing to pay higher amounts, Haro said. “Dawnay’s other new tactic is offering money to the tenants to vacate.” The company has introduced a “buy out program,” he said, in which longer-term tenants have been offered $10,000 to leave their apartments. “Because of rent control, they’re targeting longer term tenants, some of whom have lived in El Barrio for 30-40 years.”

A lawsuit filed in October by 17 MJB members accused Dawnay, Day of making “false, deceptive and misleading representations to [tenants] in verbal and written communications, including rent bills and other correspondence,” in an attempt to force them out of their apartments. If true, these charges would violate a number of New York consumer protection laws.

“Billing and accounting was an issue at first,” Kessner said, referring to rents allegedly owed to the previous owner. “I think [the lawsuit] has been resolved because we’ve credited their accounts.”

But neither the lawsuit against Dawnay, Day nor the broader fight against gentrification is over, according to MJB.

The influx of multinational companies such as Dawnay, Day is both “an international problem” and a consequence of neoliberalism, Haro said. “To combat this, we have to have an international plan. It can’t be local, can’t be regional: it has to be international.”

MJB’s response to both Kessner and Dawnay, Day has been to rely on Zapatista strategies of community consultation and cooperation. MJB’s “Consultas del Barrio” is a grassroots initiative for popular democracy within the neighborhood. MJB canvassed over 800 people—of all ages and races—from around the community, asking them to identify the issues that most affected their lives.

“Our goal is to create space and opportunity for the broader community to engage in the democratic process,” Haro said. “We can’t say we represent every single member of the community unless we consult with all of them.”

“People feel discouraged or disillusioned with the forms of discourse in civil society,” he said. “For example, when it comes to voting, they feel that the powerful always win out,” but the “consultas” represent another form of politics, independent from the government.

Though time-consuming, these “consultas” have allowed MJB to stay abreast of evolving relationships between El Barrio’s tenants and landlords—relationships which, in the case of Dawnay, Day, are volatile.

“We consider ourselves to be on ‘red alert’ because of what Dawnay, Day has been doing,” Haro said.

But an equally important side to MJB’s success has been its cooperation with other anti-gentrification and social justice groups, both in New York and around the world. On October 21, MJB hosted its first “NYC Encuentro for Humanity and Against Gentrification.”

“The encuentro is a tool very helpful in getting people from different communities to share stories that are usually left out or silenced,” said Helena Wong, coordinator for the Chinatown Justice Project and for Right to the City New York. Attending the “encuentro” made sense, she said, because MJB and Right to the City both face gentrification in their respective communities.

“Gentrification is something that’s been happening in Chinatown for 10 years,” she said, “but you don’t know it’s happening until storefronts start changing.” Companies are buying up entire blocks, “kicking people out” so that they can build luxury condos, she said. Wong sees the same erosion of New York’s once-strong rent protection laws at work in Chinatown as in El Barrio.

“It seems like our struggles are the same, the causes of the conditions in our communities are the same,” Wong said. “We’re never going to win anything by ourselves in Chinatown so it’s important to work with other communities that are marginalized.”

Although tenant groups like Right to the City and MJB see gentrification as the enemy, landlords consider it their livelihood.

According to Zwilling, gentrification is as old as the neighborhoods themselves. It isn’t just business, he argues, it’s part and parcel of the American promise of upward mobility.

Zwilling says he understands peoples’ anger towards landlords, and has offered to help former tenants find new apartments. But landlords aren’t to blame for gentrification, he argues.

“Whose fault is it? I have a family to feed, too,” Zwilling said. “Is it the former owner’s fault? Is it no one’s fault? Is it the city’s fault for not having programs in place to help these people?”

The gentrification of East Harlem isn’t likely to slow down any time soon, Zwilling acknowledged. He bought an apartment building in East Harlem one year ago for $6 million. While honoring pre-existing leases, Zwilling said he has raised rents to market value whenever possible. But most long-time tenants cannot afford market prices, meaning they lose out to wealthier newcomers.

“Since we bought it, most of the building now houses young professionals,” said Zwilling. Unlike the apartments in which MJB’s members live, these buildings are not rent-controlled, Zwilling said.

For MJB, January marks the beginning of both the New Year and a new campaign against Dawnay, Day.

“For the first time, we have an international campaign or plan to target Dawnay, Day,” Haro said, adding that MJB’s small staff had been working seven days a week to map out where the company owns property, both in the US and abroad.

MJB’s international campaign also includes cooperation with anti-gentrification groups in London, where Dawnay, Day has its headquarters. Haro met several of these groups at a conference on participatory democracy in Barcelona last April.

MJB plans to give presentations and workshops on its Zapatista-inspired “consultas del barrio” across Britain next year, Haro said, hoping to make more allies in the fight against gentrification and for affordable housing for the poor.

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This story first appeared in NYC Pavement Pieces and New York University’s Writing and Reporting 1 (WRR1), Jan. 9, 2008

RESOURCES:

Consulta del Barrio

Chinatown Justice Project

From our weblog:

Crime, water wars rock Chiapas Highlands
WW4 Report, Feb. 2, 2008
/node/5018

Zapatistas announce “new political initiative”
WW4 Report, June 30, 2005
/node/694

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Reprinted by World War 4 Report, Feb. 1, 2008
Reprinting permissible with attribution

Continue ReadingZAPATISMO IN NEW YORK CITY 

MARLON SANTI

The New Voice of Ecuador’s Indigenous Movement

Marlon Santi” class=”image thumbnail” height=”100″ width=”99″>Marlon Santi

by Marc Becker, Upside Down World

The Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE) has elected Marlon Santi to serve as its president for the next three years. Santi was elected by more than 1,000 Indigenous delegates gathered at Santo Domingo de los Tsa’chilas from Jan. 10-12, 2008, for the Third Congress of Indigenous Nationalities and Peoples of Ecuador.

Indigenous activists founded CONAIE in 1986 as a national federation to represent Indigenous interests to the government. CONAIE first gained broad international attention when it led a protest in June 1990 that shut down the country. In 1995, CONAIE helped found the political movement Pachakutik to run candidates for political office.

Santi was elected by consensus of the regional organizations CONAICE, ECUARUNARI, and CONFEINIAE that represent Indigenous peoples from Ecuador’s coast, highlands, and Amazon. He is a 32-year-old native of Sarayacu in the eastern Amazonian province of Pastaza. Sarayacu has long been a center of protest again petroleum exploration. After studying in Quito, Santi returned to Sarayacu where he was a tireless fighter against petroleum companies and corrupt governments. For his activism, Santi has received assassination threats. Santi vowed to continue CONAIE’s struggle against neocolonial domination.

Official delegates and other observers arrived to the Congress on the morning of Jan. 10 in a constant rain. The Congress opened with a traditional ceremony with the participation of several leaders of the different organizations, governmental representatives, members of the national assembly, and invited national and international representatives. Jaime Pilatuña, a yachak (shaman) of the Kitu Kara people, led a ceremony together with Hector Awavil, leader of the host Tsa’chila government, to create a harmonious space for the meeting. Children and women also made a presentation in the inaugural act. Juana Nenquimo, a member of Waorani nationality, spoke in four languages of their struggles against international oil, lumber and mining companies.

The Congress began with an analysis of Ecuador’s current political situation. Jorge Guamán, National Coordinator for the Indigenous political movement Pachakutik, and Mónica Chuji, an Indigenous delegate to the Constituent Assembly, presented reports on their political activities. Guamán stated that Indigenous peoples and nationalities in Ecuador have maintained the cultural, social, and political structures necessary to create successful government processes. They have formed these under the traditional Andean code of “ama llulla, ama shuwa, ama killa,” or don’t lie, don’t steal, don’t be lazy.

Luis Macas, outgoing CONAIE president, presented a report of his work during his three-year term. He referred to the Congress as a “minga” (a communal work party) to construct a new country that would belong to all Ecuadorians. “Even though some governments have done everything to divide us,” Macas said, “this Congress is a practical demonstration of our unity and brotherhood.”

Humberto Cholango, leader of the highland regional federation Ecuarunari, said that “this congress is of vital importance because CONAIE is responding to the poverty, exclusion, mistreatment, and discrimination we have received from the government with proposals for life.”

Constituent Assembly member Mónica Chuji read a letter from Alberto Acosta, president of the Constituent Assembly that is currently re-writing the country’s constitution, in which he states that “the assembly will fight for the recognition of the rights and achievements of all Indigenous peoples and nationalities.” Acosta called for a unity of all Indigenous organizations.

Acosta’s letter emphasized that Indigenous movements and its struggles against the oligarchy and colonial powers are of great transcendental importance to the social transformation that the country is experiencing. “The historical consciousness, the cultural inheritance of Indigenous peoples and nationalities are needed to build an inclusive and just society,” he said.

At the Congress, Indigenous leaders declared their opposition to any policies that would lead to an extraction of natural resources from Ecuador, particularly petroleum and water. Instead, these are elements of strategic importance to the development of the country.

A principle demand of the Congress was the recognition of Ecuador as a plurinational state. Delegates also appealed for the development of a social economy. Indigenous leaders called on the Constituent Assembly to change government structures and the political system to end social exclusion and inequality. They presented an Integral Agrarian Reform plan to redistribute land, eliminate inequality, and to stop environmental destruction.

Delegates to the congress ratified their unlimited support to the changes in Bolivia led by president Evo Morales. They identified those developments as an example for the entire continent of Latin American. Ecuarunari leader Humberto Cholango emphasized the Indigenous movement’s defense for the changes sweeping throughout the region. Cholango stated that Indigenous communities will not allow the oligarchy to destabilize their sister nations with the support of the United States government.

The Congress elected Miguel Guatemal as vice-president of CONAIE. In addition to Santi and Guatemal, CONAIE’s governing council for the next three years will be comprised of Humberto Martínez (Organization), Silvio Chiripuwa (Fortification), Luis Champis Dirigente (Territory), Fredy Paguay (International Relations), Fausto Vargas (Education), Agustin Punina Dirigente (Health), David Poirama (Youth), Norma Mayu (Women), Janet Kuji Dirigente (Communication). The new leaders were sworn in by a ceremony of thanks to the Pachamama (Mother Earth) led by the Yachakuna (Shamans) Jaime Pilatuña and Carlos Pichimba.

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This story first appeared in Upside Down World, Jan. 15, 2008

See also:

FOR THE “TOTAL TRANSFORMATION” OF ECUADOR
An Interview with Pachakutik Presidential Candidate Luis Maca
by Rune Geertsen, Upside Down World
WW4 Report, October 2006
/node/2574

From our weblog:

Ecuador: Correa puts down oil protests
WW4 Report, Dec. 26, 2007
/node/4865

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Reprinted by World War 4 Report, Feb. 1, 2008
Reprinting permissible with attribution

Continue ReadingMARLON SANTI 

GLOBAL WARMING AND THE STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE

by Brain Tokar, Toward Freedom

If 2006 was the year that the “inconvenient truth” of global climate disruption made its way into the popular consciousness—and sparked a huge new wave of green products and corporate greenwashing—then hopefully the results of 2007’s revelations about the earth’s rapidly changing climate will prove more substantive and long-lasting. Not only did the UN’s Intergovermental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) issue a massively comprehensive report on climate science and its consequences, but the disturbing, and sometimes catastrophic, reality of worldwide climate collapse began to affect almost everyone’s daily life.

In the US, where the minds of a media-saturated public seemed to be firmly lodged in the sand around this issue for at least two decades, people finally began to notice the disturbing changes in the weather and in the once-familiar pattern of the seasons. In most regions now, spring comes a couple of weeks or more earlier than it used to and fall comes later. In much of the country, unseasonably warm weather appeared sporadically throughout the year and cold spells were sudden, severe, and relatively short-lived. Rain in many areas was sparse and appeared more often in rapid, concentrated deluges. Major floods seemed more common than ever. The extreme drought in much of the Southeast—the worst in over a century—made national headlines, and nearly everyone saw the news of the unprecedented wildfires that swept across southern California in October. Midsummer temperatures in much of the US Southwest, as well as in parts of Greece and Turkey, reached 115 degrees F. or higher.

The professional doubters continue to relegate all this to chance and coincidence, but two central facts make the evidence more compelling than ever. First, the patterns of heat, highly erratic weather, and cycles of floods and drought are felt worldwide and closely match the projections of climate modelers going back more than a decade.

Second, the scientists of the IPCC have documented an unprecedented convergence of findings from hundreds of studies and tens of thousands of distinct data sets in numerous independent fields of inquiry.

Another reality that began to break into the public consciousness in 2007 is that the effects of chaotic global warming were felt most by those people who are least able to adapt or compensate for these disturbing changes: the roughly half of the world’s population that live on less than two dollars a day. Beside the anecdotal evidence, several systematic studies, including the IPCC’s second volume addressing the consequences of climate change, have begun to map out this story in detail. Impoverished people around the world are also bearing the consequences of some of the most prevalent false solutions to global warming, including the push for so-called “biofuels” and the dual hoax of carbon emissions trading and purchases of offsets. Considerations of justice and equity further highlight the scale of social and economic transformations that are necessary if we are to head off the very worst consequences of an increasingly erratic, overheating climate. While business-as-usual scenarios in terms of energy use and carbon dioxide emissions have now been shown to be untenable, so, too, is the continuation of business-as-usual in the structure of our political and economic institutions.

Global Justice

One of the latest articles to bring the global justice consequences of global warming to a wide audience was an unusually insightful piece in the New York Times that appeared fast on the heels of the IPCC’s initial 2007 report. As reporter Andrew Revkin stated, “In almost every instance, the people most at risk from climate change live in countries that have contributed the least to the atmospheric buildup of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases linked to the recent warming of the planet. Those most vulnerable countries also tend to be the poorest.”

The Times dispatched reporters to cover four widely varying instances of people coping with the consequences of a severely altered climate, illustrating some stark contrasts across different parts of the world. In a village in Malawi, officials struggled to maintain the functioning of a simple weather station, chronically lacking basic supplies like light bulbs and chart paper, while in India, rural villagers struggle to cope with the effects of increasing floods and more erratic monsoons on their already fragile life support systems. Meanwhile, Western Australia has built a state-of-the-art water desalinization plant, powered by an array of wind turbines about 100 miles away and the Dutch have begun building homes attached to huge columns that allow houses to rise and fall by as much as 18 feet with the ebb and flow of tidal waters.

The plight of people in Pacific island nations is also finally attracting some mainstream press attention. With rising sea levels, not only are people less able to live near the shore, but inland sources of essential drinking water are becoming brackish due to increasing infiltrations of sea water. Migration of Pacific islanders to New Zealand has quadrupled in recent years, according to the Independent, as rising numbers of island communities are becoming uninhabitable. Yet island nations, according to the IPCC, are collectively responsible for less than 1 percent of global greenhouse gas emissions.

In the US, Hurricane Katrina brought home the extreme inequity in people’s capacity to cope with climate-related disasters. While affluent homes have been restored and people are again flocking to New Orleans’ unique tourist quarters, roughly a third of the population has yet to return and public housing projects remain empty, continually threatened with demolition, despite a relatively low level of storm-related damage. While the human toll from the more recent San Diego area wildfires was comparatively low, the systemic inequities remained rather harsh. Naomi Klein reported in the Nation in November that residents able to pay several tens of thousands of dollars were whisked away to elite resorts to wait out the fires, while their homes were sprayed with special fire retardants that were tragically unavailable to their neighbors.

It has become common wisdom that people living near the coasts are vulnerable to the uncertainties of a changing climate; however the magnitude of that threat remains controversial, even among climate scientists. The IPCC, reflecting the high level of scientific uncertainty around this issue, projected an estimated sea level rise of less than 25 centimeters this century, based on current trends. But scientists agree that the two most vulnerable glacial landmasses, Greenland and the West Antarctic, each hold enough water to raise sea levels by 20 feet.

In a paper published by the British Royal Society last spring, NASA climatologist James Hansen documented a much higher level of ice sheet instability than is accounted for in the IPCC report. Factors such as the decreased reflectivity of Arctic zones due to global warming—the well known “albedo effect”—along with an increasing incidence of glacial fractures and quakes, and the lubricating effects of glacial meltwater, all point toward a much faster rate of melting. Hansen stands by the far more disturbing prediction of an 80-foot sea level rise, based on extrapolation from the period 3 to 4 million years ago when global temperatures were last as warm as they will become by the end of this century.

Studies

The IPCC devoted several chapters of its second volume to the human costs of global warming. By comparing all of the available studies issued since their last report in 2001, and quantifying the confidence levels of various observations and trends, this report establishes a benchmark for virtually all future study.

Their basic message is overwhelming in its consequences. The northern- and southernmost portions of the earth’s temperate zones may reap some short-term benefits from global heating, including longer growing seasons. The tropics and subtropics, however, where most of the world’s poor people live, are in for a future of uncertain rainfall, persistent droughts, coastal flooding, loss of wetlands and fisheries, and increasingly scarce fresh water supplies. Flooding will most immediately affect residents of the major river deltas of Asia and Africa. The one-sixth of the world’s population that depends on water from glacial runoff may see a brief increase in the size and volume of their freshwater lakes as glaciers melt, but very soon the overall decrease in glacial area will become a life-threatening reality for many people.

The IPCC predicts a worldwide decrease in crop productivity if global temperatures rise more than five degrees Fahrenheit, but crop yields from rain-fed agriculture could be reduced by half as early as 2020. In Africa alone, between 75 million and 250 million people will be exposed to “increased water stress.” Agricultural lands in Latin America will be subject to desertification and increased salt content.

The health consequences of climate changes are perhaps the most starkly framed: “increases in malnutrition and consequent disorders…; increased deaths, disease and injury due to heatwaves, floods, storms, fires and droughts; the increased burden of diarrheal disease; the increased frequency of cardio-respiratory diseases due to higher concentrations of ground-level ozone…; and, the altered spatial distribution of some infectious disease vectors,” including malaria. There is little doubt that those with “high exposure, high sensitivity and/or low adaptive capacity” will bear the greatest burdens.

The UN’s Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, released in 2005, offers a particularly graphic representation of where we seem to be headed. Page 119 of the “Synthesis Report on Ecosystems and Human Well Being” offers a pair of world maps, each with a bar graph superimposed on every continent. The upper map chronicles the number of major floods reported in each decade from 1950 to 2000; the lower map displays the number of major wildfires. Everywhere but in Oceania (which is facing such a severe drought that large portions of Australia are now virtually unable to grow crops), the graphs rise steeply as the decades advance. Over this period, global temperatures only rose about one degree Fahrenheit; only the most optimistic of the IPCC’s projected future scenarios limits further warming during this century to less than three additional degrees.

The biannual UN Human Development Report, issued at the end of November, reported that 1 out of every 19 people in the so-called developing world was affected by a climate-related disaster between 2000 and 2004. The figure for people in the wealthiest (OECD) countries was 1 out of every 1,500. Yet the funds available thus far to various UN efforts to help the poorest countries adapt to climate changes ($26 million) is less than one week’s worth of flood defense spending in the UK and close to what the city of Venice spends on its flood gates every 2 to 3 weeks. The report estimates that an additional $86 billion will be needed to sustain existing UN development assistance and poverty reduction programs in the face of all the various threats attributable to climate change.

Two additional studies addressed the likelihood for increased violent conflict in the world as a result of climate-related changes. A paper published in the journal Political Geography by Rafael Reuveny of Indiana University examined 38 cases over the past 70 years where populations were forced to migrate due to a combination of environmental (droughts, floods, storms, land degradation, pollution) and other factors. Half of these cases led to varying degrees of violent conflict between the migrating population and people in the receiving areas. It is clear, states Reuveny, that those who depend the most on the environment to sustain their livelihood, especially in regions where arable land and fresh water are scarce, are most likely to be forced to migrate when conditions are subjected to rapid and unplanned-for change.

In November the UK-based relief organization International Alert reached a similar conclusion. In a report titled “A Climate of Conflict,” they compared maps of the world’s most politically unstable regions with those most susceptible to serious or extreme effects of climate change, and concluded that 46 countries, with a total population of 2.7 billion people, are firmly in both categories. The report states: “Hardest hit by climate change will be people living in poverty, in under-developed and unstable states, under poor governance. The effect of the physical consequences—such as more frequent extreme weather, melting glaciers, and shorter growing seasons—will add to the pressures under which those societies already live. The background of poverty and bad governance means many of these communities both have a low capacity to adapt to climate change and face a high risk of violent conflict.”

The report profiles eight case studies of places in Africa and Asia where climate changes have already put great stress on people’s livelihoods and often exacerbated internal conflicts. The outlook is significantly improved, however, in places where political institutions are relatively stable and accountable to the population. This contrast allows for a somewhat hopeful conclusion, with the authors extolling “the synergies between climate adaptation policies and peace-building activities in achieving the shared goal of sustainable development and peace.” One specific recommendation is to prioritize efforts to help people adapt to a changing climate, especially where subsistence-based economies already contribute very little to global warming but are highly vulnerable to the consequences. Various international NGOs have already intervened, particularly in Africa, to document and disseminate those adjustments in farming practices that prove most useful in facilitating adaptation to a changing climate.

Worldwide, the potential human (and non-human) toll from severe changes in the climate is even more disturbing than the statistics and “objective” case studies suggest. Two centuries of capitalist development—and especially the unprecedented pace of industrial development and resource consumption that has characterized the past 60 years—have created conditions that threaten everyone’s future. “There could be no clearer demonstration than climate,” says the recent UN Human Development Report, “that economic wealth creation is not the same as human progress.” Those who have benefited the least from the unsustainable pace of economic growth and expansion over the past five or six decades are facing a future of suffering and dislocation unlike any the world has ever seen.

Mitigations Worse Than the Disease?

Unfortunately, many of the most widely promoted solutions to the problem of global warming don’t come close to addressing these highly unequal impacts. Indeed, some of the most popular proposals, including the widespread conversion of food crops to so-called “biofuels” and the payment of fees by Northern consumers to development projects in the South hoping to “offset” personal greenhouse gas emissions, often do significantly more harm than good.

A year ago in these pages (WW4 Report, December 2006), I cited some early studies demonstrating that the extraction of ethanol from corn and biodiesel fuel from soybeans may not offer much of a solution to the dual problems of climate change and declining fossil fuel resources. Most striking at the time were the land use consequences of US production of agrofuels (the preferred term among activists and critics in the global South): for example, researchers at the University of Minnesota demonstrated that the entire current US corn and soybean crops could only displace about 3%, respectively, of our gasoline and diesel consumption. In the past year, the pressure on global grain prices from the accelerated push for agrofuels has led to a near crisis in global food supplies.

Analysts such as Lester Brown of the Earth Policy Institute have been predicting a conflict between food and fuel consumption for some time. Brown calls it an “epic competition between 800 million people with automobiles and the 2 billion poorest people.” But in the past year, the effects began to reverberate worldwide. World corn prices nearly doubled, as more than 20 percent of the US corn crop was diverted to ethanol production. Wheat prices rose to an all time high as midwestern farmers, seeking to profit from the ethanol boom, converted acreage from wheat to corn production. (Wheat is also relatively drought tolerant, whereas corn is far more dependent on large inputs of water and chemicals.) The world price of milk increased nearly 60 percent and people in Mexico rioted as prices for tortilla flour nearly doubled. China announced a freeze on the diversion of food grains to fuel production, as the effect on their own food prices began to be felt. Even the elite journal Foreign Affairs determined that “[t]he biofuel mania is commandeering grain stocks with a disregard for the obvious consequences.”

The most popular solutions to this dilemma carry equally troubling consequences. Europe is getting less of its biodiesel from soybean or canola oil and more from oil palm plantations, mainly in Southeast Asia. Malaysia and Indonesia, in particular, have lost 80 to 90% of their tropical rainforests to intensive logging, followed by the planting of monocultures of oil palms. Brazil is plowing under its unique Cerrado grasslands for sugar cane plantations, known to be a more efficient source of ethanol than corn, and is collaborating with US and global investors to export its exploitative model of sugar production throughout the Caribbean. Meanwhile, soy plantations are spreading deep into the Amazon to satisfy growing demands for biodiesel, as well as for livestock feed. Peasant and indigenous groups throughout the global South have come to see the agrofuel push as an accelerated effort to expand industrial agriculture and drive subsistence farmers from their lands.

Meanwhile, virtually all biofuel/agrofuel advocates are staking the future on the hope of rapidly switching from food crops to cellulose-rich sources—mainly trees, grasses, and crop wastes—as the major feedstock for agrofuel production. But these scenarios, too, often rely on the massive replacement of natural biodiversity with monoculture plantations of “energy crops.” Cellulose, as one of the two main structural components of plant cells, is extremely resistant to chemical or biological digestion, and current experimental “cellulosic” agrofuel plants consume far more energy than they produce. Thus, the push for cellulose-based fuels has also turned into a massive subsidy to biotechnology companies that are attempting to re-engineer enzymes and microorganisms—and even synthesize entirely novel bacterial genomes—in the hope of developing an efficient way to turn cellulose into fuel.

Even if these technical problems can be resolved without dire unforeseen consequences, there is not enough “excess” biomass to keep all of the privileged world’s cars running. Crop “wastes” are an essential resource for farmers seeking to return some fertility to the soil after harvesting grains, and many of the grasses frequently proposed as fuel sources are noxious weeds in many parts of the world.

One of the most disturbing consequences of the push for cellulose-based fuels is a resurgence of interest in the genetic engineering of trees. A company known as Arborgen, partly owned by International Paper and Mead-Westvaco, received USDA approval last summer to expand its experimental plots of a variety of eucalyptus that is genetically engineered to withstand cold temperatures. This would allow these highly invasive and resource-consuming trees to be planted throughout the southeastern US, as well as in other moderate temperate zones. Backers of this technology continually invoke the idea that such trees are needed to make fuel to replace petroleum, in an attempt to disarm critics and dismiss wider ecological concerns. Throughout the global South, people whose lands have been appropriated by corporations for conversion to commercial tree plantations have joined the worldwide campaign to prevent the commercial growing of genetically engineered trees. Ultimately, there is not enough biomass on earth, whether on fields, grasslands, or forests, to replace the millions of years of accumulated biomass that produced the once-abundant reservoirs of fossil fuels, consumed at an ever accelerating pace during the past century.

Similarly, the growing practice of purchasing carbon dioxide credits in order to “offset” affluent consumers’ excessive greenhouse gas emissions is increasingly opposed by people on the receiving end. Carbon offsets, whether sold on the Internet or negotiated through the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism, also favor the conversion of forests into monoculture plantations and further the displacement of traditional communities. Intensive monitoring required by the UN may be necessary to prevent profiteering and outright fraud, but also significantly favors homogeneous and biologically deficient plantations owned by transnational timber companies, in contrast to richly biodiverse tropical and subtropical forests inhabited by indigenous communities.

Most of us tend to view planting trees as an inherently benign activity, but as Larry Lohmann has documented in his study, “Carbon Trading: A critical conversation on climate change, privatization and power” (online at The Cornerhouse), international funding for tree planting (also for various industrial conversions and even for solar electricity) often exacerbates inequalities and semi-feudal economic relations in the recipient regions. Further, the process of global warming has begun to measurably decrease the ability of trees to absorb carbon dioxide, as nighttime respiration begins to emit more carbon than the trees can absorb through photosynthesis during the day. The added damaging effects of hurricanes and other catastrophes can quickly turn even the healthiest forest into a net emitter of carbon dioxide.

A Different Response

The more closely we follow the evolving discussion of global warming and its potential impacts, the more often we seem to find ourselves hovering at the edge of despair. This is especially true once we realize how many of the proposed “solutions” worsen the problem and exacerbate inequalities around the world. Powerful interests in the US are seeking massive subsidies for ever more destructive false solutions, including the expansion of nuclear power and the liquification of coal. So what are we to do? Most analysts opt for a cautious approach, trying to piece together enough different strategies to reduce CO2 emissions while maintaining current levels of production and consumption. Such systematic analysis is necessary and several approaches to building a more renewable energy system will be reviewed in a future article. But it is not sufficient, and current consumption levels in the industrialized world cannot be sustained. The technical obstacles to addressing the problem of global warming are often not even the most important ones. If we can find a way beyond the current impasse to imagine and realize a different kind of society, the problem of reorganizing our energy sources becomes far more tractable.

The last time a popular movement compelled significant changes in US environmental and energy policies was during the late 1970s. In the aftermath of the OPEC oil embargo, imposed during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, the nuclear and utility industries adopted a plan to construct more than 300 nuclear power plants in the United States by the year 2000. Utility and state officials identified rural communities across the US as potential sites for new nuclear facilities, and the popular response was swift and unanticipated. A militant grassroots anti-nuclear movement united back-to-the-landers and traditional rural dwellers with seasoned urban activists and a new generation of environmentalists who had only partially experienced the ferment of the 1960s.

In April 1977 over 1,400 people were arrested trying to nonviolently occupy a nuclear construction site in the coastal town of Seabrook, New Hampshire. This event helped inspire the emergence of decentralized, grassroots anti-nuclear alliances all across the country, committed to nonviolent direct action, bottom-up forms of internal organization, and a sophisticated understanding of the relationship between technological and social changes. Not only did these groups adopt an uncompromising call for “No Nukes,” but many of them promoted a vision of an entirely new social order, rooted in decentralized, solar-powered communities empowered to decide their energy future and also their political future. If the nuclear state almost inevitably leads to a police state—due to the massive security apparatus necessary to protect hundreds of nuclear plants and radioactive waste dumps all over the country—a solar-based energy system could be the underpinning for a radically decentralized and directly democratic model for society.

This movement was so successful in raising the hazards of nuclear power as a matter of urgent public concern that nuclear construction projects all over the US began to be canceled. When the nuclear reactor at Three Mile Island near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, nearly melted down in March 1979, it spelled the end of the nuclear expansion. While the Bush administration today is doing everything possible to underwrite a revival of nuclear power, it is still the case that no new nuclear plants have been licensed or built in the United States since Three Mile Island. The anti-nuclear movement of the late 1970s also spawned the first wave of significant development of solar and wind technologies, aided by substantial federal tax benefits for solar installations, and helped launch a visionary “green cities” movement that captured the imaginations of architects, planners, and ordinary citizens.

The 1970s and early 1980s (before the “Reagan revolution” fully took hold) were relatively hopeful times, and utopian thinking was far more widespread than it is today. Some anti-nuclear activists looked to the emerging outlook of social ecology—developed by Murray Bookchin and others—as a new theoretical grounding for a revolutionary ecological politics and philosophy. Social ecology challenges prevailing views about the evolution of social and cultural relationships to non-human nature and explores the roots of domination in the earliest emergence of human social hierarchies. For the activists of the period, Bookchin’s insistence that environmental problems are mainly social and political problems encouraged radical responses to ecological concerns, as well as reconstructive visions of a fundamentally transformed society.

Radically reconstructive social visions are relatively scarce in today’s political climate, dominated by endless war and further inequality. But dissatisfaction with the status quo reaches wide and deep among many sectors of the US population. While elite discourse and the corporate media continue to push political debates rightward and politicians of both major parties glibly comply, poll after poll suggests the potential for a new opening, reaching far beyond the confines of what has become politically acceptable. The more people consume, and the deeper into debt they fall, the less satisfied most people seem to be with the world of business as usual.

Global warming can represent a future of deprivation and scarcity for all but the world’s wealthiest or this global emergency can compel us to imagine a radically transformed society—both in the North and the South—where communities of people are newly empowered to remake their own future. The crisis can drive us to break free from a predatory global economy that fabulously enriches elites, while leaving the rest of us scrambling after the crumbs. The time is too short and the outlook far too bleak to settle for status-quo false solutions. Instead, we can embrace the reconstructive potential of a radically ecological social and political vision, prevent catastrophe, and begin to make our way toward a fundamentally different kind of future. As a writer in The Nation recently summed up her assessment of two books on the rise of the extreme right in the US, “sometimes only a willingness to be radical really brings about change.”

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Brian Tokar’s books include Earth for Sale, Redesigning Life? and Gene Traders. This article first appeared in Toward Freedom Jan. 22, and also ran in the January issue of Z Magazine

RESOURCES

The Cornerhouse
http://www.thecornerhouse.org.uk

Earth Policy Institute
http://www.earth-policy.org/

The Climate Divide, by Andrew Revkin
New York Times, April 2, 2007

How Biofuels Could Starve the Poor
by C. Ford Runge and Benjamin Senauer
Foreign Affairs, May/June 2007

Rapture Rescue 911: Disaster Response for the Chosen
by Naomi Klein
The Nation, Nov. 1, 2007

NASA’s Hansen says oceans could rise several meters by 2100
Post-Carbon Cities, Aug. 28, 2007

Rafael Reuveny profile
Indiana University News Room, Feb. 1

Deal Breakers
by Kim Phillips-Fei
The Nation, Dec. 10, 2007

See also:

BETRAYAL AT BALI
Toward a People’s Agenda for Climate Justice
by Brian Tokar
WW4 Report, January 2008
/node/4897

THE REAL SCOOP ON BIOFUELS
“Green Energy” Panacea or Just the Latest Hype?
by Brian Tokar
WW4 Report, December 2006
/node/2864

From our weblog:

Darfur crisis linked to climate change: UN
WW4 Report, June 27, 2007
/node/4131

New US reactors ordered for first time since Three Mile Island
WW4 Report, Sept. 25, 2007
/node/4472

Murray Bookchin, visionary social theorist, dies at 85
WW4 Report, Aug. 1, 2007
/node/2267

——————-

Reprinted by World War 4 Report, Feb. 1, 2008
Reprinting permissible with attribution

Continue ReadingGLOBAL WARMING AND THE STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE 

OIL SHOCK REDUX

Is OPEC the Real Cartel —or the Transnationals?

by Vilosh Vinograd, WW4 Report

At its Vienna summit, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) decided Feb. 1 against pumping more oil—in an open rebuff to Washington at a time when fears of a world economic downturn are adding to concern over rising prices. In defense of its decision, the 13-nation cartel said that global supplies are adequate and that speculation and geopolitical jitters—not oil availability—are setting prices. It also actually cited the impending downturn as a reason to put less oil on the market. “In view of the current situation, coupled with the projected economic slowdown…current OPEC production is sufficient to meet expected demand for the first quarter of the year,” read the official statement from the summit.

OPEC president Chakib Khelil of Algeria told reporters that US economic conditions “will probably have some impact on demand.” In the prelude to the summit, Iran’s oil minister, Gholam Hussein Nozari, told reporters: “we think there should be cutting in production.”

President Bush, meanwhile, led the lobbying for an output increase. “Everyone is fully aware that having a reliable and steady and predictable supply of oil is a benefit to the global economy,” said White House spokesman Tony Fratto in response to OPEC’s announcement. “We hope that they understand that their decisions on oil production have a real impact on the economy,” he said.

Including Iraq, which is not under quotas, total OPEC output is estimated at about 31.5 million barrels a day—about 40% of daily world demand, believed to be around 85.5 million barrels. The formal “OPEC-12” (minus Iraq) output ceiling is around 30 million barrels a day. (AP, Feb. 1)

Oil prices hit a symbolically cataclysmic $100 a barrel over the new year, and Bloomberg wrote that the “fastest-growing bet” on the New York Mercantile Exchange in is that the price of crude will double to $200 a barrel by the end of the year.

Petroleum prices have tripled over the last five years, with gasoline prices reaching record heights last summer. But for all the hand-wringing and exhortations to OPEC, these are unprecedentedly good times for the transnational oil companies.

ExxonMobil, the world’s largest publicly listed company, has reported a record-breaking $40.6 billion in net profits for 2007—up from $39.5 billion in 2006, which was the largest annual profit for any US company in history. (Money Times, Feb. 3)

Geopolitics, not Geology

The theorists of “Peak Oil” foresee an imminent end to the exorbitant profits and petroleum profligacy on which North American society is predicated. It is true that Exxon’s profits in the third quarter last year were 10% lower than the same period a year earlier—which was attributed to rising prices at the gas pump finally taking an impact on consumption.

It is also true that the remaining new fields that the majors are finding are are in hard-to-reach places—like the bottom of the sea, where drilling and pumping costs far more than it does on land.

But the most significant reality is that the oil fields the transnationals do control account for only about 6% of the world’s known reserves. State-owned companies such as Saudi Aramco and the National Iranian Oil Company have the rest—and, with oil costs above $90 a barrel, they are increasingly independent of investment from the globe-spanning majors. (SF Chronicle, Feb. 1)

Only 34% of global production is directly controlled by the trans-nationals, and terms for the exploitation of state-owned resources have been getting less favorable for the last generation. As Le Monde Diplomatique noted last March:

Under the traditional concession, companies owned the oil fields. But since the 1970s that model has disappeared outside the United States and a few European countries such as Britain, the Netherlands and Norway. Elsewhere, in Colombia, Thailand and the Gulf, the last contracts that granted concessions before the great wave of nationalisations during the 1970s have ended or are about to end. In Abu Dhabi, the authorities have already notified the majors that three concessions, due to expire in 2014 and 2018, will not be renewed.

And the state oil companies are generally only accepting the trans-nationals as 40% partners. The most significant reversal of this trend would be the Iraq oil law, which would open the country’s undeveloped fields (the big majority) to private investment on favorable terms. But, as Le Monde notes, Washington committed a “miscalculation” in thinking it could easily push this through Iraq’s parliament: “[T]he US had no difficulty in rewriting the occupied country’s constitution to suit itself, but all its attempts to overturn the 1972 law that nationalised oil and revert to a system of concessions have so far failed.”

ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips abandoned their heavy crude oil projects in Venezuela’s Orinoco Belt last year rather than cede majority ownership and operating control to the state-owned oil company PDVSA.

In an editorial in its Jan. 5 issue—just as oil was hitting $100 a barrel—The Economist wrote, “Oil keeps getting more expensive—but not because it is running out.” Instead, the magazine which is considered sacred guardian of the neoliberal order blamed “peak nationalism.”

“Oil is now almost five times more expensive than it was at the beginning of 2002,” The Economist noted.

It would be natural to assume that ever increasing price reflects ever greater scarcity. And so it does, in a sense. Booming bits of the world, such as China, India and the Middle East have seen demand for oil grow with their economies. Meanwhile, Western oil firms, in particular, are struggling to produce any more of the stuff than they did two or three years ago. That has left little spare production capacity and, in America at least, dwindling stocks. Every time a tempest brews in the Gulf of Mexico or dark clouds appear on the political horizon in the Middle East, jittery markets have pushed prices higher. This week, it was a cold snap in America and turmoil in Nigeria that helped the price reach three figures.

No wonder, then, that the phrase “peak oil” has been gaining ground even faster than the oil price. With each extra dollar, the conviction grows that the planet has been wrung dry and will never be able to satisfy the thirst of a busy world.

But The Economist places the blame with “geography, not geology.”

Yet the fact that not enough oil is coming out of the ground does not mean not enough of it is there… For one thing, oil producers have tied their own hands. During the 1980s and 1990s, when the price was low and so were profits, they pared back hiring and investment to a minimum. Many ancillary firms that built rigs or collected seismic data shut up shop. Now oil firms want to increase their output again, they do not have the staff or equipment they need.

Worse, nowadays, new oil tends to be found in relatively inaccessible spots or in more unwieldy forms. That adds to the cost of extracting oil, because more engineers and more complex machinery are needed to exploit it—but the end of easy oil is a far remove from the jeremiads of peak-oilers. The gooey tar-sands of Canada contain almost as much oil as Saudi Arabia. Eventually, universities will churn out more geologists and shipyards more offshore platforms, though it will take a long time to make up for two decades of underinvestment.

Finally, The Economist cuts to the chase—revealing that the real answer lies in neither geology nor geography, but geopolitics:

The biggest impediment is political. Governments in almost all oil-rich countries, from Ecuador to Kazakhstan, are trying to win a greater share of the industry’s bumper profits. That is natural enough, but they often deter private investment or exclude it altogether. The world’s oil supply would increase markedly if Exxon Mobil and Royal Dutch Shell had freer access to Russia, Venezuela and Iran. In short, the world is facing not peak oil, but a pinnacle of nationalism.

So The Economist backs up the conventional wisdom that the oil majors want what is best for humanity, that consumer needs are best served by the “free (read: unregulated) market,” and that the roots of the crisis lie with efforts by countries in the global south to reclaim sovereign control over the resources under their own soil.

This is, of course, a recipe for endless war. Not only is rolling back the wave of oil nationalizations a long-standing goal of the transnationals and their allies going back at least to the CIA-backed Iranian coup of 1953, but there are pressing geostrategic concerns related to the long-term preservation of US global hegemony.

As far back as 1992, the Pentagon “Defense Planning Guide” drawn up by Paul Wolfowitz and Scooter Libby stated that the US must “discourage advanced industrial nations from challenging our leadership or even aspiring to a larger regional or global role.” The oil resources of the Persian Gulf were recognized as critical to this aim: “In the Middle East and Southwest Asia, our overall objective is to remain the predominant outside power in the region and preserve US and Western access to the region’s oil.”

In this light, the fact that Beijing’s national company PetroChina is rapidly gaining on Exxon as the world’s largest oil company takes on a significance far beyond mere commercial competition. “Access to oil” ultimately means access to military power, so what is really at issue here is control of oil as a key to global power.

Last November, Defense Secretary Robert Gates, after meeting in Beijing with his counterpart, Gen. Cao Gangchuan, told a news conference he had raised “the uncertainty over China’s military modernization and the need for greater transparency to allay international concerns.” In its coverage of the meeting, the New York Times precisely echoed the language of the 1992 Defense Planning Guide: “Pentagon officials describe China as a ‘peer competitor’…” An analysis on the visit in the newspaper quoted Michael J. Green of the Center for Strategic and International Studies saying, “If you are sitting in the Pentagon, China is a potential peer competitor.”

Understand this, and the reckless, criminal adventure in Iraq becomes at least comprehensible. So does the war drive against Iran, whose growing sway over the Shi’ite-dominated Baghdad regime could render the US “victory” in Iraq horrifically Phyrric. So too becomes the mutual Sudan-Chad proxy war—in which a government with PetroChina contracts and one with Exxon contracts sponsor guerilla movements on each others’ territory. The destabilization campaign against the Hugo Chávez regime in Venezuela comes into focus as a struggle over ancillary but still globally significant oil reserves in the traditional US “backyard.” The popular notion that the West’s contest with OPEC is fundamentally about securing low oil prices on behalf of consumers dematerializes like a mirage.

Oil industry insiders understand that there is actually a strong tendency in exactly the other direction. OPEC needs to keep prices under control to assure their dominance of “market share,” while Western governments and transnationals need high prices in order to line up the investment and political will to expand production to areas beyond OPEC’s control—from Alaska to the Caspian Basin.

The Public Strikes Back?

There are signs of a public backlash to the oil majors’ free ride now that the Bush administration enters its endgame. The Foundation for Taxpayer and Consumer Rights is calling for Congressional action to bring unregulated energy markets under public control. “Exxon is making more than $75,000 a minute around the clock on crude oil prices that are at unjustifiable levels,” read their press release. “Oil companies have opposed legislation to regulate electronic energy trading, even as they deflect blame by pointing to such markets as the reason for crude oil prices that remain above $90 a barrel… Exxon’s $40.6 billion annual profit and Chevron’s $17.1 billion come at the cost of an economy tipping into recession… While Exxon makes the largest corporate profit by any corporation, ever, families pay $60 and more for a gas station fill-up and Northeasterners are shelling out more than $2,000 on average for heating oil.”

“The 2007 profit of just the three U.S.-based major oil companies comes to $70 billion,” said FTCR research director Judy Dugan, research director of the nonprofit, nonpartisan FTCR. “Yet Americans are deeper in consumer debt than ever in large part for high energy costs.” (FTCR, Feb. 1)

Tyson Slocum of Public Citizen, wrote in a September 2006 report, “Hot Profits and Global Warming: How Oil Companies Hurt Consumers and the Environment”:

The high prices we are now paying are simply feeding oil company profits and are not being invested in sustainable energy solutions. Since January 2005, the largest five oil companies—ExxonMobil, BP, Shell, ChevronTexaco and ConocoPhillips—spent $112 billion buying back their own stock and paying dividends, and have an extra $59.5 billion in cash, while their investment in renewable energy pales in comparison. For example, BP, the so-called renewable energy leader, in 2005 posted $38.4 billion in stock buybacks, dividend payments and cash, but plans to invest two percent of that amount on solar, wind, natural gas and hydrogen energy.

And this despite an aggressive ad campaign emphasizing BP’s supposed commitment to renewable energy, a new logo that looks like a pretty green flower, and the dropping of the word “petroleum” from all advertising—except for the catch-phrase “beyond petroleum.” Of course, BP remains fundamentally an oil company, and still officially stands for British Petroleum. In fact, Public Citizen finds, the oil majors are doing their best to keep alternativesoff the market:

Under the current market framework, oil companies aren’t making the investments necessary to solve our addiction to oil and never will. With $1 trillion in assets tied up in extracting, refining and marketing oil, their business model will squeeze the last cent of profit out of that sunk capital for as long as possible. The oil industry’s significant presence on Capitol Hill ensures that the government does not threaten their monopoly over energy supply through funding of alternatives to oil. For example, energy legislation signed by President Bush in August 2005 provides $5 billion in new financial subsidies to oil companies.

And FTCR’s Dugan says the 2007 energy bill didn’t do much better, failing to include any provision to recoup some $14 billion in oil company tax subsidies over five years. “The major oil companies’ incredible profits, boosted by multibillion-dollar tax subsidies to the industry, are ultimately clobbering taxpayers,” she said Dugan. “Given the rising federal debt, today’s babies will still be paying the Exxon tab.”

Iraq and the GWOT: It’s the Oil, Stupid!

Bush may have been sincere in his exhortations to OPEC to boost production and thereby lower prices. High prices may now be costing the administration and its oil industry friends more than is deemed acceptable. But in any case, the fundamental thing at this stage of the game is no longer the price of oil but control of oil. Mohammed Mossadeq’s nationalization of Iran’s oil in 1952 was the first major assault on Western control of oil. It was turned around with the following year’s CIA coup. The 1956 Suez crisis briefly interrupted oil flows from the Middle East and affected prices, but posed no challenge to Western control. The founding of OPEC in 1960 was a first step towards reasserting sovereign control of oil, but the fields still largely remained in private Western hands even if host governments would now dictate production levels in a coordinated manner so as to influence prices.

The 1969 coup d’etat in Libya brought the radical Col. Moammar Qadaffi to power and led to first the nationalization of Libya’s oil and then the imposition of production-sharing agreements on terms favorable to the host government. Analyst James Akins writing in Foreign Affairs, the journal of the elite Council on Foreign Relations, called the Libyan demands of 1970 “a flash of lightening in a summer sky.” But far worse was yet to come with the October 1973 Arab-Israeli war.

As Israel’s tanks rolled into the Sinai, Iraq nationalized the Exxon and Mobil holdings in the Basra oil fields and launched a drive for a full Arab embargo of the US. “Radical” regimes like Iraq and Libya won over “conservative” ones like Saudi Arabia and the Gulf mini-states. The Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC), an independent body within OPEC, was formed—and the embargo was on. In December, the price shot up to a then-unprecedented $11.65 per barrel (not adjusted for inflation)—an increase of 468% over the price in 1970. For the first time, producing nations had used the “oil weapon” as a lever of influence against the West. The first “oil shock”—then known as the “energy crisis”—was a wake-up call for consumers, governments and transnationals alike.

Then, as now, oil company profits went through the roof. As long lines formed at gas stations across the USA, Exxon’s profits went up 29%; Mobil’s 22%; and Texaco’s 23%. But fearing loss of control, the transnationals pressured the White House to cede to Arab demands. The major shareholders in Aramco (the Saudi-based Arabian American Oil Company, then consisting of Exxon, Mobil, Texaco and Chevron) sent a memorandum to President Nixon warning of dire consequences if the US did not halt aid to Israel.

While demonization of the Arabs was widespread in the US media, the oil companies were also a target of public ire. In 1974, executives were called to testify before the Senate Subcommittee on Investigations, where James Allen, Democrat of Alabama, posed the question: “Would it be improper to ask if the oil companies are enjoying a feast in the midst of famine?” Litigation was also launched against the oil majors, but they had made little progress when OPEC decided to boost production again in 1975, leveling off prices—the war now long over, and maintenance of market share emerging as an imperative in response to Capitol Hill talk of “energy independence.”

The US Strategic Reserves and UN International Energy Agency were established in response to the crisis. But these measures failed to prevent the next “oil shock” when the Iranian Revolution toppled the Shah in 1979. The price per barrel more than doubled between 1979 and 1981, and prices at the pump jumped 150%. The combined net earnings of Exxon, Mobil, Chevron, Gulf and Texaco increased by 70% between 1978 and 1979, while 1980 was the most lucrative year in the oil industry’s history up to that point. The US and its Gulf allies gave former rival Iraq a “green light” to invade Iran and cut the ayatollahs down to size.

In the Reagan-era Pax Americana, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states kept the price low so as to undermine the struggling Iranian regime. But now even conservative allies of the West were asserting oil sovereignty. 1980 saw the Saudi regime’s nationalization of Aramco—a tipping point in fast-eroding Western control of global oil.

The subsequent generation was one of both retreat and consolidation for the transnationals. Even as their control over global oil contracted, they retrenched their forces internally. The “Seven Sisters” of the 1970s (Exxon, Mobil, Chevron, Gulf, Texaco, BP and Shell, by their contemporary names) are now four, following the mergers of Mobil with Exxon, and Gulf and Texaco with Chevron—or perhaps five, if we consider ConocoPhillips as having joined their ranks.

Oil prices dropped in the weeks after 9-11, even as theories mounted that the US invasion of Afghanistan was aimed at encircling the Caspian Basin oil reserves. But some observers recognized even then that the real struggle was over the Persian Gulf reserves, the most strategic on the planet by far. On Oct. 18, 2001, Michael Klare wrote in The Nation:

The geopolitical dimensions of the war are somewhat hard to discern because the initial fighting is taking place in Afghanistan, a place of little intrinsic interest to the United States, and because our principal adversary, bin Laden, has no apparent interest in material concerns. But this is deceptive, because the true center of the conflict is Saudi Arabia, not Afghanistan (or Palestine), and because bin Laden’s ultimate objectives include the imposition of a new Saudi government, which in turn would control the single most valuable geopolitical prize on the face of the earth: Saudi Arabia’s vast oil deposits, representing one-fourth of the world’s known petroleum reserves.

Klare stated, rather obviously: “A Saudi regime controlled by Osama bin Laden could be expected to sever all ties with US oil companies and to adopt new policies regarding the production of oil and the distribution of the country’s oil wealth—moves that would have potentially devastating consequences for the US, and indeed the world, economy. The United States, of course, is fighting to prevent this from happening.”

With the invasion of Iraq—which sits on nearly half the Persian Gulf reserves—it was correctly perceived that the struggle for the planet’s most critical reserves was truly underway, and the third oil shock arrived. The price has escalated along with the level of insurgent violence ever since. The Great Fear driving the prices ever higher is that the US could lose control of Iraq, the conflagration could generally engulf the Middle East, and that Iran or jihadist elements far more intransigent than Saddam Hussein could emerge as new masters of the Gulf reserves.

An effective anti-war position must entail deconstructing the propaganda of “national security” on the oil question, and breaking with the illusion that elite concerns and consumer concerns coincide. Iraq and its various “sideshows” such as Afghanistan are the battlegrounds in a strategic struggle for control of oil as the foundation of continued US global dominance (or “primacy,” in the argot of wonkdom). This struggle will not mean lower oil prices for US citizens—but their sons and daughters dying on foreign shores, fueling Islamist terrorism and hatred of the US in a relentless vicious cycle.

—-

RESOURCES

Foundation for Taxpayer and Consumer Rights
http://www.consumerwatchdog.org

FTCR press release via
Fox Business, Feb. 1

Public Citizen Energy Program
http://www.citizen.org/cmep

OPEC: No boost in oil output
AP, Feb. 1

Exxon gains from Soaring Oil Prices, beats own Record
Money Times, Feb. 3

Big Oil has trouble finding new fields
San Francisco Chronicle, Feb. 1

The oil price: Peak nationalism
The Economist, Jan. 3

Hydrocarbon Nationalism
by Jean-Pierre Séréni
Le Monde Diplomatique, March 2007

The Geopolitics of War
by Michael Klare
The Nation, Oct. 18, 2001

See also:

IRAQ: EXPOSING THE CORPORATE AGENDA
by Antonia Juhasz, Oil Change International
WW4 Report, November 2007
/node/4611

PEAK OIL AND NATIONAL SECURITY
A Critique of Energy Alternatives
by George Caffentzis
WW4 Report, September 2005
/node/1027

From our weblog:

Oil: $200 a barrel by year’s end?
WW4 Report, Jan. 27, 2008
/node/4986

China emerges as “peer competitor” —in race for global oil
WW4 Report, Nov. 8, 2007
/node/4649

Consumers get revenge on Exxon …a little
WW4 Report, Nov 2, 2007
/node/4621

Specter of “hydrocarbon nationalism” drives Iraq war
WW4 Report, March 27, 2007
/node/3453

Exxon quits Venezuela
WW4 Report, June 27, 2007
/node/4136

From our archive:

Petro-oligarchs wage shadow war
WW4 Report, Dec. 22, 2001
/static/13.html#shadows2

——————-

Special to World War 4 Report, Feb. 1, 2008
Reprinting permissible with attribution

Continue ReadingOIL SHOCK REDUX 

BOLIVAR’S SWORD

Venezuela’s Recognition of the Colombian Insurgency

by Paul Wolf

“Now go and smite Amalek, and utterly destroy all that they have, and spare them not; but slay both man and woman, infant and suckling, ox and sheep, camel and ass.” — I Samuel 15:3

Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez took the world by surprise in January when he asked the Colombian government to stop calling the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and National Liberation Army (ELN) “terrorists.” Chávez then appealed to the international community to formally recognize the belligerent status of the two insurgent groups. Then came a resolution of the Venezuelan National Assembly backing the president’s statement. It comes very close to the legal recognition of the FARC and ELN by the Venezuelan government. Not quite as exciting as the recent release of two hostages by the FARC, to be sure, but far more significant.

The Colombian government reacted to the Venezuelan declarations by panicking. Reinforcements were called in from the USA. Admiral Michael Mullin, Chairman of the Joints Chiefs of Staff, flew to Bogotá to publicly affirm that, indeed, the Colombian guerrillas are terrorists. Then Jan. 19, Colombian President Alvaro Uribe flew to Europe to launch a “diplomatic offensive,” fearing that the European Union will consider removing the guerrillas from their official terrorist list. Yet the implications go well beyond labeling and name-calling.

First of all, recognition of the FARC and ELN as belligerents would provide Venezuela with a legal basis it could use to intervene in the Colombian conflict, either by arming the guerrillas, or more directly. There is no indication that Venezuela would want to do that, but legal recognition is a step in this direction. Venezuela can treat the government and the insurgents on equal terms. This is quite threatening to the Colombian government.

On a more positive note, recognition of belligerent status brings with it the responsibility of the guerrillas to act in accordance with the Geneva Conventions, which among other things, prohibit kidnapping, killing civilians, and using indiscriminate weapons. Opening this door for the FARC might, for the first time in 50 years, offer an incentive for the group to mend its ways. For the ELN, decimated by the murder of thousands of its cadre over the last decade, it could offer a way to get out of this alive. The ELN is already in negotiations with the Colombian government, which are being mediated by Cuba. They are slow-moving and the ELN is not demobilizing. That could change.

While Colombian politicians are busy wringing their hands over what they anticipate will be a debate over this in Europe, and some conservative politicians are even warning that Venezuela may intervene in the Colombian conflict militarily, it’s far more productive—and, presumably, President Chávez’s intent—to consider recognition of belligerent status as the best way to bring the insurgency under control. Colombia’s relentless media campaign, the goal of which is always to denounce the guerrillas as terrorists, may stimulate the troops, but it has an equal and opposite effect on the guerrillas. The repeated use of this term, “terrorist,” is calculated to inflame the conflict, not resolve it. It is pointless to talk about negotiations when one of the parties won’t tone down its rhetoric.

So how can recognition of the belligerent status of the guerrillas help to bring peace? First of all, there will no longer be any excuse for not engaging in a dialog with the guerrillas. The Colombian government will be forced to negotiate, and that is the only way the conflict can ever end. Secondly, the guerrillas will have an incentive to not engage in the kinds of behaviors that the Colombian government is so quick to point out. These are two good reasons for supporting Chavez’s position.

It’s useful to take a look at the laws that apply here, to understand what is at stake and where things may be heading in Colombia. Let’s digress for a moment and consider how the term terrorist is used to equate one’s enemies with the people responsible for blowing up the World Trade Center. That’s the comparison people using the term want to make.

War has always been an awful business. It’s the ultimate expression of man’s capacity for barbarism. Efforts to rein in the worst of it reached their zenith following the horrors of World War II, in the form of multilateral treaties stating that humanity would no longer tolerate torture, genocide, and the wholesale bombing of cities. The wars of the future would be conducted by humanitarians, it was believed. Unfortunately, the tactics of war have become more, not less, brutal.

Today’s wars are not, as a rule, waged across the national borders of the opponent. They are waged in homes, streets, universities, and meeting places, through subversion, infiltration, and guerrilla warfare. Today’s combatants include civilians, guerrillas, special operations forces, and paramilitary death squads. That’s an unfortunate but undeniable fact. Whether they’re homegrown revolutions, or proxy wars for global domination, the modern day combatant could easily be described as a terrorist.

The traditional laws of war are entirely too chivalrous and impractical for the modern-day warrior. Revolutionaries lack the capacity for regular warfare or the facilities to take care of prisoners, whereas the government often lacks the popular support needed to separate the revolutionary cadre from the civilian population. The reality is often that both sides engage in terrorism to discourage the civilian population from supporting the other. Governments don’t respond to insurgencies according to legal rules and procedures, but on the basis of prudential calculations, despite the fact that their citizens value the avoidance of gratuitous suffering and destruction. Likewise, insurgents promise a better society while justifying the brutal methods of guerrilla warfare on the basis that they have no other way to win. For both, the laws of war are seen as somewhat sentimental and naïve when applied to their own side. Human rights finds its use in the moral justifications of war propaganda and the denunciation of atrocities committed by the enemy. It’s rare indeed for human rights defenders to criticize their own. Yet this was the noble intention of the founders of the League of Nations and the United Nations who sought to create a more humane world.

So how should insurgent groups such as the FARC, ELN, Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PLFP) be treated by the international community? Should we make a list of groups using irregular warfare methods – a list that could include practically every insurgency in world history – and call them terrorists? It seems wildly unrealistic to try to impose order in the world by labeling insurgents as the enemies of mankind. Simón Bolívar and George Washington would, by today’s standards, be candidates for the terrorist list. So how does international law treat insurgent groups?

Traditionally, the legal status of an insurgent group depended on their degree of success. When an insurgent group was able to maintain a sustained campaign and control a substantial portion of the national territory, the counter-government could be accorded insurgent status by third states, which would thereafter be obligated to take into account the condition of warfare in their relations with the state. If the hostilities persisted, it was permissible, and perhaps even obligatory, to recognize the condition of belligerency, provided that insurgent forces acting under responsible authority observed the rules of warfare, and that there was some need for the third state to define its attitude towards the conflict. This need could occur if the rebels became so strong in some geographical area that the third government found it necessary to deal with them as well as with the established government. Recognition was simply made by public declaration. Formal procedures for third-party recognition have never existed, except in the very rare cases where the parties agreed to submit their disputes to a tribunal for settlement.

The classic example of a belligerency is the American Civil War. The North declared the South to be in a state of belligerency, for the purpose of asking European nations to respect a blockade of Southern ports. This declaration was upheld by the US Supreme Court. In the Prize Cases, Justice Robert C. Grier held that large-scale insurrection constitutes war in the legal sense:

Insurrection against a government may or may not culminate in an organized rebellion, but a civil war always begins by insurrection against the lawful authority of the government. A civil war is never solemnly declared; it becomes such by its accidents – the number, power, and organization of the persons who originate and carry it on. When the party in rebellion occupy and hold in a hostile manner a certain portion of territory; have declared their independence; have cast off their allegiance; have organized armies; have commenced hostilities against their former sovereign; the world acknowledges them as belligerents, and the contest is war… Therefore, we are of opinion that the President had a right jure belli [war power], to institute a blockade of ports in possession of the states in rebellion, which neutrals are bound to regard.

This was a rare example of a nation formally declaring a state of belligerency within its borders, for the purpose of obtaining foreign assistance in blockading the rebels. Such declarations are rarely made, because the recognition of belligerency also implies the formal recognition of other legal rights of the insurgents. Any government would be ill-advised to acknowledge that such rights exist. In fact, no government has formally recognized the belligerent status of insurgents within its territory since World War II.

In today’s world, there is almost no reliance by third states on the traditional legal definitions of rebellion, insurgency, and belligerence. Instead, governments normally determine their relations with the competing factions on the basis of their own foreign policy goals. This often translates into supporting the forces of “law and order” in allied states, and the forces of “self-determination” in rival states. Nevertheless, the legal status of insurgents should be a matter of serious concern to the courts, which are supposed to decide cases based on objective legal standards, rather than on whether the defendant is a member of an official enemies list. That is the rule of guilt by association. The new crime of providing material support to a terrorist organization takes us back to the days of the inquisition. It is the crime of helping a group on the official enemies list of the United States or the European Union.

Recently, a court in Copenhagen dismissed charges against persons selling t-shirts bearing FARC and PFLP logos. The defendants had advertised that five Euros from each sale would be donated to those organizations. The court made factual findings that the FARC and PFLP are not, under Danish law, terrorist organizations because their actions are intended to overthrow their governments, not to terrorize civilians.

In the United States, this kind of political designation is not reviewable by the courts, even though it determines the rights of the individual “terrorists.” When FARC guerrilla Simón Trinidad was put on trial for conspiracy to commit hostage-taking for his admitted role as a prisoner exchange negotiator for the group, the court not only did not review the FARC’s status as a terrorist organization, but also held that Trinidad could not be a prisoner of war, because the United States and Colombia are not at war. Trinidad is the first “international terrorist” ever extradited and tried in the US under the new law prohibiting the provision of material support to an officially designated terrorist organization.

Chavez’ call to the international community will have wide-ranging implications—for foreign insurgents being tried as ordinary criminals in places like Washington DC, for ordinary Colombians who should not have to fear being kidnapped or blown up by a land mine, and for the irrational and war-mongering “global war on terrorism,” whatever that is. It could begin to undo the immense damage this one word – terrorist – has inflicted on the world in recent years.

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Paul Wolf is an attorney in Washington DC practicing international human rights law.

From our weblog:

FARC: “terrorists” or “belligerents”?
WW4 Report, Jan. 21, 2008
/node/4962

Danish court: FARC, PFLP not terrorists
WW4 Report, Dec. 16, 2007
/node/4810

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Special to World War 4 Report, Feb. 1, 2008
Reprinting permissible with attribution

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