Coming Soon: World War 4 Report Reloaded

Dear Readers:

World War 4 Report’s autumn hiatus turned out be longer and deeper than we had anticipated, with your chief editor and trusty blogger under a state of force majeure for several weeks. But we are back. The Daily Report news blog is being updated each day, with some (shall we say?) lively interchanges in the reader comment section.

We are currently preparing a long-overdue major redesign of the website, which we will be unveiling sometime over the winter. After years of reader complaints about the format, we are working on something that will be more graphically exciting and user-friendly.

One question we are still grappling with is whether to continue the monthly e-journal in the new format. How much does it mean to you to have a magazine-style forum for a few offerings of finished journalism and commentary each month, in addition to the daily digests and bloggery? We put it to the readers as this month’s Exit Poll, as well as asking you to vote with a donation.

Before we went on autumn hiatus, we pledged that if we could raise $500 over the autumn, we would keep the monthly edition going. One reader in Japan immediately contributed $100 towards that goal. That makes $400 to go.

What do you say, readers? Please be in touch with feedback—and, if you want to give us some encouragement, a donation. (It doesn’t have to be anywhere near what our Japanese reader gave, of course.)

Thank you, arigato, shukran and gracias,

Bill Weinberg

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Continue ReadingComing Soon: World War 4 Report Reloaded 

FRESH EYES NEEDED ON WIKILEAKS’ TROVE OF SECRETS

by Rohan Jayasekera, Index on Censorship

With maybe hundreds of human rights activists named in the WikiLeaks files, and frontman Julian Assange threatening to throw them open to the world if “forced” to do so, it’s time for fair assessment of the potential threat to whistle-blowers and free expression advocates argues Rohan Jayasekera

When WikiLeaks turned from publishing battlefield reports to secret US State Department cables, the initial effect of seeing state-to-state relations shorn of traditional diplomatic obfuscation was electric. The lasting effect was more like reading your teenager’s Facebook page, initially shocking but ultimately predictable, and for those with the right experience, actually pretty familiar.

Again, there were fears about exposure and endangerment. The Atlantic magazine even alleged that WikiLeaks had exposed Zimbabwean opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai to treason charges by revealing his views on sanctions, as if Robert Mugabe had ever felt that he needed “evidence” to jail someone.

Some regimes are passing laws to extend the meaning of treason to cover economic “attacks” as well as military or political ones. In that particular hall of mirrors simply voicing sympathy for a tourism boycott can get you bundled into the back of a van.

And any association with the US looks bad to a lot of people in some parts of the world, especially when done in private. WikiLeaks frontman Julian Assange hardly helped this week by telling al-Jazeera TV that many officials visiting US embassies are “spies for the US in their countries.”

Generally though, the diplomats and politicians named and shamed (and sometimes praised) in the WikiLeaks cables tended to escape chastened but safe from the experience.

The risk is far greater for the many ordinary human rights defenders and civil society activists who have risked a visit to US embassies in their home countries. They come, often in surprisingly large numbers, to make advocacy cases to what they hope are sympathetic US ears, and until WikiLeaks, away from the dictators’ prying eyes.

Mercifully, it seems—though Assange now suggests otherwise, to al-Jazeera at least—the rights defenders have been saved from being cited in US embassy CIA staff reports.

Intelligence officers have a reputation for boosting the significance of their reports by making more out of routine contact with dissidents than the exchanges actually deserve. But the CIA removed them all from the SIPRNET digital shoebox of US diplomatic cables that alleged WikiLeaks source Bradley Manning drew from.

But the risk remains, as I was firmly told by a US embassy political attache in an Arab state this month. A veteran human rights campaigner had already warned that many local rights activists expect more support from US diplomats than they will actually get; in the vault-like security of a typical US embassy they speak more freely than they possibly should.

The embassy attache was adamant. It was only a matter of time before a human rights defender was exposed by WikiLeaks, and jailed or killed as a result. “Then in that case,” he said grimly, “you may ask Mr Assange exactly what he thinks he has done for ‘transparency and human rights.'”

Weirdly, almost on cue, Wikileaks released a cable that might have proven his point, in which the name of the source—a public critic of a particularly reprehensible head of state — was redacted by WikiLeaks. However the redactor, presumably unfamiliar with the dissident’s work, failed to recognise a giveaway clue cited in the cable’s title.

Even with the redactions, anyone with reasonable knowledge of the country concerned could have guessed who was being quoted giving off-the-record, publicly unatributable, deep background information—or so he thought—to US diplomats about top-level state corruption.

Again, dictators don’t need evidence to jail people, and the key equation at the heart of the work of free expression defenders supported by Index on Censorship is simple: risk balanced against effect.

The risk posed by exposure by WikiLeaks is one more fresh edge to the multi-faceted threat they, their families and friends already face.

But WikiLeaks is supposed to be helping, no?

Redaction of data was never meant to be WikiLeaks’ prime duty, so it should be no surprise that they do it unwillingly, and when they do, that they can do it badly or obscurely. Index on Censorship raised the issue of the giveaway clue in the title of the otherwise redacted leaked cable with WikiLeaks directly.

They replied sympathetically, but noted that the redacted name was already out there as author of a critical book about the head of state. “…[S]o we feel that too much redaction is futile,” said the reply. “However, we do feel it is better to be safe than sorry and so have redacted the title…”

Well, OK, but the root of the question is the same as that raised everywhere, very specifically at an Index on Censorship debate between WikiLeaks’ Julian Assange and UK journalist David Aaronovich at London’s City University this year.

Since WikiLeaks decided to take editorial responsibility for selecting, redacting and publishing the content, what editorial criteria do they apply, what process is followed, what in-house oversight is there of their work and what qualifies for redaction under its “harm minimisation procedure“?

WikiLeaks itself said this was a problem, solved by opening up the data in advance to selected international publications, The Guardian, Der Spiegel and the New York Times among them. That relationship has since splintered over coverage of Julian Assange’s personal issues, but the relevance of adding external expertise to the process—expertise that WikiLeaks doesn’t have—still stands.

Assange repeatedly maintains that “[WikiLeaks] must protect our sources at whatever cost. This is our sincere concern.” But while he says his organisation presently releases files in a “responsible” manner, he fears extradition to the US and makes a clear threat to everyone involved, willingly or otherwise. “If I am forced we could go to the extreme and expose each and every file that we have access to.”

It’s easy to underestimate how much time US embassy staff spend talking to dissidents, opposition leaders, human rights and civil society activists. Hundreds could be named in the WikiLeaks collection of diplomatic cables still unreleased. It might be helpful to provide advance warning to dissidents about to get their moment in the WikiLeaks sun, and prepare the various organisations charged to defend them.

The WikiLeaks core principles, at least as they were when Index on Censorship honored the organisation in 2008, are good ones. But surely it’s possible to bring together independent groups of advisors, or draw on the advice of local human rights defenders. Maybe just three experts, easy to find, who before redacting or not redacting a name, will have at least read one of the redactee’s books or are more personally acquainted with the threats he or she faces?

—-

Rohan Jayasekera is Associate Editor and Deputy Chief Executive of Index on Censorship

This story first ran Dec. 31 on Index on Censorship.

From our Daily Report:

Enough with the Julian Assange hero worship
World War 4 Report, Dec. 26, 2010

WikiLeaks and the Belarus affair
World War 4 Report, Dec. 30, 2010

See related stories, this issue:

WIKILEAKS HONDURAS
State Department Busted on Support of Coup
by Robert Naiman, TruthOut
World War 4 Report, January 2011

WIKILEAKS BOLIVIA
Cable Lays Bare Washington’s Stance Toward Evo Morales
by Benjamin Dangl, Toward Freedom
World War 4 Report, January 2011

——————-
Reprinted by World War 4 Report, January 1, 2011
Reprinting permissible with attribution

Continue ReadingFRESH EYES NEEDED ON WIKILEAKS’ TROVE OF SECRETS 

THE AMBASSADOR HAS NO CLOTHES

WikiLeaks Cable Lays Bare Washington’s Stance Toward Bolivia

by Benjamin Dangl, Toward Freedom

A classified cable from the US embassy in La Paz, Bolivia released by WikiLeaks lays bare an embassy that is biased against the Evo Morales government, underestimates the sophistication of the governing party’s grassroots base, and out of touch with the political reality of the country.

The recently released Jan. 23, 2009 cable, entitled “Bolivia’s Referendum: Margin of Victory Matters,” analyzes the political landscape of the country in the lead up to the January 2009 referendum on the country’s new constitution, and was sent to all US embassies in South America and various offices in Washington.

In 2006, the leftist union leader and politician Evo Morales was inaugurated as Bolivia’s first indigenous president. Since his election he and members of his party, the Movement Toward Socialism (MAS), have partially nationalized gas reserves, enacted land reform and convoked an assembly to rewrite the country’s constitution. Following years of debates among assembly members, this constitution was passed in a national referendum on Jan. 25, 2009.

The US embassy cable released by WikiLeaks that was written during the politically-charged days leading up to this vote shows a mischaracterization on the part of embassy officials of the MAS government and its supporters.

The cable cites Bolivian newspaper reports that many community leaders and their supporters in the Altiplano, the high plains of western Bolivia, where much of the MAS support lies, had not even read the constitution, and instead would simply “take their marching orders from the MAS, and vote for the constitution.” Many had not read the document out of, according to the US embassy, “disinterest, blind faith in Evo Morales’ political project, and illiteracy.” The cable describes one meeting between members of the US embassy and Bolivian political officials who “lamented the way the MAS had ‘cheated’ and ‘fooled’ campesinos into believing Morales was himself truly indigenous or cared about indigenous issues.” The officials said the MAS popularity was due to “‘vertical control’ in the countryside…”

These are all inaccurate portrayals of the dynamics of the MAS party and its grassroots base. Support for the constitution and the MAS did not simply grow out of illiteracy, disinterestedness, blind faith or the vertical control of the MAS over its members, as embassy officials would have those reading of this cable believe.

While many social sectors in Bolivia had serious critiques of the new constitution, the writing and passage of it was largely the result of years of discussions and consultations with constituents. The political consciousness among the MAS party base, both rural and urban, is highly sophisticated and has benefited from years of social mobilizations and a first hand understanding of the needs of the impoverished majority of the country. People support the MAS because the party speaks to those needs, has opened up political participation to marginalized sectors of society, and has developed a political project that seeks to empower disenfranchised and indigenous communities.

Such democratic tendencies challenge the economic interests and political power of Washington and the Bolivian right. It is telling, therefore, that many of the sources the US embassy drew from in this cable are members of the Bolivian right and critics of Morales.

For example, in the cable, the embassy officials cite Bolivia’s Santa Cruz Civic Committee as a source on the supposed electoral fraud of the MAS. Since Morales’ election, this Civic Committee has risen to notoriety as a fierce critic of the MAS government, and is tied to Bolivian business elites, racist youth groups, and acts of violent repression against indigenous activists and MAS supporters.

According to the released cable, US embassy officials were told by members of the Santa Cruz Civic Committee that they did not trust international electoral observers—including those from the Organization of American States, the Carter Center, the United Nations and the European Union—because they had “blessed” an August 2008 recall vote which empowered Morales with over 60% of the vote. Therefore, members of the Civic Committee did “not expect an honest review of the constitutional referendum” in January of 2009.

These views are illustrative for a couple of reasons. For one thing, the US embassy, in this diplomatic primer on one of the most important votes of the decade in Bolivia, emphasized electoral fraud on the part of the MAS where leading international observers saw none. Secondly, it looked to the Civic Committee, an organization that is totally unrepresentative of the views of the majority of the population, as a source on the topic.

Such misdirection and detachedness from Bolivia’s political reality was also demonstrated in a section of the cable which described a conflict in the department of Pando, Bolivia in September of 2008. Here, the embassy shares the views of an unnamed source:

In a conversation with PolOff, xxxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxx alleged the MAS deliberately fomented unrest in Pando in September to justify a military siege, depose Prefect Leopoldo Fernandez, and arrest opposition-aligned leaders to swing the balance of power to the MAS in the Senate. Besides disabling the opposition’s ability to campaign by arresting many of its leaders,xxxxxxxxxxxx alleged the government crackdown changed Pando’s electoral map by causing hundreds of opposition voters to flee to Brazil while importing 2,000 new security forces, which xxxxxxxxxxxx claimed were likely MAS voters from the Altiplano (Reftel B).

This is an egregiously inaccurate portrayal of events. In September of 2008, in what Morales called a civic coup attempt, right forces in the country mobilized against the MAS government, ransacking human rights offices, attacking indigenous people and MAS supporters, and destabilizing the country. The most violent manifestation of this uprising occurred in Pando, where paramilitaries hired by Pando Prefect Leopoldo Fernandez fired on unarmed campesinos marching in support of the MAS. Following this upheaval, the US ambassador to Bolivia was kicked out of the country by Morales for “conspiring against democracy” and funding right wing opposition groups in Bolivia.

This cable provides useful insights into the inner workings of Washington’s diplomacy toward Bolivia, and will hopefully be one among many more such cables that become available to the public, thus spreading awareness about the true tactics of Washington in international relations. These revelations have contributed an already extensive lack of trust among citizens around the world toward the US government.

According to Bolivian Vice President Álvaro García Linera, this lack of trust toward Washington won’t be erased by castigating those who downloaded and leaked the documents. It will only be erased, said Linera, through “a change of attitude on the part of the North American government.”

—-

Benjamin Dangl is the author of the new book, Dancing with Dynamite: Social Movements and States in Latin America (AK Press, 2010), and The Price of Fire: Resource Wars and Social Movements in Bolivia (AK Press, 2007). He is the editor of Toward Freedom, a progressive perspective on world events, and Upside Down World, a website on activism and politics in Latin America.

This story first ran Dec. 1 on Toward Freedom.

From our Daily Report:

Bolivia charges dozens in destabilization complot
World War 4 Report, Dec. 20, 2010

A dissenting view:

Enough with the Julian Assange hero worship
World War 4 Report, Dec. 26, 2010

See also:

BOLIVIA: CONGRESS APPROVES CONSTITUTIONAL REFERENDUM
by Benjamin Dangl, Upside Down World
World War 4 Report, November 2008

See related stories, this issue:

WIKILEAKS HONDURAS
State Department Busted on Support of Coup
by Robert Naiman, TruthOut
World War 4 Report, January 2011

THE DARK SIDE OF WIKILEAKS?
Released Diplomatic Cables Place Dissidents at Risk
by Rohan Jayasekera, Index on Censorship
World War 4 Report, January 2011

BOLIVIA’S NEW WATER WARS
Climate Change & Indigenous Struggle
by Bill Weinberg, NACLA Report on the Americas
World War 4 Report, January 2011

——————-
Reprinted by World War 4 Report, January 1, 2011
Reprinting permissible with attribution

Continue ReadingTHE AMBASSADOR HAS NO CLOTHES 

WIKILEAKS HONDURAS

State Department Busted on Support of Coup

by Robert Naiman, TruthOut

By July 24, 2009, the US government was totally clear about the basic facts of what took place in Honduras on June 28, 2009. The US embassy in Tegucigalpa sent a cable to Washington with the subject, “Open and Shut: The Case of the Honduran Coup,” asserting that “there is no doubt” that the events of June 28 “constituted an illegal and unconstitutional coup.” The embassy listed arguments being made by supporters of the coup to claim its legality, and dismissed them thus: “None…has any substantive validity under the Honduran constitution.” The Honduran military clearly had no legal authority to remove President Manuel Zelaya from office or from Honduras, the embassy said, and their action—the embassy described it as an “abduction” and “kidnapping”—was clearly unconstitutional.

It is inconceivable that any top US official responsible for US policy in Honduras was not familiar with the contents of the July 24 cable, which summarized the assessment of the US embassy in Honduras on key facts that were politically disputed by supporters of the coup regime. The cable was addressed to Tom Shannon, then assistant secretary of state for western hemisphere affairs; Harold Koh, the State Department’s legal adviser; and Dan Restrepo, senior director for western hemisphere affairs at the National Security Council. The cable was sent to the White House and to Secretary of State Clinton.

But despite the fact that the US government was crystal clear on what had transpired, the US did not immediately cut off all aid to Honduras except “democracy assistance,” as required by US law.

Instead, a month after this cable was sent, the State Department, in its public pronouncements, pretended that the events of June 28—in particular, “who did what to whom” and the constitutionality of these actions—were murky and needed further study by State Department lawyers, despite the fact that the State Department’s top lawyer, Harold Koh, knew exactly “who did what to whom” and that these actions were unconstitutional at least one month earlier. The State Department, to justify its delay in carrying out US law, invented a legal distinction between a “coup” and a “military coup,” claiming that the State Department’s lawyers had to determine whether a “military coup” took place, because only that determination would meet the legal threshold for the aid cutoff.

Question: And so—sorry, just a follow-up. If this is a coup—the State Department considers this a coup, what’s the next step? And I mean, there is a legal framework on the US laws dealing with countries that are under coup d’etat? I mean, what’s holding you guys [back from taking] other measures according [to] the law?

Senior State Department Official:
I think what you’re referring to, Mr. Davila, is whether or not this is—has been determined to be a military coup. And you’re correct that there are provisions in our law that have to be applied if it is determined that this is a military coup. And frankly, our lawyers are looking at that exact question. And when we get the answer to that, you are right, there will be things that—if it is determined that this was a military coup, there will be things that will kick in.

As you know, on the ground, there’s a lot of discussion about who did what to whom and what things were constitutional or not, which is why our lawyers are really looking at the event as we understand them in order to come out with the accurate determination.

But the July 24 cable shows that this was nonsense. The phrase “military coup” occurs nowhere in the document, a remarkable omission in a cable from the embassy presenting its analysis of the June 28 events’ constitutionality and legality one month after the fact, if that were a crucial distinction in assessing US policy. And indeed, initial press reports on the statements of top US officials in response to the coup made no such distinction, using the descriptions “coup” and “military coup” interchangeably.

Why did the State Department drag its feet, pretending that facts which it knew to be clear-cut were murky? Why didn’t the State Department speak publicly after July 24 with the same moral clarity as the July 24 cable from the embassy in Honduras? Had the State Department shared publicly the embassy’s clear assessment of the June 28 events after July 24, history might have turned out differently, because supporters of the coup in the United States—including Republican members of Congress and media talking heads—continued to dispute basic facts about the coup which the US embassy in Honduras had reported were not subject to reasonable dispute, and US media reporting on the coup continued to describe these facts as subject to reasonable dispute, long after the embassy had firmly declared that they were not.

As the Center for Economic and Policy Research noted in an August 2009 report, in the previous 12 months the US had responded to other coups by cutting US aid within days. In these cases—in Africa—there was no lengthy deliberation on whether a “coup” was a “military coup.”

What was the difference?

A key difference was that Honduras is in Central America, “our backyard,” so different rules applied. Top officials in Washington supported the political aims of the coup. They did not nominally support the means of the coup, as far as we know, but they supported its political end: the removal of the ability of President Zelaya and his supporters to pursue a meaningful reform project in Honduras. On the other hand, they were politically constrained not to support the coup openly, since they knew it to be illegal and unconstitutional. Thus, they pursued a “diplomatic compromise” which would “restore constitutional order” while achieving the coup’s central political aim: removal of the ability of President Zelaya and his supporters to pursue a meaningful reform project in Honduras. The effect of their efforts at “diplomatic compromise” was to allow the coup to stand, a result that these supporters of the coup’s political aims were evidently content with.

Why does this matter now?

First, the constitutional and political crisis in Honduras is ongoing, and the failure of the US to take immediate, decisive action in response to the coup was a significant cause of the ongoing crisis. After nominally opposing the coup, and slowly and fitfully implementing partial sanctions against the coup regime in a way that did not convince the coup regime that the US was serious, the US moved to support elections under the coup regime which were not recognized by the rest of the hemisphere, and today the US is lobbying for the government created by that disputed election to be readmitted to the Organization of American States, in opposition to most of the rest of the hemisphere, despite ongoing, major violations of human rights in Honduras, about which the US is doing essentially nothing.

Second, the relationship of actual US policy—as opposed to rhetorical pronouncements—to democracy in the region is very much a live issue from Haiti to Bolivia.

Yesterday there was an election in Haiti. This election was funded by the US, despite the fact that major parties were excluded from participation by the government’s electoral council, a fact that Republican and Democratic Members of Congress, in addition to NGOs, complained about without result. The Washington Post reports that the election ended with “nearly all the major candidates calling for the results to be tossed out amid ‘massive fraud'”: “12 of the 19 candidates on Sunday’s ballot appeared together at a raucous afternoon news conference to accuse the government of President Rene Preval of trying to steal the election and install his chosen candidate, Jude Celestin.”

Yesterday’s election in Haiti had the fingerprints of the US government all over it. It was funded by the US “Security” for the election was purportedly provided by UN troops, paid for by the US And the crucial historical context of the election was the 2004 coup that deposed democratically elected President Jean Bertrand Aristide, a coup engineered by the US with years of economic destruction clearly intended to topple the elected government.

Last week, Bolivian President Evo Morales called out the US for its recent history of supporting coups in the region.

AP’s treatment of President Morales’ remarks was instructive:

Morales also alleged US involvement in coup attempts or political upheaval in Venezuela in 2002, Honduras in 2009 and Ecuador in 2010.

“The empire of the United States won,” in Honduras, Morales said, a reference to the allegations of former Honduran President Manuel Zelaya that the US was behind his ouster.

“The people of the Americas in Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador, we won,” Morales continued. “We are three to one with the United States. Let’s see what the future brings.”

US officials have repeatedly denied involvement in all of those cases and critics of the United States have produced no clear evidence. [my emphasis]

It’s certainly true that critics have produced “no clear evidence” of US “involvement” in any of these cases – if your standard for “clear evidence” of US “involvement” is a US government document that dictated in advance everything that subsequently happened. But this would be like saying that critics have produced “no clear evidence” for the Armenian genocide because researchers haven’t yet found a Turkish Mein Kampf. [Some who dispute that there was an “Armenian genocide” do actually claim something like this – “there is no proof of a plan” – but claims like this are generally not taken seriously by US media – except when the US government is an author of the crime, and the crime is recent.]

In the case of the coup in Venezuela in 2002, we know the following:

* Groups in Venezuela that participated in the coup had been supported financially and politically by the US.

* The CIA had advance knowledge of the plans for a coup, and did nothing to warn the Venezuelan government, nor did the US do anything meaningful to try to stop the coup.

* although the US knew in advance about the plans for a coup, when these events played out, the US tried to claim that there was no coup.

* the US pushed for international recognition of the coup government.

* the International Monetary Fund, which would not take such action without advance approval from the United States, announced its willingness to support the coup government a few hours after the coup took place.

These facts about US government “involvement” in the coup in Venezuela are documented in Oliver Stone’s recent movie, South of the Border. This is why it’s so important for as many Americans as possible to see this movie: because there are basic facts about the relationship of actual US government policies—as opposed to rhetoric—to democracy in Latin America that major US media simply cannot be counted upon to report straight. In order to successfully agitate for meaningful reform of US government policy in Latin America, Americans have to know what the actual policy of the US government has been.

—-

This story first ran Nov. 30 on TruthOut.

Resources:

South of the Border
Film website

Senior State Department Officials on Honduras
State Department press release, Aug. 25, 2009

Bolivian leader lectures Gates about US behavior
AP, Nov. 22, 2010

From our Daily Report:

Honduras: Resistance Front protests Porfirio Lobo’s presence at UN
World War 4 Report, Sept. 26, 2010

Haiti: protests greet dubious election results
World War 4 Report, Dec. 14, 2010

World Bank, EU, NATO certify “constitutional rule” in Mauritania
World War 4 Report, Oct. 11, 2009

From our Archive:

Venezuela: Anatomy of the Coup d’Etat
World War 4 Report, April 21, 2002

A dissenting view:

Enough with the Julian Assange hero worship
World War 4 Report, Dec. 26, 2010

See also:

HONDURAS AND THE POLITICAL USES OF THE DRUG WAR
by Nikolas Kozloff and Bill Weinberg, NACLA News
World War 4 Report, May 2010

See related stories, this issue:

WIKILEAKS BOLIVIA
Cable Lays Bare Washington’s Stance Toward Evo Morales
by Benjamin Dangl, Toward Freedom
World War 4 Report, January 2011

THE DARK SIDE OF WIKILEAKS?
Released Diplomatic Cables Place Dissidents at Risk
by Rohan Jayasekera, Index on Censorship
World War 4 Report, January 2011

——————-
Reprinted by World War 4 Report, January 1, 2011
Reprinting permissible with attribution

Continue ReadingWIKILEAKS HONDURAS 

2010: TURNING POINTS FOR CHIHUAHUA DRUG WAR

from Frontera NorteSur

If anything could be said about 2010 in Ciudad Juarez and the state of Chihuahua, it might be stated that any semblance of human rights flew out the window. Ushered in with the January murder of Juarez Valley human rights defender and army critic Josefina Reyes, the year drew to a close with the December slaying of activist Marisela Escobedo in the state capital of Chihuahua City, a crime which was captured on camera and transmitted across the world via the Internet.

Despite the immediate outrage provoked by the murder of Escobedo, who had spent more than two years protesting the disappearance and murder of her daughter in Ciudad Juarez, gunmen soon not only burned down the business of Escobedo’s male partner, but also kidnapped and murdered the man’s brother in the beleaguered border city.

Four of Escobedo‚s surviving relatives took the hint and hightailed it across the Rio Bravo to El Paso, where they are expected to seek political asylum.

From January onward, the killing machine greased by the mechanics of the underworld roared non-stop. The slaughter of 14 young people in Ciudad JuĂĄrez’s Villas de Salvarcar neighborhood plunged the troubled city and Mexico into deepened crisis. Villas de Salvarcar popularized the word “youthcide” [jovenicidio] in the national vocabulary. Additional massacres at house parties, in bars and on public streets kept the public in a perpetual state of terror.

The Calderon administration unveiled a reconstruction plan for Ciudad JuĂĄrez, “We are all JuĂĄrez,” and put the Federal Police instead of the army in charge of the city‚s security. Yet the killing intensified, more people fled and the once-vibrant business/tourist and residential districts of Ciudad JuĂĄrez fell into an eye-grabbing decay.

Tourism Ministry statistics obtained by Ciudad JuĂĄrez’s Diario newspaper via Mexico’s Freedom of Information Act, reported that hotel occupancy plummeted from 447,034 people from January to October 2007 to 310,000 people during the same period in 2010.

The crash surely would have been much worse. Some establishments managed to stay afloat thanks to the Federal Police officers in need of lodging and the involuntary guests from across Mexico seeking US residency who were forced by the US government to stay in Ciudad JuĂĄrez while completing their approval process.

“We don’t have visitors coming for border tourism, or for shopping or for realizing cultural and sporting activities,” said Jorge RuĂ­z Carres, president of the Ciudad JuĂĄrez Hotel and Motel Association. “That type of visit is almost non-existent.”

Added to the factory lay-offs related to the global financial melt-down and the financial losses from extortion and robbery, the disappearance of tourist revenues from the local economy will be felt for a long time.

In 2010 international media devoted much reporting to the violence that engulfed Ciudad JuĂĄrez, blamed on the conflict between the JuĂĄrez and Sinaloa syndicates, but less international attention was given to the war also battering many other parts of the state of Chihuahua.

Nobody really knows for sure how many people perished in the course of the year. Citing official numbers from the Chihuahua state attorney general’s office, the Reforma news agency reported 5,212 people were murdered in the state between Jan. 1 and Dec. 19 of 2010. The authorities blamed organzied crime for the bulk of killings, or 3,766 homicides, according to Reforma.

Violence hit hard the state capital of Chihuahua City, where 488 people were reportedly slain just between the months of May and August. In a city where extreme insecurity should imply at least a modicum of government security response, the brazen murder of Marisela Escobedo in front of Chihuahua state government offices and in plain public view was quite noteworthy.

The public security crisis had its repercussions on the political scene. In July, a minority of eligible Chihuahua voters elected CĂŠsar Duarte of the Institutional Revolutionary Party to the governorship and chose HĂŠctor “Teto” MurguĂ­a (Ciudad JuĂĄrez mayor 2004-2007) for a second try at leading an embattled municipality.

As he was preparing to leave office, Ciudad JuĂĄrez Mayor JosĂŠ Reyes Ferriz created a stir by accusing outgoing Governor JosĂŠ Reyes Baeza of abandoning Ciudad JuĂĄrez to the wolves during the past three years. Others criticized Reyes Ferriz for making untimely remarks and shirking his own responsibilities for the crisis.

The atmosphere surrounding the political transition got uglier. Media-savvy kidnappers snatched Mario GonzĂĄlez, the brother of former Chihuahua State Attorney General Patricia GonzĂĄlez, and released a series of videotaped “confessions” in which GonzĂĄlez, surrounded by a group of armed, hooded men, detailed the alleged participation of his sister in murder and crime. He named individuals supposedly connected to femicides, publicly tarred members of the political class-including former Governor Reyes Baeza— with accusations of illicit activities, and fueled new doubts among a public increasingly fed up with the political system.

A key player in the US Agency for International Development’s program to reform Mexico’s legal system, Patricia GonzĂĄlez was also a partner in the efforts of the outgoing Richardson administration in neighboring New Mexico to expand legal, trade and other ties with Chihuahua.

GonzĂĄlez challenged the credibility of statements her brother made under extreme duress and offered to sacrifice herself for his life. No matter. Mario GonzĂĄlez was executed and, despite the arrests of suspects allegedly behind the kidnap/murder, the scandal was largely forgotten amid fresh headlines publicizing an endless slew of new murders and crimes.

Other crucial events occurred in 2010 that could influence developments in 2011. Perhaps most significantly, civil society began stirring and emerging as an independent voice in a socio-political melodrama dominated by business groups, politicians, urban and rural bosses, and government and private security forces.

In the northern Chihuahua farming town of Ascension, thousands of residents rose up against kidnappers, killed two suspected criminals, disarmed police accused of corruption and temporarily occupied city hall. In December, thousands of doctors and health care workers carried out a one-day work stoppage in Ciudad JuĂĄrez to protest criminal attacks on members of their profession and the overall public safety situation in their city.

Galvanized into action by the Villas de Salvarcar massacre, groups of youth, especially from the Autonomous University of Ciudad JuĂĄrez took to the streets to protest death and uphold life.

In one such action on Oct. 29, 19-year-old JosĂŠ Dario Alvarez was shot in the back by members of the Federal Police. Alvarez survived but was left physically impaired- possibly for life.

The murder of Marisela Escobedo sparked a wave of protest across Mexico and the world, eliciting condemnations from the European Union and the Organization of American States‚ Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.

Civil society organizations from the US, Honduras, Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, Spain, Ireland, and the Philippines joined hundreds of individuals and groups from Ciudad Juarez and Mexico in signing on to a December 20 statement that demanded a genuine investigation of the activist‚s murder, protection for members of the Escobedo family and government compliance with the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ 2009 sentence related to the murders of women in Ciudad JuĂĄrez.

The statement read in part: “More than 50 million poor people, more than 7 million young people that don‚t work or study, more than 3,000 murders this year in Ciudad JuĂĄrez, more than 10,000 orphans, hunger, and unemployment are definitive evidence that we have failed as a society.”

Tracing Ciudad JuĂĄrez’s and Mexico’s troubles to corruption, myopia, authoritarianism, patronage politics, impunity, and an ineffective citizenry, the Dec. 20 statement declared, “A society in peace is built on freedom, truth and justice.”

Widespread protests against the Escobedo assassination continued into the holiday season. In Chihuahua City, thousands of candles that had been placed at the murder scene to honor the fallen activist were mysteriously removed but then quickly replaced by enraged citizens and activists. Decorated with altars, the scene outside the state government complex soon resembled a shrine.

In California, activist groups including Centro Azteca, Amnesty International and the Mexican American Political Association plan a Dec. 30 protest at the Mexican Consulate in San Francisco.

“We are demanding that the government of Mexico stop protecting murderers and drug cartels and instead stand up to protect the women, children and other innocents of Mexico,” read a flier announcing the protest.

A former Chihuahua state and federal lawmaker, columnist Victor Quintana wrote that Escobedo’s murder could be the proverbial straw that broke the camel’s back. Quintana contended that Marisela Escobedo’s relentless pursuit of justice was now spreading to many sectors in Ciudad JuĂĄrez and Chihuahua.

Escobedo’s example, Quintana wrote, could inspire a new determination to “rebel for life.”

Expect more grassroots mobilizations in 2011. For instance, on Jan. 29, near the date of the first anniversary of the Villas de Salvarcar slaughter, citizen groups in the El Paso-Ciudad JuĂĄrez area plan a joint, binational protest at the borderline dividing the common and bloodied land they inhabit.

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This story first ran Dec. 29 on Frontera NorteSur.

From our Daily Report:

Mexico: activist murdered, survivors harassed
World War 4 Report, Dec. 21, 2010

See also:

MEXICO’S OTHER DISAPPEARED
Demanding Justice for Missing Migrants
from Frontera NorteSur
World War 4 Report, June 2010

THE MEXICAN HISTORY AND GEOGRAPHY GAP
Media Misreadings of the Border Violence
by Kent Paterson, Frontera NorteSur
World War 4 Report, May 2010

WOMEN IN BLACK MARCH ON CIUDAD JUAREZ
from Frontera NorteSur
World War 4 Report, December 2009

——————-
Reprinted by World War 4 Report, January 1, 2011
Reprinting permissible with attribution

Continue Reading2010: TURNING POINTS FOR CHIHUAHUA DRUG WAR 

BOLIVIA’S NEW WATER WARS

Climate Change & Indigenous Struggle

by Bill Weinberg, NACLA Report on the Americas

The stark and arid Bolivian Altilpano is one of the regions of our planet most susceptible to the impacts of climate change—ominous portents can already be seen. Yet, as South America’s poorest country, Bolivia is among the least prepared on Earth to meet these challenges.

Last year, water levels in Lake Titicaca—upon which some 2.6 million people depend for their sustenance—dropped 81 centimeters (2.6 feet). The Lake Titicaca Authority, jointly overseen by the governments of Bolivia and Peru, found that the lake is at its lowest level since 1949. Water levels in the lake fluctuate due to El NiĂąo weather phenomena—but this time it looks uncertain that Titicaca will recover. Over the past four years, seasonal rainfall and the flow into Titicaca from feeder rivers was insufficient to compensate for evaporation and drainage. The authority says 95% of the lake’s inflow is being lost.

Bolivia’s National Meteorological and Hydrological Service notes that the region’s rainy season has been reduced from six to three months in recent years. The drought has prompted water rationing in some Altiplano towns and cities.

Last year also saw the 18,000-year-old Chacaltaya glacier overlooking La Paz vanish—six years earlier than scientists predicted—threatening water supplies to the Bolivian capital. The World Bank warns that water could be diminished imminently to the 2 million people in La Paz and neighboring El Alto. Chacaltaya—”bridge of ice” in the Aymara language—became barren for the first time as the Southern Hemisphere’s 2009 summer came on. The World Glacier Monitoring Service at the University of Zurich had forecast its disappearance for 2015.

In a front-page article timed to coincide with the United Nations’ Copenhagen climate summit last December, “In Bolivia, Water and Ice Tell A Story of Changing Climate,” the New York Times noted growing water shortages in El Alto and La Paz—disproportionately affecting low-income areas, despite what the Times called the government’s “socialist rhetoric.”

The reality that—locally and globally—the poor bear a disproportionate risk from climate change was one that Bolivia’s President Evo Morales sought to address when he called the World People’s Conference on Climate Change and the Rights of the Mother Earth (CMPCC), held in Cochabamba from April 19-22. Conceived as an alternative to the moribund UN process that failed to produce a binding treaty at Copenhagen, the CMPCC sought to bring governments and civil society groups together to work to address climate change. The conference explicitly looked to indigenous cultures and movements for wisdom and leadership on the question.

Some 30,000 people from over 150 countries attended the Cochabamba summit, Morales jointly presiding with Venezuela’s Hugo ChĂĄvez. The “People’s Accord” produced by the CMPCC, presented by Morales to the UN after the summit, calls for a 50% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by developing countries over the next seven years. It demands that the UN adopt a “Universal Declaration on the Rights of Mother Earth”; that the industrialized nations provide annual financing equivalent to 6% of their GDP to confront climate change in the developing world; and that an International Tribunal on Environmental and Climate Justice be created, with its seat in Bolivia. The summit called for a new global organization to press for these demands, tentatively dubbed the World Movement for Mother Earth—by its Spanish acronym, MAMA-Tierra.

These resolutions emerged from the CMPCC’s 17 “tables,” or working groups, organized around themes such as “Structural Causes,” “Indigenous Peoples.” and “Rights of Mother Earth.” Representatives of the working groups submitted their resolutions to the assembled government officials at a joint meeting at the Hotel Regina, in the Cochabamba suburb of Tiquipaya, on the morning of Earth Day, April 22. They were then officially adopted.

President Morales told the press at Tiquipaya that he would demand the resolutions be endorsed at the upcoming UN climate summit in CancĂşn, Mexico, and warned that he would otherwise seek redress at the International Court of Justice.

Table 18: Intransigent Voice of the “Andean Cosmo-Vision”
As the CMPCC opened April 19 at Tiquipaya, a controversy emerged over an “18th table” demanded by Aymara indigenous leaders, on social conflicts related to climate change. Bolivian Environmental Vice-minister Juan Pablo Ramos dismissed the demand. “In reality, there is no Table 18,” he said, asserting that since it proposed discussion of Bolivia’s “internal problems,” it was therefore not appropriate to an international forum.

But Rafael Quispe, leader of the National Council of Ayllus and Markas of Cullasuyu (CONAMAQ), countered: “Table 18 is going ahead whether the government likes it or not, and it does not only deal with Bolivia’s problems.” He said the table would be held on the streets of Tiquipaya outside the official summit if it wasn’t allowed in. Refering to Bolivia’s government, he said: “We are not opposed to the process of change, nor are we against the forum, but it is important to deal with the problems in our own house.”

As the CMPCC convened for a second day April 20, Table 18 opened. Barred from the official summit grounds on the Tiquipaya campus of the University del Valle, Aymara elders convened the forum in a Brazilian restaurant just off the campus.

Cleared of tables to make room for rows of chairs, the premises filled with pungent smoke as incense and coca leaves were ritually burned for the opening ceremony. With many drawn by the controversy, Table 18 was well-attended—despite a contingent of UTOP, the national police anti-riot force, stationed at the restaurant’s door.

Officially dubbed the table on “Collective Rights and the Rights of Mother Earth,” the panel credited the Evo Morales government with recognizing the collective rights of Bolivia’s “original nations,” Afro-Bolivians and “inter-cultural communities” (mestizos). But panelist Pablo Regalsky of the Andean Center for Communication and Development (CENDA) stated: “Here in Bolivia, we are building a new model—in practice, not theory—so we have to discuss the problems that arise in the creation of this new model.” He warned that there are some in the Morales government—especially the Finance Ministry—who seek a “forced march to industrialization.”

Despite “the anti-capitalist discourse of Brother Evo,” he charged that “foreign capital” still often plays a decisive role in Bolivia’s development policies. He cited moves towards reviving plans for an inter-oceanic transport link through Bolivia, and mineral and gas exploitation on indigenous lands. Refuting government charges that Table 18 was only dealing with internal Bolivian issues, Regalsky said, “These questions also have implications for Paraguay, Brazil, Chile and Peru. And they have implications for the rights guaranteed by the Bolivian constitution.”

Grievances aired by Aymara and Quechua leaders at Table 18 centered on ecological impacts of mineral projects, including the Japanese-owned San CristĂłbal mine in southern PotosĂ­ department and the state-owned Corocoro mine in La Paz department.

Figures in the Bolivian government attempted to discredit Table 18, with Chancellor David Choquehuanca unsubtly stating that any effort to divide the summit is the work of “opponents and capitalists.”

Yet, when Norma Pierola, a national legislator from Cochabamba with the right-opposition National Convergence party, attempted to enter the restaurant to address Table 18 (on environmental concerns, she said), her way was blocked by attendees who barred the entrance with their bodies, chanting “¡No pasará!” (she shall not pass).

When she finally gave up and turned away, Pierola spoke to a clatch of reporters outside the restaurant, railing against the supposed environmental impacts of coca-growing, and calling for a crackdown on the cocaleros.

At the end of the CMPCC’s third day, the Aymara elders who convened the dissident table held a final meeting, where CONAMAQ’s Rafael Quispe announced that President Morales had agreed to meet with the Table 18 leaders and hear their demands. Quispe said the Table 18 representatives would demand “the expulsion of all extractive resource industries” from Bolivia, and the adoption of a new development model based on the “Andean cosmo-vision” of ayllus and local self-sufficiency.

Rafael Quispe on Evo Morales: “neoliberal, capitalist”
Table 18’s final resolution was handed in to Morales with the “official” resolutions on the morning of Earth Day—but not formally adopted by the CMPCC, of course. Morales, it must be noted, really had no choice other than to meet with Quispe, because the CONAMAQ leader had also convened the “official” Table 3 on the Rights of Mother Earth.

CONAMAQ is a body of traditional leaders (mallkus) representing collective land-holdings (ayllus) and regions (markas) from throughout the Aymara realm (Cullasuyu). It is based among several villages in the Aymara heartland of La Paz department. Quispe says it was founded 1997 “to reconstitute Collasuyu, to work for the restitution of its authorities.”

CONAMAQ has been working to re-instate traditional indigenous government—known as “usos y custumbres””—in the hamlets or ayllus of Pacajes province in La Paz department. Using its original indigenous name, Quispe calls the province Suyu Pacajaqi—the suyu being a region made of markas, or regional clusters of autonomous ayllus. Suyu Pacajaqi, in CONAMAQ’s vision, is in turn part of Cullasuyu, which covers most of the Altiplano.

“When the Spaniards arrived 500 years ago, they began to exterminate our indigenous culture, our structures of government,” Quispe says. “And since 1997, we have been in the process of reconstituting our traditional authorities.”

Quispe hopes one day this system will cross national borders, uniting ayllus and markas in Peru, Chile and Ecuador. “Collasuyu was one state within Tawantinsuyu, a great federation made up of four federations of nationalities,” he says. “This is the system that we are in the process of reconstituting.”

Interviewed during a break in the proceedings at Tiquipaya, Quispe insisted that Table 18 was relevant to the Cochabamba summit.

“To speak of the rights of Mother Earth isn’t just a discourse. To speak of protecting the Mother Earth is to speak of extractive industries like petroleum and mining. These are the industries that are harming the Mother Earth. And it cannot be outside the working tables to speak of socio-environmental conflicts related to these industries.”

For Quispe, Morales’ program hasn’t gone far enough. “Today in Bolivia, 80% of state revenues are derived from extractive industries like petroleum and mining—as in much of the rest of Latin America. What is causing global warming are the greenhouse gases that come from these same fossils such as petroleum. How can we not speak of social conflicts related to their extraction?”

But Evo’s project is to use these resources to lift Bolivia out of poverty. What is the alternative?

“Capitalism or socialism is extractive, consumerist, developmentalist,” Quispe replies. “In this sense, they are the same. We have to speak of a new model of development, an alternative to this system. Because both capitalism and socialism will go on changing the planet. And the development model of the indigenous peoples is the allyu, the communitarian development model.”

“We original indigenous peoples for thousands and thousands and thousands of years have been living in equilibrium and respect for our Pachamama, from whom we emerged,” he adds, using the word for Quechua earth goddess.

The nation needs electricity, transportation, roads, education, I persist. How can you have this without resource exploitation?

“Wind energy is clean technology. This electricity can power transportation too. But petroleum exploitation and projects like the inter-oceanic corridor do not correspond to the needs of the indigenous peoples.”

What is your attitude towards Evo Morales?

“We support the process of change, and CONAMAQ is a protagonist, but we do not participate in the government. We don’t make deals, we don’t support candidates—absolutely nothing.

“And this systematic violation of the rights of the peoples and of the Pachamama shows that there is something wrong with the process. In these last elections, I had to say, ‘Evo, you are wrong. What you are saying is pure talk. You are not complying with your own discourse.’ And therefore, I didn’t vote.”

And when Evo first won the presidency in 2005?

“We thought that he represented hope, we identified with him. He won, we gave him all the power. But the process has given us nothing. It has been all discourse, no application. He speaks of the Mother Earth, and he is the foremost violator of the Mother Earth.”

What is Quispe’s response to the charge that he is aiding the right opposition?

“When he doesn’t have responses, his only response is ‘you are a rightist, you are a capitalist.’ It is his only response—to stigmatize. But we in CONAMAQ have the moral authority to say, ‘You are wrong, Brother Evo Morales.'”

Quispe’s words are even stronger when we speak a week later at the CONAMAQ office in La Paz. Morales hadn’t shown up for a follow-up meeting in the capital to discuss Table 18’s demands, he tells me. “There’s still no response,” Quispe says. “There’s just a lot of bureaucracy.”

Now, he openly accuses Morales of hypocrisy. “The government say ‘capitalism or pachamama.’ But this government is neoliberal and capitalist. It’s all a political show. Evo’s election was a step. But the marches, strikes, blockades that brought him to power are continuing.”

Corporate Power and PotosĂ­’s Disappearing Waters
Ironically, three days before the Cochabamba summit opened, a group of some 900 local comunarios (communal peasants) invaded the operations area of San Cristobal Mining Company in Nor LĂ­pez province, PotosĂ­ department, burning the company’s office and overturning two rail-wagons loaded with some 20 tons each of lead, silver and zinc ore. The comunarios were protesting the contamination of local water sources by the mining operations, while the company uses 50,000 cubic meters of water every day free of charge. Comunario leader Mario Mamani said the protesters are demanding that company, a subsidiary of the Japanese multinational Sumitomo, pay local communities directly for use of the water, as well as paying for electrification projects. They pledged to continue their occupation, and overturn another wagon every five hours until their demands were met.

The comunarios said they had been petitioning authorities for months to no avail. For five days before invading San Cristobal’s installation, they had been peacefully blocking the border crossing with Chile at Avaroa. Interior Vice-Minister Gustavo Torrico said dialogue had been established with the protesters via the PotosĂ­ prefectural authorities—but that due to the “intransigence of the comunarios, we cannot rule out the use of public force.”

Mining Minister JosĂŠ Pimentel admitted that the mine’s contract was granted under “neoliberal laws”—a reference to the 1997 mineral code—but said that since the law had not been amended, it must be honored.

A new mineral law then being prepared mandates that private interests develop leases instead of sitting on them—but in other circumstances, the leases will remain in private corporate hands.

After occupying the mine, the rebel comunarios set up barricades on the major rail line from their remote desert region to the Chilean border. It wasn’t until the summit was well underway that they agreed to lift the barricades, on a pledge of dialogue.

The mine occupation was a wildcat action not endorsed by the Sole Regional Federation of Campesino Workers of the Southern Altiplano (FRUTCAS). Francisco Quisbert, a former FRUTCAS president, attended Table 18. He’s from Calcha K, 30 kilometers from San CristĂłbal, a key community behind the direct action. After the summit, a long, frigid overnight bus ride on sporadically paved roads brought me to Uyuni, on the edge of the desert, where I met with Quisbert. He approached me amiably on an old bicycle with no breaks.

Quisbert doesn’t endorse the wildcat action, but understands what provoked it. The Quechua campesinos are increasingly leaving the area because of climate change, he believes. After three years of failed rains, there is no quinoa, and the llamas are thinning. The Cochabamba summit was held at quinoa harvest time, just after the rainy season—and there was no crop to harvest, nor had there been rain.

“The people are obligated to migrate to Argentina, Chile,” Quisbert says. “Some local people work in the mine, but it is very mechanized and can’t provide for all the communities.”

Quisbert acknowledges political factors in the agricultural crisis in northern PotosĂ­. “There is no government presence here,” he says. “We have been waiting years for irrigation. Now we work with artisanal canals”—meaning those made with local technology, as best they can.

What water exists is at risk. Local lakes are contaminated with arsenic and other mine waste, from subterranean movement of water, he says. New roads and explosions at the mine site mean more dust in the air, affecting crops.

During Bolivia’s constituent assembly in 2006, FRUTCAS proposed a constitutional provision that 10% of all mineral investment go to environmental remediation. It was not accepted.

But there is no getting around the water shortage. “There has been three years of almost no rain,” Quisbert says. “Some people blame the mine, but I think it is global warming. It’s a big doubt.”

Whether the mine’s consumption of water is responsible for local aridity is hotly contested. The mine’s own study says no; the deep, heavily mineralized water the mine uses is unfit for human consumption or agriculture. Nor does it affect the fresh-water aquifers that lie above. The government accepts these findings.

FRUTCAS does not. After fruitless meetings with the mine in 2006, FRUTCAS and the municipality of Colcha K, with aid from CENDA and other NGOs, contracted their own hydrological study—which reached opposite conclusions.

FRUTCAS, formed a generation ago to pressure for titling of collective lands, is neutral on the mine occupation. PorfĂ­rio Cruz, the current director, sits in his office on the dusty outskirts of Uyuni under a large portrait of Evo Morales. On the wall a poster from the group CENDA reads in Quechua: “ÂĄCapitalistas Pachamamata Kankapuchkaku!” Below is the Spanish translation: “Capitalismo estĂĄ liquidando al planeta y la humanidad.” Capitalism is killing Mother Earth and humanity.

At odds with the government on the San CriistĂłbal issue, Cruz still has faith in Evo Morales. He shows me correspondence from the Environment and Mines Ministry on the local water issue, and says it is unprecedented that the government is hearing grievances. “This is the democracy that we are practicing in Bolivia thanks to the process of change that is taking place,” he says. “There is no need for blockades and occupations.”

Uyuni is full of Israeli and Japanese tourists, who contract Quechua guides in all-terrain vehicles to go out into the unearthly Salar de Uyuni—the vast salt flats at the heart of the desert. I contract one to go out to the desert pueblos of Colcha K and Calcha K.

The first stop is Nuevo San CristĂłbal, the canton that was relocated before the mine was opened in 2005 by Denver-based Apex Silver. The mine was bought by Sumitomo three years later, after the site of former pueblo had been turned into one of the world’s largest open-pit mines.

Like most local cantons, Nuevo San CristĂłbal has a Quechua corregidor, but it is clearly a company town. The most visible exponent of governance is the non-governmental San CristĂłbal Foundation, which is attempting to promote eco-tourism with a mountain bike rental initiative. The Foundation’s Ascensio Caso nearly portrays the settlement as a boom town.”There were 20 families in Viejo San Cristobal; now we have 500.” He says the quinoa and llamas are doing fine, and a 10-year development plan for the area will eventually include reforestation programs. He says 90% of Nuevo San CristĂłbal residents work in the mine. He says the mine uses “cutting edge” technology to control pollution.

Some 50 kilometers across the desert in the canton of Calcha K, it is clear there is widespread support for the direct action. Freddy Cayo, the corregidor, takes me out to the ayllu on edge of the pueblo, traditionally full of quinoa ready for harvest this time of year. It is brown and barren. “This is our fourth year without a quinoa harvest,” Cayo says “The level of water is dropping in our wells since operations began at the mine. We demand nationalization of the mine.”

Unlike San Cristóbal, Calcha K is not on the electricity grid, and only received running water in recent years. The same is true of the municipal seat, Colcha K, my next stop. In his office in the pueblo’s adobe town hall, municipal officer Julio Huanca warns me that anger is rising.

“The people have always been so pacific here,” he says. “But they are tired of being ignored by the government—no roads, no development, no jobs. We are more economically linked to Chile than to Bolivia. And the mineral wealth of this region is contributing much to the national economy.”

Do you support the direct action?, I asked.

“As an institution, no,” he says, “But as people, yes.”

Huanca says the municipality has had dialogue with mine on issues of protecting local waters—to no avail. He charges that Huaylla Kjara, a desert lake that is Andean flamingo habitat, has been contaminated with mine wastes—and the mine has taken no responsibility. “Sooner or later the mine will leave, but we will always be here,” he says.

Although he does not speak of nationalization, Huanca supports the demand that the mine pay for water.

Sumitomo claims the mine only draws water from the Jaukihua micro-aquifer which represents only a minute part of the Salar de Uyuni watershed. Exploitation of these saline waters causes no type of regional impact, the company asserts. It also denies that mine waste is contaminating Huaylla Kjara, saying it is a “closed aquifer.”

Hydrological consultant Robert Moran, co-author of “Mining the Water,” the study commissioned by FRUTCAS, is dismissive of the company’s claims.

“I’ve seen the same situation all over the world,” he says. “The source of information is always the company itself, so they can make any claim they want. Its very facile to say its all salty, but that’s not true. We don’t have the data to answer the question, but they’re just making blanket statements. They haven’t dug the test wells to do the measurements.”

“Mining the Water” asserts that even if the mine is only extracting deep saline waters, it is almost certainly drawing down the fresh-water aquifers above. “They are clearly dropping water levels,” Moran charges. “If you’re a local farmer, you’re going to have to dig deeper wells, pay more money to pump it up, and find that it is degraded.”

He adds on a sarcastic note: “But the nice thing is there’s no data to back this up because the company wasn’t required to do the kind of studies they’d be required to do in the US or Canada or Western Europe.”

And the fact that government is backing the mine’s position? “The Bolivian government has an interest in having revenues come in from San CristĂłbal, so it doesn’t surprise me that the La Paz government would say that.”

Strategic Salt Flats
The remote desert of northern PotosĂ­ is emerging as a strategic resource zone for the Bolivian state. The government is embarking on a massive lithium development project in the Uyuni salt flats. A pilot plant is under construction at the southern end of the Salar for exploitation of what is expected to be one of the most critical substances of the 21st century. Lithium, the key raw material in the manufacture of batteries for laptops, is also envisioned to power electric cars—giving the substance a “green” cachet.

The lithium exploitation will be under state control, and is explicitly aimed at advantageously positioning Bolivia on the global stage. At a ceremony marking the 199th anniversary of the Bolivian army last year, President Morales warned his armed forces that the US has military designs on his country’s hydrocarbon and mineral wealth—especially singling out lithium.

The government also recently announced a preliminary study for a program of uranium exploration in the PotosĂ­ desert, and broached the possibility of uranium exports to Venezuela. The Bolivian Institute of Nuclear Technology, a moribund agency since its uranium processing plant in PotosĂ­ was closed 25 years ago, may be revived if the exploration program is successful.

The Canadian firm Mega Uranium—part of the U308 Corporation, with operations in Guyana, Colombia and Argentina—in association with Australia-based Intrepid Mines worked uranium exploration leases in Potosí in 2006, but never announced results.

As the uranium project was announced, Leonid Golubev, the Russian ambassador in La Paz, told the press the Moscow was prepared to provide aid for Bolivia “to begin to develop an atomic industry with peaceful ends.” As if anticipating the US reaction, he added that Russia would consider supplying Bolivia with missiles.

Climate Change, Indigenous Autonomy and the Resource Wars
Mario Katari is environmental director at YPFB, the Bolivian state hydrocarbon company. I ask him via e-mail how growing state control over hydrocarbon and mineral resources impacts global climate change. The hydrocarbons have been partially nationalized under Evo Morales, and this may be an advance for Bolivians. But carbon now under Bolivia’s earth will still be burned and released into atmosphere as greenhouse gases.

“The nationalization, as a method of recovering the property rights of the Bolivian state, does not imply change in technology,” Katari concedes. “If the environmental controls do not change and the consciousness does not change, it cannot be said that nationalization averts climate change.”

But he adds that the nationalization has coincided with a commitment to protect the environment. He notes that the new Hydrocarbon Law bans the use of flares to burn off excess gas. He also says there has been a “significant decrease in exploration and exploitation” since nationalization. However he also admits that the government policy is to “increase production and all activities related to the hydrocarbon cycle,” and that this could lead to “greater foci of greenhouse gas emissions if there isn’t a corresponding environmental control.”

His words on Table 18 are harsh. In an evident reference to Rafael Quispe, he says, “I consider that it was led by someone influenced by the first world and out of touch with the national reality.” He says that the demand to end all extractive activities in Bolivia would mean a “dramatic contraction in the national economy, with consequences that cannot be predicted.” He says this demand would only be acceptable “if the compensation Bolivia receives for putting an end to all extractive activities in the country is equivalent to or greater than the amount that would be received from these activities.”

He dismisses the talk of a nuclear plant as “no more than speculation, thanks to the ‘cost’ that this would mean for the country.” Evoking Iran, he cites a likely “economic blockade.”

Bolivia saw a wave of angry protests across the country in the aftermath of the Cochabamba summit. One was in the desert of PotosĂ­, where “Ayllus Guerreros”—warrior ayllus—lynched four police officers they accused of corruption. They claimed the right to do so under usos y costumbres, and threw up barricades to bar national police. They declared the local municipality of UncĂ­a a “red zone.”

In Cochabamba, factory workers went on hunger strike in protest of the 5% raise offered by the government. This would escalate to a national general strike by the Bolivian Workers Central (COB) after May Day. National police officers also staged public hunger strikes in a salary dispute with the government.

In El Alto, the sprawling working-class city on the plateau above La Paz, residents erected barricades on thoroughfares to demand better services.

In Las Yungas region of La Paz department, campesinos shut down the highway at Caranavi village with roadblocks, paralyzing all traffic for days, to demand the government build a citrus processing plant for their communities.

In eastern Santa Cruz department, squatters occupied lands controlled by sugar interests at San Aurelio.

Also in Santa Cruz department, pro-development residents at Puerto SuĂĄrez blocked the border with Brazil to demand that the government resolve its dispute with India’s Jindal Steel and allow the controversial iron mining project at El MutĂşn to go ahead.

On the right, opposition party supporters held hunger strikes and mock “crucifixions” over the assigning of seats in the new departmental assemblies following April elections. In La Paz, opposition protesters repeatedly clashed with police, who responded with tear gas.

Evo Morales, just before flying to New York to present the Cochabamba demands to the UN, spokes about the general strike: “This president will never take measures against workers, but workers also have to be rational for the sake of the country.” Again echoing the rhetoric employed against Table 18, he also questioned the motives of the workers: “Some sectors [of labor] appear to be infiltrated by the right that wants to confuse the workers.”

Similar charges were made in June, when the Confederation of Indigenous Peoples of the Oriente of Bolivia (CIDOB) launched a cross-country march on La Paz from the jungle department of Beni to demand greater powers of local rule than those allowed by the new autonomy law. Minister of Autonomy Carlos Romero warned CIDOB to “shake off” the interference of foreign-backed NGOs. The comment came as President Morales threatened to kick out USAID.

Despite such accusations, Francisco Quisbert defends the airing of concerns about San CristĂłbal at Cochabamba—and the ongoing indigenous and campesino protests over resource issues. “The international debate on climate change needs to be had, and it is good that our compaĂąero Evo is doing this,” he says. “But in our own house, we are not guarding the environment. This is my difference with President Morales.”

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This story first ran in the fall 2010 edition of NACLA Report on the Americas.

Resources:

World Peoples’ Conference on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth

From our Daily Report:

Afghan lithium bonanza bad break for Bolivia?
World War 4 Report, June 14, 2010

Evo Morales delivers Cochabamba climate summit resolutions to United Nations
World War 4 Report, May 10, 2010

See also:

THE CLIMATE JUSTICE GROUNDSWELL
From Copenhagen to Cochabamba to CancĂşn
by Karah Woodward, The Indypendent
World War 4 Report, June 2010

See related stories, this issue:

BOLIVIA’S CLIMATE PARADOX
Latin American progressive governments still bet on “extractivismo”
by Carmelo Ruiz-Marrero, Latin America Energy & Environment Monitor
World War 4 Report, January 2011

CANCUN PACT: NO VICTORY FOR CLIMATE JUSTICE
by Michelle Chen, ColorLines
World War 4 Report, January 2011

——————-
Reprinted by World War 4 Report, January 1, 2011
Reprinting permissible with attribution

Continue ReadingBOLIVIA’S NEW WATER WARS 

CANCUN PACT: NO VICTORY FOR CLIMATE JUSTICE

by Michelle Chen, ColorLines

After days of agonizing negotiations, the climate conference in CancĂşn ended on a somewhat hopeful note, with a last-minute agreement that largely reflects the lowered expectations that permeated the atmosphere of the conference. The provisions are more detailed than the half-baked plans outlined at the failed 2009 Copenhagen talk. But like the summit itself, the accord was shaped more by diplomatic fatigue than by a desire to act collectively to deal with climate change. That’s what happens at a conference where thousands of people who are genuinely interested in getting something done aren’t even allowed inside.

There will be much self-congratulations over the framework endorsed by most participating countries. It references worldwide targets for significant emissions cuts, but lacks a meaningful legal framework for achieving those targets or enforcing regulations on a global level. The biggest concrete achievement is the establishment of a $100 billion climate fund to be used for poorer nations seeking new technology to cope with climate-related impacts. Yet we know little about how the expenditures will be managed, the role of international financial institutions like the World Bank, or how resources will be targeted to the most vulnerable communities. The haste with which this measure was approved suggests an ongoing pattern of rich countries buying off poorer ones with the low-hanging fruit of promised foreign aid.

From a climate justice standpoint, the deal lost credibility once it was tainted with REDD, a supposed anti-deforestation initiative that indigenous communities have long decried as an assault on native people’s sovereignty and way of life. Bolivia’s Evo Morales, representing the lone country at CancĂşn that rejected the final document, warned the plan would blaze new trails for industry’s destruction of precious forests. The driving principle of REDD, to deter deforestation under a market scheme in which businesses buy the “right” to pollute, strikes many indigenous activists as a blank check for the commodification of critical habitats under the guise of conservation.

An official statement from Bolivia reads the CancĂşn deal as the codification of institutional betrayal:

A so-called victory for multilateralism is really a victory for the rich nations who bullied and cajoled other nations into accepting a deal on their terms. The richest nations offered us nothing new in terms of emission reductions or financing, and instead sought at every stage to backtrack on existing commitments, and include every loophole possible to reduce their obligation to act.

The CancĂşn deal appears to affirm the revelations of documents published by Wikileaks suggesting that the US cynically used the promise of aid (or withdrawal of it) to wheedle support from delegates representing the Global South.

According to a study by UNFairPlay, the very people who have the most at stake in the climate debate were the least represented in CancĂşn. From the beginning, those participating in the negotiations were insiders and influence brokers, while the groups locked out were the impoverished nations who are marginalized ecologically and socially: islanders fearing sea level rise, farmers ravaged by floods in South Asia, refugees of wars in places like Sudan, motivated by the growing scarcity of land and water resources. The Guardian reported, “For every 100 [million] people living in Africa there are three negotiators—the equivalent figure for the EU is 6.4.” Moreover, the report suggested that delegates from small poorer nations who did attend the event may have been effectively silenced by inadequate technical support and translation services.

Activists reported throughout the conference that they were systematically blockaded and shut out of the negotiations. As with Copenhagen, the talks were not so much about what was said than what was not—the perspectives that never broke through to the inside network of negotiators. From the Global Justice Ecology Project:

Activists and representatives from civil society have been systematically excluded from the meetings and even expelled from the UNFCCC itself. When voices have been raised in Cancún, badges have been stripped. … Youth delegates were barred for spontaneously taking action against a permitting process for protests made unwieldy and inaccessible. NGO delegates were banned from the Moon Palace simply for filming these protests.

Despite the specter of “manufactured consent,” Shefali Sharma at Think Forward argues that activists were still missing critical opportunities to shift the agenda.

For civil society organizations, CancĂşn must be a wake up call for serious reflection. How have we been complicit in an outcome that has ultimately not respected the science of global warming?

While some may say a weak agreement is better than none at all, many are wary that CancĂşn has crystallized a model for closed political decision making. The inevitable result will be climate policy that enables polluters to profit from cleaning up their own mess and barely pays the interest on the climate debt held by rich industrialized nations, which continues to be financed by the devastation of historically exploited communities.

Yes, civil society has some tough questions to ask itself about how it can bring its voice into the next phase of negotiations. But it’s not just about representation. While the CancĂşn agreement was disturbingly vague on critical issues, the parallel agenda raised at the alternative climate summit in Cochabamba earlier this year feels similarly amorphous. At that conference, a coalition of indigenous and civil society groups denounced capitalism as the cause of the crisis, championed the concept of food sovereignty, and defended the “Rights of Mother Earth.” But their broad vision didn’t yet add up to a concrete plan for controlling carbon emissions through a fair regulatory system. So how do those ideas translate into an enforceable international treaty?

In struggling to democratize the climate negotiation process, activists should plan to come to the table with a proactive alternative to the status quo. In the coming months, the Global South will be challenged to present a long-range program to reorient the political economy of climate change. Unless they want corporations to steal the show again, the grassroots will have to prove to delegates and the public as a whole that the value of preserving the earth outweighs the profits to be gained from destroying it.

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This story first ran Dec. 13 on ColorLines.

From our Daily Report:

Tianjin climate talks break down on North-South divide
World War 4 Report, Oct. 10, 2010

See also:

THE CLIMATE JUSTICE GROUNDSWELL
From Copenhagen to Cochabamba to CancĂşn
by Karah Woodward, The Indypendent
World War 4 Report, June 2010

See related story, this issue:

BOLIVIA’S NEW WATER WARS
Climate Change and Indigenous Struggle
by Bill Weinberg, NACLA Report on the Americas
World War 4 Report, January 2011

——————-
Reprinted by World War 4 Report, January 1, 2011
Reprinting permissible with attribution

Continue ReadingCANCUN PACT: NO VICTORY FOR CLIMATE JUSTICE 

BOLIVIA’S CLIMATE PARADOX

Latin American progressive governments still bet on “extractivismo”

by Carmelo Ruiz-Marrero, Latin America Energy & Environment Monitor

Surely no Bolivian head of state has ever been as famous an international celebrity as Evo Morales. His pronouncements on environmental protection and against the capitalist system have earned him much fame. His participation in the United Nations summit on climate change in Copenhaguen in December 2009 was key in exposing to the whole world the hipocrisy and inaction of major polluting countries regarding global warming.

It was in response to the Copenhaguen fiasco that Morales took the initiative of organizing and hosting an alternative civil society summit meeting in the Bolivian city of Cochabamba last April. His opening speech at the summit, officially named the World Peoples’ Conference on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth, was the most important and right-on-target statement ever made by a head of state on the subjects of ecology and climate change. At the international level all of his declarations and actions have earned him the esteem of environmentalists and progressives from all over the world.

However, it seems president Morales does not practice in his own country what he preaches in international fora. When he came to power in 2006, hydrocarbons, or fossil fuels, were his country’s main source of income. Mining followed closely behind in second place. The activities of both economic sectors are highly polluting and predatory of natural resources, and hydrocarbons are precisely the main cause of global warming. If anything has changed since then, it’s that Bolivia is nowadays more dependent on hydrocarbon and mining exports, according to a recent report by the Center of Studies for Labor and Agrarian Development (CEDLA).

CEDLA explains that in 1988 hydrocarbons and mining were responsible for 47% of the country’s exports and today they constitute 80%. “Between 2004 and 2005 the growth of the hydrocarbon sector accounted for nearly 25% of the country’s economic growh, and in 2008 the mining sector’s growth explained almost 40% of economic growth.”

Given the growing importance of fossil fuel exports for Bolivia’s national economy, one can hardly conceive of Evo Morales’ government making a useful contribution to moving the world towards a post-carbon economy in the near or middle term.

Environmental aspects aside, dependence on raw materials exports sentences the countries of Latin America and the rest of the global South to the lowliest state of economic underdevelopment. The writings of thinkers like Raul Prebisch, Celso Furtado and Eduardo Galeano, and the reports of the Commission for the Development of Latin America (CEPAL) have elaborated extensively on this.

The government of Morales had made a commitment to changing this situation through the industrialization of hydrocarbons, meaning the creation of industries to manufacture value-added products. In the case of petroleum, a variety of finished products can be made from it, including gasoline, kerosene, motor oil, pesticides and plastics. And with natural gas one can make fertilizer or electricity to power manufacturing and metallurgical industries.

But so far the industrialization has not taken off. Quoting an article published in Plataforma Energetica on October 10: “On the first of October president Morales admitted: ‘I want to be very sincere: what we are not being able to pull off is the industrialization of gas and petrochemicals’, he said, blaming this on the lack of ‘accompaniment’ of Bolivian experts on hydrocarbons to carry this process forth, since, he pointed out, they prefer to earn thousands of dollars a month working for the transnationals.”

In the first week of October social and labor organizations founded the National Committee for the Regional and National Development of Bolivia (CONADERENA) to push for the industrialization of hydrocarbons. CONADERENA’s founding organizations “coincided in affirming that regrettably the government of Evo Morales did not fulfill the ‘October agenda’, whose main postulates regarding the nationalization and industrialization of natural gas and all our natural resources, are not reflected in the policies and actions undertaken by the current administration and, on the contrary, it continues the neoliberal policies imposed by (previous president) Gonzalo SĂĄnchez de Lozada of exporting gas, as well as minerals, as raw material.”

Another critique levelled at Morales’ energy policy is that in his drive towards turning his country into a major energy exporter he has neglected the domestic market. While supplying markets in Brazil, Argentina and most recently Paraguay, the Bolivian economy has been left without enough gas supply. This has led to embarassing situations, like in September when energy scarcity forced Bolivia to import 20,000 tons of cement, even when the country has the capacity to manufacture it.

According to various experts that participated in the recent Second Forum of the Latin American Network on Extractive Industries, organized by CEDLA and carried out in Bolivia, the foreign exchange obtained from hydrocarbons has not been put to good use. “Our countries… have grown accustomed to living off nature’s rent, to exporting raw materials, and to losing in international trade”, decried Alberto Acosta, who was mining and energy minister under current Ecuador president Rafael Correa, and chairman of the constituent assembly that wrote a new constitution for Ecuador in 2007.

Acosta, a leftist economist with a close relationship with the ecology movement, holds that although the governments of Evo Morales and Rafael Correa write and talk a lot about “right livelihood” and a harmonious relationship with nature, all their plans for “development” and economic “growth” are sustained by a growing “neo-extractivism” of non-renewable natural resources with ever growing environmental impacts.

He pointed out that “we have extracted much oil, received plenty of money and large credits, but the result has been very poor: there is no development, there is massive poverty and the environmental impacts are alarming, there is pollution, massive deforestation, harms to health, and diseases.”

It was also stated in the Forum that the capital generated by this extractivist activity has been spent on social programs which, while being very popular, are of an assistentialist and clientelist nature. According to Acosta, this has led to the creation of a “welfare-client class” (bonocracia clientelar).

Mexican specialist RocĂ­o Moreno lamented that “there is no serious and profound discussion in our countries about what we want to do with the rent obtained from petroleum… In recent years the money was used to cover current spending, in paying bureaucracy, it is not oriented towards closing development gaps, towards improving equality.”

Acosta holds that the way out of this predicament is a transition towards a post-extractive economy. The presidents of Bolivia and Ecuador cannot claim ignorance about this proposal since it is written in both countries’ constitutions. He acknowledges that oil wells cannot be shut down overnight, but he urges that in light of peak oil and climate change, the transition cannot be postponed.

The Ecuadorian economist made clear that post-extractivism does not mean rejecting the exploitation of natural resources, but rather “establishing the biophysical limits of exploitation, arriving at sustainability, eliminating poverty and its cause, which is opulence,” and moving towards a post-petroleum economy. “Oil is running out, and given the growing rates of consumption we will not be able continue being oil exporting countries.”

Acosta is hopeful that the Yasuni-ITT Initiative will become a precedent that could lead Latin America towards a post-extractivist, post-petroleum future. This acclaimed initiative consists of the Ecuador government’s commitment to abstain from extracting oil from the biodiverse Yasuni national park, and in exchange receive a compensation
provided by the international community, which will be administered by a trust fund set up by the United Nations.

In conclusion: “The speakers at the II Forum on Extractive Industries agreed that the construction of a new post-capitalist economy does not depend solely on tax reform or the development of alternative energies, but basically on citizen participation in the administration of the ever growing incomes that the state has garnered from oil and mining. That’s why it is key and urgent that the peoples of the region develop effective mechanisms of social control, and denounce unilateral and improvised decisions made by their governments.”

—-

This story first ran Oct. 26 on Latin America Energy and Environment Monitor.

Resources:

World Peoples’ Conference on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth

Yasuni battle continues
Latin America Energy and Environment Monitor, Sept. 6, 2006)

Despilfarran la renta petrolera y minera en una ‘bonocracia clientelar’
Plataforma EnergĂŠtica, Sept. 1 2010

Bolivia estĂĄ en el nudo de sus contradicciones
Plataforma EnergĂŠtica, Oct. 10 2010

See also:

THE CLIMATE JUSTICE GROUNDSWELL
From Copenhagen to Cochabamba to CancĂşn
by Karah Woodward, The Indypendent
World War 4 Report, June 2010

BOLIVIA’s NEW WATER WARS
Climate Change and Indigenous Struggle
by Bill Weinberg, NACLA Report on the Americas
World War 4 Report, January 2011

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Reprinted by World War 4 Report, January 1, 2011
Reprinting permissible with attribution

Continue ReadingBOLIVIA’S CLIMATE PARADOX 

2010: EUROPE’S “SUMMER OF INTOLERANCE”

Western Leaders and the New “Barbarian Invasions”

by Giulio D’Eramo, World War 4 Report

The most remarkable event signaling the racist shift in Europe’s politics in 2010 was probably the mid-September crisis over a leaked French document showing the explicit targeting of Roma people for deportation that the administration in Paris had written over the summer. The following unprecedented complaint against France by the European Union for breaching of EU rules on the free movement of citizens gives a measure of the importance of this scandal.

The complaint was retracted at the end of October when Paris removed overtly discriminatory language from its new immigration bill. But by then, some 1,000 Roma had been expelled, and hundreds of their camps demolished. The European summer of 2010 might well be remembered as the “summer of intolerance.”

Europeans started to feel the heat in August, when in Germany one Thilo Sarrazin, an outspoken Bundesbank’s consultant and prominent Social Democratic Party member, published a book—Deutschland schafft sich ab (“Germany Does Away With Itself”)—in which he blames immigrants and Jews for every social and economic problem of the Federal Republic. The book, upon its release, was #1 on Germany’s bestsellers list.

Just as Sarrazin was finally being kicked out from both the Bundesbank and the SPD, the offending French document was leaked to the press. It starts off as follows: “The President of the Republic has fixed on July 28 concrete objectives for the evacuation of illegal camps: 300 illegal camps or settlements have to be evacuated by 3 months, with priority those of the Roma.”

The French government had previously assured EU officials that they were kicking out people without documents and living in “favelas.” They had made it clear that the process was not carried out on a discriminatory basis. As EU law holds that no member state may have laws that explicitly target an ethnic group, the publication of the document prompted the reaction of European Commissioner Viviane Reding, who issued a strong and angry condemnation. She stated:

During a formal meeting with French ministers…the Commission received political assurances that specific ethnic groups had not been targeted in France. I can only express my deepest regrets that the political assurances given by two French ministers…are now openly contradicted by an administrative circular issued by the same government…

Despite the obvious illegality of the measure as described by the leaked document, Italy’s Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi rushed to support of French President Nicolas Sarkozy, saying: “Europe had not yet woken up to the fact that the Roma problem is not a uniquely a French or Italian, Greek or Spanish problem. President Sarkozy, on the other hand, is fully aware of this.” He added: “We hope that this Franco-Italian convergence will shake Europe and make it confront the problem with coordinated policies.”

And indeed, the Italian government had already started to work within its own boundaries.

The mildest representative of the xenophobe Northern League Party, Interior Minister Roberto Maroni, has just proposed a new decree on Urban Security. This decree, which would include strong measures against nomadism, has long been awaited from the mayor of Rome, the post-fascist Gianni Alemanno.

A loyal to Berlusconi supporter throughout the latest political crisis, Alemanno started off as a young and violent supporter of the overtly Mussolini-nostalgist Italian Social Movement (MSI), which then became the National Alliance (AN), which in turn melted into the Berlusconi’s ironically named party, People of Freedom (PDL). One of his first plans as mayor is the immediate dismantling of some 90% of the 100-plus Roma camps around the city. He obviously adds that the camps will be erased only after a new accommodation is found for the people living there—but that only means until another existing camp (but one out of the city) is enlarged. He says he’s waiting for the Interior Minister to pave the way for legal eviction of all nomadic people (read: Rom), even those with EU papers.

Alemanno states: “It is paramount that when there are situations of either vagrancy or absolute misery, we are able to provide compulsory medical treatment to those people for periods up to 6 months.” This is a barely veiled reference to internment in psychiatric institutes. From this declarations we learn two useful facts. First: Nomadic people do not deserve civil rights. Second: Roma people like to be poor, and are therefore crazy—and therefore lose their civil rights, as appropriate for crazy dangerous people.

The immigration office of Catholic aid organization Caritas expressed concerns that the moves of Rome’s mayor will force more and more Roma to join overcrowded and malfunctioning camps in other regions of Italy—for example in the poor Naples suburb of Scampia, notoriously controlled by the Camorra crime machine.

The Cardinal of Milan, Dionigi Tettamanzi, also protested against discrimination when the city’s right-wing administration evicted 200 Roma from an abandoned building they had been squatting in September, asserting, “this operation did not respect human rights.” Too bad, one could say, that when it comes to election times the Church always supports right-wing parties because of their “pro-life” stand. Just before Christmas, a Milan judge ordered the city government to offer housing to the evicted families.

Despite recent violent demonstrations in Rome (Dec. 14 saw riots on a scale not witnessed since the ’70s, as thousands marched against Berlusconi) and the fact that Alemanno is now at the center of a huge scandal (with many of his relatives and fascist cronies getting top-paid jobs in the administration), he was originally elected on a security platform. (Ironically, one of the directors of Rome’s public transport company, Francesco Bianco, is a former member of fascist terrorist groups, charged in the ’80s for two politically motivated killings.)

On his original security ticket, Alemmano repeatedly made propaganda use of one of the most famous crimes of recent years, that of a woman who was killed on the way from the train station to her house, in an unlighted alley just beside a Roma camp. Anger was focused on the Roma, rather than the government for failing to provide a paved, well-lit route from the train station to the residential area on the other side of the trafficked Via Tor di Quinto. Alemmano exploited the climate of fear around this episode. The high-profile arrest (on unrelated criminal charges) of a couple of extremely rich Roma families, owning tens of Ferraris and luxury apartments, increased the common feeling that they just “act” poor.

Although with less fanfare than in France and Italy, Germany has also been aggressively deporting Roma—generally, on quietly chartered flights to Kosova and elsewhere in the Balkans. In September, rights groups reportede police arriving at the homes of undocumented immigrants in Frankfurt in the middle of the night and giving the residents two hours to pack.

The French and Italian moves against the Roma, the more successfully hidden moves in Germany, the xenophobic statements of Bundersbank’s Sarrazi (supported by 85% of Germans, at least on the Muslim issue, polls indicate), like the growing Tea Party movements in America, show once more that the much-feared “barbarian invasions” are not coming from outside, but from within the West’s own boundaries.

To use the power of a state against a minority is to follow the line of the worst and most undemocratic groups within a country. We should always remember that the most important task of a democracy is not expressing the will of the majority, but protecting and giving voice to the many minorities that constitute a nation.

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Giulio D’Eramo is a freelance writer whose work appears frequently in Index on Censorship, Articolo 21, Red Pepper and other online publications. He recently launched his own website, Blog Me There. An Italian native, he currently resides in England.

Resources:

EU to suspend complaint against France over Roma expulsions
The Guardian, Oct. 19

German expulsions of Roma have long been kept secret
Romea.cz, Sept. 24

Fears of anti-immigration alliance as Berlusconi lauds France’s expulsion policy
The Independent, Sept. 17

Orders to police on Roma expulsions from France leaked
The Guardian, Sept. 13

The Bundesbank and Axel Weber’s Nightmare Dilemma (on public reaction to Thilo Sarrazin)
Wall Street Journal’s The Source blog, Aug. 31

From our Daily Report:

HRW protests deportation of Roma to Kosova
World War 4 Report, Oct. 28, 2010

Echoes of Nazism seen in Sarkozy’s Roma policy
World War 4 Report, Sept. 17, 2010

From our archive:

Back to the Dark Ages: Europe’s April of Atavism
World War 4 Report, April 28, 2002

See also:

BLOODY CALABRIA
Criminal Networks Exploit Italy’s Anti-Immigrant Backlash
by Giulio D’Eramo, World War 4 Report
World War 4 Report, March 2010

RISE OF THE CZECH FAR RIGHT
Neo-Nazis Exploit Growing Anti-Roma Racism
by Gwendolyn Albert, World War 4 Report
World War 4 Report, July 2009

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Special to World War 4 Report, January 1, 2011
Reprinting permissible with attribution

Continue Reading2010: EUROPE’S “SUMMER OF INTOLERANCE” 

WikiLeaks and the Belarus affair

Our post “Enough with the Julian Assange hero worship” has accrued nearly 3,000 hits in three days (compared with a typical 300 or less in this period), as well as 59 comments—overwhelmingly negative. Ironically, some readers have urged us to stick to our “typical” posts, implying that we have no right to air a dissenting opinion on the WikiLeaks affair. These same readers have never commented on (and probably rarely read) our painstaking daily reports on human rights in Western Sahara, environmental disasters in Guatemala, peasant uprisings in Peru, et cetera.

And they still fail to seriously address (or, mostly, to address at all) the most grave allegation against WikiLeaks, which has received virtually no coverage from the mainstream media—that WikiLeaks’ representative in Belarus, the notorious anti-Semite Israel Shamir, actively provided dictator Alexander Lukashenko with intelligence on dissidents who were then rounded up and tortured by the hundreds.

The original page now has so many comments that it is having trouble loading. The discussion will continue here, if Assange’s defenders care to keep posting. I have titled this page “WikiLeaks and the Belarus affair” in an effort (probably futile) to provoke some honesty on this issue.

Fire at will…

Continue ReadingWikiLeaks and the Belarus affair 

THE DISPOSSESSION OF THE PALESTINIANS, PT. III

Continued from node 6211

Operation Defensive Shield

The Sept. 11, 2001 devastating terrorist attacks on the Pentagon and New York’s World Trade Center would of course open a new era of US military adventures nearly throughout the Islamic world. In his Oct. 7 statement on the attack, terrorist leader Osama bin Laden of the feared al-Qaeda network repeatedly invoked the Palestinian cause. He pledged: “I swear by Almighty God who raised the heavens without pillars that neither the United States nor he who lives in the United States will enjoy security before we can see it as a reality in Palestine…” (Osama bin Laden statement, Oct. 7, 2001, online at World War 4 Report)

Prime Minister Sharon from the beginning attempted to wed his own struggle against Palestinian militants to the new US crusade against international terrorism, stating on the day of the attacks: “At this most difficult hour, Israelis stand with you ready to provide any assistance. The government of Israel declares tomorrow a day of mourning as we bow our heads and share the pain of the American people.” Hamas leader Shiekh Yassin was equally quick to distance his struggle from al-Qaeda’s designs: “We are not ready to move our struggle outside the occupied Palestinian land. We are not prepared to open international fronts, however much we criticize the unfair American position,” he told reporters in Gaza. Arafat too quickly denounced the Sept. 11 attacks. But international footage of Palestinians apparently celebrating the attacks served as effective propaganda for Israel. CNN issued a statement denying rumors that it had re-broadcast old footage after the attacks of Palestinians cheering for Saddam Hussein in the 1991 Gulf War, to deceive viewers. (Fox News, Sept. 12, 2001; CNN, Sept. 20, 2001)

The situation in Palestine escalated along with the world situation that autumn. A wave of suicide attacks left 25 dead in Israel in November, prompting Sharon’s government to respond with military strikes on the West Bank and Gaza Strip. An emergency Israeli cabinet meeting in the prelude to the air-strikes issued a statement calling the Palestinian Authority a “terror-supporting entity,” and Yasser Arafat’s Fatah political organization and elite paramilitary Force 17 “terrorist groups.” Accusing Arafat of a “war of terror,” Sharon actually ordered air-strikes on PA targets, wiping out Arafat’s personal helicopters in Ramallah, killing two. (ABC News, New York Times, Dec. 4, 2001).

But Arafat actually complied with Israeli demands for a crackdown on the Hamas network and arrested the group’s spiritual leader Sheikh Yassin for complicity in the suicide attacks. The inevitable result was more clashes between Hamas supporters and PA police. Ironically, the suicide attacks were themselves retaliation for the Nov. 23 assassination of Hamas leader Mahmoud Abu Hanoud—who had been serving a twelve-year term in a PA prison for terrorist activity until he escaped when a May 18 Israeli air-raid hit the Nablus prison building in a bungled attempt to kill him. (FAIR, Dec. 6, 2001)

In a tilt to Israel, the US froze the assets of US-based charities said to be Hamas fronts—and condemned the suicide attacks without the usual admonition to Sharon to refrain from military incursions into PA-controlled areas. (New York Times, Dec. 4, 2001).

A cycle of retaliatory violence ensued, in which Palestinian attacks on settlers resulted in Israeli air-strikes, resulting in further Palestinian attacks, and so on. The al-Aqsa Brigades, militant wing of Arafat’s Fatah movement, Hamas, and smaller groups such as Islamic Jihad claimed credit for the Palestinian attacks.

Among numerous sites hit by Israeli air raids in Ramallah over the night of Dec. 12 was the Quaker-run Friends School, an elementary school for local Palestinian children. Because the attack occurred at night, no one was injured. (Atlanta Friends’ Meeting press release, Dec. 13, 2001)

After initial hesitancy, the White House backed Israel’s claims that 50 tons of weapons seized by Israeli forces from a boat in the Red Sea in January 2002 were supplied by Iran and bound for Arafat’s forces. Said President Bush in response to Israel’s claim: “Mr. Arafat must renounce terror…” Palestinian Authority cabinet minister Saeb Erekat retorted: “We are guilty [in US eyes] until proven innocent. I don’t know what this compelling evidence is.” (Ha’aretz, Jan. 10, 2002)

That month, Israel’s Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Shaul Mofaz was in Washington meeting with Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, Joint Chiefs of Staff head Gen. Richard Myers and National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice—architects of the President George W. Bush’s bellicose new foreign policy. Seeking to integrate Israel’s war with Palestine into the US war on terrorism, Mofaz accused Iran of deep involvement in terrorism against Israel, anonymous sources said. (AP, Jan. 20, 2002)

Later that month, Israel and the US held a large joint exercise, deploying the Arrow and Patriot missile defense systems in an “Iraqi scenario” war game, preparing for missile attacks on Israel in the event of a US attack on the Saddam Hussein dictatorship. Hundreds of soldiers from US Army anti-aircraft units based in Europe came to Israel for the exercise. Similar exercises had been held almost every year since Desert Storm, but these received greater attention as the US appeared to be preparing for an invasion. (Ha’aretz, Feb. 5, 2002)

Also that month, Israel demolished 70 Palestinian homes at the Rafah refugee camp in Gaza in retaliation for the killing of four Israeli soldiers by Palestinian militants. (New York Times, Jan. 11, 2002)

On Jan. 25, 2002, the Israeli daily Ha’aretz ran a paid statement signed by 53 members of the armed forces calling for troops to refuse orders for repression in the Occupied Territories:

We, combat officers and soldiers of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), raised on the values of Zionism, sacrifice, and giving to the Jewish people and the State of Israel, who have always served on the front line and were the first to fulfill every mission, regardless of how difficult, in order to defend and strengthen the State of Israel…

We, who have personally witnessed the terrible bloodshed on both sides of the conflict…

We hereby declare that we will not go on fighting a war for the peace of the settlements. We will not go on fighting beyond the ‘green line’ for the purposes of domination, expulsion, starvation, and humiliation of an entire people.

We hereby declare that we shall continue to serve the Israel Defense Forces in any mission that serves the defense of the State of Israel. The mission of occupation and repression does not serve this goal–and we refuse to participate in it. [Seruv.org.il]

Following the statement was a list by name, rank and unit of 53 IDF soldiers. Within a week, the number of signatories had doubled—despite harsh warnings from the government. Sharon said, “It will be the beginning of the end of democracy if soldiers don’t carry out the decisions of the elected government.” (Israel Insider, Feb. 5, 2002)

This movement was just part of a wave of general non-cooperation among IDF reservists. At least 2,500 reservists were absent without leave, while thousands of others had become “gray conscientious objectors,” having fabricated medical or personal reasons not to be called up. Israel jailed some 600 reserve soldiers on charges of evading service. Ishai Menuchim, a reservist tank commander and leader of the anti-occupation draft-resistance movement Yesh Gvul (“There is a Limit”—a reference both to the Green Line and the boundary of what is morally acceptable), said: “The reservists do not care about the territories. Many are in their ’30s and ’40s, they have families and care more about their businesses or studies. So they are not willing to pay the price and risk their lives for something they don’t believe in.” (London Telegraph, Jan. 31, 2002)

Following weeks of escalating retaliatory violence between Israeli troops and Palestinian militants, on Feb. 28, the IDF launched attacks on the West Bank’s Jenin and Balata refugee camps, allegedly controlled by the militant organizations Tanzim (Fatah-aligned) and Hamas. This marked the first time ground troops had been sent in to Palestinian refugee camps. (Ha’aretz, Feb. 28, 2002)

On March 2, nine people, including four children, were killed and over 50 injured when a suicide bomber blew himself up in Jerusalem’s Orthodox Beit Yisrael neighborhood. The al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade claimed responsibility, which, like Tanzim, was linked to Yasser Arafat’s Fatah political organization, but apparently did not answer to his Palestinian Authority. (Ha’aretz, March 3, 2002)

Dissent was now emerging within the highest levels of Israeli military power. The Council for Peace & Security, a group of 1,000 top-level Israeli reserve generals, colonels, and Shin Bet/Mossad officials, announced a public campaign for a unilateral Israeli withdrawal from all of Gaza and much of the West Bank. The group called for dismantling 50 settlements, the immediate establishment of a Palestinian state, and immediate peace talks with the Palestinians—cease-fire or no. The campaign was dubbed “Saying Shalom to the Palestinians.” (Ha’aretz, Feb. 22, 2002)

But the opening days of March were the bloodiest of the new Intifada. Some 42 Palestinians were killed March 8 in IDF operations against refugee camps, Palestinian Authority buildings and other targets in the Occupied Territories. In Tul Karm, elite IDF Golani troops seized control of a local refugee camp, detaining some 1,300 camp residents. Paratroopers took control of large areas in Bethlehem and surrounding camps. Israeli helicopters also fired on a refugee camp near Ramallah, and Israeli tanks entered Rafah in the southern Gaza Strip. Israeli helicopters and gunboats totally destroyed Arafat’s Gaza headquarters early March 10, hours after a Palestinian suicide bomber killed 11 and injured over 50 at a busy cafe in West Jerusalem, with Hamas claiming responsibility. (World War 4 Report round-up, March 10, 2002)

Saudi foreign minister Prince Saud al-Faisal, at a Cairo conference with Arab heads of state to develop a peace plan for Israel-Palestine, called the March 8 violence “Black Friday.” The Saudi peace plan, approved by the Arab League, had called for the Arab nations to “normalize” relations with Israel in return for an Israeli withdrawal from all territories conquered in the 1967 war. It was now toughened. The term “normalization” was dropped, and demands were added for restitution for Palestinian refugees, as well as a specific reference to Israeli withdrawal from East Jerusalem. (New York Times, March 9; Ha’aretz, March 10, 2002; Dolphin, p. 16)

A Zionist terrorist underground meanwhile seemed to be re-emerging. In southern Jerusalem’s Arab neighborhood of Sur Bahir on March 5, metal cones hidden in a grove of pines in a school yard exploded, spraying bullets and shrapnel all over the yard, breaking windows in the schoolhouse and sending students scrambling under their desks. The bomb was set to go off during morning exercises when the yard is usually filled with some 400 Palestinian junior high school students—the death toll would have been high if the cones hadn’t been discovered ten minutes before detonation and the yard evacuated. An Israel Radio reporter received a message claiming responsibility for the attack in the name of “Revenge of the Infants,” saying it was intended to avenge the killing of Jewish children by Palestinian suicide bombers. But Jerusalem Mayor Ehud Olmert suggested the bombing was a provocation by Palestinian militants: “Suicide, killing themselves, is not foreign to their repertoire. So one can imagine the possibility that they’re doing it to themselves in an attempt to create a provocation, to stir up this population.” Angry students later marched out of the schoolyard, holding signs reading “Stop killing our children,” and hurling rocks at Israeli riot police, who responded with stun grenades and tear gas. (New York Times, March 6, 2002 via World War 4 Report) [top]

On March 12, the UN Security Council voted up the US-drafted Resolution 1397, “Affirming a vision of a region where two States, Israel and Palestine, live side by side within secure and recognized borders.” Resolution 1397 also encouraged Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah’s peace initiative. Fourteen of the 15 Security Council members voted in favor, with Syria abstaining. The theretofore obstructionist US offered the resolution as it was attempting to sell Arab regimes on military intervention against Iraq. The vote came at the end of a day in which Israeli troops invaded towns and refugee camps in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, killing at least 30 Palestinians. (The Guardian, March 14; MSNBC, March 13, 2002, via World War 4 Report)

On March 14, eight Palestinians and three Israeli soldiers were killed as Israeli forces invaded the West Bank town of Ramallah and other targets in the Palestinian territories. President Bush mildly criticized Israel’s push into the West Bank and Gaza, saying “the recent actions are not helpful.” (The Guardian, March 14, 2002)

Following protests by Holocaust survivors, Israeli Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Mofaz ordered the IDF to immediately stop marking numbers on the forearms of Palestinians detained in the sweep of refugee camps. Mofaz said there had not been an order to mark captives with ink, and that he had ordered an investigation into the matter. In Knesset testimony, cabinet minister and Holocaust survivor Yosef Lapid called the connotation of the act “unbearable,” recalling the ID numbers printed on the arms of Jewish inmates at the Auschwitz death camp. A military source told the Jerusalem Post that numbers had been inked on the forearms of Palestinians to facilitate the interrogation process at a detainment camp in the Tulkarm area. (Jerusalem Post, March 13, 2002 via World War 4 Report)

Despite an official Israeli ban on the house demolitions, the practice had continued. According to a February report by the B’tselem human rights group, Israel had by then demolished hundreds of houses in refugee camps in the Gaza alone, rendering 5,124 people homeless since the beginning of the Second Intifada. (Jerusalem Post, Feb. 4, 2002 via World War 4 Report)

Hardline Israeli Infrastructure Minister Avigdor Lieberman submitted his letter of resignation to Prime Minister Sharon March 12. Tourism Minister Benny Elon also resigned. In an interview upon his resignation, Elon said he would work on a “right-wing peace plan,” under which “Israel would dismantle the Palestinian Authority,” the Oslo Accords principle of a two-state solution “would be nullified,” and Palestinian refugees would be resettled “in neighboring Arab countries.” His own “two-state solution” called for Israeli sovereignty over the Palestinian territories, and establishment of a “Palestinian-Jordanian state” in Jordan. (Jerusalem Post, March 15, 2002 via World War 4 Report)

Some 50,000 right-wing demonstrators attended a mass rally in Tel Aviv’s Rabin Square March 11, under the slogan “A strong nation will defeat terror.” Addressing the crowd, reserve Brig. Gen. Effi Eitam called on Sharon to be “a true Lion of Judah. If you are, the nation will be at your side.” Gen. Eitam was the author of a recent “security-political plan” urging Sharon to re-occupy and annex the Palestinian territories. (World War Report, Feb. 2, 2002; Ha’aretz, March 11, 2002)

With Vice President Dick Cheney on the ground in Israel, violence again escalated. On March 18, Israel began to pull back from positions in the Palestinian territories after a rare joint meeting of Israeli and Palestinian security chiefs, brought together by US envoy Gen. Anthony Zinni. As Zinni worked to broker a truce, Cheney was pictured shaking hands with Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon on the front page of the New York Times March 19. Appearing with Sharon at a press conference that day, Cheney announced he would not meet with Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat until a truce was in place. The following days, two suicide bombings left several dead in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. On the day of the second blast, the US State Department put the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades on the official list of “foreign terrorist organizations.” In a statement, al-Aqsa responded that making the list “is an honor for the brigades” because “America is the greatest sponsor of terrorism in the world.” It vowed to step up bombings. (New York Times, March 23, 2002)

The Israeli human rights group B’Tselem released a report entitled “Trigger Happy: Unjustified Gunfire and the IDF’s Open-Fire Regulations during the al-Aqsa Intifada.” The report documents numerous incidents of unarmed Palestinian civilians being killed by Israel Defense Forces. To cite but one incident: “On 17 December 2001, several children from the Khan Yunis refugee camp were playing with toy weapons made of plastic. IDF soldiers at a post some one hundred meters away fired live ammunition at them, killing Muhammad Hanaidiq, age 15.” (B’Tselem, March 2002)

B’Tselem wrote that until the outbreak of the new intifada, “the Open-Fire Regulations in the Occupied Territories were based on Israel’s penal code. Soldiers were only allowed to fire live ammunition in two situations: when soldiers were in real and immediate life-threatening danger, and during the apprehension of a suspect. When the intifada began, the IDF defined the events in the Occupied Territories as an ‘armed conflict short of war,’ and expanded the range of situations in which soldiers are permitted to open fire… The new version of the Open-Fire Regulations, which according to press reports are referred to as ‘Blue Lilac,’ have remained secret.” Therefore B’Tselem based its investigation primarily on testimonies from soldiers. (ibid)

But the situation was about to dramatically escalate. On March 27, the Israeli cabinet decided not to let Arafat attend the Arab summit in Beirut—where Arab leaders unanimously agreed to the peace proposal put forward by Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah, calling for Israel to withdraw to its 1967 borders in exchange for normalized relations. The proposal was rejected by Israel. Just before the Beirut vote took place, Islamic Jihad killed 22 Israelis celebrating Passover with a suicide bomb in Netanya, north of Tel Aviv. The Palestinian Authority “strongly condemned” the bombing, and offered an immediate cease-fire. But the Israeli cabinet declared Arafat “an enemy.” On March 30, Israel invaded Ramallah with 150 tanks, besieging Arafat in his compound. Arafat told reporters that Israel wanted to make him “either a hostage, a runaway, or a martyr… I tell them I will be a martyr, a martyr, a martyr.” (Jerusalem Post, March 30; Ha’aretz, March 31, 2002 via World War 4 Report)

With Ramallah under siege, on March 31, a suicide bomber blew up himself and 15 others in restaurant in Haifa. Hamas took responsibility. (Ha’aretz, March 31)

Journalists were ordered out of Ramallah as IDF tanks and troops rolled in, and a “Closed Military Area” was declared. IDF troops fired warning shots and threw stun grenades at journalists who stayed behind in defiance of the ban (New York Times, April 6, 2002 via World War 4 Report)

On April 2 the IDF besieged Bethlehem’s Church of the Nativity—purported birthplace of Jesus—where some 250 armed Palestinians had taken refuge, and shoot-out ensued. The bell-ringer at the church was caught in the crossfire and bled to death in Bethlehem’s Manger Square before an ambulance could reach him. (The Independent, April 4, 2002 via World War 4 Report)

April 6 the Palestine Red Crescent Society reported at least 30 civilians killed in the Jenin refugee camp, with total casualties of over 100. Eyewitnesses reported IDF bulldozers leveling homes with the families inside. Jenin’s three modest hospitals were without electricity or water. A hospital in Jenin came under fire in a battle between Israeli and Palestinian forces, as the Red Cross struggled to evacuate the ill and wounded. The Red Cross, World Health Organization and UNWRA all reported deaths due to Israeli forces stopping rescuers getting through. (World War 4 Report, April 7, 2002)

In Nablus, the West Bank’s biggest city, fierce fighting rocked the market, or casbah, where Palestinian fighters made a stand. (ibid)

“Operation Defensive Shield,” as the IDF dubbed it, was Israel’s biggest offensive in the Palestinian territories in 34 years of occupation. The US envoy, Gen. Anthony Zinni, visited Arafat April 5 in his besieged Ramallah compound, now reduced mostly to mounds of rubble ringed by barbed wire. Sharon expressed displeasure withe the visit, and barred a European Union delegation from meeting Arafat. Israeli troops threw stun grenades, fired rubber bullets and rammed the vehicles of journalists trying to cover Zinni’s arrival. (The Guardian, April 6, 2002, via World War 4 Report)

Sharon for the first time publicly proposed sending Arafat into exile, saying he would be released to European diplomats on condition that he does not return. Sharon said Arafat “can’t take anyone with him, the murderers who are located around him there. And…it would have to be a one-way ticket.” (Irish Times, April 2, 2002)

Avigdor Lieberman, who had resigned his cabinet seat accusing Sharon of being too soft on the Palestinians, blasted the West Bank ground offensive, saying that Arafat and his headquarters should be “erased from the face of the earth.” Lieberman, explicitly invoked the US campaign then underway in Afghanistan in calling for massive aerial bombardment of the Palestinian territories. “Why should we endanger our troops? What did the armies of the United States and NATO do in Yugoslavia and Afghanistan? They didn’t endanger their soldiers. They simply bombed everything from above.” (Ha’aretz, April 1, 2002)

On April 4, Lebanon-based Hezbollah guerillas attacked the contested Har Dov/Shaba Farms area in the Golan Heights, seriously wounding one IDF soldier. Meanwhile, two Katyusha rockets hit Israeli territory from Syria near Kiryat Shmona. Shaba Farms had been seized from Syria in 1967, but was claimed by Beirut as part of Lebanon in a border dispute dating to the Mandate period. More Hezbollah attacks on Israeli forces in the disputed enclave would follow in ensuing months. (Ha’aretz, April 4, 2002)

The number of IDF reservists resisting service in the Palestinian territories surged to 375 officers and soldiers, who had all signed the public letter of refusal. At least 20 “refuseniks” had been jailed, with more facing military tribunals. On March 29, a group of refuseniks demonstrated outside the Prime Minister’s Residence in Jerusalem, carrying Israeli flags to stress their loyalty to Zionism. But Yishai Menuhin, spokesperson for Yesh Gvul said many conscripts who had not signed the refuseniks’ letter had also been jailed for conscientious objection—and the refusal movement was both more widespread and politically diverse than was being portrayed in the media. Menuhin said, “among us there are many Zionists, but also many non-Zionists and anti-Zionists. We support them all.” The Forum in Support of Conscientious Objectors distributed a brochure to draftees and reservists documenting human rights abuses in the territories, and stating: “The international community has already brought to trial soldiers who committed war crimes in the Balkans. Do you want to be next?” (Ha’aretz, April 1, 2002 via World War 4 Report)

Gush Shalom and other Israeli peace groups—both Jewish and Arab—held a “March Against the War” April 3, attempting to cross into the West Bank to deliver solidarity aid to the besieged communities. The marchers, dressed in white, were accompanied by trucks of food and medical supplies destined for Palestinian relief and women’s organizations. The activists intended to march from Jerusalem to Ramallah, but were stopped at A-Ram Checkpoint in north Jerusalem, where they were dispersed by police and IDF troops who used tear gas, batons and rifle butts. (Ha’aretz, April 4, 2002 via World War 4 Report)

By this point, 300 Israelis and 1,200 Palestinians had been killed since the new Intifada began in September 2000. According to the Israeli human rights group B’Tselem, 897 of the Palestinians killed from Sept. 29, 2000 though March 30, 2002 were civilians rather than armed militants, and 192 were children. B’Tselem found that Israeli were killed by Palestinians in the same period, 253 were civilians, including 48 children. (FAIR, April 4, 2002)

Members of the Norwegian committee that awards the annual Nobel Peace Prize launched an unprecedented verbal assault on Israeli foreign minister and Nobel peace laureate Shimon Peres. Committee members said they regretted that Peres’ prize could not be recalled because, as a member of the Israeli cabinet, he had not acted to prevent the re-occupation of Palestinian territory. Committee chairman Geir Lundestad noted that if Arafat were to be killed in the Israeli siege, one Nobel laureate would in effect have killed the other. (BBC, April 5, 2002 via World War 4 Report)

Israeli intellectuals and Holocaust survivors reacted with outrage to statements by Portuguese Nobel Literature Prize laureate Jose Saramago comparing Israel’s siege of Ramallah to the Nazi genocide. Saramago, who had recently visited the Palestinian city as part of an International Parliament of Writers (IPW) delegation, told the Israeli press that “the spirit of Auschwitz” could be seen in the assault on Ramallah. “This place is being turned into a concentration camp,” he said. According to Haaretz, when asked where the gas chambers were, he replied “so far, there are none.” Israeli legislator and Holocaust survivor Yosef Lapid said: “There is nothing more despicable than to use the Holocaust and its victims in such a way as this novelist with a worldwide reputation has done.” (DPA, March 26, 2002 via World War 4 Report)

Meanwhile, speaking at a ceremony commemorating Holocaust victims in New York City, Mayor Mike Bloomberg said: “Jewish people today are confronted by a new twisted ideology of hatred—that is Islamic extremism. Suicide bombers…are just the same thing as the concentration camps of the Nazis.” (NY Daily News, April 8, 2002 via World War 4 Report)

On April 7, President Bush said Arafat “needs to speak clearly, in Arabic, to the people of that region and condemn terrorist activities. At the very minimum, he ought to at least say something.” But on March 28, after the Passover suicide attack in Netanya, an Arafat speech broadcast on Palestinian TV in Arabic had stated: “On this occasion, I would like once again to reiterate our condemnation of yesterday’s operation in Netanya, in which a number of innocent Israeli civilians were killed and wounded. This operation constitutes a deviation from our policy and a violation of our national and human values…” (Daoud Kuttab, April 9, 2002)

US Secretary of State Colin Powell met with Yasser Arafat in besieged Ramallah April 15—much to the chagrin of Sharon. The meeting was portrayed as Arafat’s reward for a statement denouncing the suicide bombings. Some 40 international peace activists holed up in Arafat’s compound hoped to witness the meeting, but were herded by Powell’s US diplomatic security bodyguards into one room and told to stay out of sight. Netta Golan, the only Israeli in the group, said, “Everyone here has taken into consideration that there is a high probability we might die.” (NY Daily News, April 15, 2002 via World War 4 Report)

Arafat’s statement, in Arabic, read in part:

The Palestinian leadership and His Excellency President Arafat express their deep condemnation for all terrorist activities, whether it is state terrorism, terrorism by a group or individual terrorism. This position comes from our steady principle that rejects using violence and terror against civilians as a way to achieve political goals. We declared this position beginning in 1988 and also when we signed the Oslo accords at the White House, and we have repeated it several times before, including our declaration on Dec. 16 last year. After that, we did not find any Israeli response but more Israeli escalation, a tighter siege, further occupation of our people, refugee camps, cities, villages, and more destruction of our infrastructure. We strongly condemn all the attacks targeting civilians from both sides… [AP, April 13, 2002 via World War 4 Report]

A front-page New York Times analysis April 14 said Palestinians were angered by “what they perceive as a double-standard from Washington”—constant pressure to condemn the suicide bombings, yet no condemnation from Washington of the hundreds of Palestinian casualties of Operation Defensive Shield, “which the Palestinians refer to as state terrorism.” (New York Times, April 14, 2002)

As the IDF began to withdraw from Jenin, the UN Security Council voted unanimously April 20 to send a fact-finding mission to look into what happened at the devastated Palestinian refugee camp. But following heavy diplomatic pressure from the US and Israel, the resolution did not describe the mission as an investigation. As camp residents started to retrieve bodies from the ruins, Israeli authorities insisted there was “no massacre.” Palestinians claimed up to 500 residents were killed in Jenin, while Israel put the death toll at about 50 Palestinians and 23 Israeli soldiers. (CNN, April 19; BBC, April 20, 2002 via World War 4 Report)

After touring Jenin, UN special Middle East envoy Terje Larsen said the scene was “horrifying beyond belief,” that the most heavily destroyed area “looks like there’s been an earthquake here,” and is permeated with the “stench of death.” Reported Larsen: “I saw people using their bare hands to dig out the body of a 12-year-old boy. More than 2,000 people have been left without a roof over their heads and there is an acute lack of water and food in the camp and town.” (Ha’aretz, April 18, 2002 via World War 4 Report)

Ariel Sharon dismissed accounts of a massacre and mass clandestine graves at Jenin as “lies” of the “Palestinian empire of falsehood… They look you in the eye and lie.” Defense Minister Binyamin Ben-Eliezer told the cabinet the number of Palestinians killed in Jenin was in the dozens, not the hundreds. (Jerusalem Post, April 15, 2002 via World War 4 Report)

On April 21, Sharon declared an end to “this stage” of Defensive Shield, ordering troops out of Nablus and Ramallah, except for the ring around Arafat’s compound. In Nablus, the ancient Casbah was in ruins after a bloody battle between IDF forces and Palestinian militants who had taken refuge there. Hundreds of Palestinians surrendered at al-Ayn refugee camp near Nablus after five straight hours of ground-fire from tanks, and missile-fire from helicopter gunships. (The Guardian, April 9, 11, 2002 via World War 4 Report)

In another move to control media portrayals, the Arab section of Israel Radio was issued a new set of guidelines for terminology to be used in broadcasts, barring the word “victim” when referring to Palestinian civilians killed in the Intifada. Instead of “victim,” broadcasters were ordered to say “the dead.” The word “assassination” were not to be used in regard to Israel’s assassinations of Palestinian activists. Instead, the word “killing” [katal in Arabic] was to be used—despite the fact that the IDF itself called these actions “targeted assassinations.” (AP, April 26, 2002 via World War 4 Report)

Israel said the standoff at Bethlehem’s Church of the Nativity could be resolved if the gunmen inside agree to a face trial in Israel—or accept permanent exile. The offer was rejected. The Franciscan order asked Israel to allow some of the 200 armed Palestinians sheltering in the church to leave unharmed, and called for water and electricity to be urgently supplied to the complex. An Armenian monk at the complex was seriously wounded by an Israeli bullet April 10. (BBC News, April 12, 2002 via World War 4 Report)

A new report by human rights group B’Tselem documented massive abuses by the IDF in Operation Defensive Shield, including: use of civilians as human shields, obstruction of medical treatment, mass detention and torture, and overcrowding and humiliating treatment of detainees: “There are 1,000 detainees held in Ofer military camp, between 1,000 and 1,500 at Megiddo military prison, 100 in the detention facility in Salem, opened near Jenin and several dozens in permanent detention facilities in the West Bank. Detainees released from Ofer reported harsh holding conditions. Among other things, they reported insufficient food, overcrowding, being cold, humiliation and beatings.” (ReliefWeb, April 11, 2002)

Three prominent international human rights groups released a joint statement April 7:

Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and the International Commission of Jurists want to send a clear, unambiguous message to all parties to this conflict, and to the international community. Stop the deliberate targeting of civilians and other persons protected by international humanitarian law. Stop actions that harm them. Immediately deploy international monitors to protect the human rights of Palestinians and Israelis… We strongly deplore actions by the state of Israel that harm persons protected by international humanitarian law. These include prolonged curfews with severe restrictions on the movement of people and access for medical personnel; intensified collective punishments; wanton damage to homes, cars and civilian property; looting and theft; and the coerced use of civilians to assist military operations. Such actions violate international standards and transcend any justification of military necessity… Even in the face of this situation, we are appalled by an increase in the use of suicide bombers by armed Palestinian groups to attack Israeli civilians. Such deliberate attacks on civilians are absolutely prohibited by international humanitarian law. These actions tarnish the Palestinian cause and will not at all help the situation… [Amnesty International, April 9, 2002]

Israel claimed to have found documents at Ramallah linking Arafat to suicide bombings. Ariel Sharon told Ha’aretz on March 5: “The PA is behind the terror… Arafat is behind the terror. Our pressure is aimed at ending the terror. Don’t expect Arafat to act against the terror. We have to cause them heavy casualties and then they’ll know they can’t keep using terror and win political achievements.” (War in Context, March 14)

On April 15 the IDF announced the arrest in Ramallah of Marwan Barghouti, the Fatah politician and Palestinian Legislative Council representative who Israel said turned Tanzim from a civil guard into a West Bank militia that organized suicide bombings. (Ha’artez, April 16)

Thousands attended protests in European cities April 13 to express solidarity with the Palestinians and denounce Operation Defensive Shield. 15,000 marched through central London, some carrying posters depicting Ariel Sharon behind bars and comparing him to Adolf Hitler. (Ha’aretz, April 14, 2002)

UN human rights chief Mary Robinson human rights chief repeatedly urged Israel to allow her travel to the country for a delayed fact-finding mission on the conflict, citing “growing concerns over recent events in Jenin.” Israeli authorities refused to approve the planned five-day visit by Robinson. Finally, Robinson’s office announced that the mission had been cancelled because it “will not be facilitated by the Israeli authorities.” (AFP, April 19, 2002)

The UN Commission on Human Rights in Geneva condemned Israel for “acts of mass killings” and “gross violations” of humanitarian law on April 15. The resolution was approved by 40 votes in favor and five against. (Jerusalem Post, April 19, 2002)

While the IDF pulled out of Jenin, the camp remained surrounded. Defense Minister Binyamin Ben-Eliezer said troops would also be withdrawing from occupied West Bank towns. But anticipating future fighting, Ben-Eliezer said he prefered to call the withdrawal a “redeployment” (Ha’aretz, April 21, 2002 via World War 4 Report)

Daoud Kuttab, director of the Institute of Modern Media at Jerusalem’s al-Quds University, described in a New York Times op-ed piece April 6 how the Institute’s al-Quds Educational Television station in Ramallah was ransacked by IDF troops. The studio and offices were broken into, equipment destroyed and two staffers arrested. (Via World War 4 Report)

The siege that continued at Bethlehem came just after a $250 million renovation project of the ancient city was completed, funded by foreign aid agencies and aimed at drawing tourists—especially for the 2000 Millennium celebrations, which brought Pope John Paul II and numerous heads of state to the town. Now much of the town was in much worse shape than before the project. Reported the Washington Post April 14:

Israeli tanks have turned historic Madbassah Square into rubble, three years after it was renovated at a cost of $2 million. Fires and explosives have ruined a 300-year-old pilgrims’ hostel with soaring arches that took two years to refurbish. A once-sparkling new artists’ colony, recently completed for $600,000, has been ransacked and defaced… [A]rmored personnel carriers rumble through the narrow and deserted streets of the Old City daily, ripping up sidewalks, sideswiping stone pillars and banging into storefronts with centuries-old facades. [Via World War 4 Report]

President George Bush weighed in on Operation Defensive Shield April 19, stating: “I do believe Ariel Sharon is a man of peace… I’m confident he wants Israel to be able to exist at peace with its neighbors. I mean, he’s told that to us here in the Oval Office. He has embraced the notion of two states living side by side.” Bush said he was satisfied that Sharon was acting in good faith. “He gave me a timetable, and he met the timetable” for beginning withdrawal from re-occupied towns. He also said, “Mr. Arafat did condemn terrorism, and now we will hold him to account.” (ReliefWeb, April 18, 2002) A few hours later, Arafat, in a telephone interview with Tunisian TV, called Sharon “bloodthirsty” and said “his history is known. His hands are stained in blood.” (CNN, April 19, 2002 via World War 4 Report)

Sharon told his weekly cabinet meeting April 21 that no government that he headed would evacuate Jewish settlements on the West Bank. Banging on the table, Sharon said he would not even discuss evacuating the settlements until the elections, set for October 2003, or even beyond should he be elected for a second term. (Ha’aretz, April 21, 2002 via World War 4 Report)

An initial probe into the Israeli attack on the Jenin refugee camp led an Amnesty International delegate to declare at a London press conference “we have concluded that very serious breaches of international law were committed, and we are talking here of war crimes.” (Ha’aretz, April 29, 2002 via World War 4 Report)

But the world media focused on the more ambiguous question of whether there had been a “massacre” at Jenin—with war crimes short of a massacre implicitly minimized. For instance, veteran commentator Daniel Schorr on National Public Radio said: “Some things happened which were not terribly, terribly nice, and I’m sure they happened a lot. But if the question is raised that ‘Was there a deliberate massacre of civilians in Jenin?’ the answer seems to come out no.” (FAIR, May 10, 2002)

In late April, citing new intelligence on the location of militants, Israel made new brief incursions into Qalqilya and Hebron, sparking new clashes. (BBC News, AFP, April 26, 2002 via World War 4 Report)

There were conflicting statements on suicide bombings from the Arab and Islamic leadership. Yasser Arafat’s wife Suha Arafat endorsed suicide bombing attacks in a London-based Arabic magazine, al-Majallah, saying if she had a son, there would be “no greater honor” than to sacrifice him for the Palestinian cause. “Would you expect me and my children to be less patriotic and more eager to live than my countrymen and their father and leader who is seeking martydom?” Suha Arafat, who had no son, was living with her daughter in Paris. (New York Times, April 15, 2002 via World War 4 Report)

Two prominent Islamic clerics also endorsed suicide bombings. Mohammed Sayed Tantawi, the most prominent religious scholar at al-Ahzar University in Cairo, called “martydom operations” the “highest form of jihad operations” and that such attacks were “an Islamic commandment until the people of Palestine regain their land and cause the cruel Israeli aggression to retreat.” However, a ruling by the grand mufti of Saudi Arabia “declared suicide to be against Islam.” (New York Times, April 15, 2002 via World War 4 Report)

Newspapers in Saudi Arabia stopped using the term “shaheed,” or martyr, in reference to suicide attackers. In Egypt, the pro-government daily Al-Riad called for an end to “suicide bombings,” suggesting instead that the Palestinians look to their “supreme national interests.” (Ha’aretz, May 22, 2002 via World War 4 Report)

A commander of the al-Aksa Martyr’s Brigades interviewed in Nablus by the New York Times said his group would no longer conduct suicide bombing attacks inside the 1967 borders of Israel. But the commander, identified only by his nom de guerre Abu Mujahed, said the group would continue its attacks in the occupied territories. Abu Mujahed said that he regretted the loss of civilian life. “I am sorry for all the civilians that died in this intifada, both Israelis and Palestinians,” he said. “I want to fight whoever is in charge of the government of Israel, not civilians.” He also said he was concerned the attacks on restaurants, buses and the like was hurting the Palestinian cause: “What was happening is that we were delivering the wrong message to the world.” (New York Times, April 23, 2002 via World War 4 Report)

Hamas moderate Ismail Abu Shanab said that if Israel withdrew to its pre-1967 borders, Hamas would “cease all military activities.” Asked if that meant Hamas would give up its objective of destroying Israel, Shanab said “there is a right for every generation to be satisfied with their condition. Now, when Palestinians and Israelis live among each other in peace, they may cooperate with each other in a way that everyone will be satisfied.” (San Francisco Chronicle, April 28 via World War 4 Report)

In a makeshift court inside Arafat’s compound, four members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine were convicted for the murder of right-wing Israeli Tourism Minister Rehavem Ze’evi. The men were given sentences ranging from one to 18 years in prison. The Israeli government had demanded the extradition of the men to Israel to stand trial for Ze’evi’s murder. Ze’evi was killed in retaliation for the Israeli assassination of the PFLP’s political leader, Abu Ali Mustafa, who himself was killed in retaliation for a successful strike on a Gaza IDF outpost by PFLP operatives. The trial was dismissed as a farce by Palestinian human rights activists. Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon said, “It would have been possible to avoid trying them twice, as they will anyway be brought to trial in Israel.” (Ha’aretz, April 26, 2002 via World War 4 Report)

In May, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan announced that the United Nations would go forward with a report on possible war crimes committed by Israel at Jenin, even though Israel continued to reject the fact-finding mission. Annan would ask Israel and the Palestinians to provide information for the report. (New York Times, May 3, 2002 via World War 4 Report)

The five-week siege at Bethlehem’s Church of the Nativity finally came to an end May 10, when more than 100 Palestinians emerged from the church’s Gate of Humility and walked through a metal detector into Manger Square. In a European Union-brokered deal, 13 militants called “senior terrorists” were transferred in a British plane to Cyprus, from where they would go into exile in Italy, Spain, Greece and Ireland. (World War 4 Report, May 5, 2002)

The leaders of Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Syria, who met at the Egyptian resort of Sharm el Sheik May 11, reaffirmed their commitment to the Saudi initiative that called for peace with Israel in exchange for an Israeli withdrawal to the pre-1967 borders and expressed a “sincere desire for peace and a rejection of violence in all forms.” The meeting came four days after 16 people were killed in suicide bombing in Rishon Letzion, south of Tel Aviv. (New York Times, May 12, 2002 via World War 4 Report)

Hamas spiritual leader Sheikh Yassin said in an interview May 11 that the group would continue suicide bombings, calling them “forms of resistance open against the enemy.” In response to Arafat’s call to cease the bombings, Yassin said: “Hamas always considers the higher interests of the Palestinian people…We have in the past stopped martyrdom operations against the enemy. But they did not stop their killing of our people… That is why we are no longer obligated by our previous initiative.” (Reuters, May 11, 2002 via World War 4 Report)

In a raucous meeting of the Likud central committee, Sharon lost a key vote on whether to allow a future Palestinian state May 13. Sharon’s rival Binyamin Netanyahu stated: “This must be clear—there will not be a Palestinian state west of the Jordan River because that would be a deadly threat to Israel.” (BBC May 13).

That month, four Jewish settlers were detained by the Jerusalem police and the Shin Bet security service on suspicion of planning terror attacks on a girl’s school and other Arab targets in East Jerusalem. A group calling itself “Jewish Underground” distributed leaflets in various settlements taking responsibility for the murder of eight Arabs in terror attacks. (Ha’aretz, May 9, 10, 2002 via World War 4 Report)

The largest peace demonstration since the start of the Intifada in September 2000 was held May 11 in Tel Aviv’s Rabin Square. The protestors, estimated at 100,000 by organizers Peace Now, demanded an immediate withdrawal from Palestinian territories and the dismantling of Israeli settlements there. Singer Yaffa Yarkoni performed, despite having received death threats. (BBC, May 12, 2002)

Despite international outrage against Israel, the idea of “transfer” meanwhile seemed to be gaining currency even in the West. John Derbyshire, a contributing editor to National Review, the foremost American conservative journal, wrote an article describing what he viewed as the five options available to the Palestinians:

1. An independent state, under Arafat or someone just as thuggish.
2. Military occupation by Israel.
3. Re-incorporation into a Jordanian-Palestinian nation.
4. Some sort of UN trusteeship.
5. Expulsion from the West Bank and Gaza, those territories then
incorporated into Israel.

Derbyshire’s conclusion:

When I say “the best option,” I don’t mean “best for the Palestinians.” I don’t think they have any good options. Being Arabs, they are incapable of constructing a rational polity, so their future is probably hopeless whatever happens… Would expulsion be hard on the Palestinians? I suppose it would. Would it be any harder than options 1 thru 4? I doubt it. Do I really give a flying falafel one way or the other? No, not really. [National Review, May 9, 2002]

The Israeli army was now requiring Palestinians living in the West Bank to obtain freedom-of-movement permits in order to travel between cities and towns. Israel did not notify the Palestinian Authority about the change in policy. Representatives of donor countries protested that the system was hindering aid deliveries—and had the effect of splitting the West Bank into eight separate cantons (Jenin, Nablus, Tul Karm, Qalqilya, Ramallah, Jericho, Bethlehem and Hebron), effectively isolated from one another. (Palestine Media Center)

On May 19, three Israelis were killed and 56 injured when a suicide bomber blew himself up in a crowded market in Netanya. The bomber was dressed as an Israeli soldier. The PFLP claimed responsibility for the attack. The PA condemned the attack, saying it “endanger[ed] the Palestinian people, its just cause, its rights, and the future of its dream of a state.” (Ha’aretz, May 20, 2002 via World War 4 Report)

The Revolutionary Council of Araft’s Fatah movement issued a statement May 29 calling for an end to attacks inside Israel: “Military attacks inside the ‘green line’ must stop because they reflect negatively on the image of our national struggle. Resistance to the occupation should be limited within Palestinian land occupied in 1967.” (Washington Post, May 29, 2002 via World War 4 Report)

Soldiers and tanks re-entered the Jenin refugee camp May 17 to search for militants who had evaded capture during Operation Defensive Shield. The army withdrew after making 20 arrests. (BBC, May 17, 2002)

Israel cut the Gaza Strip in half May 22, preventing north-south travel for Palestinians. Tel Aviv said the move was in reprisal for raids on Jewish settlements in the Strip. (Ha’aretz, May 26, 2002 via World War 4 Report)

The IDF again entered several West Bank towns and refugee camps in the search for suspected militants at the end of May, taking over Bethlehem for four days and sealing off most of Ramallah. (BBC, May 30)

B’Tselem released a report in May asserting that while Israeli settlements had administrative control of nearly half the West Bank. The report, titled “Land Grab: Israel’s Settlement Policy in the West Bank,” based on information obtained with difficulty from the civil administration, found that “while the built-up areas of the settlements constitute only 1.7% of the land in the West Bank, the municipal boundaries are over three times as large: 6.8%. Regional councils constitute an additional 35.1%. Thus, a total of 41.9% of the area in the West Bank is controlled by the settlements.” B’Tselem also reiterated that “International humanitarian law prohibits an occupying power from transferring citizens from its own territory to the occupied territory. An occupying power is also prohibited from undertaking permanent changes in the occupied area, unless they are undertaken for the benefit of the local population or are for urgent military needs. Israel’s settlement policy violates these regulations.” (B’Tselem, May 13, 2002)

By this point, there were 400,000 Jewish settlers on the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, in 137 settlements and 100 more “outposts” seen as the nuclei of future settlements. Some 300,000 Palestinians had left or been driven from the West Bank—mostly those who fled during the Six-Day War. (Dolphin, p. 7-8)

Settlement activity continued under Sharon, especially in and around East Jerusalem. But Yosef Barel, the chief the Israeli Broadcast Authority (IBA), issued an order May 30 banning the use of the word “settlers” on radio and TV broadcasts. Barel told editors to identify people solely by their place of residence, leaving editors confused as to how to distinguish between Arab and Jewish residents of the Occupied Territories. (Ha’aretz, May 31, 2002, via World War 4 Report)

An investigation by the Associated Press, based on interviews with settlers, found that the settlement department of the World Zionist Organization, working with Israel’s Jewish Agency, was bringing whole immigrant communities—consisting of dozens of families and their rabbis—directly to the Occupied Territories. “In principle, we are trying to encourage Jews to settle in Judea and Samaria [the West Bank] and Gaza,” Ezra Rosenfeld, a spokesman for West Bank communities told AP. “This is part of our ideology.” The report embarrassed Israeli officials. Jewish Agency chairman Sallai Meridor stated: “The Zionist movement has no plan whose goal is to bring communities to settle precisely beyond the Green Line.” (Ha’aretz, June 9; AP, June 10, 2002 via World War 4 Report)

A bus carrying Israeli soldiers was destroyed when a car bomb exploded next to it June 5, killing 17, and wounding 47 at Meggido (the biblical Armageddon). The car was driven by an Islamic Jihad militant from Jenin. A caller from the militant organization told the press that the attack “took place on the 35th anniversary of the occupation of Jerusalem. We tell our enemies that we will continue to destroy their shields.” (Ha’aretz, June 6, 2002)

Israel again invaded Ramallah the day after the attack in Medgido, sending a column of around 50 tanks and armored vehicles into the town in the pre-dawn hours. The tanks surrounded Arafat’s headquarters, known as the Muqata’a, and opened fire. Several buildings were destroyed, although the PA chief was unharmed. The forces withdrew after six hours. There was a similar IDF incursion into Ramallah on June 10. Jenin was briefly re-occupied on June 7. (Ha’aretz, June 6, 10, 2002)

President George Bush stated the US must start immediate work with the Israelis and Palestinians in establishing a Palestinian state, but failed to set a timetable. In an op-ed piece in the New York Times June 9, “The Way Forward in the Middle East,” Sharon exploited the strategic ambiguity in Security Council Resolution 242:

[T]he United Nations Security Council determined in a historic decision, Resolution 242, that Israel was entitled to “secure and recognized boundaries” and was not expected to withdraw from all the territories that its forces had entered—and from which it was attacked—in the Six Day War. In effect, the resolution established that these were disputed territories where Israel had legitimate rights to defensible borders, besides the claims of the Arab parties to the conflict. [New York Times, June 9, 2002]

George Bush did not respond to this assertion, but stated on June 24: “I call on the Palestinian people to elect new leaders, leaders not compromised by terror.” (Second “Road Map for Peace” speech, June 24, 2002)

The UN World Food Program meanwhile inaugurated a plan to provide emergency food aid to about 500,000 Palestinians. Said WFP regional director Khaled Adly: “Hunger and malnutrition are rapidly increasing among the Palestinians. Even when food is available in some of the markets, many impoverished Palestinians have become increasingly unable to meet all their food needs. The latest Israeli military incursions have dealt a hard blow to an already vulnerable economy pushing many Palestinians into destitution.” (World Food Program, May 21, 2002)

On June 18, a suicide bomber blew himself up on a Jerusalem bus, killing 19 and injuring 50. Seven of dead were Israeli Arabs. It was 8 AM, and there were schoolchildren on the bus, one of whom was killed. (BBC, June 18, 2002)

The PA again condemned the attack “The Palestinian Authority…retains its position of not condoning the killing of civilians—Palestinians and Israelis,” said Saeb Erakat, chief Palestinian negotiator. “We reject any Israeli attempt to assign blame or finger-pointing at us. The Israelis have done nothing in the last 21 months but destroy our ability [to go after the bombers].” But Israel did indeed blame the Palestinian leadership, calling its statements “false condemnations.”(CNN, June 19, 2002)

In an advertisement appearing in the Arabic daily al-Quds, Palestinian leaders Sari Nusseibeh and Hanan Ashrawi called on their people to reconsider suicide attacks. The ad counseled “those dispatching the Palestinian youths to take personal stock of their actions,” which “are only hurting innocent people, creating more hatred and distancing the prospects of achieving Palestinian independence.” (Jerusalem Post, June 19, 2002)

Operation Determined Path

In response to the June 18 Jerusalem suicide bombing, the Israeli army announced it would re-occupy Palestinian territory for an unspecified period—and occupy more each time another attack occurred. An Israeli defense official said this response would be “crushing and decisive,” and the IDF called up 2,000 reservists for the operation, dubbed “Determined Path.” In the following days, the IDF entered Nablus, Jenin, Tul Karm, Bet

Continue ReadingTHE DISPOSSESSION OF THE PALESTINIANS, PT. III