ISRAEL & PALESTINE: ONE STATE OR TWO?

A Debate between Ilan Pappé and Uri Avnery

from Gush-Shalom/Peacework

Ilan PappĂ© is an Israeli historian who taught at Haifa University. He is the author, most recently, of The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine. Uri Avnery is an Israeli activist, journalist, and former Knesset member who founded Gush Shalom (Peace Bloc), one of Israel’s most significant anti-occupation organizations. On May 8, the two men held a public debate in Tel Aviv, sponsored by Gush Shalom, entitled “Two States or One State.” Excerpts from each of their opening statements are presented here, translated by Adam Keller and edited by Peacework, monthly magazine of the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) in Cambridge, Mass. The full transcript of the debate is online at the Gush Shalom wesbite.

ILAN PAPPÉ: One State—We Must Give it a Chance

The tragedy of the indigenous Palestinian population was not only their being the victims of a colonial movement — but specifically being the victims of a colonial movement which sought to create a democratic movement. In the face of the clear Palestinian demographic majority, eleven leaders of Zionism did not hesitate in March 1948 to resolve upon ethnic cleansing as the best means to create a Jewish, ethnically pure democracy over most of Palestine’s territory. Within a year, the ethnic cleansing was carried out.

This crime was retroactively approved by the international community and remained a legitimized means in the hands of the Jewish state, then as well as now, to ensure the existence of a Jewish democracy on the country’s soil. The achievement and maintenance of a demographic majority became a sacred goal.

That is how such formulas were born as “Territory in exchange for Peace” and “Two States for Two Peoples.” These were not recipes for peace or justice to the two peoples, but attempts to limit an expansionist movement which sought to gain more territory without the Arab population living on it.

The insatiable Zionist hunger

There are those who believe that it is possible to satisfy this hunger to settle and create settlements, to dispossess and rule and stay democratic via the creation of a Palestinian state in twenty percent of the territory. The Zionist peace camp sought to increase the number of supporters of the idea of limitation, and assimilate the settlement facts created on the ground, and therefore it knowingly shrunk the territory of the state intended for the Palestinians. As the territory shrunk, the connection increasingly disappeared between the Two State formula and the idea of a fair, full, and viable solution to the conflict. Under the idea of the Two States as a diplomatic international formula, it was generally agreed that the Zionist hunger for as much as half of the West Bank might be satisfied. Later, the Two State formula led inevitably to international support for the imprisoning of the entire Gaza Strip in a modern concentration camp.

Look at it from whatever angle you choose. If justice be the basis for dividing the country, there can be no formula more cynical than the Two State formula: to the occupier and dispossessor, eighty percent; to the occupied, twenty percent in the best and probably utopian case, and more likely a ten percent…divided and scattered. Moreover: the return of the refugees—where will it be, where will it be implemented? In the name of justice, the refugees have a right to decide if they should return, and they have the right to participate in defining the future of the entire country, not just of twenty percent.

We can live together

As Jewish and Palestinian citizens in this state we have relations of blood, of common fate and common disaster which cannot be “partitioned.” Such a division is neither moral nor practical. Let us propose an alternative dialogue including the old and new settlers — even those who arrived yesterday — the expelled of all generations and the people who were left behind. Let us ask which political structure suits us — one which would involve and include the principles of justice, reconciliation, and coexistence. In Bil’in we have struggled shoulder to shoulder against the occupation — we can also live together.

The appeal of Palestinian civil society for imposing boycotts and sanctions should be heeded. The sincerity should be recognized of the moral pressure exerted by associations of journalists, academics, and physicians over the world who seek to sever contacts with official Israel and its representatives, as long as the crimes continue. Let us give this nonviolent way a chance to end the occupation. From here and from there, we will call together for the castigation of a government and a state which continues to perpetrate such crimes; Jews and non-Jews, we will be immune from the stain of anti-Semitism, unjustly cast at us. From every possible point of view — Socialist, Liberal, Jewish or Buddhist — a decent person cannot but call for the boycotting of a regime and a government which for forty years already has mistreated a civilian population only because it is Arab. And decent Jewish persons must let their voices resound more loudly than those of others calling for action and effort.

Whether or not the South African experience is the source and inspiration for the One State solution and for a justified and moral international boycott, it is unacceptable that this way and this vision remain without a thorough examination, only due to a continued adherence to a failing formula which has long since become a recipe for disaster.

URI AVNERY: Two States—There is No Time for Despair

A person can despair and say: There’s nothing to be done. Everything is lost. We have passed the “point of no return.”

I say: There is no reason at all for despair. Nothing is lost. Nothing in life is “irreversible,” except life itself. There is no such thing as a “point of no return.”

There are three questions concerning the One State idea: Is it at all possible? If it is possible, is it good? Will it bring a just peace?

Is a One State solution possible?

Absolutely not. We want to change many things in this state, its historical narrative, its accepted definition as a “Jewish and democratic” state. We want to put an end to the occupation outside and the discrimination inside. We want to create a new basis for the relationship between the state and its Arab-Palestinian citizens. But it is impossible to ignore the basic ethos of the huge majority of the Jewish public who do not want to dismantle the state.

The majority of the Palestinian people, too, want a state of their own. Anyone who thinks otherwise is laboring under an illusion. There are Palestinians who talk about One State, but for most of those, it is just a code-word for the dismantling of the State of Israel. They, too, know that it is utopian.

Would a One State solution be a good thing?

My answer is an unequivocal no. Let’s examine this state, not as an imaginary creature, the epitome of perfection, but as it would be in reality.

In this state, the Israelis will be dominant. They have a complete superiority in practically all spheres — quality of life, military power, technological capabilities. The Israelis will see to it that the Palestinians will be the hewers of wood and the drawers of water for a long, long time.

It will be an occupation by other means. A disguised occupation. It will not end the conflict, but open another phase.

Could a One State solution bring a just peace?

Hardly. This state will be a battlefield. Each side will try to take over as much land as possible and bring in as many persons as possible. The Jews will fight by all means to prevent the Arabs from becoming the majority and coming to power. In practice, this will be an apartheid state. If the Arabs become the majority and try to assume power, there will be a struggle that may become a civil war. A new edition of 1948.

The Two State solution is the only practical solution in the realm of reality. In the most important sphere, the collective consciousness, it is winning all out. There are those who despair because the peace forces have not succeeded in putting an end to the occupation. We have remained a small minority. The government and the media ignore us. True. But we, too, bear a part of the responsibility for that. We have not been thinking enough, we have not identified the reasons for the failures. When was the last time a thorough discussion of the strategies and tactics of the fight for peace took place?

However, it is not enough to point out that the One State solution cannot be realized. This “solution” is also very dangerous.

It diverts the efforts into a mistaken direction. We see this already happening. It both results from despair and produces despair. It causes people to desert the battlefield in Israel and creates the illusion that the real battlefield is abroad. That is escapism.

It divides the peace camp and deepens the gap between it and the public. It strengthens the Right, because it frightens the sane public and causes it to lose sight of a sensible solution.

It pulls the rug from under the feet of those who fight against the occupation. If the whole country between the sea and the Jordan is to become one state anyhow, then the settlers can put their settlements anywhere they like.

Resisting distraction and despair

The situation is terrible (as always), but we are progressing nevertheless.

True, on the surface the situation is depressing and shocking: the settlements are getting bigger, the wall is getting longer, the occupation is causing untold injustices every day.

Perhaps it is the advantage of age: today, at the age of 83, I am able to look at things in the perspective of a much longer time span.

Because under the surface, things are moving in the opposite direction. All the polls prove that the decisive majority of the Israeli public is resigned to the existence of the Palestinian people and is resigned to the necessity of a Palestinian state. The government recognized the PLO yesterday and will recognize Hamas tomorrow. The majority has more or less accepted that Jerusalem must become the capital of the two states. In ever widening circles, there is the beginning of a recognition of the narrative of the other nation.

True, 120 years of conflict have created in our people a huge accumulation of hate, prejudice, suppressed guilt feelings, stereotypes, fear (most importantly, fear) and absolute mistrust of the Arabs. These we must fight, to convince the public that peace is worthwhile and good for the future of Israel. Together with a change in the international situation and a partnership with the Palestinian people, our chances of achieving peace are good.

I, anyhow, have decided to stay alive until this happens.

———

These statements first appeared in the June issue of Peacework, Cambridge, MA:

Ilan Pappé
http://www.peaceworkmagazine.org/node/612

UriAvnery
http://www.peaceworkmagazine.org/node/613

The complete transcript is on-line at the Gush Shalom website:
http://zope.gush-shalom.org/home/en/events/1178719775/

From our weblog:

Ehud Barak plans Gaza invasion —demise of the “Bush Doctrine”?
WW4 REPORT, June 17, 2007
/node/4082

Pappé refutes Chomsky on Israel Lobby
WW4 REPORT, April 4, 2006
/node/1826

Israel represses non-violent protest in occupied West Bank
WW4 REPORT, Sept. 9, 2005
/node/1060

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Reprinted by WORLD WAR 4 REPORT, July 1, 2007
Reprinting permissible with attribution

Continue ReadingISRAEL & PALESTINE: ONE STATE OR TWO? 

AFRICAN RENAISSANCE IN A COLOMBIAN WAR ZONE

Cauca and the Afro-Colombian Renaissance

by Bill Weinberg

Heading south in a “chiva” mini-bus from the teeming and chaotic city of Cali, the road crosses into the southern department of Cauca—one of the most conflicted in Colombia—as suburbs and industrial sprawl gradually give way to small campesino plots and extensive haciendas where cattle graze. On the cusp of this urban-rural divide lies Villa Rica, a community of some 15,000 African descendants. On a wall near where the chiva drops me and my photographer off is a mural depicting Black youth studying, building, playing musical instruments. The legend reads LA JUVENTUD NO VA A LA GUERRA—Youth Don´t Go to the War. It was painted by a group of Villa Rica´s young residents this July 20, Colombia´s independence day.

On the southern edge of metropolitan Cali, Villa Rica must contend with both the urban and rural manifestations of Colombia´s endemic violence— the gang warfare that terrorizes the city barrios and the dialectic of retaliatory bloodshed between guerillas and paramilitary groups that reigns in the countryside. But in Villa Rica, it is the youth—who are most impacted by the violence—that are on the frontlines of resisting it and finding alternatives.

Juan Carlos Gonzalez, now 23, helped found the group Colombia Joven—Young Colombia—when he was only 12. He does some construction work for money, but devotes far more time to his community activism. A young man with an almost relentlessly serious demeanor—in contrast to his friends who joke and sing as they guide us on a tour of the community—Gonzalez explains how Colombia Joven sees cultural revival and recovery of economic self-sufficiency as the keys to an exit from increasing embroilment in the region´s armed conflicts.
“We came together to address unemployment, violence, human rights,” he says. “We have drawn up a development plan for this region of Cauca, based on local micro-enterprises. We want to recuperate values of love and respect to halt the disintegration of families. We want to empower youth so they wont be recruited by armed groups.”

Under Article 55 of Colombia´s 1991 constitution, the Afro-Colombians are recognized as having local jurisdictional authority of the same kind that the indigenous peoples were given by the same constitutional reform. But acheiving real autonomy has been a challenge—especially for communities, such as Villa Rica, outside the Afro-Colombian heartland along the Pacific coast in Choco department. Gonzalez is cynical about the officially-instated Afro-Colombian autonomy. “Its a lie, the state doesn´t respect it,” he says—citing especially the military presence on Afro-Colombian lands in spite of community wishes.

Villa Rica became a self-governing municipality in 1999 as a “fruit of the social struggle,” according to Gonzalez. Before that it was part of mestizo-dominated Santander de Quilichao municipality. Santander has large Indian and Afro-Colombian minorities, but the leaders have always been mestizos. A Black mayor elected in 1998 was promptly removed on corruption charges. After this, the Villa Rica residents began petitioning the Cauca government for a referendum on remunicipalization. The referendum was held the following year, and creation of an independent municipality was overwhelmingly approved by Villa Rica´s residents. Villa Rica´s current Mayor Maria Edis Dinas is a community leader and former Cauca department representative who had led road blockades in the ´80s to pressure for potable water projects and recuperation of usurped lands.

Villa Rica now has its own hospital, but still has no potable water. A truck comes once a week to bring drinkable water; what comes out of tap is contaminated by both biological and industrial pollutants. But the overriding concern for the new municipality is lack of economic opportunity.
There is some agriculture in Villa Rica, with a few residents growing platano, sugar and cacao on small plots to sell in local markets. But with inadequate lands, most youth find work in a nearby industrial park—or join armed groups. The ultra-right paramilitary militias pay the best—but indoctrinate their young recruits with a depraved insensitivity to human life. Gonzalez says paramilitary recruits are literally paid by the head. “They give them chainsaws to cut off the heads and limbs of their victims as proof of the kill,” he says. “They bring them back and are paid for each death.”

Colombia Joven sees recovery of local lands traditionally worked by the region´s African descendants as critical to the struggle against violence and paramilitarization. Under 1993´s Law 70, the empowering legislation of Article 55, Afro-Colombians have the right to recover traditional lands and hold them collectively, in a system similar to the Indian “resguardos” or reservations. In Caloto municipality, to south of Villa Rica, Pilamo Hacienda—once worked by African slaves—is now controlled by an Afro-Colombian community council. The land was first occupied by the descendants of the former slaves in the 1980s, and was titled as an inalienable communal holding—with no right to resale—under Law 70 in 1994. It is now producing fruit, cacao and cattle.

Just outside Villa Rica´s urban center—within the municipality and across the road from the industrial park—lies the former slave-labor cacao plantation of La Bolsa, now a cattle ranch. Juan Carlos and his friends walk us out there, and the expanse of vacant, verdant land contrasts both the tired and overworked campesino plots and shoe-box factories that surround it. We walk through the gate despite the menacing barks of guard dogs that surround the stately and palatial old hacienda house in the middle of the fields. As we wait in a drive-way shaded by centuries-old orchid-laden trees, a young mestizo boy comes out. Gonzalez explains to him that we are journalists who want to see the slave-era relics on the hacienda. But we are told that the patron is not around now, and we will have to return later.

We cross back out the gate. But Gonzalez and his friends lead us down the road and across a barbed-wire fence onto La Bolsa lands. We cross a field and arrive at a patch of trees that shade a cluster of decrepit gave markers of brick and cement. The most recent dates are from the 1930s. The oldest bear no visible markings. Gonzalez tells us that this is where generations of La Bolsa´s slaves and their descendants—the ancestors of Villa Rica´s inhabitants—are buried.
Why haven´t you retaken the hacienda, and claimed it under Law 70?, I ask. For the first time, Gonzalez cracks a wry smile. “That´s a good question,” he admits. He faults lack of education about histoy and land rights under the old Santander municipal government. “Our ancestors struggled for the land and understood their history, but they didn´t have a law. We have a law, but we don´t know our history.”

Slavery was officially abolished in Colombia in 1851, but little changed for many Afro-Colombians, who continued working the same lands under similar conditions as debt laborers. Even before abolition, escaped slaves, or “cimarrones,” sometimes founded their own armed and fortified communities known as “palenques” in the rainforest or mountains, devising elaborate tricks to hide their whereabouts—such as only approaching them walking backwards to throw off trackers. Some palenques still survive as autonomous Afro-Colombian communities. At Palenque San Basilio near Cartagena, in the north of the country, a distinct language is still spoken today, incorporating elements of the African tongues Bantu and Kikongo.

Cimarrones from La Bolsa went to a place called El Chorro, on the banks of the Rio Cauca, and founded a community there—because it was the only land available. Even there, they were eventually forced to flee—both by periodic floods when the river broke its banks and attacks by the gunmen of big landowners who coveted the rivershore lands. In the 1930s, the local story goes, La Bolsa´s owner, Don Julio Arboleda, was killed by a Black child whose parents he had killed. Don Julio´s children who inherited the hacienda were somewhat more modern and enlightened—and also found cattle more profitable than labor-intensive cacao. In 1939, they ceded a large chunk of their lands to their former laborers to found a community on. Blacks from both La Bolsa and El Chorro gathered there and founded Villa Rica as a “vereda” or unincorporated village of Santander municipality.

Villa Rica´s inhabitants trace their ancestry to Guinea, Senegal and Angola; African traditions survive and are being institutionalized in the new municipality. We watch Villa Rica´s children perform the dance called El Chunche at the village community center. Juan Carlos´ friend Einer Diascubi, who beat on the bombo drum to drive the ceremony, says the dance depicts rice harvesting and other means of community sustenance. “Chunche” means pollen in Caucana, the region´s local dialect, and at one point the young dancers writhe on floor shaking off imaginary rice pollen. Diascubi says the Associacion Folklorica Chango was founded 15 years ago to preserve the dances that contain the collective historical memory of Villa Rica.

A new political group, the Unity of Afro-Caucano Organizations (UOAFROC), has recently come together to extend the land recovery movement—much stronger in coastal Choco department—into Cauca. New cross-ethnic alliances are also emerging. “The indigenous and the African descendants are now cooperating to recover their lands,” says Gonzalez. “The Afro-Colombian and indigenous communitiess are the most marginalized in the country. So we took the decision to struggle together.”

Both groups have lost traditional lands to government mega-development projects as well as landlord encroachment in recent years. The Salvajina hydrodam built on the Rio Cauca south of Villa Rica in 1980s affected both Nasa Indians and Afro-Colombians. Black residents of Suarez municipality had thier lands seized by the government for the floodplain, and were relocated. Many ended up joining armed groups, Gonzalez says.

In May 2002, the First Inter-Ethnic Meeting of Cauca was held in Villa Rica´s school building, bringing together both Afro-Colombian and indigenous leaders to discuss land recovery and cultural survival. Convened by Villa Rica´s first mayor, Atie Aragon, it was attended by 2,000 local Blacks and some 3,000 Indians, mostly Nasas.

But such efforts are daily ground down by the harsh realities of war and an entrenched culture of violence. In 2002, eight Villa Rica youth were killed by paras or violent crime—in some cases, the bodies were burned or mutilated and thrown into Rio Cauca, in trademark para style. Paramilitary outfits recruit youth to assassinate both accused guerilla collaborators in the mountains and—making the war nearly fratricidal—their own kin who have become gang members. A Villa Rica-based gang called Los Crazy steal cars and hold up buses on the road to Cali—and are targetted for death in the paramilitaries´ “social cleansing” campaign.
In adjacent Puerto Tejada municipality—also with an Afro-Colombian majority—the situation is even worse. Gangs with names like Los Ramallama, Los Emboladores and Los Mechas use military rifles and grenades as well as pistols in wars against both the paras and each other, jacking up a death toll of nearly 600 last year in a municipality with a population of just 35,000. Family members are often killed in retaliation for the killing of paras. A nephew of of Villa Rica´s Mayor Dinas was killed by presumed paras—along with 14 others—in a drive-by shooting in Puerto Tejada in August of this year.

Colombia Joven, which is now present in five Cauca municipalities, continues to wage its campaign against violence and militarization of Afro-Colombian lands. Gonzalez emphasizes that the group was founded well before Colombia´s then-president Andres Pastrana launched a short-lived national program of same name in 1998. The group remains independent of all armed factions—including the government.

When I ask Gonzalez if he has any closing words for readers in the United States, he immediately states that Washington must cut off aid to President Alvaro Uribe´s government. “The government is the greatest perpetrator of violence in our communities,” he says. When I point out that most of the violence in Villa Rica seems to come from ostensibly illegal criminal gangs and paramilitaries, he responds: “The paramilitary groups are funded by the same government. Everybody knows it.”

Before we get on the chiva back to Cali—before sundown, to avoid gang hold-ups—Gonzalez offers his final words: “Every dollar from the United States is one more death. They are cutting health, education, public services— everything is going for the war. The United States government needs to reflect about what it is doing to our country.”

Continue ReadingAFRICAN RENAISSANCE IN A COLOMBIAN WAR ZONE 

HYDRO-COLONIALISM ADVANCES IN CANADA’S FAR NORTH

Cree Nation Divided Over James Bay Mega-Project

by Bill Weinberg, Indian Country Today

Hydro-Quebec, the provincial utility which is a major energy exporter to the Northeast US, has commenced construction on a new mega-project on Cree lands of the far north James Bay region. The project, which would divert the waters of the Rupert River, has divided the Cree nation. The last chief of the Cree Grand Council, Ted Moses, signed on to the project and aggressively pushed it, but a new and more critical administration has since taken office in Cree country. The chiefs of the three communities to be directly affected by the water diversion are in active opposition.

“People aren’t aware of how it will impact us and our way of life,” says Robert Weistche, chief of Waskaganish, one of the three dissenting communities. “We would lose the majority of the river, because we live at the mouth, at the estuary. In light of global warming, one year there might not be any water at all.”

The project consists of a series of dams, tunnels and canals on the Rupert River, diverting 70% of the flow a hundred miles north into the system of hydro-dams already built in the Eastmain River watershed. The Rupert River diversion is slated to add 888 megawatts of power, flooding 600 square kilometers of traditional Cree lands. New roads, power lines, temporary cities, and two new power stations are to be built in the remote region of boreal forest. The deal which approved the project also includes rights to timber and mineral exploitation in the region.

Canada’s federal authorities approved the project in December after completion of an impact statement by the Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency. But two federal commissioners disagreed with the assessment’s methodology for evaluating methyl mercury contamination in the river. A Sierra Club study also maintains that the impact statement underestimates the amount of mercury that will be released by the new project.

“We depend a lot on the fish, and we’re very concerned about the methyl mercury,” says Chief Weistche.

Mercury contamination was a disastrous result of the so-called “James Bay I” mega-project, which saw construction of a series of dams on La Grande and Eastmain rivers in the 1970s, flooding 11,000 square kilometers. Most of the Eastmain River was then diverted into La Grande’s watershed. James Bay I is already considered the world’s largest hydroelectric complex. But Hydro-Quebec has eventual plans to dam every river flowing into James Bay, a southern extension of Hudson Bay.

In addition to flooding Cree hunting grounds, the James Bay I project poisoned Cree waters, with the increased pressure of the floodplains leaching mercury from the soil. The Cree were barred from consuming fish from the rivers, further eroding their self-sufficiency.

Waskaganish and fellow dissident community Nemska are both along the Rupert River. The third dissenting community is Chisasibi, along La Grande River, downstream of the dams. Many residents there say James Bay I has changed local climate conditions. Chisasibi’s Chief Abraham Rupert, reached by telephone at his office, says: “This is March. All the rivers should be frozen. But I look out my window now they aren’t. The dams increase velocity and turbulence, and this prevents freezing. In the cold months of the year, January and February, we’re lucky if it freezes over for a few weeks now. With this new diversion, the river probably won’t freeze at all.”

Rupert says the failure of the rivers to freeze means more moisture in air during the harsh winters, affecting community health.

But Rupert says the impacts ripple far beyond the river banks. “The dams have had a great impact on the James Bay coast,” he says. “In the fall we used to have thousands of thousands of Canadian geese coming through. The eel grass they fed off grew in abundance along the coast. Now there’s none at all. It took around 20 years for that to happen after the La Grande project.”

Rupert says the Canadian and brant geese have disappeared with the eel grass, and points out that his community has traditionally relied on them for food. Rupert attributes the eel grass decline to increased sediment, caused in turn by the hydro dams causing fluctuating water levels.

Chief Weistche acknowledges that the Cree-Quebec agreement permitting the Rupert River project “bars chiefs speaking against the signed deal. But our communities voted against it, and we have a responsibility to represent our people.”

In early 2002, the Cree Grand Council held a community-by-community referendum approving the project. Of the nine Cree communities, only Chisasibi voted “no.” But the impact study had not then been completed, and critics say the Cree had voted without knowing the project’s full impact.

Under the deal, the Cree will receive $70 million per year for the next 40 years, plus a share in logging and mineral rights for the region.

The agreement—signed February 7, 2002 in Waskaganish, and dubbed Paix des Braves (Peace of the Brave)—stipulates that the Rupert diversion will not be allowed without the full support of local communities. Waskagnish, Chisasibi and Nemaska held their own vote in November 2006, which defeated the project by some 80 percent.

Says Chief Weistche: “This question of acceptability is still up in the air, because three communities are opposed to the project. Yet things are going ahead as planned. The provincial government takes the position that the Cree signed the deal. But people were told, ‘You’re not agreeing to diversion, just to the process, we’ll come back to you after the environmental review.’ That never happened. It was done very swiftly.”

Conceived as an improved successor to the 1975 James Bay Agreement which approved James Bay I after decades of litigation, the 50-year Paix des Braves pact allows for joint jurisdiction between the Quebec government and Cree in the seven municipalities of the James Bay region. Upon its signing, Cree Grand Chief Moses declared: “Quebec becomes a leader in the application of the principles recognized by the United Nations in regards of aboriginal development. Quebec will be able to show that the respect of aboriginals is compatible with her national interest. The federal government should inspire itself with this agreement in its negotiations with Natives across Canada.”

New Grand Chief Matthew Mukash, who took office in 2006, is proposing the development of wind power on Cree land instead of the Rupert diversion, which is slated to actually take place in the summer or fall of 2008.

Weistche supports this proposal. “There are alternatives,” he says. “It’s been estimated we have the potential to generate 100 thousand megawatts from wind power in Cree country.”

Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper supports the Rupert River project, and Quebec’s Premier Jean Charest hails the Rupert diversion as the “biggest project of the decade.” However, Quebec, like the Cree Grand Council, has changed government since the Paix des Braves agreement. The pact was negotiated by Premier Bernard Landry of the separatist Parti QuĂ©bĂ©cois.

In this year’s March 27 provincial elections, the PQ came in third place after Charest’s Liberals and the upstart conservative populist Action Democratique. All three parties support the Rupert River project, and all three predicate Quebec’s economic future on continued exports of James Bay hydro-power. But their divergent views on Quebec’s political future have implications for Cree country.

In 1995, the then-ruling PQ held a provincial referendum on secession from Canada, which was narrowly defeated. Just before the 1995 referendum, the Cree held a plebiscite of their own—and overwhelmingly voted to stick with Canada.

It is Canadian federal courts which have upheld the right of the Cree to be consulted in provincial development plans for their land—starting with the key ruling over James Bay I in 1973. Even though it was overturned on appeal, the ruling for the Cree’s aboriginal title that forced Quebec to the table and resulted in the James Bay Agreement. Quebec secession from Ottawa would certainly mean Cree secession from Quebec, and carries the potential for a showdown over the James Bay region.

Whether a separatist Quebec would have the right to take Cree country with it is open to question. The name for the Rupert River agreement was inspired by the 1701 Great Peace of Montreal, also known as “La Paix des Braves,” which ended a century of war between the French-allied Algonquins and the English-allied Iroquois. But the Cree, isolated in the far north, were not involved in this struggle, or a part of Quebec. The James Bay region was then known as Rupert’s Land, established in 1670 as a holding of the Hudson’s Bay Company. Its status as a part of Canada was not settled until Britain passed the Rupert’s Land Act in 1868, the year after Canadian independence. The region was not formally incorporated into Quebec until 1912.

Asked about their stance in the event that the PQ take power again and hold a new referendum, Chief Weistche and Chief Rupert both recall the experience of 1995. “We’d stick with Canada,” Rupert says.

Rupert warns that the in 2001, the Quebec National Assembly established a Municipality of Baie-James (MBJ) in 2001, for white settlers in the region. “The MBJ is expanding on to category 2 and category 3 lands,” Rupert charges. Category 2 lands are those put aside for the use of the Cree village centers, which are considered category 1. Category 3 are the wide expanses of public land between the communities, where the Cree have also traditionally trapped, fished and hunted. Rupert sees the MBJ as a strategy to set a precedent for eroding Cree land title, and notes that the Rupert River project will bring a flood of new settlers into the region.

In Nunavut, the self-governing Inuit homeland carved out of the Northwest Territories in 1999, leaders are also concerned that the Rupert River project to their south will impact their arctic domain, and say they should have been consulted. Nunavut legislator Peter Kattuk says traditional Inuit knowledge was not given enough weight in the federal study approving the Rupert River project. He told the CBC earlier this year that local Inuit have observed changes in ice conditions in Hudson Bay since the James Bay I project was built, which he attributes to disruption in the balance of fresh and salt water inflows.

Chief Rupert emphasizes that he supports development. “We have the technology and know-how to produce energy through wind power. But the cost of this river project is too much for Cree people to bear at this time.”

“They say this power from the north is clean and cheap,” says Chief Weistche. “Well, its not clean because it is impacting the Cree. When you start losing the rivers that we’ve been given the responsibility to take care of for future generations, its not right.

——

A shorter version of this story appeared in the April 24 issue of Indian Country Today http://www.indiancountry.com/content.cfm?id=1096414898

RESOURCES:

Grand Council of the Crees
http://www.gcc.ca

Government of Nunavut
http://www.gov.nu.ca

Hydro-Quebec
http://www.hydroquebec.com

One of Canada’s Last Wild Rivers is to be Sacrificed
Sierra Club of Canada, Dec. 20, 2006
http://www.sierraclub.ca/national/media/item.shtml?x=1036

From our weblog:

Inuit petition on climate change rejected
WW4 REPORT, Dec. 18, 2006
/node/2922

Native nations protest US-Canada border restrictions
WW4 REPORT, Feb. 16, 2007
/node/3156

From our archive:

Alberta Indians resist NATO
WW4 REPORT, Dec. 9, 2002
/static/63.html#canada8

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Reprinted by WORLD WAR 4 REPORT, June 1, 2007
Reprinting permissible with attribution

Continue ReadingHYDRO-COLONIALISM ADVANCES IN CANADA’S FAR NORTH 

AFRICA’S INDIGENOUS PEOPLES

The Fight for Inclusion

by Gumisai Mutume, Africa Renewal

The San, the indigenous people of the Kalahari Desert in Botswana, won a major victory in December 2006, at the end of the longest and most expensive court proceeding in that country’s history. The High Court ruled that the state had wrongfully evicted them from a reserve four years earlier and that they could return home. Civil society activists around the world hailed the ruling as a historic precedent for the rights of indigenous people everywhere, especially in Africa, where many governments have been reluctant to recognize the concept of indigenous rights.

The Botswana case stemmed from the San’s eviction from the Central Kalahari Game Reserve (CKGR), one of the world’s largest reserves, in 2002. In response to a class action suit filed by the San that same year, the court ruled that the government had acted “unconstitutionally” and “unlawfully.” According to Rupert Isaacson of the Indigenous Land Rights Fund, a San advocacy group, “The removals were accompanied by beatings and the destruction of water sources.”

The British colonial government created the reserve, which is 52,800 square kilometers—larger than Switzerland—during the days leading up to Botswana’s independence in 1966. Anthropologists maintained that the San had inhabited the area for at least 40,000 years, but that their numbers were declining at an alarming rate. The colonial administration deemed them to be “endangered‚” and established the CKGR as a refuge.

After independence, the new government in Botswana encouraged the San to move out of the park into state-assisted settlements that were within reach of modern services such as schools and clinics and where they could assimilate into modern society. But many San refused, preferring to remain in a natural habitat where they could continue to live as hunters and gatherers, as they had done for thousands of years. Finally, the government decided to evict 3,000 San from the reserve, setting off the legal action.

Despite the court settlement, the battle is not over. The court ruled that the 189 applicants in the case and their children may return to the reserve. Some activists, such as members of the First Peoples of the Kalahari, contend that the ruling should cover all 50,000 San in the country. But the government of Botswana maintains that other San who wish to return may do so only if they apply for and obtain permits from the state.

Who is Indigenous?

The case of the San in Botswana brings to the fore a delicate question in Africa: who is an indigenous person? Some communities claim indigenous status in Africa today on the grounds that their ancestors resisted the influence of the massive waves of migration of Bantu-speaking agro-pastoralists who migrated from western to southern Africa beginning around 1000 BC. While some were subsumed by those migrations, others maintained their distinct linguistic, cultural and social characteristics, largely as communities of hunters, gatherers and herders.

Later, Arab language and culture spread across northern and eastern Africa. And finally, a number of European countries colonized the continent, bringing their own influences. Those colonial governments often favored the dominant, food-producing populations they found in their new colonies and marginalized the “aboriginal” peoples, as some historians refer to the indigenous people that had settled on the land before the Bantu.

Most governments that came to power following independence have been reluctant to acknowledge claims to rights, especially political rights, on the basis that a particular community regards itself as indigenous. After all, government officials argue, all black Africans consider themselves indigenous to the continent.

Nigel Crawhall, director of the Indigenous Peoples of Africa Coordinating Committee (IPACC), says the argument for recognizing indigenous rights does not rest on historical precedence. Communities arising from the Bantu migrations, he acknowledges, are just as African as everyone else. “The claims of indigenous peoples need to be seen in the context of their systematic discrimination and marginalization” under contemporary political and economic conditions.

“It was colonialism that brought new economic and political structures that reinforced the power of agricultural peoples over herders and gatherers, and set down the rules of who had access to the state apparatus,” Crawhall explains. This meant that during colonial rule, agricultural peoples had easier—if still very limited—access to education, health care and other social services that were almost completely denied to indigenous communities. When colonialism ended, it was these educated elites that were able to take over the institutions of political and social power.

Bottom of the Hierarchy

At the bottom of the colonial hierarchy were nomadic hunters and gatherers. They often withdrew into less hospitable environments, such as deep forests and deserts. In the worst cases, as in colonial South Africa, recalls Crawhall, European settlers tried to virtually exterminate the San. “They were hunted on horseback, killed with diseases, families were destroyed and children were given to other people as servants,” he told Africa Renewal. Among Africa’s many indigenous peoples are the hunter-gatherer forest peoples (“pygmies”) of central Africa, nomadic pastoralists such as the Maasai and Samburu in East Africa, the San in Southern Africa and the Amazigh people (Berbers) of North Africa and the Sahel.

“We may not all agree on the definition of indigenous or the categorization of communities as indigenous,” notes Angela Khaminwa, a Nairobi-based expert on social inclusion policies. “Regardless of what label we place on ethnic communities that maintain traditional lifestyles and livelihoods, there is no doubt that many of these communities are vulnerable to labor and sexual exploitation.”

Many such groups are struggling with the encroachment of farming into their areas. Others are threatened by conservation policies intended to protect species of animals and plants, but that forbid local communities to hunt or gather. Their languages and ways of life are being eroded. “The hesitancy of governments to address the issue of internal difference full force may be due to a need to promote national cohesion,” says Khaminwa. Giving a community special protection, she adds, might be perceived as political favoritism.

The fears of African governments are not baseless. Insurgents and politicians have all too often dwelt on ethnic differences to mobilize support against their competitors. Claims by different ethnic communities over land and mineral rights, often justified on the basis of historical precedence, have frequently contributed to armed conflict.

“A Legitimate Call”

The UN estimates that there are about 370 million indigenous people in more than 70 countries around the world. They are among the most marginalized people in economic, social and cultural terms. Despite the challenges, the world’s indigenous people have scored notable achievements in their efforts to reclaim rights during the last decade, designated by the UN as the International Decade of the World’s Indigenous People (1995-2004). That period saw many changes in Africa, notes Crawhall. One of the most profound was “the rise of an organized civil society representing diverse indigenous peoples from one end of the continent to the other.”

These civil-society groups lobbied the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights, a continental body, to recognize that the concept of indigenous peoples is applicable in Africa. In 2003 the commission adopted a report of the commission’s Working Group on Indigenous Populations/Communities, which acknowledged that “certain marginalized groups are discriminated against in particular ways because of their particular culture, mode of production and marginalized position within the state…[a] form of discrimination that other groups within the state do not suffer from. The call of these marginalized groups to protection of their rights is a legitimate call to alleviate this particular form of discrimination.”

The adoption of the report, in theory, subscribed all 53 member governments of the commission to the aims of promoting indigenous rights. But in reality, the majority of countries continue to struggle with putting such concepts into practice, explains Lucy Mulenkei, director of the Indigenous Information Network in Kenya. While a number of African governments argue that recognizing indigenous rights will foster ethnic tensions, “we who are working among indigenous communities still say we want to have these people recognized in order to deal with issues of marginalization and so forth,” she told Africa Renewal.

Under pressure from organizations representing indigenous people, some countries have made significant progress, she notes. Recently, Burundi amended its constitution to guarantee representation in the national assembly to the indigenous Twa people, who live in several countries in Africa’s Great Lakes region. In neighboring Rwanda, the government is working with the main Twa organization to investigate war crimes perpetrated against them during the 1994 genocide, in which an estimated one third of all Twa in that country were killed.

Elsewhere in Africa, Cameroon recognizes “pygmies” and nomadic pastoralists as indigenous people. The government agreed to comply with policies to compensate and resettle indigenous people affected by the construction of the Chad-Cameroon oil pipeline, an initiative supported by private investors and the World Bank. Morocco lifted a ban on the teaching of the Amazigh (Berber) language in schools and has set up a national commission to formulate policies on indigenous language and culture.

Contentious Negotiations

The Decade of the World’s Indigenous People also helped activists focus their attention on the creation of a Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues at the UN and draft a declaration on the rights of indigenous peoples. The Permanent Forum, which held its first meeting in 2002, gathers annually at UN headquarters to give a voice to the world’s indigenous people at an intergovernmental level.

Representatives of indigenous people and the international community first began working on the declaration on the rights of indigenous people in 1985. The draft was completed in 1993 and has been under negotiation since then. On the International Day of the World’s Indigenous People in August 2006, then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan described it as the product of “many years of complex and at times contentious negotiations.” The declaration, he said, was “an instrument of historic significance for the advancement of the rights and dignity of the world’s indigenous peoples.”

The expected adoption of the declaration by the UN General Assembly in November of that year, Annan noted, would be a major achievement. But that was not to be. Namibia and other African countries, joined by Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the US, blocked the adoption of the agreement.

The Namibian representative to the meeting explained that some of the declaration’s provisions ran counter to the national constitutions of a number of African countries. However, he added, the declaration was of such critical importance that it was only “fair and reasonable” to defer its adoption to allow more consultations.

Kenya’s representative said the declaration contained a number of contradictions. For instance, it talks of “self-determination” as if it were referring to people living under colonial rule. In his country, he said, all citizens enjoyed the right to self-determination. Another African delegate noted that the concept of self-determination was in direct contradiction to efforts to integrate indigenous people into the mainstream of society. The declaration was divisive, he argued, isolating groups and inciting them to establish their own institutions alongside existing central ones.

The General Assembly delayed the adoption of the declaration until its next session, in September 2007. The failure to approve the draft declaration surprised many observers because in June 2006, African and other states had adopted it at the UN Human Rights Council. “We feel very sad about the failure to adopt the declaration,” says Mulenkei, a member of Kenya’s indigenous Maasai community.

Mulenkei notes that many of the concerns that African countries are now bringing up have been debated for a long time, over two decades of negotiations. She believes the real reasons for blocking the resolution are political and economic. Many of the countries opposing the declaration fear that it would give indigenous people the authority to reclaim land and seek compensation for centuries of discrimination.

“All these years that the discussions on the draft declaration have been going on, we barely had African governments participating,” Mulenkei says. “And then at the last minute they come in and say no to the draft declaration. This takes us back many years.” But, she adds, it is now too late for governments to break the momentum. She foresees more progress on indigenous rights in the near future.

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This story first appeared in the April issue of Africa Renewal, a United Nations publication
http://www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/vol21no1/211-indigenous-rights.html

Sidebar:

Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
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RESOURCES:

Indigenous Peoples of Africa Coordinating Committee (IPACC)
http://www.ipacc.org.za

African Commission on Human and People’s Rights (ACHPR)
http://www.achpr.org/

Indigenous Information Network—Kenya
http://www.indigenous-info-kenya.org/

Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (UNPFII)
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/

See also:

PRESIDENTS IN THE DOCK
An End to Africa’s Reign of Impunity?
by Michael Fleshman
WW4 REPORT, February 2007
/node/3111

ALGERIA’S AMNESTY AND THE KABYLIA QUESTION
Berber Boycott in Restive Region Signals Continued Struggle
by Zighen Aymi
WW4 REPORT, November 2005
/node/1235

EXXON, PENTAGON AND JIHAD TARGET CHAD
Sinister Convergence in New Sahel Terror War Front
by Wynde Priddy
WW4 REPORT, April 2004
/static/chad.html

From our weblog:

Kalahari Bushmen win land battle
WW4 REPORT, Dec. 14, 2006
/node/2911

Mexco votes for UN indigenous rights declaration
WW4 REPORT, Sept. 25, 2006
/node/2542

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Reprinted by WORLD WAR 4 REPORT, June 1, 2007
Reprinting permissible with attribution

Continue ReadingAFRICA’S INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 

ALGERIA: DEMOCRACY CRUMBLING?

Islamist Violence and State Legitimacy

by Kanishk Tharoor, Madrid11.net

In recent months, the specter of Islamist violence has grown across North Africa. After enduring a brutal decade-long civil war, Algeria has seen Salafist radicals regrouping under the ominous banner of “al-Qaeda in the Maghreb” (AQMI). The emergence of AQMI heralded fears of the internationalization of political violence in the region, fueled in large part by the presence of numerous North Africans in the battlefields of Iraq. In Algeria, police and military posts in the interior of the country have come under increased threat in 2007, but on April 11, the AQMI threat hit the heart of the political establishment. Bombs ripped through Algiers killing at least 33 people, in the first such violence witnessed in the capital since the black days of the civil war. The blasts coincided with a number of aborted and successful attacks in Morocco. Violence there has continued after raids into impoverished slum areas of Casablanca prompted reprisal bombings.

The international dimension 1

Islamic terrorism in the region has long been considered a distinctly Algerian phenomenon, confined to the country that denied the Front Islamique de Salut (FIS)—rightfully elected to power in 1992—the right to rule. A civil war ensued in which over 100,000 civilians are thought to have been killed. The Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat (GSPC)—the group said to have embraced the al-Qaeda cause last year—emerged in the turmoil of the war to fly the Islamist militant banner.

What was once mostly a national insurgency has now taken on the dimensions of the larger “war on terror.” Notably, Moroccan and Algerian officials have reacted very differently to recent developments. Algiers has readily acknowledged the involvement of “external” elements. At a recent rally against terrorism in the capital, Bouguerra Soltani, leader of the Islamist but moderate Mouvement de la SociĂ©tĂ© pour la Paix (MSP), claimed that “we are living through a new genre of terrorism… [T]he executors of the attacks were Algerian, but the goal comes from the outside, from the cadre of international terrorism”.

Meanwhile, Rabat has insisted that its terrorists are “home-grown,” their causes restricted and local, despite evidence to the contrary. With Moroccans deeply involved in the Madrid bombings in Spain, the stern eye of international scrutiny has fallen on Morocco, as local officials scramble to head off the growing threat.

Adding to the muddle, Hassan Hattab, the founder of the GSPC, has disavowed his group’s new links with al-Qaeda and urged a process of political reconciliation between the government and local Islamists. Whom Hattab, nom de guerre “Abu Hamza”, speaks for at this point is uncertain. It also remains unclear to what extent the recent spurt of Islamic violence in the Maghreb derives material support and direction from a wider network of jihadists. Yet it is beyond doubt that the high profile of conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, and of figureheads like Osama bin Laden, has galvanized militants across the region to adopt the symbols and trappings of a trans-national cause.

The international dimension 2

At the same time, the “local” conflicts in the Maghreb have become the stuff of international interest. Murli Deora, India’s petroleum and gas minister, toured Algeria last month in a bid to strengthen energy ties between New Delhi and Algiers. Talks will also touch upon security issues amidst fears over the stability of Algeria’s energy industry.

Russian and Algerian officials are also locked in negotiations that could make Algeria the largest buyer of Russian arms. A deal thought to be in the region of $7 billion is on the table, and would provide Algeria with new batches of fighter and bomber jets, tanks and air-defense systems.

Algiers’ growing strategic ties with the likes of Russia and India come at a time of growing domestic dissatisfaction with European policy on the Maghreb. Algerians and Moroccans resent the EU’s view of their countries as frontlines against terror, where violence welling up from the Sahel and the dusty interior of North Africa must be confined lest it spill across the Mediterranean. France, the former colonial master of the Maghreb, has grown particularly nervous about the re-emergence of the region’s Islamist militants. North African countries are also being increasingly relied upon to hold back the tide of African immigration, making them key parts of Europe’s regional security policy. Such a task is likely to become harder in the coming years unless significant work is done to mitigate the effects of climate change and growing economic discrepancies in sub-Saharan Africa.

The threat to democracy

Algeria’s human rights record has never been sparkling, particularly during the course of the civil war in the late 1980s and 1990s that saw the notorious intelligence service, the DĂ©partement de Renseignement et de la SecuritĂ© (DRS), cut its teeth in authoritarian control. The imperatives of safeguarding Europe’s frontier and Russian military support will heap further pressure on Algeria’s democratic institutions, cowed as they are by the robust voice of the army.

Algeria does boast a lively domestic press and a plethora of parties that operate with more than a modicum of freedom. In the wake of the April attacks, Algiers witnessed Madrid-style demonstrations against terrorism, urging civic action and a commitment to the democratic process. Politicians further encouraged participation in the impending May 17 elections as a “response” to the bombs and threats of the Islamist menace. The continuing heavy-handed activities of the DRS, like the disappearance of the Islamic student Abdelaziz Zoubida, will invariably undermine the legitimacy of such democratic pretensions, potentially spinning the Maghreb into further chaos.

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This article first ran April 19 on Madrid11.net
http://www.madrid11.net/articles/algeria190407

See also:

SUFISM: THE MIDWAY BETWEEN EXTREMISMS
Indigenous North Africa Between Jihad and Imperialism
WW4 REPORT, March 2007
/node/3263

From our weblog:

Algeria seeks closer US energy ties
WW4 REPORT, May 19, 2007
/node/3900

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Reprinted by WORLD WAR 4 REPORT, June 1, 2007
Reprinting permissible with attribution

Continue ReadingALGERIA: DEMOCRACY CRUMBLING? 

RESISTING THE NEW EURO-MISSILES

Czech Dissidents Stand Up Again—This Time to the Pentagon!

by Gwendolyn Albert, WW4 REPORT

In violation of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the and commitments made in the year 2000 at the UN Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, the United States is planning to expand its missile shield defenses—a system to target potential incoming missiles and shoot them down en route—to cover any potential missiles fired from the Middle East, seen as a growing threat due to Iran’s reported pursuit of ballistic missile technology.

The plan is to place 10 interceptor rockets in the northwestern town of Koszalin in Poland, and a radar base in the Brdy district southwest of Prague in the Czech Republic to track any incoming missiles. Iran reportedly is in possession of medium-range missiles now which could reach Israel or Turkey, and the US claims Iran could possess an ICBM by 2015. The cost of this European expansion of the missile defense shield is estimated at $3.5 billion. Around 200 US personnel, both military and civilian, are expected to work at the Czech base, which would be the first of its kind in Europe.

Since the idea of a missile defense shield was first proposed during the Reagan administration, the US has spent approximately $110 billion developing it. In response to the reported threat from North Korea, the US has already set up two sets of missile interceptors at Ft. Greely, Alaska, and Vandenberg Air Force Base, California—again in violation of international non-proliferation agreements—to defend against incoming missiles from that country.

Critics of the effort say it will not work: In 2004, the Union of Concerned Scientists issued a 76-page report entitled “Technical Realities” which found “no basis for believing the system will have any capability to defend against a real attack.”

Undaunted, the Bush administration has also announced plans to place interceptors—missiles to shoot down other missiles—not on earth, but in orbit, reviving and expanding a proposal which prompted critics of the plan two decades ago to nickname it “Star Wars.” This expansion could cost as much as $200 billion. The militarization of space is obviously fraught with ethical and political problems which will increase existing tensions in an unstable world and accelerate the arms race.

Back to Wenceslas Square

The first rumblings of dissent against the plan to locate the US anti-missile radar base in the Czech Republic came from two segments of civil society which can in no way be described as having “popular” appeal in this country: the tiny peace movement (whose efforts to protest the Iraq war are consistently undermined by the Czech Communist Party driving away potential centrist supporters) and the slightly more institutionalized (but still small) women’s movement. These two groups were ahead of the game on this issue years ago, when rumors of the plans for the US base first surfaced, and their activism has spurred what has become a genuinely popular, nationwide wave of protest, “NE zakladnam” (“No to Bases”), complete with petition drives and demonstrations all over the country. Recent public opinion polls show more than 60 % of the country is opposed to a US anti-missile radar base on Czech territory.

May 26, 2007: yet another demonstration against the base is called for 3 PM on Wenceslas Square in the capital Prague, site of the famous demonstrations that accompanied the collapse of the communist regime in 1989. Two thousand people turn out; in Poland, a similar demonstration draws one thousand people in the capital Warsaw. The “NE zakladnam” poster at the Prague protest reads “David vs. Goliath” and makes a pun on the similarity between the words “radar” and “zrada”—meaning treachery, betrayal, treason. Banners carried at the demonstrations often read: “1938 – Munich, 1968 – the Kremlin, 2006 – No more decisions about us without us!” The movement is not only protesting the planned base, but is calling for a nationwide referendum on the issue. Opinion polls show that as many as 73% of the Czech public agree a referendum should be held.

“Referendum” is a touchy word in this part of the world. Many here still remember Vaclav Havel’s hopeful prediction, prior to his political career, that the fall of the Berlin Wall would herald the dismantling of not only the Warsaw Pact, but also of NATO; that vision of a “peace dividend” and a nuclear weapons-free Europe has yet to be realized. As for including the public in decisions, referenda were never held on two of the largest decisions to ever affect this country, the decision to divide Czechoslovakia into two separate states and the decision to join NATO. A referendum on EU membership was held under the auspices of what was then a center-left government, and the Social Democrats, currently in opposition, are supporting the call for a referendum on the base issue as well.

One of the reasons the base strikes such a nerve with people here, besides their visceral dislike of the idea of foreign troops in a place that has had its fill of military occupation, is that it touches on the thorny issue of “sovereignty,” a concept which is not the territory of the right wing alone but resonates with the nationalism that is common currency across the political spectrum here. The issue is also providing a forum for Czech society to debate how it understands the events of the last twenty years of “transition,” as well as a test of the responsiveness of Czech democracy.

Czech critics of the radar base argue that there is no difference between a radar base and a missile base, and claim the base could be used offensively as well as defensively, all assurances notwithstanding. They say that by permitting the US base, the Czech Republic would simply become an instrument of America’s unilateral foreign policy, its attempt at military domination of the globe from space, and its “war on terror.” They argue that NATO membership does not require them to allow a US base to be located in the country, and finally, that the base will not only not make the Czech Republic more secure, it may actually make the country more of a target.

They also stress that the Czech authorities will have no right to monitor the US base as to its actual use once it is installed. Whether most opponents of the base genuinely identify with all these arguments is an open question; what is clear is that most people reject the idea because the decision to begin negotiations on the plan was made without their input. The question of whether to invite the US base in was never even raised during last year’s parliamentary election campaign.

The current right-wing government was only formed after an embarrassing post-election wrangling period of more than half a year, and it has a tenuous grip on power at best. The radar issue is not its only foreign policy challenge, but it is definitely the one that has prompted the most domestic debate and action. As on many other issues, the government has been its own worst enemy, with Czech PM Topolanek impatiently scoffing at the idea that the base is anything but a done deal. Indeed, attendance at a demonstration on the issue in Prague this winter was probably given an extra boost by the attempt of the (right-wing) Prague City Hall to “ban” the gathering, claiming it would “disrupt traffic.”

Technically the city has no powers to “ban” public gatherings; no official “permission” is required to assemble in public, just notification to the authorities of the planned location and route of the event. But the city can send police to disperse a gathering deemed unsafe, and the Czech media still use the term “ban” to describe the authorities’ expression of disagreement with certain gatherings. Turnout was higher than expected – the press reported 500 people gathered, but those attending estimated numbers at 2,000 – and the event took place without incident.

Who is the Enemy?

The mayors of 23 communities surrounding the military training area in Brdy, the planned site of the base, have written directly to the US Congress to express their opposition. Since the calls for a national referendum have so far gone unheeded, some local governments have held their own plebiscites on the matter, such as the village of Trokavec, located a mere two kilometers from the planned site. In that plebiscite 70 people voted against the radar, one voted in favor, and 16 eligible voters did not participate. Three more villages plan to hold plebiscites on the issue on June 2 in the run-up to President Bush’s planned visit here.

The votes are symbolic and have no legal effect, but they did prompt the US to send Gerald C. Augeri, assistant head of MIT’s Lincoln Laboratory, to visit the mayors and address their concerns. among its other activities, the Lincoln Lab runs an R&D program developing sensor systems for use in the missile defense shield program. Augeri told local politicians that the radar station would not affect electronic devices or mobile phones and would be placed at least four kilometers from the nearest houses.

Czech Greenpeace has also been active on the issue, trying to leverage the fact that Czech Foreign Minister Schwarzenberg ran on the Green Party ticket and should theoretically be much more susceptible to pressure by environmentalists than if he were from any other party in the governing coalition. Czech Greenpeace executive director Jiru Tutter issued a sharp critique of the text of the diplomatic note between the USA and Czech Republic proposing terms for the base agreement, reminding the foreign minister that any foreign army to be stationed on Czech territory for longer than 60 days must, according to Article 43 of the Czech Constitution, receive the support of parliament. Certain terms used by the USA in the note seemed to be an attempt to help the Czech government try to circumvent this requirement, but that did not wash for long. As a result of all this public pressure, the Czech foreign affairs and defense ministries announced on May 22 that they will submit their own counterproposal to Washington’s initial proposal within two months, and that the counterproposal would outline what sorts of “services” the US should provide in exchange for the base being located here.

Some Czech political commentators have noted that the country’s stance on the issue has been complicated by the fact that the government does not present a clear (or even a unified) foreign policy. Czech Foreign Minister Schwarzenberg is perceived as a figurehead, with most analysts saying the foreign policy show is really being run by deputy PM for European affairs Alexander Vondra of the governing Civic Democratic Party (ODS), a former Czech ambassador to the US who is the main person reporting on the progress of the Czech negotiations to parliament.

Vondra has spoken of a potential rejection of the base in catastrophic terms, claiming it could lead to Prague breaking its ties with NATO, which would in turn require the reintroduction of compulsory military service in the Czech Republic. Compulsory service was abolished in 2005. Czech Defense Minister Vlasta Parkanova, another cabinet member from a minority party to have been more or less sidelined by Vondra’s advocacy of the base, immediately contradicted his analysis.

Even though the missile defense shield is a US plan (not a NATO one), Washington claims the 26 NATO allies will all receive protection under the shield. But Germany expressed concern in April that Bulgaria, Greece, and Romania would actually be left out of the shield’s protective radius. The US move means debate at NATO about its own plans for missile interception is now on the front burner, and the NATO countries have held high-level talks with Russia—which has expressed its objection in no uncertain terms.

Czech Defense Ministry officials have repeatedly insisted that the base is not intended for use against Russia or China, as the communists contend, and that the technical parameters of its configuration and geographical location mean it can only be used to detect potential missiles from the Middle East. This contention is disputed by Russia, which claims that Iranian, North Korean or Syrian rockets would probably not go across Central Europe on their way to the US, but that a radar station in the Czech Republic would be able to monitor rocket installations in central Russia and the Russian Northern Fleet.

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s threat to train his missiles on the Czech Republic and Poland should they host the bases coverage in both the Czech press and global media, as has the maneuvers of US, EU and NATO diplomats. But criticism from another Russian source has received surprisingly little coverage. Former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev made a statement in Kaliningrad on April 12, bluntly calling the planned US bases in the Czech Republic and Poland part of America’s plan to “control Europe.”

Certainly Germany, which currently holds the EU presidency, has not expressed the enthusiasm for the US plans that the UK has, but Germany has also not tried to raise the issue in NATO—which takes the position that the question is a purely bilateral one between the US and the countries concerned. Elsewhere in Europe, the issue was a key topic during the recent presidential elections in France, with the eventual right-wing victor Sarkozy expressing himself during the election campaign as follows: “It is rather disturbing, in my opinion, that the US is not discussing this anti-missile defense system with our European partners. I do not understand how anyone can say that this is simply a problem for the Czech Republic and Poland, and not a problem for Europe, unless we want to abandon our ambitions for a European defense policy.” At the European Parliament, Social Democratic MEPs from Austria, the Czech Republic, the Netherlands, and Poland have also written to the US Congress expressing the socialist faction’s view that the plan could “divide the international community and therefore seriously threaten efforts to restrict the further spread of weapons of mass destruction.” Austrian President Heinz Fischer has also expressed opposition to the plan.

What are the Chances?

What of the 30 % of the Czech Republic that supports the base, according to polls? Protests are sometimes attended by an iconoclast or two holding the American flag in staunch support of the US base. Their argument runs thus: the Americans saved us last time (meaning WWII), and the rest of you will be crying for them to come save us again sooner or later, this time from Iran, or North Korea, or Syria. The US helped us end communism and we are allies again at long last, so let their radar in. One group even held a demonstration in favor of locating missiles as well as radar on Czech territory, but theirs is clearly a minority opinion. Polls do show that 56% of the Czech public believe the country should defend itself against a possible missile attack-but on its own, without the assistance of the global superpower.

The Defense Ministry says that the Czech Republic is in fact already within range of the existing missile capability of the countries from which the threat is presumed to come, but has tried to downplay the critics’ assertion that this is precisely why building such a target on Czech territory is undesirable. They have also claimed an 80% effectiveness rate for the system in the Czech media—a remarkable claim to anyone who has followed the debate on the system in the US, where the efficacy of this entire idea has been questioned for decades now. Senator Carl Levin (D-MI), chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, said last fall that the Pentagon had not yet performed operational testing with convincing enough results that the system would actually work when needed.

The Czech Defense Ministry website links to a fairly wide range of media coverage of the issue, including a piece on the actual equipment concerned, which is to be relocated from the Kwajalein atoll in the Pacific—a move which is also causing some controversy there. A poll in May 2007 for the Polish daily Rceczpospolita reported two-thirds of Poles also believe the decision to install the missile base in their country should be preceded by a national referendum. Fifty-one percent said they opposed the base, while 30% were in favor, a ratio similar to the Czech statistics. Plans are also afoot to locate another US radar base for the missile shield in the Caucasus.

The US has asked that the Czech Republic to make its final decision by next year, and that will depend on parliament. It is unclear at this time how the lower house will vote. The US Congress is also key, as it controls the funding for the plan, and members of the House Armed Services Committee are reluctant to commit funds without a clear, formal agreement with the Czech Republic and Poland and an expression of full support from NATO. The committee has already cut the Pentagon’s request for funds for the European part of the system by more than half, citing concerns that the technology is not ready, but the budget could still be restored later by the appropriations committee. If approved, the base would begin operations in 2011.

——

Gwendolyn Albert, a US citizen, is a permanent resident of the Czech Republic, a member of the Czech Government Human Rights Council representing civil society, and Director of the Women’s Initiatives Network at the Peacework Development Fund.

http://www.peacework.org

RESOURCES:

Technical Realities: An Analysis of the 2004 Deployment of a US National Missile Defense System
Union of Concerned Scientists, 2004
http://www.ucsusa.org/…

Czech Ministry of Defense — Information Campaign on Missile Defense
http://www.army.cz/scripts/detail.php?id=8798

From our weblog:

Putin: US missile shield threatens stability
WW4 REPORT, April 28, 2007
/node/3702

Syria: fortified missile city?
WW4 REPORT, April 30, 2007
/node/3724

From our archive:

Federal court: ABM treaty dead
WW4 REPORT, Jan. 13, 2003
/static/68.html#nuke1

Greenland Inuit protest “Star Wars” plans
WW4 REPORT, Dec. 30, 2002
/static/66.html#nuke6

Chretien waffles on “Star Wars” participation
WW4 REPORT, Dec. 16, 2002
/static/64.html#canadian1
——————-

Special to WORLD WAR 4 REPORT, June 1, 2007
Reprinting permissible with attribution

Continue ReadingRESISTING THE NEW EURO-MISSILES 

INDIGENOUS OPPOSITION TO PUEBLA-PANAMA PLAN FACES REPRESSION

by Bill Weinberg

On July 21, leaders of indigenous, campesino and grassroots organizations from throughout the Central American nations and Mexico gathered in Tegucigalpa, capital of Honduras, for the Mesoamerican Forum, fourth in a series of meetings aimed at defending ecological culture throughout the isthmus–and opposing the Puebla-Panama Plan (PPP), an isthmus-wide mega-development scheme aggressively promoted by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). Meanwhile, in the Honduran countryside, three peasant ecologist leaders were assassinated just days before the Forum opened–casting the issues addressed at the meeting in a stark light.

In the southern province of La Paz, two Lenca Indian campesinos involved in an occupation of contested lands were killed in a dawn attack by presumed hired gunmen of a local landlord. In northern and remote Olancho province, a peasant leader who had been opposing illegal timber exploitation on communal lands was cut down at his home by an unknown pistolero. A banner above the check-in desk at the Forum read REMEMBER THE MARTYRS OF LA PAZ AND OLANCHO.

There was an irony that the Forum was held in a city dominated by the ubiquitous icons of corporate culture–Burger King, McDonalds, Pizza Hut. In contrast, the banner above the stage at Tegucigalpa´s Universidad Pedagogica, where the Forum was held, pictured a traditional Maya Indian design of a maize god.

The first Mesoamerican Forum was held in Spring 2001 in Tapachula, Chiapas, after the IDB and Mexican President Vicente Fox announced the PPP, which calls for new hydro-electric projects, trans-isthmus trade routes and industrial zones. The Forum convened again in Fall 2001 in Quetzaltenango, Guatemala; and in July 2002 Managua, Nicaragua. At the Tegucigalpa meeting, the agenda was topped by the issues of breakneck resource exploitation privatization of national resources and infastructure–especially water. A water privatization law currently pending in the Honduran national legislature would mandate that local municipalities allow private contracts to run their water systems. Honduras´ second city, San Pedro Sula, already has such a contract with an Italian firm.

Such privatization moves are IDB and World Bank prescriptions–but, as representatives from throughout the Mesoamerican subcontinent pointed out, they are taking place in atmosphere of lawlessness, in which public oversight is meaningless and opponents are targetted for assassination.

“ANOTHER MESOAMERICA IS POSSIBLE”

A featured speaker at the Forum was Mexican writer Armando Batra, author of The Heirs of Zapata, a study of post-revolutionary Mexican campesino movements, who called the PPP an example of “savage capitalism,” and claimed that it is dividing Mexico. “It serves the interests of the northern, white part of the country which is a neighbor to the US, and condemns to poverty the southern, indigenous part which is a neighbor to Guatemala.” But, echoing a frequent slogan at the Forum, he asserted that “another Mesoamerica is possible.” As an alternative development model, he called for “rebuilding the links between rural and urban sectors, with agricultural production for internal consumption based on local cooperatives.”

Indigenous representatives from Guatemala at the Forum included opponents of the planned massive hydro-electic project on the Usumacinta River, which forms the border between Guatemala and Mexico. Juan Ixbalan of Guatemala´s National Indigenous and Campesino Coordinator (CONIC) called the IDB-backed project, which would flood vast areas of rainforest, “a new conquest of Maya territory.”

Even as technocrats portray privatization and mega-development proposals as part of an inevitable march towards democracy and modernization, ghosts from Central America´s violent recent past are returning to haunt the isthmus. Guatemalan indigenous leaders are currently preparing a case against former military dictator–and current presidential candidate-Rios Montt on genocide charges for his 1980s “scorched-earth” campaign against Maya Indians. The indigenous-led Justice & Reconcilation Association (AJR)is coordinating witnesses to 1980s massacres from 24 communities in the departments of Quiche, Huehuetenango, Chimaltenango and Alta Verapaz. Said Neela Ghoshal, a New York City shcoolteacher who recently served as a human rights observer with the AJR and attended the Forum: “The Guatemalan courts probably won´t hear the case, so they will have to go to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. But they are really committed to seeking justice.”

On July 25, just days after the Forum ended, violent riots rocked Guatemala City as supporters of Rios Montt–mostly former members of his paramilitary “civil patrols”–took to the streets to protest a court ruling that barred his candidacy under a law blocking former coup leaders from the presidency. The protesters erected barricades of burning tires and attacked random pedestrians, leaving one television reporter dead of heart failure. Five days after the riots, Guatemala´s top Constitutional Court would overturn the ruling, allowing the ex-dictator´s presidential campaign to proceed. US State Department spokesman Richard Boucher quickly assured that US relations with Guatemala would not be disrupted if Rios Montt is elected.

Another speaker at the Forum, Raul Moreno of El Salvador, representing the rural development group Sinti Techan (Nahuatl for “maize for the people”) condemned the pending Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) and Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA), asserting that these agreements would “modify the judicial order, subordinating the labor code, environmental laws and human rights. The PPP is not neutral–it benefits the US and its giant corporations. The PPP is not reformable.” Nor, he asserted, is it inevitable. “We can resist. Electricity and the national health system remain public in Costa Rica, despite the desire of the government and the World Trade Organization to privatize, because the people don´t want it.”

Magda Lanuza of Nicaragua´s International Study Center noted that plans for water privatization are even more advanced in her country than in Honduras. Several Nicaraguan departments–including Leon, Chinandega, Jinotega and Matagalpa–already have private contracts to manage their water systems with such firms as the French water giant Suez (whose contracts with local governments in South Africa have won international criticism as soaring water rates have left many poor communities without access). Now, as in Honduras, the water privatization program is to be instated nationwide–as a condition of a loan from the IDB. But Magda predicts a political battle. “Local communities are prepared to defend their water resources,” she says. “They understand that water is life.”

Hydro-energy is also being privatized in Nicaragua. The private firm Hydrogesa has won a contract to manage the Apenas dam in Jinotega, and the scandal-ridden Enron actually bid on it in 2002. But following public protest, the contract now suspended pending a national law on water privatization. Local Matagalpa Indians were relocated when the project was first built in 1960s, and now oppose its privatiztion.

HEIRS OF LEMPIRA STRUGGLE FOR THE LAND

The two Lenca Indians killed at La Paz, Fabian Gonzalez and Santos Carrillo, were part of a land occupation led by the National Center of Rural Workers (CNTC), one of the largest campesino unions in Honduras. The killers opened fire with AK-47 rifles in dawn attack on their encampment July 19. In an eerie coincidence, the very next day, July 20, is Dia de Lempira, a national holiday commemorating the death in 1536 of the Lenca warrior who resisted the conquistador Francisco Montejo. The land in question had been first occupied in 1985, under a provision of the Honduran agrarian reform law allowing peasants to move on to unused private lands, and begin a process for their eventual expropriation and title transfer to the campesinos. But the agrarian reform law has now been almost completely repealed in Honduras.

Lenca leader Berta Caceres notes an irony that Lempira has become a symbol of national pride even as Lenca land rights and culture have been lost to modernization. “The indigenous context has been invisible in Honduras for too long,” she says. “But there has been a new process of struggle since the 500 Years of Resistance campaign in 1992 and the Zapatista revolt in Chiapas in 1994. We are organzing to defend Lenca territory.”

Caceres is the coordinator of the Civic Council of Popular and Indigenous Organizations of Honduras (COPINH), representing 47 communities in the Lenca heartland of La Paz, Intibuca and Lempira departments. It was founded in 1993, and has been at the forefront of a Lenca cultural and political renaissance. After the Forum, I visited COPINH´s modest office in the village of Itibuca.

The Lenca are among the northernmost Chibcha Indian groups, whose cultual sphere begins just south of that of the Maya and extends into South America. Their language only survives in some 45 words–mostly referring to animals and places, such as the local Sierra de Puca Opalaca, which means “high mountain” in Lenca. They have also adopted Nahuatl, the lingua franca of the Aztec-Maya cultural sphere, to communicate with neighboring peoples.

Since 1993, COPINH has organized a series of 4,000-strong “indigneous pilgrimages” to local sacred sites associated with saints and virgins (and, earlier, with Lenca deities and earth-spirits)–such as the Virgin of Lourdes in Ilama, Santa Barbara department, and the Virgin of Remedios in Tomala, Lempira. Caceres says these pilgrimages “linked the spiritual and cultural traditions of the Lenca with our political demands.” COPINH has also resorted to more militant tactics, such the 1993 occupation of local timber mills to protest deforestation.

COPINH´s demands have won some results–such as the redrawing of municpal borders to give local Lenca communities legal contol over their territories. In 1994, the first new municipality was created, San Francisco Opalaca in Intibua department–the only municipality in the country where all land is collectively owned and managed by an indigenous land council. Six other new municipalities followed in the ensuing years.

Under the Honduran agrarian reform, some national lands were transfred to peasant collectives, which held them privately, but not for resale. Under the 1992 Agrarian Modernization Law–known as the “contra-reforma”-they can now be resold. The “contra-reforma” also overturned provisions for expropriation of unused private lands for redistribution to peasant squatters. In addittion, the National Agrarian Institute (INA) started privatizing national lands and even “ejidos,” the traditional communal lands accruing to municipalities that had been protected since the colonial era.

Salvador Zuniga, a member of COPINH´s executive committee, notes the shift from the “populist” policy of the 1960s, when the agragian reform was initiated, to the “neoliberal” policy of today, which is supported by the US, World Bank and IDB, and calls for a return to the 19th-century Liberal ideology of privatization of public or collective lands and resources. In between was the harsh repression of th 1980s, which–if less severe than that in neighboring El Salvador and Guatemala–still saw the assassination and “disappearance” of hundreds of peasant leaders, and the decapitation of peasant cooperatives. “The neoliberal policy of today is the fruit of the low-intensity war of the 1980s,” says Zuniga.

And that war continues, as indigenous leaders are still marked for death. On May 17 of this year, Teodoro Martinez, a Tolupan Indian leader in the central department of Fracisco Morazan who had been leading a campaign against illegal timber operations, was assassinated. Martinez had been a leader of another indigenous alliance, the Confederation of Autochthonous Peoples of Honduras (CONPAH)–whose founder, Vicente Matute, was assassinated in 1989, the same year the organization was launched.

OLANCHO: TROUBLE ON THE WILD FRONTIER

In another trip into the Honduran countryside after the Forum, I joined a delegation to Olancho, organized by the country´s foremost human rights group, the Committee of the Families of the Detained and Disappeared of Honduras (COFADEH), founded during the repression of the 1980s. The largest department in Honduras by territory, Olancho is largely inhabited by mestizo settlers from the central and southern zones of the country who were encouraged by the government to colonize the wild fronteir to the north in the 1960s and ´70s. But, as always, economic interests followed the settlers, and today the pine-clad mountains of Olancho are being rapidly denuded by local timber barons. On the road, we pass numerous trucks loaded with huge pine logs, heading south towards the Panamerican Highway and foreign markets. We also pass several timber mills cutting the big logs into boards.

On the night of July 18, Carlos Arturo Reyes was shot down by an unknown pistolero at his home in Olancho´s El Rosario municipality. Reyes had founded the local Olancho Environmental Movement (MAO)in 2001, and had led a cross-country March for Life in June 2003, in which 30,000 marched from Olancho to Tegucigalpa to demand a crackdown on outlaw timber operations. MAO used marches, community meetings and finally–in February of this year–physical blockades of logging roads to press thier demands for community participation in drafting what the group calls a “rational plan of exploitation.” Twenty other MAO members are now said to be targetted for death.

Other peasant ecologists have likewise been assassinated in Olancho in recent years. On June 30, 2001, Carlos Flores of La Venta, a village in Gualaco municipality, was gunned down in front of his home by AK-47 fire. As a leader of the local Heritage Center of La Venta, Gualaco (CEPAVEG), he had opposed a hydro-dam being built on the nearby Rio Babilonia by the private firm Energisa under contract to the Honduran government. Two of Energisa´s guards were eventually arrested in the case, but Gilberto Flores, Carlos´ cousin, says “the intellectual authors remain free.”

Gilberto, still involved in opposition to the hydro project, is now facing death threats himself, has a National Police officer assigned to protect him in La Venta. Gilberto reports that on June 14 he had a an AK-47 levelled at him from a passing car in Juticalpa, capital of Olancho department.

Gilberto emphasizes the necessity of halting Olancho´s deforestation and fighting to maintain public control over water resources: “In many municipalities in Olancho, there is no water. We dig wells and we find none. The department is going dry. This has happened over the last 20 years, along with the exaggerated exoploitation of our forests. There are around 100 trucks full of timber leaving Olancho each day for Trujillo,” the northern Caribbean port.

Also apparently targetted for death is Rafael Ulloa, former mayor of Gualaco. Ulloa protests that the appropriation of the Rio Babilonia for the hydro-dam represents a reversal of national priorities. “Officially, water is to go first for muncipal use, then for irrigation, and then for electrical generation. But downstream communities will lose thier access to the river by this project.”

The small Rio Babilonia plunges down from the mountain of that same name in a series of cascades, and eventually joins the Rio Tinto Negro that drains to the Caribbean to the north. The site of the dam is officially within the Sierra de Agalta National Park, and but for the construction activity the forest-cloaked mountain is indeed beautiful. From La Venta, we set out on horses and mules up the steep and muddy trail which is also used by the Energisa workers. This area is too rugged and inaccessible for heavy equipment, and the workers carry the plastic tubing up the mountain on their backs, or slung between makeshift wooden poles. The trail follows the ditch cut in the mountainside which will re-route the river through the plastic pipes to the power station below, still yet to be built. At the top, the dam itself is alrady intact, standing astride the first cataract, but the gates have yet to be closed and the floodplain which has been dug off to the side yet to be filled. An Energisa guard with a shotgun stands on duty.

The campesinos at La Venta also take us to nearby Las Delicias in neighboring San Estaban municipality–where national police and private gunmen evicted some 20 families from 83 manzanas of land on July 23. Across the barbed-wire fence we can see the remains of recently-razed homes. The families, settlers from Choluteca department in the south, had been on the land for over 20 years. They are now living in an overcrowded one-room schoolhouse and makeshift bivuoacs on adjacent municipal land. They say that the courts ruled for the local Calderon ranching family in the land dispute despite the campesinos´ title to the land. The case is pending before INA, but the families, who worked their land as a peasant collective, have little hope the decision will be reversed. They say their meager cattle were stolen in the eviction as well, and probably wound up on the already-expansive lands of the Calderon family. Says evicted grandmother Heribeta Aguilar: “We came here for a better life-now everything is gone.” Added evicted farmer Silverio Molina: “We will die fighting for land and water.”

The evicted campesinos show us a beat-up Toyota pick-up truck parked near thier bivouacs. It is riddled on the driver´s side with bullets from an AK-47 attack in the prelude to the eviction–allegedly by Calderon gunmen. The driver, Candido Cruz, lost his leg in the attack, and now hobbles on crutches.

Another environmental crusader facing death threats in Olancho is Padre Jose Andres Tamayo, a Salvadoran-born priest who now leads the parish that covers both Salama and El Rosario, where Carlos Reyes was killed. He too notes a dramatically declining productivity in Olancho´s land as a result of erosion and aridification related to destruction of the region´s forests. “Just five years ago, the campesinos here got 30 sacks of maize for every manzana,” he says. “Now they usually get twelve.”

On the road between Salama and El Rosario, Padre Tamayo points out a large expanse of mountainous and forested land owned by a local “cacique”-a land baron and political boss favored by the corrupt bureaucracy. He says trucks leave the cacique´s land hauling out timber frequently, and the mountainsides are rapidly being denuded. Across the road, more forested slopes form the opposite wall of the valley. These, Tamayo says, are the communal lands of local peasant communities. But they are also being denuded by the local timber barons, as campesino leaders are bought off with cash or alcohol. Tamayo asserts that 80% of the wood cut in Honduras is felled illegally.

On March 2, 2002, the Honduran daily El Heraldo reported that ex-head of the national forestry agency, COHDEFOR, Marco Vinicio Arias, faces corruption charges for illegally allowing the felling of trees in the Rio Platano Biosphere Reserve, which stretches north from Olancho into the extremely remote lowland tropical rainforests of the Miskito Coast.

Tamayo says that six companies control the Olancho timber trade in a shady network that overlaps with that of the narco-gangs who use Olancho as an artery for US-bound cocaine between clandestine ports on the Miskito Coast and the Panamerican Highway. Timber revenues are used to launder narco-profits, and both go to arming paramilitary-style mafia enforcement gangs. Tamayo refers to the timber gangs as “narco-madereros.”

Tamayo claims that the timber is largely resold to US-based companies for export, and much of it is off-loaded in New Orleans and other US ports. Once again, corporate power appears to have an incestuous relationship with the criminal and paramilitary gangs that terrorize the isthmus. “This is the second conquest of Mesoamerica,” says Tamayo.

Our delegation to Olancho ended with an ominous coda. On July 29, the day after our return to Tegucigalpa, the daily La Prensa ran a front-page photo of masked men carrying rifles in a dense pine grove, claiming they were a group of radical environmentalists who were arming themselves to defend Olancho´s forests. Their supposed leader, “Comandante Pepe,” claimed to have 10,000 men under his command. In an accompanying article, Honduran President Ricardo Maduro was pictured looking in dismay at photos of “Pepe” from the same newspaper. He was quoted as saying, “They are doing a great damage to the country,” noting that the presumed eco-guerillas look like “Zapatistas or members of Sendero Luminoso.” He was also quoted pledging a crackdown: “I am not going to permit the existence of any armed groups that generate violence. I don´t care whose side they´re on, because in this case there is no justified reason.” Padre Tamayo was also quoted, saying that the mysterious Pepe and his followers were actually a creation of the timber gangs “to discredit the movement.”

August, 2003

Continue ReadingINDIGENOUS OPPOSITION TO PUEBLA-PANAMA PLAN FACES REPRESSION 

MINING IN MEXICO: VIOLENCE MADE IN CANADA

by Mandeep Dhillon, Upside Down World

The history of mining in Mexico is a long one. The riches of the Mexican sub-soil were a major motivation for Spanish colonizers and the mining industry is often accorded an important place in events leading to the Mexican Revolution; the 1906 bloody repression of striking miners working for U.S. Cananean Consolidated Copper in Sonora is often cited as a precursor to current labor struggles in Mexico. The authors of the Mexican Revolution sought to make a reality of the ideal that those who work the land should have control over it. In order to protect the land from foreign interests, Article 27 of the 1917 Mexican Constitution dictated that the land, the subsoil and its riches were all property of the Mexican State. More importantly, Article 27 recognized the lasting collective right of communities to land through the ejido system, and limited private land ownership.

As in the colonization of Indigenous lands elsewhere, mining was an activity of primary economic importance to colonizing forces and a major cause of injury, death, land destruction and impoverishment for Indigenous communities. Not much has changed in this imbalance today. And Canadian mining corporations– with wealth created from the historic (and ongoing) take-over and exploitation of Indigenous territory in Canada–are at the lead of these colonizing forces in present-day Mexico.

Important changes to the Mexican Constitution in anticipation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) resulted in the facilitation of land privatization and the entry of foreign corporations. One such change was the modification of Article 27, allowing for the sale of ejido land to private owners, including foreign multi-nationals. Another was the Mining Law of 1992 which together with the Law on Foreign Investment allowed for 100% foreign investment in exploration and production. Article 6 of this Mining Law also stipulates that the exploration and exploitation of minerals will have priority over any other use of the land, such as agriculture or housing. The modifications also allowed for the participation of the private sector in the production of some minerals previously reserved to the government, including coal and iron.

Though the Canadian corporate world is often seen as a secondary beneficiary of aggressive American corporate expansion, the reality of the mining industry certainly turns this myth onto its head. And the picture of mining activities in Mexico is a prime example.

The Scope of the Canadian Mining Industry

Canadian mining corporations lead the global mining industry. The Canadian industry ranks first in the global production of zinc, uranium, nickel and potash; second in sulphur, asbestos, aluminium and cadmium; third in copper and platinum group metals; fourth in gold; and fifth in lead. It has interests in over 8,300 properties worldwide–3,400 of which are in 100 foreign countries. In Latin America and the Caribbean, which has been identified as the main current geographical target for mineral exploration, Canadian mining corporations represent the largest percentage of foreign mining companies–with interests in more than 1,200 properties. In 1998, over $4.5 billion USD were raised by Canadian mining companies through domestic and foreign projects which represented 51% of the world’s mine capital.

Canadian Corporate Interest & Mining in Mexico

The politics of neo-liberalism in Mexico, which gained important ground in the 1980s and took flight with the implementation of NAFTA, have had a tremendous impact on the presence of Canadian corporate interests. Since NAFTA, bilateral trade between the two nations increased about 300%. According to the report, Opening Doors to the World: Canada’s International Market Priorities–2006: “Over 1,500 Canadian companies have a presence in Mexico, and a further 3,100 are currently working on their first sales in Mexico.” Canada is Mexico’s fifth largest investor. Some of Canada’s largest corporations which have a significant presence in Mexico include Scotiabank, TransAlta, Transcontinental, Magna International, Palliser, Presion Drilling, Fairmont and Four Seasons Hotels.

In a 2005 address, the Canadian Ambassador to Mexico, Gaetan Lavertu noted that “well over half of the foreign mining concessions issued in Mexico are registered to Canadian companies. The bulk of these investments are from British Columbia… Mexico recognizes Canada’s leadership and technological advantages in the minerals and mining equipment business.”

The importance of Mexico to Canada’s mining industry is confirmed by a 2004 report entitled Current Mexican-Canadian Relations in the Mining Sector by Cecilia Costero. The report describes Mexico as almost entirely mineralized with an estimate of 85% of mineral reserves yet untouched–this despite the 10,380 mines which have already been exploited. After the manufacturing industry, mining is the second largest Canadian capital interest in Mexico. In 2000, this interest was to the tune of over $150 million USD. In December 2001, 225 Canadian mining corporations were operating in Mexico (over 40% of the foreign investment), 209 of which owned over 50% of the capital in their projects. In the same year, Canada led foreign nations in terms of direct investment in the Mexican mining industry. Further, Mexico imports 75% of its machinery used for mining and Canada accounts for 4.4% of its total market needs.

Made in Canada: Violence & Displacement

The devastation and violence perpetrated by Canadian mining corporations has been documented clearly, with links to human rights violations in Guatemala, Peru, Romania, the Philippines, Honduras, Ecuador, Bolivia, Ghana, Suriname, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Papua New Guinea, Tanzania, India, Indonesia, Zambia and Sudan. Though the criticism of Canadian mining corporations taking advantage of so-called weak human rights protection in the South is made often enough, significantly less is said about the role of the same corporations in the destruction and displacement of Indigenous communities within Canadian borders. In Saskatchewan, on Deline Dene territory, over 1.7 million tons of radioactive waste and tailings were dumped in and around Great Bear Lake during the 1940s and 50s, contaminating all food sources of the Dene People. The community lost 50 men due to radiation effects. Since 1990, 27% of the 609 First Nations reserves in Canada have undergone some level of mineral exploration activity.

In British Columbia–where over 97% of the land is yet unceded First Nations land even according to Canadian and international law–the British Columbia Mining Plan of 2005 designated over 85% of the province’s land “open to exploration,” even setting up an online system for staking mineral claims. (In the right-wing Canadian think tank The Fraser Institute’s 2005/06 survey, mining corporation executives and representatives ranked B.C. second for “uncertainty about native land claims” as a deterrent to mining investment; only Venezuela was ranked higher.) Mining is a $5 billion industry in B.C. with a multitude of Canada’s mining corporations based in Vancouver. In a review of a non-exhaustive list of Canadian mining companies operating in Mexico, over 60 of them locate their head-quarters in Vancouver.

Selling Mining Projects

The website of Endeavour Silver, one of those Vancouver-based corporations, includes an industry article which attempts to answer the question, “Why Mexico?” The piece says that “Mexico is the world’s premier silver exploration and mining country for several reasons… mining is an integral part of national and local economies… this takes on increasing importance as migration from rural areas to cities increases due to lack of rural employment opportunities: mines create economic anchors wherever they are found, which mitigates this effect locally and allows rural residents to maintain well-paid, dignified and productive occupations.”

In actual fact, reviews of Mexican neo-liberal policies since the 1980s, including NAFTA, have concluded that land privatization for corporate use, including mining projects, has resulted in an exponential increase in displacement and migration. Since NAFTA came into effect in 1994, over 15 million Mexicans have been displaced from their lands. The myth that mining is a necessary activity for economic development has been central to the industry. Most employment created by mining projects for local residents is short-term and low-paid.

Furthermore, mining companies receive heavy government subsidies in most countries, leave virtual ghost-towns after their projects end, and leave local governments to dispose of wastes. The environmental price and the long-term cost to local communities are never calculated. The article goes on to state that “Mexico has strong environmental laws and a commitment to uphold them, but effective obstructionist environmental organizations are few.” As in the community of Cerro de San Pedro, San Luis Potosi, which has been battling Toronto-based Metallica Resources Inc. for over 10 years, communities pay with the loss of their land, homes, health and lives.

“Culturally,” writes the author, “Mexicans are friendly towards mining at all levels. This means…developers can expect to be welcomed when they enter an area…in stark contrast to their reception in many other parts of the world.”

Currently in Mexico, public audiences are not required by law prior to granting mining concessions. Local communities are often the last to find out about mining projects and are hardly ever informed about the projected effects of mining operations on their land and their health.

This phenomenon is not limited to Mexico. Communities affected by mining in Canada, which is often attributed respect for consultation processes, have related experiences of false consultation processes or deals made between corporations and so-called community leaders without community involvement. Such has been the case with Montreal-based Niocan Inc. which has been attempting to open a Niobium mine on unceded Mohawk territory next to the community of Kanehsatake, Quebec. Residents of Kanehsatake received notice of the consultation meetings only days prior and were shut out of negotiations carried out with Niocan by a Canadian government-backed band-council leader that the community had attempted to oust multiple times.

These myths are not supported solely by mining corporations. The Canadian government has been an active player in pushing forward Canadian mining projects in foreign countries, including Mexico, through its embassy representatives and trade councils. This type of Canadian government pressure continues even when mining projects result in the murders of opposing local residents such as occurred during the opposition to Vancouver-based Glamis Gold’s Marlin mine in Guatemala. Along these lines, Kenneth Cook, the Canadian ambassador to Guatemala, has recently been denounced for carrying out a disinformation campaign seeking to discredit a documentary film on the recent violent eviction of the Maya Q’eqchi Indigenous communities near El Estor, carried out on request of another Vancouver-based corporation, Skye Resources.

From B.C. to Oaxaca

Another reason given for Mexico being a prime location for silver exploitation on Endeavour’s website is that “politically, Mexico is the most stable country in Latin America.” Another industry report states that, “political and financial stability, legal security for investors…are all positive factors impacting Mexico’s mining industry today. However, one must also consider the highly unionized nature of its mining and metallurgical workers…and possible socio-economic issues generated by low wages and under-employment as possible road blocks to the continued prosperity of the industry.”

Weakened workers’ rights and the silencing of social movements are necessary pre-cursors to the flourishing of mining projects in Mexico and elsewhere. Industry reports such as this one are clear about it. The “political stability” that corporate and Canadian government reports refer to is certainly not social stability but rather the heavy-handed control of social movements, the militarization of the countryside and the displacement of local communities to protect corporate investment.

The world has recently become witness to Oaxaca’s social movement that is calling for an end to years of impoverishment through neo-liberal policies, displacement of Indigenous communities and government violence. The state violence against this movement has recently increased to unprecedented levels. Oaxaca, like the rest of Mexico’s south, is rich in natural resources that have been the target of foreign corporations for years. Vancouver-based Continuum Resources already has ten projects in Oaxaca at various stages, covering over 70, 000 hectares of land and “continuing to consolidate larger land positions.”

At the end of September, Vancouver-based Chesapeake Gold Corp announced it had optioned 70% of its two Oaxaca projects to Vancouver’s Pinnacle Mines. Horseshoe Gold Mining Inc., also based in Vancouver, acquired 60% interest in Almaden’s Fuego prospect located in Oaxaca. Halifax’s Linear Gold Corp also owns an active project in the state.

Neighboring Chiapas, another of Mexico’s most impoverished and most militarized states, is also the target of Canadian mining projects. From 2003 to 2006, the federal government has granted a total of 72 mining concessions in Chiapas, representing a total of 727,435 hectares. More than 55% (419,337 hectares) of these lands conceded without any information or consultation with local communities lies in the hands of two Canadian mining corporations alone: Linear Gold Corp and Fronteer Development Group.

Canadian mining corporations in Oaxaca and Chiapas are not just witnesses to the violence that is occurring there, but rely on that violence to protect their profits. Businesses and governments have identified one of NAFTA’s short-comings as the failure of its benefits to reach Mexico’s southern states rather than an increase in poverty and inequality caused by NAFTA itself. Recent talks between Canada, the U.S. and Mexico have focused on the Security and Prosperity Partnership (SPP). The opening of Mexico’s energy resources–in particular to Canadian corporations–has been accorded prime importance. (So has the further development of energy sources in Canada.) According to the Independent Task Force on the Future of North America, one of the major business think-tanks behind the SPP, “improvements in human capital and physical infrastructure in Mexico, particularly in the center and south of the country, would knit these regions more firmly into the North American economy and are in the economic and security interest of all three countries.”

It comes as no surprise that the same corporate and government bodies are calling for expansions of Canada’s exploitative agricultural guest-worker program which they cite as an example of bi-lateral success. For Canadian and Mexican governments and business, such guest-worker programs are a win-win situation as they provide a means to control forced migration caused by corporate and military displacement while reaping the economic benefits of a moveable, exploitable labor force in Canada, and through remittances sent to Mexico. According to a Mexican government official who ran the program for two years in one of the southern states, these programs also allow for the Mexican government to weaken social movements by intermittently removing thousands of its poorest citizens.

The perception of Canada as the United States’ junior partner often comes with a lack of clarity on Canadian responsibility in the history of violence and displacement within and beyond its national borders. Often, language around Canada-based solidarity work with the struggles of Indigenous communities, campesino and labor movements in Mexico distorts the responsibility of Canadian governmental and corporate players in the violence which has engendered those movements. Canadian mining corporations are but one example of how Canadians are complicit beyond just silence on the issues but through a very active process. The reality of mining also offers a concrete point of solidarity between those who have been displaced from the South and Indigenous communities in “Canada.”

Allies in Canada also cannot limit solidarity work to pointing fingers at a “corrupt Mexican government” or U.S. imperialist drive. To get to the roots of this displacement, there is a need to first look inwards at what is being perpetrated against Indigenous communities here and how the authors of that violence are also dictating crimes against the people of Oaxaca, Chiapas and other parts of Mexico.

On occupied Coast Salish land in Vancouver, these relationships visibly come full circle. As development for the 2010 Olympics causes the destruction of Indigenous land, the gentrification of the Down Town East Side and the repression of First Nations peoples both outside and inside the city, many of the unsafe, slave-wage construction jobs are being filled by Mexican men who are coming from impoverished communities that have similarly been repressed in the name of development. In the background stand the tall office buildings of West Vancouver that house the majority of its mining and “development” conglomerates.

——

Written by Mandeep Dhillon with help from Antoine Libert Amico. Dhillon is an organizer with No One Is Illegal-Vancouver and Justicia Para Trabajadores Migrantes B.C.

This story first appeared April 12 on Upside Down World
http://upsidedownworld.org/main/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=700&It
emid=0

See also:

GUATEMALA: MINERAL CARTEL EVICTS KEKCHI MAYA
Security Forces Burn Peasant Settlements for Canadian Nickel Firm
by Bill Weinberg, Indian Country Today
WW4 REPORT #130, February 2007
/node/3117

From our weblog:

Guerrero: GoldCorpt mine dispute settled
WW4 REPORT, April 30, 2006
/node/3729

NAFTA Security Summit held in Ottawa
WW4 REPORT, Feb. 25, 2007
/node/3230

RESOURCES:

Non-exhaustive list of Canadian Mining Corporations Currently Operating in Mexico
(many of these companies operate through subsidiaries)

Alamos Gold (Toronto): Sonora

Aquiline Resources (Vancouver): Sonora

Aurcana Corporation (Vancouver): Queretaro

Avino Silver and Gold Mines Ltd. (Vancouver): Durango

Baja Mining Corp. (Vancouver): Baja Peninsula

Bralorne Gold Mines Ltd. (Vancouver): Durango

Canasil (Vancouver): Durango, Sinaloa, Zacatecas

Canplats Resources Corporation (Vancouver) : Durango, Chihuahua

Capstone Gold Corp. (Vancouver): Zacatecas

Cardero Resource Group (Vancouver): Baja California,

CDG Investments Inc. (Calgary): Sinaloa

Chesapeake (Vancouver): Oaxaca, Sonora, Durango, Sinaloa, Chihuahua

Columbia Metals Corporation Ltd. (Toronto) : Sonora

Comaplex Minerals Corp. (Calgary): Mexico State

Coniagas Resources (Toronto): Zacatecas

Continuum Resources Ltd. (Vancouver): Oaxaca

Copper Ridge Explorations Inc. (Vancouver): Sonora

Corex Gold Corporation (Vancouver): Zacatecas

Cream Minerals Ltd. (Vancouver) : Nayarit

Diadem Resources (Toronto) : Zacatecas

ECU Silver Mining (Rouyn-Noranda): Durango

Endeavour Silver (Vancouver) : Durango

Energold Drilling Corp [Impact Silver Corp.] (Vancouver): Mexico State

Evolving Gold Corp. (Vancouver): currently exploring acquisitions in Mexico

Esperanza Silver Corp. (Vancouver): Morelos

Excellon Resources (Toronto): Durango

Exmin Resources Inc. (Vancouver): Chihuahua

Dundarave Resources Inc. (Vancouver): Chihuahua

Farallon Resources Ltd. [Hunter Dickinson] (Vancouver): Guerrero

Firesteel Resources (Vancouver): Durango

First Majestic Silver Corp. (Vancouver): Jalisco, Coahuila, Durango,
Zacatecas

Fording Canadian Coal Trust [NYCO] (Calgary): Sonora

Formation Capital Corporation (Vancouver): Tamaulipas

Fronteer Development Group (Vancouver): Jalisco, Chiapas

Frontera Copper Corporation (Toronto): Sonora

Gammon Lake Resources (Halifax): Chihuahua, Guanajuato

Genco Resources (Vancouver): Mexico State

Goldcorp Inc. (Vancouver): Sinaloa, Durango, Chihuahua, Guerrero, Zacatecas

Gold-Ore Resources Ltd. (Vancouver): Sinaloa

Golden Goliath Resources (Vancouver): Chihuahua

Grandcru Resources (Vancouver): Sinaloa

Grayd Resource Corporation (Vancouver): Sonora

Great Panther Resources Ltd. (Vancouver): Durango, Guanajuato, Chihuahua

Grid Capital Corporation (Vancouver): Chihuahua

Hawkeye Gold and Diamonds (Vancouver): Nayarit

Horseshoe Gold Mining (Vancouver): Oaxaca

Iamgold Corporation (Toronto): (royalties) Chihuahua

Iciena Ventures (Vancouver): Sonora

Impact Silver Corp. (Vancouver): Zacatecas

International Croesus Ltd. (Vancouver): Jalisco

Intrepid Mines (Toronto): Sonora

Kimber Resources (Vancouver): Chihuahua

Linear Gold Corp (Halifax): Chiapas, Oaxaca

Macmillan Gold (Toronto): Durango, Sinaloa, Zacatecas, Jalisco, Nayarit

MAG Silver Corp (Vancouver): Chihuahua, Zacatecas, Durango

Minefinders (Vancouver): Chihuahua, Sonora

Morgain Minerals Inc. (Vancouver): Durango, Sonora

Metallica Resources Inc. (Toronto): San Luis Potosi

Mexoro Minerals Ltd. (Vancouver): Chihuahua

Northair Group (Vancouver): Durango, Sinaloa

Northwestern Mineral Ventures (Toronto): Durango

Oromex Resources (Vancouver): Durango

Orko Silver Corp. (Vancouver): Durango

Pacific Comox Resources (Toronto): Sonora

Palmarejo Silver and Gold (Longueuil): Chihuahua

Pan American Silver (Vancouver): Sonora

Pinnacle Mines Ltd. (Vancouver): Mexico State, Oaxaca

Quaterra (Vancouver): Durango, Zacatecas

Rome Resources Ltd. (Vancouver): Sonora

Ross River Minerals (Vancouver): Sinaloa

Roxwell Gold Mines (Vancouver): Sinaloa

Santoy Resources Ltd. (Vancouver): Sinaloa

Scorpio Mining Corporation (Vancouver): Sinaloa

Silver Crest Mines (Vancouver): Sonora

Silver Standard Resources (Vancouver): Durango, Mexico

Soho Resources Group (Vancouver): Durango

Sonora Gold Corp (Vancouver): Sonora

Sparton Resources (Toronto): Sinaloa, Sonora

Starcore International Ventures (Vancouver): Puebla

Stingray Resources (Toronto) : Chihuahua

Southern Silver Exploration (Vancouver): Jalisco, Chihuahua

Stroud Resources (Toronto): Chihuahua

Teck Cominco Ltd. (Vancouver): Guerrero

Terra Novo Gold Corp. (Vancouver): Michoacan

Tumi Resources (Vancouver): Chihuahua, Sonora

Tyler Resources (Calgary): Chihuahua

UC Resources (Vancouver): Durango, Nayarit

Valdez Gold (Toronto): Chihuahua

War Eagle Mining Company (Vancouver): Chihuahua

West Timmins Mining Corp. (Vancouver): Sinaloa, Chihuahua

Zaruma Resources Inc. (Toronto): Sonora

——————-

Reprinted by WORLD WAR 4 REPORT, May 1, 2007
Reprinting permissible with attribution

Continue ReadingMINING IN MEXICO: VIOLENCE MADE IN CANADA 

COLOMBIA: PARAMILITARY SCANDAL AND CORPORATE POWER

from Weekly News Update on the Americas:

On March 19 the Cincinnati-based banana company Chiquita Brands International formally admitted that its wholly owned Colombian subsidiary Banadex paid a total $1.7 million to the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), a rightwing paramilitary group, between 1997 and 2004. The company agreed to pay the US federal government $25 million in fines for supporting a terrorist group; the AUC is on the US State Department’s list of terrorist organizations. On March 20 Colombian attorney general Mario Iguaran announced that he would seek the extradition of eight Chiquita officials to face trial in Colombia.

Chiquita officials claimed the company paid the paramilitary group to keep it from attacking Chiquita employees; the company said it had also paid off the two leftist guerrilla organizations, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN), for the same reason. But Colombian prosecutors indicate that Chiquita’s ties to the AUC are more extensive. They plan to ask the US Justice Department about a November 2001 incident in which a Banadex ship was used to unload 3,000 AK-47 rifles and more than 2.5 million bullets; these were bought by the paramilitaries from arms dealers who got them from Nicaraguan police. Colombia held Banadex’s legal representative, Giovanny Hurtado Torres, in jail for a year in the investigation of the arms smuggling, but finally released him for lack of evidence. (Reuters, March 20 via Yahoo en Espanol; Houston Chronicle, March 25 from AP)

On March 16 Sun-Times Media Group Inc., publisher of the Chicago Sun-Times, said the US may investigate its chief executive, Cyrus Freidheim Jr., who headed Chiquita from 2002 to 2004. (Reuters, March 17)

Meanwhile, a suit is proceeding against the Alabama-based mining company Drummond Co. Inc. in connection with the 2001 murder of three unionists representing workers at Drummond’s coal mine in northern Colombia. The suit, filed in US federal court in 2002 by the Colombian miners’ union, Sintramienergetica, and the United Steelworkers of America, is now set for trial on May 14.

On March 14 the 11th US Court of Appeals ruled that US District Judge Karon Bowdre had exceeded her authority by sealing the documents in the case. These documents included sworn testimony by Rafael Garcia, a former Colombian security official now in prison in Colombia, that he was present at a meeting where Augusto Jimenez, president of Drummond Ltd, the company’s Colombian branch, handed “a suitcase full of money” to a representative of paramilitary leader Rodrigo Tovar Pupo to have the three union leaders murdered. The sealed documents also showed that Drummond attempted to lobby the US State Department, apparently to get its help to have the lawsuit dismissed. The lobby effort included working with Baker Botts LLP, the law firm of James Baker, secretary of state in the 1989-1993 government of former US president George H.W. Bush.

On March 22 Drummond officials denied Rafael Garcia’s allegations. But Jose Miguel Linares, a local Drummond vice president, acknowledged that a Drummond Ltd. director, Alfredo Araujo, is a cousin of Senator Alvaro Araujo, who was jailed in February on charges of working with the paramilitaries to kidnap a political rival; Alvaro Araujo’s sister, Maria Consuelo Araujo, resigned from her post as foreign minister in the resulting scandal. On March 20 Colombia announced that it was starting a formal investigation of Drummond’s possible ties to paramilitaries. (Forbes, March 14 from AP; Associated Press, March 16; Houston Chronicle, March 22 from AP)

Army Kills Peasants on Eastern Plains

According to information provided by the Foundation of the Committee in Solidarity with Political Prisoners (FCSPP) and the Social Corporation for Community Advising and Training (COS-PACC), troops from the Colombian Army’s 16th Brigade executed two campesinos, Daniel Torres Arciniegas and 16-year-old Roque Julio Torres Torres, in the rural hamlet of El Triunfo, in Aguazul municipality, Casanare department. The army then presented the victims as “subversives killed in combat.” Torres Torres had been a witness to the earlier execution of Hugo Edgar Araque Rodriguez and Freddy Alexander Cardenas by members of the same 16th Brigade; several soldiers were under judicial investigation for that crime.

Since 1996, 13 campesinos from Aguazul have been executed, another 26 have been disappeared, and there have been multiple cases of torture, forced displacement, arbitrary detention and other abuses in the municipality. The community has reported the abuses and fears retaliation. (Agencia Prensa Rural, March 20)

At least three other campesinos have been murdered in Aguazul since the beginning of this year. On Jan. 18, Angel Camacho was murdered in the hamlet of Plan Cunama las Brisas by individuals who appeared to be from a unit of the GAULA, a national anti-kidnapping force, based in Yopal, capital of Casanare. Witnesses said that after killing Camacho, the assassins placed a gun in the victim’s hand and took photos of the body before taking it away.

On Jan. 29, two young individuals in civilian clothing who appeared to be leftist guerrillas murdered Reinaldo Zea in the hamlet of Retiro Milagro. After killing Zea, the assailants threatened his wife, warning her to stay quiet or face the same fate. On Feb. 12, a heavily armed group of men dressed in camouflage, accompanied by others in civilian clothing, stopped a bus transporting British Petroleum contract workers in the hamlet of La Florida; the men took Jaime Palacios off the bus and murdered him. (Message posted by FCSPP/COS-PACC March 20 on Colombia Indymedia)

On March 15, troops from Battalion 29 of the army’s 16th Brigade, based in Yopal, took campesino Carlos Guevara from his home in the village of Ocove, in Labranzagrande municipality, Boyaca department (just northwest of Casanare), and forced him to accompany them. Hours later members of the army told the community that they had killed a guerrilla; residents recognized the body as that of Guevara. Several months earlier, the army had detained Guevara and accused him of being a guerrilla; the courts had freed him after finding no evidence for that claim. (Message from FCSPP/COS-PACC, undated, received March 23)

Weekly News Update on the Americas, March 25, 2007

——

Weekly News Update on the Americas
http://home.earthlink.net/~nicadlw/wnuhome.html

See also:

WW4 REPORT #126, October 2006
/node/2577

More on Drummond at WW4 REPORT #43:
/static/43.html#andean3

From our weblog:

Colombia rejects CIA report on army-para ties
WW4 REPORT, March 26, 2007
/node/3445

——————-

Reprinted by WORLD WAR 4 REPORT, April 1, 2007
Reprinting permissible with attribution

Continue ReadingCOLOMBIA: PARAMILITARY SCANDAL AND CORPORATE POWER 

TOM FORÇADE: UNSUNG HERO OF THE COUNTER-CULTURE

How a Yippie conspiracist changed America, mainstreamed marijuana and was destroyed by his dream…

Thomas K. Forçade was one of the most influential figures of the counterculture, and changed American culture as much as his confederates Abbie Hoffman and Larry Flynt. Forçade built a media empire, revolutionized journalism, mainstreamed marijuana and helped found the legalization movement before his untimely and still-mysterious apparent suicide at the age of 33. But he was the counterculture’s Howard Hughes, who labored behind the scenes, shunned the spotlight, wrote under pseudonyms—and continued to move large quantities of grass right to the end. Nearly 30 years after his death, it is time those who stand on his shoulders to know the man and the myth that was Tom Forçade.

by Bill Weinberg, Cannabis Culture

The Youth International Party (YIP)—popularly known as the Yippies—came to fame in 1968, with the violence at that summer’s protests against the Democratic Convention in Chicago, where the pro-war candidate Hubert Humphrey won the nomination. The protesters themselves had overwhelmingly been the target of violence by the Chicago police and Illinois National Guard—yet in the aftermath, eight activists associated (to varying degrees) with the Yippies were charged with federal conspiracy. In what was widely perceived as a travesty of justice, five of the “Chicago eight”—Yippie co-founders Abbie Hoffman and Jerry Rubin, Tom Hayden of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), and Dave Dellinger and Rennie Davis of the National Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam (“The Mobe”)—were convicted of inciting to riot (although cleared of conspiracy) and each sentenced to five years. Bobby Seale of the Black Panthers was charged separately and convicted of contempt after being ordered bound and gagged in the courtroom by Judge Julius Hoffman. The convictions were reversed on appeal. But the trial—and the prankish antics by the defendants—catapulted Hoffman, Rubin and their cohorts to celebrity status. They were breathing the same rarefied air as the rock stars with whom they jointly defined the “counter-culture”—and they as eagerly exploited the media attention.

The irony of the outlandish conspiracy charges for First Amendment activity is that the Yippies did actually see themselves as a sort of conspiracy. Hoffman especially saw his mission as to bring a political consciousness to the hedonistic hippies, and to harness the creative energies of the counter-culture to protest the war in Vietnam. They set about this with a methodical intent that belied their seeming spontaneity. In fact, a case can be made that many of the vast cultural and political changes that swept America in the years of the Vietnam adventure’s grim endgame traced their origins to a New Years Day 1968 conclave, in a smoke-filled room in Hoffman’s apartment on New York’s Lower East Side, where the “Yippie” concept was conceived. And the smoke in that room wasn’t tobacco.

So the movement was riven with paradoxes from the start: Activism versus hedonism. Idealism versus opportunism. Ultra-democracy versus conspiracism. Anarchists versus hustlers. Disciplined cadre versus dope-fueled rabble. Even the “party” of Youth International Party was intended as a pun, with both senses of the word equally legitimate.

The Yippies’ unlikely fusion of these seeming opposites was, somehow, a real one. They saw themselves as the harbingers of a new culture, seeking to psychedelicize the left as well as to politicize the hippies. While the traditional left (like the Mobe) held orderly marches and chanted in unison, the Yippies used hit-and-run street guerilla tactics and bizarre theater, like their October 1967 “exorcism” ritual at the Pentagon. While the traditional left disdained marijuana and LSD as decadent self-indulgence, the Yippies embraced them as agents of liberation, and adopted their legalization as a cause. They saw themselves—however unrealistically—as genuine revolutionaries, and the notion of a populist revolution as the product of an elite conspiracy can be traced back to the 19th-century Russian anarchist Mikhail Bakunin and Auguste Blanqui, who fancied himself the secret mastermind of the Paris Commune from his prison cell. The Yippies’ ethic of media manipulation—”using the system against the system”—fit this mentality perfectly.

But if Hoffman played the media by acting the role of irreverent jester for the cameras, there is another figure who was arguably even more influential—yet virtually unknown because, by choice, he labored in the shadows. And rather than merely manipulate the media, this man of mystery (an image he consciously cultivated) actually built his own modest media empire in the 1970s, creating something that, at least briefly, approached a real alternative to the corporate press, and helped move the whole American spectrum to the left, the loose and the funky. Tellingly, he killed himself on the very eve of the Reagan revolution, in which those gains would be largely repealed.

With the country once again as divided as it was in 1968, perhaps it is time that Thomas King Forçade received his posthumous due.

THE YIPPIE YEARS: GENESIS OF THE CONSPIRACY

Born Kenneth Gary Goodson (the name-change came when he forged his new identity), he started life as the nomad brat of a military contractor. After stints in Okinawa, Alaska and Greenland, the family returned to their native Arizona—where Gary’s father met his death in a car accident when the boy was 11. Gary’s principal passion as a teenager was hot-rodding, his anti-authoritarian streak manifested by getting into chases across the desert with the Utah state police. He eventually graduated to smuggling in trunkloads of marijuana from across the Mexican border. He briefly served in the Air Force in 1965, but, feigning insanity, was dishonorably discharged before he could be dispatched to Vietnam. Back in the civilian world, he earned a degree in business administration from the University of Utah. In 1967, he caught the psychedelic wave, grew his hair long, and moved into a communal household in the Tucson area. When the commune was raided for marijuana and LSD by the police, and some members arrested, he became politicized—and somewhat paranoid. He changed his name and began publishing his drug-culture journal Orpheus, which seems to have been inspired by San Francisco’s contemporaneous Oracle. But this had more of an edge—each edition of one issue was shot through with a bullet as an artistic statement. He produced it from a 1946 Chevy school bus he drove around Arizona to avoid police harassment. The name Forçade was an intentional play on the word “facade”—a wink to the initiated that it was an alias (although some sources maintain Forçade was his paternal grandmother’s maiden name).

Isolated in conservative Arizona, Forçade identified with the then-mushrooming radical or “underground” press movement. Small publications were springing up from coast to coast. Some, like Oracle, were focused on psychedelic exploration and mysticism. Others, like the Los Angeles Free Press, were journalistic, full of leftist muckracking. But increasingly, papers like New York’s East Village Other, which merged the two sensibilities, set the template. The underground press came to be seen as the voice of the radical youth movement of which the Yippies were the avant-garde.

In 1969 Forçade drove the school bus to New York where he teamed up with John Wilcock of the East Village Other to launch what they dubbed the Underground Press Syndicate (UPS), which served as a clearing house for the numerous new radical journals around the country. (The acronym, of course, was another play—on United Parcel Service.) UPS affiliates could lift material from each other, and link as a network. Forçade’s friends back in Arizona continued to publish Orpheus, which now metamorphosed into the official “directory” and periodic anthology of the UPS. But the UPS national headquarters, in a big loft on New York’s West 17th Street, became Forçade’s new base of operations.

Already Forçade was harboring dreams of the counter-culture supplanting and becoming the mainstream. “A daily underground paper in every city, and a weekly in every town,” he articulated his vision. “The underground press,” he wrote in the UPS founding manifesto, “is crouched like a Panther, dollars and days away from daily publication and thus total domination in the print media. After the underground press goes daily, they’ll die like flies.”

He saw his enterprise as on the frontlines of a culture war: “The Underground Press Syndicate papers, as advance scouts for journalism in Amerika & the world, often find themselves in conflict with the last vestiges of honky mentality… uptight Smokey-the-Bears of the totalitarian forest running around with axe-wielding blue-meanie henchmen, stomping out the fires of a people who have found their voice and are using it.” But he was convinced of victory. “The fires are too many and too big.”

The UPS claimed a collective 20 million readers, and Forçade strove to make the venture economically self-sustaining. He sold the microfilm rights of all UPS affiliates to the firm Bell & Howell for re-sale to libraries—which simultaneously brought in money and made the material more widely available. He contracted one Concert Hill Publications of Pennsylvania as the syndicate’s official ad agency. Some expressed fears that UPS was becoming too capitalistic with this move, but revenues from rock bands and concert promoters flowed in, and the underground press movement grew.

In New York, Forçade cut a strange figure. In an era and milieu of self-conscious flamboyance, he went around in an austere black outfit resembling a priest’s cassock, with a matching black wide-brimmed cowboy hat and ever-present dark glasses. He also rode around in a matching black Cadillac. He seemed to relish the rumors surrounding him that he was moving large quantities of marijuana into the city. In these years—like Hoffman, a senior figure in the New York radical scene, and clearly a role model—he actively sought notoriety, while justifying it as a tool of social change.

But, with Richard Nixon now in power, there was also an increased sense of paranoia. The Senate Internal Security Subcommittee investigated the finances of Liberation News Service, the journalistic collective that serviced many UPS affiliates. Federal legislation was introduced that sought to ban publications that ran communiquĂ©s from armed groups like the Black Panthers and Weather Underground. Local district attorneys and police forces launched a campaign of harassment. The Phoenix office of the UPS was raided in an ostensible drug search; no drugs were found, but police confiscated files and subscription lists. Wrote Forçade: “With obscenity busts, they get your money; with drug busts, they get your people; with intimidation, they get your printer; and if you still manage somehow to get out a sheet, their distribution monopolies and rousts keep it from ever getting to the people.”

The obscenity busts were also real—there was a cross-fertilization between pornography and the underground press at this point, with the radical journals pushing the limits on sexual frankness, providing personal ads for amorous readers (a new idea back then), and (in theory at least) making erotic imagery less voyeuristic and objectifying and more participatory and instructive. These distinctions were, of course, lost on the authorities. And on May 14, 1970, Forçade registered a rather dramatic protest.

Dressed in his trademark outfit, Forçade showed up at the hearings of the President’s Commission on Obscenity and Pornography in Washington DC, carrying an open letter to the commission listing 45 publications that had been censored or shut down by busts or intimidation. His testimony accused the commissioners of being “walking antiques…trying to stamp out our…working model of tomorrow’s paleocybernetic culture, soul, life, manifesting love force, anarchy, euphoria…flowing new-consciousness media… So fuck off, and fuck censorship!” Concluding his comments, he stepped forward and—with a war cry of “The only obscenity is censorship!”—wafted a cream pie right into the face of the commission’s chairman, Otto N. Larsen of the University of Washington.

This event—which took place the same day that two black student protesters were killed and nine injured by police gunfire at Mississippi’s Jackson State College—is now known as the first Yippie pie-ing. The tactic would later be taken up by Yippie Pie-Man Aron Kay, who would go on to symbolically “assassinate” Nixon aides G. Gordon Liddy, E. Howard Hunt and John Dean; CIA director William Colby; UN ambassador Daniel Patrick Moynihan; conservative pundit William F. Buckley; anti-feminist crusader Phyllis Schlafly; pop artist Andy Warhol; California governor Jerry Brown; New York mayors Abe Beame and Ed Koch, and several other icons of the establishment. Other Yippies creamed H-bomb mastermind Edward Teller, anti-gay mouthpiece Anita Bryant and Rolling Stone publisher Jann Wenner, a perceived exploiter of the youth culture. (The tradition is still being carried on today by a loose network known as the Biotic Baking Brigade, which has pied many captains of government and industry in recent years, including San Francisco mayor Willie Brown, Microsoft magnate Bill Gates and corporate raider Charles Hurwitz.)

In August 1970, Forçade undertook another high-profile caper. Warner Brothers was filming a movie entitled Medicine Ball Caravan, that chronicled the adventures of a tribe of hippies—including ex-Merry Prankster Wavy Gravy and his Hog Farm commune—as they made their way cross-country to attend the Isle of Wight rock festival in England. Forçade intercepted the caravan near Boulder. In his Cadillac limousine (now painted a militaristic olive drab) was a wide assortment of fireworks and smoke-bombs. In his entourage was one of the Yippies’ most provocative characters, David Peel—the group’s official songster, whose John Lennon-produced album The Pope Smokes Dope was an underground classic then being banned all over the world (and who took his name from his habit of smoking banana peels). Peel’s incessant taunting of the caravan leaders as whores for Warner Brothers finally brought the situation to violence. The camp boss pulled a knife on Peel; then Forçade (decked out like a frontiersman in a fringed leather jacket with a skull-and-crossbones button reading “The American Revolution”) jumped the boss from behind. The whole episode was caught on film—and used in the movie. While Forçade claimed his aim had been to expose the caravan as corporate exploitation of the counter-culture, rumors circulated that he had actually been in Warner Brothers’ pay—to provide some on-camera violence and publicity. Others claimed he was piggy-backing a big cross-country marijuana run on the caravan.

In 1971, when rock producer Phil Spector was accused of sitting on money raised by ex-Beatle George Harrison and friends (Ravi Shankar, Eric Clapton, Bob Dylan) at Madison Square Garden’s legendary Concert for Bangladesh, Forçade joined with another Yippie, AJ Weberman, to found the Rock Liberation Front—which occupied Spector’s office to demand the funds be released. The negative publicity worked. Finally, the money started to arrive at the relief organizations working at the camps in northeast India, where some 10 million had taken precarious refuge from the brutal war in Bangladesh.

But there was again an ambiguity of motives surrounding the next escapade, which represented both the pinnacle of Forçade’s career as a visible activist leader and the impetus for an abrupt change in his trajectory—the defining moment in his life. It was also the last gasp of the Yippies, and the group’s inevitable Oedipal revolt.

Forçade had, of course, been drawn into the Yippies’ orbit upon his arrival in New York. His first ego-clash with Hoffman surrounded production of Abbie’s third and most popular tome: the cleverly entitled Steal This Book. The previous two, the Yippie manifesto Woodstock Nation and the stream-of-consciousness Revolution for the Hell of It (written under the pseudonym “Free,” even though Hoffman’s highly recognizable image adorned the cover, and several inside pages), had been successful—as had Rubin’s own manifesto Do It! But Steal This Book would have to be self-published—given the provocative title (which Hoffman refused to compromise on), and the fact that it was an explicit how-to manual on subverting and ripping off the system, including detailed instructions on squatting, shoplifting and building pipe-bombs and Molotov cocktails, complete with charts and diagrams.

Woodstock Nation and Revolution for the Hell of It were credited to the celebrity-hungry Hoffman despite the fact that—by many accounts—they were actually collective efforts, with lesser-known and younger Yippies helping out on the editing and even writing. Steal This Book was to be an even more explicitly collaborative project. When Hoffman had to return to Chicago in 1969 to serve a 13-day jail sentence for writing “FUCK” on his forehead in public, he hired Forçade to edit, typeset and lay out the manuscript. Upon his return to New York, Hoffman was presented with a bill of $5,000 for two weeks of work. Unhappy with either the price or the work, he refused to pay. The Yippies organized a “people’s court” to settle the matter, with Hoffman and Forçade each presenting their case to a panel of three arbiters.

Forçade argued that his fee was based on what he was paid by Madison Avenue advertising agencies as a “youth market” consultant—which particularly galled Hoffman, as this was exactly the kind of work he regularly turned down. For Forçade, in turn, the Yippies’ spirit of volunteerism and shoestring improvisation masked exploitation. As panelist Craig Karpel put it: “If Tom was trying to use his competence to hustle Abbie, Abbie was trying to use his incompetence to hustle Tom.” The panel ultimately issued what was conceived as a compromise: Hoffman would pay Forçade $1,000. There is a famous photo taken after the verdict was announced, in which a smiling Hoffman extends his hand to Forçade, as one of the panelists, a young Yippie named Mayer Vishner, looks on between them, clearly hoping for reconciliation. Forçade makes no move to accept Hoffman’s hand, or even turn to face him; he looks at the camera, ramrod-straight and poker-faced.

After the verdict, Forçade hit Hoffman with a double-whammy. First, he held a press conference in which he announced that the “people’s court” had ruled in his favor because it had ordered Hoffman to pay him money. The “Abbie Guilty!” headline hit both the mainstream and underground media. Then, he sued Hoffman in civil court—which was seen as a grave betrayal of counter-culture ethics.

Ultimately, two rival editions were issued, identical in every particular except the title and cover. Ironically Hoffman’s was printed under the moniker of “Pirate Editions,” while Forçade’s smaller print run was a pirate edition of this version! Printed by “Hopscotch, Inc.,” Forçade’s knock-off was dubbed The “Steal Yourself Rich” Book. Hoffman’s name only appeared on the title page, not the cover. A line of small print read: “Large portions of this book were previously published under the title ‘Steal This Book.'” Of course, the text said nothing about getting rich, but much about living for free on the fringe of society, fighting the police and generally making trouble for the “Pig Empire.” The two titles exemplified the divergent philosophies of the two men: Hoffman’s saw theft as an act of resistance against the system of private property; Forçade’s as a mere hustle.

The Yippie split intensified with the presidential campaigns of 1972. Both the Republicans and Democrats would be holding their conventions in Miami. The Republicans stood behind Nixon, who had escalated the bombardment of Vietnam and spread the war to Cambodia. But this time the Democrats seemed poised to nominate the anti-war candidate George McGovern—in the first election in which 18-year-olds would have the vote. The old Yippie leaders announced that they were prepared to protest the Republicans, but not the Democrats. Hoffman, Rubin and Ed Sanders (the rock star/poet of The Fugs, a Lower East Side-based band) joined to co-author the book Vote!, which urged the anti-war movement to support McGovern. Read Hoffman’s jacket blurb: “This is the first time since 1776 that America is up for grabs. Vote and its yours.” Sanders: “I might have done a lot of crazy things before, but now, it’s time to get the rock and roll people to vote.”

The younger generation of Yippies wouldn’t go along with this. A counter-triumvirate to Hoffman/Rubin/Sanders congealed around Forçade, Dana Beal and Cindy Ornsteen, and insisted on protesting both parties at Miami. They assumed a more hard-left posture, arguing that the Democrats as well as Republicans were a party of big business and war, and that the founding Yippies had become ossified and sold out. The breakaway faction around Forçade dubbed themselves the “Zippies,” and adopted the slogan: “Put the zip back into YIP!” Another Zippie slogan was “We are not McGovernable!”

Accused a post-Miami manifesto officially purging Hoffman and Rubin as YIP leaders: “Their endorsement of the McGovern candidacy was an attempt to commit YIP to surrendering our independent identity to a party controlled by oil billionaires and labor reactionaries, the Connallys and Meanys. Our survival as a party is absolutely incompatable [sic] with that of the Democratic Party. We cannot represent the interests of youth within the Democratic Party.” It also accused them of being anti-democratic and elitist.

The folks around Hoffman and Rubin saw baser motives. Chicago ’68 had been the Yippies’ moment of glory, and these younger Yips had missed it. Forçade had still been in Arizona, and Beal had been in jail on a marijuana charge during the “Battle of Chicago.” Now they wanted their own chance to make history—or at least headlines.

Sexual rivalries may have also played a part—Forçade’s love interest, former Berkeley Barb reporter Gabrielle Schang, had recently dumped him for Sanders. In fact, some sources maintain that finding out Schang was in Miami with Sanders was what prompted him to go there and assume the role of protest leader in the first place—and that he took a New York City taxi-cab all the way down in a split-instant decision!

Finally, there were the inevitable rumors that Forçade was a paid agent provocateur—assigned a task of discrediting the protest movement as kneejerk nihilism, and even tilting the election to law-and-order candidate Nixon. In a possible revenge strategy by Hoffman for Forçade’s media zap against him over the Steal This Book affair, the old Yippies (or somebody) succeeded in selling this spin to the mainstream press. Wrote Jack Anderson in the Washington Post: “Published reports claim that the young radicals who slashed tires, threw rocks and terrorized Republicans at the national convention were really on the GOP payroll.” Mike Royko in the Chicago Tribune: “Is somebody in the White House the real leader of the Zippies?” Both stories mentioned Forçade by name, and Anderson even revealed his real name.

The Miami protests did indeed explode into violence, and even the Zippies afterwards said that real agents provocateurs had been at work. In an effort to split the Zippies from other groups at Miami—particularly Vietnam Veterans Against the War—poison-pen leaflets were distributed bearing Forçade’s face in the style of a “WANTED” poster, accusing him of dealing heroin and getting vets hooked on smack. This was almost certainly part of the FBI’s COINTELPRO (Counter-Intelligence Program), which widely used such tactics against the New Left and especially the Black Panthers (as declassification of documents subsequently revealed). A goon squad of burly crew-cut men with shirts reading “FUC” attacked and beat up protesters. It was said this stood for Florida Undercover Coalition, a semi-official extremist wing of the Miami police.

Worse, the Miami protests failed to win the media attention that had riveted the nation and the world in the summer of ’68. Wrote historian Todd Gitlin in his account of the protest movement, The Whole World is Watching: “There was, in fact, far less live coverage of the demonstrations at the 1972 Republican Convention in Miami Beach, though those demonstrations were numerically larger than the Chicago events.”

But the real trouble came in the aftermath—when Forçade was charged by federal prosecutors with possession of a firebomb and intention to incinerate the convention center. (He had been arrested during the protests for attempting to steal a portrait of Lyndon Johnson from the convention center, but the charge didn’t stick.) The nostalgia for Chicago ’68 was becoming too real. If convicted, he faced a lengthy prison term.

Initially, he considered going underground. He laid low for weeks, checking into motels under false names with Cindy Ornsteen (while planting the rumor that he had fled to Argentina). Finally he turned himself in to face the charges—and in one last hurrah of bravado boasted to the feds that the Weathermen would soon break him out of jail (as they recently had Timothy Leary). Shotgun-wielding guards were posted outside his cell around the clock.

Forçade was cleared of the charges, but the episode prompted a radical change of direction in his life. On the lam with Ornsteen, he had arrived at a new strategy to realize his ambitions—to build the radical press movement and effect social change—but this time from the shadows rather than the limelight. And, this time, to get rich in the process.

THE HIGH TIMES YEARS: THE CONSPIRACY REALIZED

1974 was a turning point. US troops were finally home from Vietnam. Abbie Hoffman, wanted on a cocaine sale rap, went underground. Jerry Rubin dropped out of activist politics. Richard Nixon resigned to avoid facing impeachment proceedings. And Tom Forçade launched High Times magazine.

The concept was brilliant, and more successful than Forçade himself had anticipated. A whole industry of marijuana paraphernalia and growing equipment had sprung up in recent years, and needed a place to advertise. And there was a public eager for the magazine’s unique mixture of sophisticated alternative journalism and marijuana pornography. A small print run disappeared from the news-stands in a flash; more were printed, and they too were gone in the blink of an eye. It was an instant sensation.

As Albert Goldman would write in a retrospective in High Times on the magazine’s founder 15 years after his death: “Starting the magazine on a $20,000 shoestring, Forçade would see the circulation double with every issue for years, until at its peak, in 1978, High Times was read by four million people a month, grossed five million dollars a year and had been acclaimed as the ‘publishing success story of the seventies.’ The same shrewdness exemplified by the concept and the financing was evinced in the design and packaging of the product… Forçade produced a slick knock-off of the paramount magazine formula of recent times: the Playboy-Penthouse sex mag. His reasoning was flawless. Dope was the sex of the ’70s: a universal pleasure fighting for full acceptance… [W]hy shouldn’t the formula that worked for pussy work for pot?”

Forçade had found his true calling. He had once theorized to the UPS: “You’re going to have to identify…some sort of base that the straight press can’t co-opt. Either sex, drugs or politics.” Precisely because drugs were illegal, they fit the bill perfectly. Sex could be commodified, and politics could go soft. But dope was inexorably outlaw—and especially after Nixon, who had launched a “War on Drugs,” and the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). High Times was inherently oppositional.

In addition to full-color centerfolds of high-grade marijuana, there were columnists—principally Ed Rosenthal and Mel Frank—who provided explicit instructions on how to grow the stuff, and one, “‘R.’, Dope Connoisseur,” who reviewed the latest strains. As the magazine was popularized, the homegrown movement flourished. There were also first-hand accounts of smuggling, and domestic growers followed in the footsteps of High Times journalists to bring back exotic strains from Morocco, Afghanistan and Nepal.

But being the Hugh Hefner of the dope culture also fueled Forçade’s paranoia. While he was both full owner and real editorial director (closely managing the official publisher, Andy Kowl, and editor, Ed Dwyer), his name did not appear in the magazine. When he wrote, it was under pseudonyms like “Leslie Morrison.” At first High Times operated out of the UPS office; eventually both moved to a bigger space at East 27th Street. Forçade (who now developed a penchant for white suits—again with matching cowboy hat and ever-present shades) rented a loft across the street, or stayed in nearby hotels, where he hosted conclaves with the staff. He ceased to be a visible figure—he now craved anonymity as avidly as he had once craved notoriety. He had become the Howard Hughes of the counter-culture, as much as the Hugh Hefner.

His old sense of absurdist humor was still at work. The company he formed as official publisher of High Times was dubbed the Trans-High Corporation, or THC—the acronym for tetrahydro-cannabinol, the psycho-active ingredient in marijuana. Its official icon was the P-38, a twin-tailed World War II fighter which Forçade re-envisioned as the ultimate smuggler plane.

A remnant faction of the Yippies, meanwhile, continued to exist under the leadership of Dana Beal, from a building at 9 Bleecker Street in the East Village. They continued to launch protests at national political conventions (Kansas City, 1976), but marijuana legalization became their special cause. They held public “smoke-ins” around the country, the most prominent being the annual affairs in Washington DC on July 4, New York’s Fifth Avenue on May 1, and Washington Square Park on Halloween. They also launched their own publication, Yipster Times. Forçade and Beal remained close collaborators—High Times publicized and covered the Yippie events, and Tom sunk money into them.

He also sunk money into an array of other publications. Just before High Times was founded, the Underground Press Syndicate officially changed its name to the Alternative Press Syndicate, hoping to win greater mainstream legitimacy—and less heat from the authorities. The APS launched its own magazine, Alternative Media, published at the High Times offices, and conceived as a more serious and activist-oriented sibling journal. Forçade also quietly provided seed money for many new additions to the APS network around the country—from gay and feminist publications to the burgeoning ecologist, anti-nuclear and Native American press.

When the punk sub-culture exploded, many old hippies were aghast, but Forçade cheered it on, providing seed money, advertisers and national distribution for Punk magazine, the brainchild of cartoonist John Holmstrom (who did the back-cover art for the Ramones’ third album, 1977’s Rocket to Russia, and the front-cover art for the following year’s Road to Ruin). This became the prototype for a whole universe of punk fanzines, and was key to popularizing the genre in America. Forçade also slapped down $400,000 for a documentary of the Sex Pistols’ legendary and star-crossed 1978 US tour, DOA.

Forçade even for a time published (it is widely suspected) his own ostensible rivals to High Times, called Stone Age and Head—another of his obsessive pranks. And he opened his own bookstore in Soho, called New Morning (from the title of both a Bob Dylan album and a Weather Underground manifesto).

High Times, it must be emphasized, contained intelligent journalism, not just pot pornography. One star reporter was Rob Singer (who in the ’90s would serve a prison term for a huge California marijuana operation, which involved moving the stuff around in a fleet of refrigerated cross-country rigs). In 1976, he authored an in-depth and highly prescient piece, “Dope Dictators,” which documented the drug ties of various despots around the planet and predicted: “In the years to come the rhetoric of the Dope War will replace rhetoric of the Cold War as the justification for foreign military intervention. Instead of sending in the Marines, Washington will send in the narcs.” These lines anticipated the 1989 invasion of Panama, and the secret war currently underway in Colombia.

Key to High Times’ success was Forçade’s partnership with Larry Flynt, the publisher of Hustler. Flynt bucked the Mafia, which had traditionally maintained control of pornography distribution, by establishing his own distribution company for Hustler and his other magazines. High Times also used this company, which—in a practice unheard-of in the business—paid for magazines up front. This allowed Forçade to maintain High Times’ extensive payroll (it is said two staffers were hired just to roll joints for the rest!), throw lavish parties regularly, and still sink money into political causes.

And Forçade’s success extended to his personal life—he finally won the love of Gabrielle Schang, who became his common-law wife (and editor of Alternative Media).

However, there were also contradictions eating away at the dream. Forçade, it became clear, was (like Abbie Hoffman) manic-depressive—or, more accurately, afflicted with what is now called seasonal affective disorder, SAD. He was full of frenetic energy in the spring and summer, but grew despondent as the days grew shorter. His mood swings made life difficult for High Times staff. In one episode, he staged a “Saturday Night Massacre,” firing everybody—only to hire them all back the next day. Andy Kowl related to Albert Goldman an incident in which Tom produced a .45 pistol in the midst of an argument—only to hand it to Kowl and demand he shoot him.

While Forçade ploughed money into the DC-based National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws (NORML, founded 1970), he could also lord it over the organization in the most arrogant manner. In one famous episode, he showed up at a NORML benefit party at a posh Park Avenue apartment and intentionally offended the hostess—putting his boots up on the polished wood table, lighting a joint and meeting protests with “Go fuck yourself!”

Most bizarrely, even as High Times became massively successful, Forçade continued to smuggle massive quantities of marijuana into the country. He established a clandestine “smoke-easy” at 714 Broadway, where the city’s pot dealers congregated to share samples, compare prices and conduct business. Goldman relates one escapade in which Forçade was personally overseeing the ferrying of boatloads of Colombian to a drop-off point from a freighter off the Florida coast. The operation was discovered by the police, and Forçade fled into the Everglades, where he hid out for days before he made his escape.

One such operation in the spring of 1978 went horribly wrong—and cost the life of Forçade’s close friend and longtime smuggling partner Jack (O’Lantern) Coombs, who was flying in a load of Colombian in a twin-engine cargo plane. Forçade was to meet him mid-air in a smaller plane and guide him to a Florida drop-off point, where the cargo would be parachuted to a waiting ground crew. Coombs’ plane came in too low, hit tree level—and burst into flames. Forçade, it was said by those who knew him, always blamed himself for his friend’s death. This is counted as the beginning of his downward spiral.

Some of High Times’ journalistic coups also backfired. In 1978, President Carter’s drug policy advisor Dr. Peter Bourne—already under fire for allegedly approving a Quaalude prescription for a secretary’s recreational use—was spotted snorting coke at a NORML party in the fashionable DC district of Georgetown. High Times writer Craig Copetas had been present, and the magazine eagerly reported this hot gossip, hoping to shame Carter into following through on his promises to decriminalize marijuana. Predictably, it had exactly the opposite effect. Bourne was forced to resign, and Carter stepped up aid to Mexico to spray the defoliant paraquat on marijuana fields.

A key turning point in High Times’ fortunes came with the attempted assassination of Larry Flynt. In March 1978, during a legal battle against obscenity charges in Georgia’s Gwinnett County, Flynt and his lawyer were shot outside the courthouse. A white supremacist militant later confessed to the crime, but rumors of Mafia or CIA involvement abounded. They both survived, but Flynt was confined to a wheelchair for life—and during his lengthy recovery, the distribution business fell into disarray. High Times lost the sweet distribution deal on which it depended. Economic chaos loomed for the magazine.

Later that year, Gabrielle Schang interviewed Tom on tape at their Greenwich Village apartment, at his request. He spoke about his ongoing dreams of building a viable alternative press, about his fears of government surveillance. (“Effectively, I’ve already spent the last 10 years in jail—I’ve been under such close surveillance.”) Incredibly, he denied ever breaking any laws. (“My only crime is not agreeing with the straight media.”) He boasted of his voracious reading and work habits. Asked what motivated him, he said: “I have a deep fear of killing myself out of boredom.”

On November 16, 1978, alone in his bed, with Gabrielle in the very next room, Tom Forçade, depressed, insomniac and paranoid (and—allegedly—having taken Quaaludes in an effort to sleep), shot himself in the temple with a pearl-handled .22.

He was 33 years old.

THE AFTERMATH: STRUGGLE FOR THE LEGACY

There were, of course, the inevitable rumors of government involvement. Forçade’s old Yippie friend AJ Weberman—a notorious conspiracy theorist, author of the book Coup d’Etat in America, claiming Watergate burglar E. Howard Hunt killed JFK for the CIA—immediately charged that Schang was a paid agent and had killed Forçade for the CIA. He noted that right-handed Tom had been shot in the left temple. Mel Frank would assert that Forçade had been followed by mysterious black cars in his final weeks.

Schang became the new High Times editor, but control of THC passed to Forçade’s lawyer Michael Kennedy, and she remained at the helm only a few issues. A succession of new editors followed, but it was clear the magazine was foundering.

The general cultural atmosphere changed rapidly. Reagan was elected. Hippies—and even Yippies, like Jerry Rubin—became yuppies. Colombia’s marijuana syndicates morphed into the sinister cocaine cartels, and coke replaced pot as America’s fashionable youth drug—but now as a symbol of affluence, not rebellion. Hardcore porn put the sexual frankness of the old underground press to shame, but utterly betrayed any ethic of equalitarian eroticism and de-objectification.

High Times, its circulation plummeting, followed this cultural de-evolution. Under editor Larry “Ratso” Sloman (who would later write an unflattering biography of Abbie Hoffman), photos of sparkling cocaine replaced marijuana buds and hashish balls in the centerfold spreads. Serious journalism nearly disappeared from the magazine. The APS withered, and Alternative Media ceased publication.

The remnant Yippies around Dana Beal (adopting a plethora of ad hoc front organizations) continued with their smoke-ins and protests at the political conventions (Detroit, New York, 1980; San Francisco, Dallas, 1984), but with greatly reduced numbers and far less support from High Times. Forçade’s final interview was run in the premier issue of Overthrow, as Yipster Times was re-named in 1979. Adopting a punk aesthetic and launching the American branch of the UK Rock Against Racism movement, the latter-day Yips that year opened a rock club at 10 Bleecker Street (just a few doors down from CBGB), popularly called Studio 10 but officially the Thomas K. Forçade Memorial Multi-Media Center. It would be evicted in 1981, with the gentrification of the East Village. Overthrow would finally cease publication in the late ’80s (perhaps marking an official end of the underground press movement), although Beal continues even now to reside in the building at 9 Bleecker, where a faded sign over the door reads “Yipster Times”—an incongruous anachronism among upscale boutiques and eateries. He is currently touting it as “The Yippie Museum.”

In 1986, as crack was infesting the streets of America’s cities, Reagan launched his own renewed War on Drugs. In the inevitable crackdown on the paraphernalia industry, High Times’ advertising base was virtually wiped out; the Justice Department even launched an investigation into the magazine for conspiracy to distribute paraphernalia. As the cheap freeze-dried variety became ubiquitous, cocaine quickly went from being a symbol of yuppie prosperity to a stigma associated with the urban poor and criminal element. Ironically, the official anti-drug hysteria came just as the CIA’s “contra” operations in Nicaragua were overseeing massive cocaine imports into the United States. (Abbie Hoffman, who had cut a deal with the authorities and come out from underground in 1980, made opposition to the secret war in Nicaragua one of his new activist campaigns. He too would fall victim to an apparent suicide in 1989.)

It was clear that High Times had to change. Steve Hager was brought in as the new editor in ’86. He cleaned out the cocaine, brought back the marijuana and a degree of political idealism. John Holmstrom, formerly of Punk, became publisher. In the late ’80s and ’90s High Times underwent something of a renaissance, with writers such as Peter Gorman, Steve Wishnia, Preston Peet and myself covering the War on Drugs as a serious political issue. Dean Latimer, the news editor from the Forçade era, was brought back. But this came to an end in subsequent editorial purges. High Times remains today the proverbial shadow of its former self—and something of a self-parody, with lots of pot pornography and sophomoric humor, but very little real journalism or political consciousness.

Controversy also surrounded Forçade’s stated desire that a certain percentage of High Times’ profits go to NORML in perpetuity. Former NORML board member Don Wirtshafter has accused THC of cooking the books to avoid giving the organization what it is due under Forçade’s deal. In 2000, THC was officially turned over from the trustees of Forçade’s estate (including some fairly conservative family members in Arizona) to those who had been on High Times staff for more than 10 years—again, in accord with Forçade’s stated wishes. But both Ed Rosenthal and John Holmstrom have sued THC, claiming they didn’t get what they were owed under the arrangement. Rosenthal lost his case, and Holmstrom’s was dropped. Michael Kennedy (while never a trustee or share-holder) is still seen as the real brains behind THC.

Marijuana, of course, remains illegal, with some 50,000 doing time for the stuff nationwide (out of over a million nonviolent drug offenders)—although several states have decriminalized, and several others passed laws or referenda legalizing medical marijuana, sparking a states’ rights showdown with the feds. Ed Rosenthal has been officially licensed to grow medical marijuana for the city of Oakland, California, and is prevailing in the courts against federal efforts to prosecute him on various felonies.

New publications on the High Times model have sprung up—principally Cannabis Culture, Heads and Skunk (all published in Canada), Weed World (UK), Cáñamo (Spain) and Stickypoint (Australia). The whole notion of an “alternative press” has been changed by the Internet in ways Forçade never could have anticipated, with webzines and blogs filling a similar niche. The Independent Media Centers, which emerged from the 1999 Seattle protests against the World Trade Organization, are in some ways an updated answer to the UPS. But the IMCs are a uniform franchise, contrasting the homespun individualism of the old underground press. And the sheer abundance of electronic media also has a marginalizing effect. With the IMCs lost amid a cacophony of right-wing blogs, there is certainly no sense of a unified oppositional culture animating the new digital alternative media.

Yet, the USA is once again bitterly divided over an unpopular war, riven by stark cultural contradictions; and issues of government surveillance and abuse of power have only grown more pressing since 9-11. These parallels make this an opportune moment to look back, re-asses what has brought us to this point. The legacy of Tom Forçade is now more worthy of examination than at any time since his death.

Bill Weinberg is a former High Times news editor and currently editor of the online journal World War 4 Report. He is the author of Homage to Chiapas: The New Indigenous Struggles in Mexico (Verso Books, 2000), and is at work on a book on the secret war in Colombia.

This story originally appeared in the January/February edition of Cannabis Culture
http://cannabisculture.com

RESOURCES:

Tom Forçade reminiscences at AcidTrip.com
http://www.acidtrip.com/secure/forcade.htm

Abbie Hoffman website
http://abbiehoffman.org

Ed Rosenthal’s website
http://www.quicktrading.com

John Holmstrom’s website
http://www.johnholmstrom.com

Yippie Pie-Man’s Homepage
http://www.pieman.org/pageb.html

The Yippie Museum
http://yippiemuseum.org

NORML
http://www.norml.org

High Times
http://www.hightimes.com

Cannabis Culture on the Forçade Trust controversy
http://cannabisculture.com/articles/1562.html

Accuracy in Media on Ed Dwyer: “From Pot to Porn to AARP”
http://www.aim.org/aim_column/2438_0_3_0_C/

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Special to WORLD WAR 4 REPORT, April 1, 2007
Reprinting permissible with attribution

Continue ReadingTOM FORÇADE: UNSUNG HERO OF THE COUNTER-CULTURE 

RAPE AND REFORM IN PAKISTAN

Real Change on Anti-Woman “Hudood” Laws?

by Abira Ashfaq, Peacework

In November 2006, women in Pakistan and around the world celebrated the passage of the Women’s Protection Bill, a rare instance of positive legislative reform offering some relief from Pakistan’s infamous “Hudood Ordinances”—a set of religious-based laws that includes extreme restrictions and punishments for women. While celebration is justified, the women’s movement in Pakistan has a long way to go.

While one dictator passed the infamous Hudood Ordinances, another, an Ataturk for the 2000s, delivered the Women’s Protection Bill. But by all indicators, women have much to achieve. Sixty-four percent of Pakistani women are illiterate. Most work in the unregulated, informal sector, and play a limited role in governance. Elements of the Muslim right wing have developed strong ties with the military, and most governments have to take the Muslim right wing into account when making decisions. For many women’s rights activists, while the new legislation does amend the Hudood laws to a limited extent, its greater significance is that it shows that persistent work by the Pakistani women’s rights movement can make a difference.

The Hudood Ordinances

For 27 years the Hudood Ordinances have dominated the discourse on women’s rights in Pakistan. In 1979, Zia-ul-Huq promulgated these laws in an effort to consolidate military power through an Islamization campaign. Passed on the eve of the Prophet’s birthday, these were hastily drafted by a reconstituted Council of Islamic Ideology. Of its 17 members, only 4 had any legal background. The Ordinances, which changed rules for some offenses covered by the secular criminal laws inherited from the days of British rule (the Pakistan Penal Code) and also created new ones, covered: zina (adultery and fornication), zina-bil-jabr (rape), theft, armed robbery, qazf (false accusation of zina), the prohibited use of alcohol and narcotics, and the procedure for whipping. Zina offenses include adultery, non-marital sex, and related offenses.

Hudood is plural for hadd (limit). Offenses covered under the Hudood Ordinances are punishable by hadd, or maximum, punishment. For zina crimes, these punishments are whipping and stoning to death. These sentences are applicable only if the accused is a Muslim and if he or she confesses—or if four adult, pious, male witnesses testify as to the crime. If the evidence falls short, the accused is subject to tazir or lesser punishment, including “rigorous imprisonment” of four to ten years, whipping, and a fine.

The number of women imprisoned for zina went up an astounding 3000% from 1979 to 1988. Most convicted, though, were given a jail sentence under tazir versus hadd, as the government was rarely able to meet the rigorous evidence standard of four male eyewitnesses. In 2004, out of 77,420 Hudood cases, 3817 were zina cases. Of these zina cases fewer than 800 resulted in final convictions. As those accused were not eligible for bail, women undergoing trial ended up spending months in jail as their cases were funneled through the broken and bribery-ridden lower courts.

The Hudood Ordinances have primarily been used against women from the lowest socio-economic stratum. Nevertheless, the laws carry the dreaded potential of disempowering all women and establishing authoritarianism as dictated by the most conservative, patriarchal interpretation of Shariah. Hence, women’s rights groups like the Women’s Action Forum, the Aurat Foundation, and Shirkat Gah have mobilized against the Ordinances. Lawyers like Asma Jehangir and Hina Jilani, and activists like Mumtaz Khawar and Fareeda Shaheed have gradually became household names for their opposition to Hudood and their work for women’s empowerment.

Rape: Whose Crime Is It?

A serious criticism of the Hudood Ordinances, one for which they have become notorious, is their conflation of zina (adultery or fornication) with zina-bil-jabr (rape). Rape was also punishable under Hudood. Quite perversely, when a rape victim was unable to convince the court that she was raped, her allegation of rape (or her pregnancy) was treated as a confession of zina. Women’s groups used such cases to highlight the morbid injustice of the Hudood laws. One was the 1983 case of Safia Bibi, a blind 16-year-old girl who was raped by the sons of a wealthy landowner and was sentenced to three years in prison, 15 lashes, and a fine. Another was the case of Jehan Mina, a 13-year-old raped by her uncle and cousin. She too was convicted of zina after becoming pregnant. The Federal Shariat Court reduced her sentence, finding her “confession” faulty. Zafran Bibi’s case hit the press in 2002. She was raped by her brother-in-law and became pregnant, and was convicted and sentenced to be stoned to death. In June 2003, the Federal Shariat Court acquitted Zafran Bibi, saying that a rape victim should not be considered to have committed a sexual offense and should not be punished.

Due to intense international and domestic condemnation of the state’s misogynist punishment of rape victims, the opinion around the Hudood Ordinances has largely been negative. And under the scrutiny of civil society, Pakistan has never witnessed a stoning execution under Hudood. The Federal Shariat Court, created by General Zia in 1980 to hear appeals on Hudood cases, has overturned many cases. In 1981 the FSC found that the practice of stoning was repugnant to the injunctions of Islam. In 1989, it recommended that the rape law be amended to require two male witnesses instead of four. The Court has thus repeatedly expressed its own discomfort with the laws as they stood.

Typical Zina Cases

The rape cases demonstrate the worst of the law’s enforcement. Most cases under the zina laws do not involve women who have been raped, but rather women who are victims of a different type of violence—women being punished by their parents or husbands in a continuing progression of psychological and physical abuse that starts at home and continues with the justice system. Unsurprisingly, a large number of the women I spoke to held for zina crimes at the Karachi Jail in 2004 had suffered domestic violence, were not literate, and worked the most menial jobs. Saman’s and Zarina’s stories were typical.

Saman, 18, from Parachinar in the north, married against her parents’ wishes. Enraged, they had her lawful husband arrested on zina charges. She was arrested a few days later. Her parents procured a fake marriage certificate and claimed that she had been married before. Therefore, her “new” marriage was invalid and a crime under Hudood.

Zarina, 30, was forced by her stepbrother to marry Hanif, her first husband. He was about 30 years older than she was, and she suspected he received a payment for the transaction. He would beat her when he was high on drugs. She complained to her brother about the domestic violence. About three years ago, she left her husband and married Falak, a carpenter. She had a daughter with this man, a child she has held onto tightly even while in jail. Her ex-husband got a police officer involved in the case. “When I appeared before the magistrate I told him how Hanif abused me, but I was still sent into jail custody.” She says Falak shows up at court and threatens to kidnap her daughter.

It isn’t easy for women who have limited education to obtain divorce decrees and use the legal system.

Resistance to the Hudood Laws

In 2003, the National Commission on the Status of Women in Pakistan, a statutory body created by the government, recommended repealing the Hudood Ordinances. They pointed out several errors—a minor could be punished for zina instead of being considered a victim of statutory rape; witnesses’ testimony was evaluated based on gender and piety instead of on their credibility; stoning is not mentioned in the Quran.

In 1997, the Commission of Inquiry of Women asked for repeal, saying the laws violate both the UN Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (ratified by Pakistan in 1996) and Article 25 of the Pakistani constitution guaranteeing women and men equal rights.

In 2006, a new body of the Council of Islamic Ideology recommended serious amendments to the Hudood Ordinances. The voices representing support for the laws have remained on the fringes, lumping together all resistance to Hudood as part of a conspiracy between Western interests and local NGOs.

The Women’s Protection Bill of 2006

In 2006, GEO TV initiated a debate on the controversial nature of the Hudood laws and presented its audience with the views of diverse religious scholars, thus further normalizing criticism of the laws. In the wake of this event, the Women’s Protection Bill was passed. It does not repeal the Hudood Ordinances, but makes some significant changes to the zina sections. The Bill passed on November 23 in the Senate. Many abstained from voting and many staged a walkout.

The women’s movement was split; while some ardently favored a complete abrogation of the laws, others were pleased with the semblance of a shift, the first in 27 years. The Hudood Ordinances had survived despite efforts to repeal them by prime ministers Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto. Their existence had seemed to be etched in stone.

Since the passage of the Bill, rape and other crimes whose punishment is not prescribed by the Quran will be covered by the Pakistan Penal Code and be punishable under tazir. The complaint process is amended to discourage the filing of false accusations of zina. The complainant must take four male eye-witnesses to a sessions judge. To issue a summons, the judge must then ensure that the witnesses meet Islamic standards of morality and truthfulness and that a prima facie case exists. Lying witnesses may be punished. The term “confession” is amended to be an explicit and voluntary admission in court before a judge. Zina defendants are now eligible for bail. Most importantly, complaints of rape can no longer be turned against the victim.

The Women’s Protection Bill does function as a safety valve—easing off some of the most intense international and domestic pressure against Pakistan’s anti-woman laws—but it does not really change the balance of power (mullah-military versus women). The Hudood Ordinances’ provisions for crimes against person and property, and their corporal punishments, still stand. Zina and false accusations are still punishable by stoning. Arguments that the high evidentiary standard provides a safeguard do not give solace. A woman I met at the Karachi Jail said her husband filed a zina complaint against her. He conjured up sixteen witnesses, mostly family members, who claimed to have known about the affair. Under the current complaint process—even since the passage of the Women’s Protection Bill—if he is able to produce four “eyewitnesses,” she could still be sentenced to death by stoning.

Activist and lawyer Asma Jehangir writes that “[t]he level of morality in Pakistan was better prior to the promulgation of the Hudood laws in 1979.” An appeal to “morality” appears hypocritical in a country where the state immorally denies women political and economic rights, yet one can see its pragmatism. Pakistan is a place where a vibrant, urban women’s movement, a largely tolerant civil society, and a liberal higher court system co-exist with the powerful Jamat-i-Islami, a robust system of right-wing religious education, and a misogynist police force. A lot of work has to be done ground-up to tip the balance toward equality. Working for women’s health, education, and economic autonomy is the only way.

Abira Ashfaq has worked as a detention attorney in the United States for over five years representing non-citizens detained by the US immigration authorities. She has also worked in Pakistan with War Against Rape and Lawyers for Human Rights and Legal Aid.

This story originally appeared in the February issue of Peacework,
American Friends Service Committee (AFSC), Cambridge, MA
http://www.peaceworkmagazine.org/node/452

References available on request.

From our weblog:

Pakistan: rape laws challenged, Islamists exploit backlash
WW4 REPORT, Nov. 26, 2006
/node/2839

Pakistan arrests rape victim
WW4 REPORT, June 14, 2005
/node/622

Pakistan: girl was poker debt bride
WW4 REPORT, Feb. 28, 2005
/node/3251

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Reprinted by WORLD WAR 4 REPORT, April 1, 2007
Reprinting permissible with attribution

Continue ReadingRAPE AND REFORM IN PAKISTAN 

SOMALIA: THE NEW RESISTANCE

Successor Factions to the Islamic Courts Union

by Osman Yusuf, WW4 REPORT

The downfall of the Islamic militants who had control over most of south and central Somalia until late last year has created a power vacuum that the transitional government is not at present able to fill.

In several parts of the war ravaged nation, real political authority has fallen to clan leaders and revived clan militias, often comprised of the same gunmen who had served under the Islamic Courts Union. In many areas they remain the primary source of power.

This localized prototype of authority is not new to Somali’s rural communities. But the abrupt shift of power from the Courts to clan leaders has been more destabilizing in tense urban settings such as Mogadishu-where the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), backed up by Ethiopian and African Union troops, is attempting to impose direct rule.

The crumbling of the Courts Union, combined with the failure of the TFG to provide even a token administrative presence, has produced ideal conditions for the revival of armed criminality. Renewed sub-clan clashes in Mogadishu and south-central Somalia is seen as increasingly likely.

Observers on the scene say some members of the Islamic Courts Union may have transformed into a new organization called Shabaab, where youthful remnants of the Islamists are being trained for specialized tasks in the resistance within Mogadishu.

Shabaab means youth or young men in Arabic. Sources in Mogadishu say Shabaab is made up of young Islamic Courts supporters who have come of age in the ruthless and vicious reality of warlord Somalia. They are less educated and more rigid than the older clerics. They have had no formal jobs, apart from earning a living through using their guns to protect foreigners or fighting for those who can pay. The only piece of clothing that signifies their membership in Shabaab is a red scarf wrapped around the face and head, so they can rapidly disappear into the populace.

Sources, including a former leader of the Islamic Courts Union, also confide that the Shabaab’s commander is Aden Hashi Ayro, a young Somali said to have been trained in Afghanistan, believed to be in his late 20s or early 30s. Those close to Ayro describe him as the portrait of an intransigent young militant who is at odds with his own clan and bitter over foreign meddling in Somalia. A number of assassinations and massacres of foreigners in Somalia are attributed to him.

“This group of young men is very lethal,” said Osman Abdi, an activist who works with the Mogadishu-based Somali Human Rights Defenders. “They claim in statements that they are linked to the deposed Islamic Courts Union. They have posted a video massage on the ICU’s website, qaadisiya.com, late last month.”

Increased assassinations in Mogadishu in recent weeks have been blamed on the Islamists’ remnants, and mostly on Shabaab. The group has also threatened suicide attacks against the Ugandan AU peacekeepers that are now being deployed.

A Somali who recently fled the fighting to Nairobi reported that he witnessed a small Shabaab rally in Mogadishu, in which hooded men threatened to attack Ethiopian and Somali government troops in Somalia.” He echoed the street talk of the Shabaab’s formidable prowess. “They are very ruthless and relentless fighters who can scale walls and jump from moving trucks without dropping their weapons,” he said.

Other Somalis and analysts suspect Shabaab may have already mutated into another new organization, the Popular Resistance Movement in the Land of the Two Migrations (PRM).

“The Shabaab were elite members in the Islamic courts militia and collapsed as a group following the ousting of the courts,” says Abdurahman Warsame, a Mogadishu-based journalist who corresponds for foreign news agencies. “It is possible that this new group is the Shabaab in a new name, though that cannot be verified and the PRM has never stated that clearly.” He adds that the PRM claims responsibility for the near-daily attacks on Ethiopian and TFG troops.”

The PRM, formed in January, has posted a new warning against the peacekeepers. “We promise we shall welcome them with bullets from heavy guns, exploding cars and young men eager to carry out martyrdom operations against these colonial forces,” said a man appearing in a video posting on an Islamist website reading from a statement.

“The Ugandan troops and those from the other African states who are being sent to Somalia are in our eyes no better than the Ethiopians who are occupying our country by force,” said the statement signed by Harith Aba-Sadiq, “Organizer of Mogadishu People’s Resistance.”

“Somalia is not a place where you will earn a salary—it is a place where you will die. The salary you are seeking will be used to transport your bodies.”

The authenticity of the video, a replica of those released in Iraq and Afghanistan by Islamist insurgents, could not be independently verified. But the warning came as the first batch of peacekeepers from Uganda was to arrive in Mogadishu. They have already claimed responsibility for the March 12 attacks in which two Ugandan soldiers were injured when their convoy was ambushed while heading to a Mogadishu hotel at night.

Other groups which have claimed responsibility for attacks in Mogadishu since the fall of the Islamic Courts Union include Al-Harakah al-Muqawamah, Al-Tawhid Wal-Jihad Brigades, and al-Sha’biyah fi al-Bilad al-Hijratayn.

With 4,000 troops in the streets, backed up by Ethiopian and AU forces, it is fair to say the TFG remains in control of Mogadishu. But near-daily attacks from the Islamist resistance may prevent them from extending their rule to the rest of Somalia for a while to come.

Osman Yusuf is a freelance journalist based in Nairobi.

See also:

SOMALIA: WASHINGTON’S WARLORDS LOSE OUT
by Rohan Pearce, Green Left Weekly
WW4 REPORT #124, August 2006
/node/2259

From our weblog:

Somalia: 12,000 displaced by Mogadishu fighting
WW4 REPORT, March 30, 2007
/node/3483

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Special to WORLD WAR 4 REPORT, April 1, 2007
Reprinting permissible with attribution

Continue ReadingSOMALIA: THE NEW RESISTANCE