HONDURAS: THE BANANA CONNECTION —AGAIN

by Nikolas Kozloff, Señor Chichero

When the Honduran military overthrew the democratically elected government of Manuel Zelaya there might have been a sigh of relief in the corporate board rooms of Chiquita banana. Earlier this year the Cincinnati-based fruit company joined Dole in criticizing the government in Tegucigalpa which had raised the minimum wage by 60%. Chiquita complained that the new regulations would cut into company profits, requiring the firm to spend more on costs than in Costa Rica: 20 cents more to produce a crate of pineapple and ten cents more to produce a crate of bananas to be exact. In all, Chiquita fretted that it would lose millions under Zelaya’s labor reforms, since the company produced around 8 million crates of pineapple and 22 million crates of bananas per year.

When the minimum wage decree came down Chiquita sought help and appealed to the Honduran National Business Council, known by its Spanish acronym COHEP. Like Chiquita, COHEP was unhappy about Zelaya’s minimum wage measure. AmĂ­lcar Bulnes, the group’s president, argued that if the government went forward with the minimum wage increase employers would be forced to let workers go, thus increasing unemployment in the country. The most important business organization in Honduras, COHEP groups 60 trade associations and chambers of commerce representing every sector of the Honduran economy. According to its own Web site, COHEP is the political and technical arm of the Honduran private sector, supports trade agreements and provides “critical support for the democratic system.”

The international community should not impose economic sanctions against the coup regime in Tegucigalpa, COHEP argues, because this would worsen Honduras’ social problems. In its new role as the mouthpiece for Honduras’ poor, COHEP declares that Honduras has already suffered from earthquakes, torrential rains and the global financial crisis. Before punishing the coup regime with punitive measures, COHEP argues, the United Nations and the Organization of American States should send observer teams to Honduras to investigate how sanctions might affect 70% of Hondurans who live in poverty. Bulnes meanwhile has voiced his support for the coup regime of Roberto Micheletti and argues that the political conditions in Honduras are not propitious for Zelaya’s return from exile.

Chiquita: From Arbenz to Bananagate
It’s not surprising that Chiquita would seek out and ally itself to socially and politically backward forces in Honduras. Colsiba, the coordinating body of banana plantation workers in Latin America, says the fruit company has failed to supply its workers with necessary protective gear and has dragged its feet when it comes to signing collective labor agreements in Nicaragua, Guatemala and Honduras.

Colsiba compares the infernal labor conditions on Chiquita plantations to concentration camps. It’s an inflammatory comparison, yet may contain a degree of truth. Women working on Chiquita’s plantations in Central America labor from 6:30 AM until 7 at night, their hands burning up inside rubber gloves. Some workers are as young as 14. Central American banana workers have sought damages against Chiquita for exposing them in the field to DBCP, a dangerous pesticide that causes sterility, cancer and birth defects in children.

Chiquita, formerly known as United Fruit Company and United Brands, has had a long and sordid political history in Central America. Led by Sam “The Banana Man” Zemurray, United Fruit got into the banana business at the turn of the twentieth century. Zemurray once remarked famously, “In Honduras, a mule costs more than a member of parliament.” By the 1920s United Fruit controlled 650,000 acres of the best land in Honduras, almost one quarter of all the arable land in the country. What’s more, the company controlled important roads and railways.

In Honduras the fruit companies spread their influence into every area of life including politics and the military. For such tactics they acquired the name los pulpos (the octopuses, from the way they spread their tentacles). Those who did not play ball with the corporations were frequently found face down on the plantations. In 1904 humorist O. Henry coined the term “Banana Republic” to refer to the notorious United Fruit Company and its actions in Honduras.

In Guatemala, United Fruit supported the CIA-backed 1954 military coup against President Jacobo Arbenz, a reformer who had carried out a land reform package. Arbenz’ overthrow led to more than 30 years of unrest and civil war in Guatemala. Later in 1961, United Fruit lent its ships to CIA-backed Cuban exiles who sought to overthrow Fidel Castro at the Bay of Pigs.

In 1972, United Fruit (now renamed United Brands) propelled Honduran General Oswaldo LĂłpez Arellano to power. The dictator was forced to step down later, however, after the infamous “Bananagate” scandal, which involved United Brands bribes to Arellano. A US federal grand jury accused United Brands of bribing Arellano $1.25 million, with the carrot of another $1.25 million later if the military man agreed to reduce fruit export taxes. During Bananagate, United Brands’ president fell from a New York City skyscraper in an apparent suicide.

Go-Go Clinton Years and Colombia
In Colombia United Fruit also set up shop and during its operations in the South American country developed a no less checkered profile. In 1928, 3,000 workers went on strike against the company to demand better pay and working conditions. At first the company refused to negotiate but later gave in on some minor points, declaring the other demands “illegal” or “impossible.” When the strikers refused to disperse, the military fired on the banana workers, killing scores.

You might think that Chiquita would have reconsidered its labor policies after that but in the late 1990s the company began to ally itself with sinister forces—specifically right wing paramilitaries. Chiquita paid off the men to the tune of more than a million dollars. In its own defense, the company declared that it was merely paying protection money to the paramilitaries.

In 2007, Chiquita paid $25 million to settle a Justice Department investigation into the payments. Chiquita was the first company in US history to be convicted of financial dealings with a designated terrorist organization.

A lawsuit launched against Chiquita victims of the paramilitary violence claimed the firm abetted atrocities including terrorism, war crimes and crimes against humanity. A lawyer for the plaintiffs said that Chiquita’s relationship with the paramilitaries “was about acquiring every aspect of banana distribution and sale through a reign of terror.”

Back in Washington, DC Charles Lindner, Chiquita’s CEO, was busy courting the White House. Lindner had been a big donor to the GOP but switched sides and began to lavish cash on the Democrats and Bill Clinton. Clinton repaid Linder by becoming a key military backer of the government of AndrĂ©s Pastrana which presided over the proliferation of right-wing death squads. At the time the US was pursuing its corporately-friendly free trade agenda in Latin America, a strategy carried out by Clinton’s old boyhood friend Thomas “Mack” McLarty. At the White House, McLarty served as chief of staff and special envoy to Latin America. He’s an intriguing figure who we’ll come back to in a moment.

The Holder-Chiquita Connection
Given Chiquita’s underhanded record in Central America and Colombia, it’s not a surprise that the company later sought to ally itself with COHEP in Honduras. In addition to lobbying business associations in Honduras, however, Chiquita also cultivated relationships with high-powered law firms in Washington. According to the Center for Responsive Politics, Chiquita has paid out $70,000 in lobbying fees to Covington and Burling over the past three years.

Covington is a powerful law firm which advises multinational corporations. Eric Holder, the current Attorney General, a co-chair of the Obama campaign and former Deputy Attorney General under Bill Clinton was up until recently a partner at the firm. At Covington, Holder defended Chiquita as lead counsel in its case with the Justice Department. From his perch at the elegant new Covington headquarters located near the New York Times building in Manhattan, Holder prepped Fernando Aguirre, Chiquita’s CEO, for an interview with 60 Minutes dealing with Colombian death squads.

Holder had the fruit company plead guilty to one count of “engaging in transactions with a specially designated global terrorist organization.” But the lawyer, who was taking in a hefty salary at Covington to the tune of more than $2 million, brokered a sweetheart deal in which Chiquita only paid a $25 million fine over five years. Outrageously, however, not one of the six company officials who approved the payments received any jail time.

The Curious Case of Covington
Look a little deeper and you’ll find that not only does Covington represent Chiquita but also serves as a kind of nexus for the political right intent on pushing a hawkish foreign policy in Latin America. Covington has pursued an important strategic alliance with Kissinger (of Chile 1973 fame) and McLarty Associates (yes, the same Mack McLarty from Clinton-time), a well-known international consulting and strategic advisory firm.

From 1974 to 1981 John Bolton served as an associate at Covington. As US ambassador to the United Nations under George Bush, Bolton was a fierce critic of leftists in Latin America such as Venezuela’s Hugo ChĂĄvez. Furthermore, just recently John Negroponte became Covington’s vice chairman. Negroponte is a former Deputy Secretary of State, director of National Intelligence and US representative to the United Nations.

As US ambassador to Honduras from 1981-1985, Negroponte played a significant role in assisting the US-backed Contra rebels intent on overthrowing the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua. Human rights groups have criticized Negroponte for ignoring human rights abuses committed by Honduran death squads which were funded and trained by the Central Intelligence Agency. Indeed, when Negroponte served as ambassador, his building in Tegucigalpa became one of the largest nerve centers of the CIA in Latin America, with a tenfold increase in personnel.

While there’s no evidence linking Chiquita to the recent coup in Honduras, there’s enough of a confluence of suspicious characters and political heavyweights here to warrant further investigation. From COHEP to Covington to Holder to Negroponte to McLarty, Chiquita has sought out friends in high places, friends who had no love for the progressive labor policies of the Zelaya regime in Tegucigalpa.

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Nikolas Kozloff is the author of Hugo Chåvez: Oil, Politics and the Challenge to the U.S. (Palgrave, 2006) and Revolution! South America and the Rise of the New Left (Palgrave, 2008). His website is Señor Chichero.

From our Daily Report:

Colombia: lawsuit accuses Dole of funding paramilitaries
World War 4 Report, May 27, 2009

Colombia: survivors remember “Bananera Massacre”
World War 4 Report, Dec. 10, 2008

Eric Holder: death-squad defender
World War 4 Report, Nov. 20, 2009

See also:

OTTO REICH’S FINGERPRINTS ON HONDURAS COUP?
by Bill Weinberg, World War 4 Report
World War 4 Report, August 2009

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Reprinted by World War 4 Report, Aug. 1, 2009
Reprinting permissible with attribution

Continue ReadingHONDURAS: THE BANANA CONNECTION —AGAIN 

OTTO REICH’S FINGERPRINTS ON HONDURAS COUP?

U.S. Right Mobilizes to Support Putsch

by Bill Weinberg, World War 4 Report

It’s a sign of hope that no nation on earth has yet recognized the de facto regime that took power in Honduras June 28, when the military summarily deported President Manuel Zelaya to Costa Rica in his pajamas. Protests demanding Zelaya’s return continue in the Central American nation. The struggle has already cost lives. When the army blocked Zelaya’s plane at the airport in Tegucigalpa July 5, security forces opened fire on his supporters who had gathered there. Popular leaders have been arrested or forced into hiding, and some have been killed.

One of the grassroots groups mobilizing for Zelaya’s return is the Honduran Black Fraternal Organization (OFRANEH), which issued a statement July 3 asserting the “undeniable involvement” of former US under-secretary of state Otto Reich in the coup d’etat.

Similar claims were made at the emergency session of the Organization of American States (OAS) in Washington DC as the coup went into action. Venezuelan representative Roy Chaderton said: “We have information that worries us. These is a person who has been important in the diplomacy of the US who has reconnected with old colleagues and encouraged the coup: Otto Reich, ex sub-secretary of State under Bush. We know him as an interventionist person…” He cited Reich’s purported involvement in the attempted coup d’etat against Venezuela’s President Hugo ChĂĄvez in April 2002.

Recalling Reich’s involvement in the Nicaragua destabilization campaign in the 1980s and (apparently) the Venezuelan coup attempt, he quipped, “We suffered the First Reich, the Second Reich, and now we are suffering the Third Reich.”

In 2001, President Bush used a recess appointment to make Reich assistant secretary of state for the Western Hemisphere, bypassing strong Congressional opposition. In 1987, Reich had been investigated by Congress for illegal activities in support on Nicaragua’s right-wing Contra guerillas.

In April 2002, the New York Times confirmed that on the morning the Venezuelan putsch went into action, Reich spoke by telephone with Pedro Carmona, the conservative businessman who would be installed as de facto president for the two days before the coup collapsed. The account claimed Reich coached Carmona on how to handle the coup, urging him not to dissolve the National Assembly. (Carmona did, cited as a key factor in the coup’s failure.)

In January 2003 the White House quietly moved Reich over to the presidential staff as special envoy to Latin America rather than face Congressional opposition to his re-appointment as assistant secretary of state. He resigned in 2004 and returned to (ostensibly) private life. Lats year, he served as a foreign policy advisor to presidential candidate John McCain.

Whither the Arcadia Foundation?
OFRANEH’s statement also asserts that Reich was working with the DC-based Arcadia Foundation to destabilize Zelaya. The Arcadia Foundation website identifies the non-profit as an anti-corruption watchdog that also promotes “good governance and democratic institutions.” Reich’s name does not appear in any obvious place on the website. However, one of the two names on the site’s “Founders” page is Robert Carmona-Borjas, identified as “a Venezuelan lawyer and an expert in military affairs, national security, corruption and governance.” It notes in genteel terms that he fled Venezuela after the coup attempt: “In Venezuela, concerned with the issue of governability, the defense of human rights, democracy and the fight against corruption, he became an activist, disregarding the risks that such a stance implied. Following the events of April 2002, he was forced to abandon his country and seek political asylum in the United States of America.”

The Mexican daily La Jornada reported April 27, 2002 (just after the Venezuelan coup collapsed) that Carmona-Borjas had drafted “anti-constitutional” decrees for the coup regime. He was immediately granted asylum in the US.

This June, Honduran newspapers noted that Carmona-Borjas had brought legal charges against Zelaya and other figures in his administration for defying a court ruling that barred preparations for the constitutional referendum scheduled for the day Zelaya would be ousted. A YouTube video dated July 3 shows footage from Honduras’ Channel 8 TV of Carmona-Borjas being extolled from the stage at an anti-Zelaya rally in Tegucigalpa’s Plaza la Democracia to enthusiastic applause. In the same speech, the speaker accuses Zelaya of collaboration with narco-traffickers.

Reich’s name popped up in the media in relation to Honduras earlier this year, when he publicly accused the Zelaya administration of corruption after the Latin Node digital telephone company (since acquired by eLandia) was fined $2 million by US authorities for allegedly bribing officials in Honduras and Yemen. “President Zelaya has allowed or encouraged this kind of practices [sic] and we will see that he is also behind this,” Reich was quoted by the Miami Herald in April. After an outcry in Honduras, Reich said he was prepared to make a sworn statement on the affair before Honduran law enforcement—but said he would not travel to Honduras to do so, because his personal security would be at risk there.

And in a September 2008 interview with the Honduran daily El Heraldo, Reich warned of Tegucigalpa’s growing closeness with Venezuela, remarking cryptically that “if President Zelaya wants to be an ally of our enemies, let him think about what might be the consequences of his actions and words.”

The Hondutel Scandal
Interestingly, the obscure Latin Node scandal may touch on one of the key issues behind the coup. Despite the media focus on Zelaya’s supposed agenda to get term limits overturned, one of the real issues in his proposed constitutional reform was to mandate national control over Honduras’ telecom system. The officials who were supposedly bribed were with the national company Hondutel.

In an April 7 piece he wrote for Miami’s Spanish-language Nuevo Herald, Reich reminded readers that Zelaya’s nephew, Marcelo Chimirri, was a high official at Hondutel and had been accused of various illicit practices. The outraged Zelaya went on national radio and TV to announce that he would sue Reich for defamation: “We will proceed with legal action for calumny against this man, Otto Reich, who has been waging a two year campaign against Honduras.”

In January, the US Embassy in Tegucigalpa denied Chimirri an entry visa into the United States, citing “serious cases of corruption.” This wasn’t Chimirri’s first attempt to get a visa. Zelaya had complained to Washington a month earlier about the visa issue, urging US officials to “revise the procedure by which visas are cancelled or denied…as a means of pressure against…people who hold different beliefs or ideologies which pose no threat to the US.”

Bush-appointed US Ambassador Charles Ford also weighed in, telling the Honduran newspaper La Tribuna that the US government was investigating North American telecom carriers for allegedly paying bribes to Honduran officials to engage in so-called “gray traffic” or illicit bypassing of legal telecommunications channels. He recommended greater competition as a means to combat this supposed abuse.

The Honduran business elite has long sought to privatize Hondutel. In the late 1990s, none other than Roberto Micheletti—the current coup-installed president—was Hondutel’s CEO. Writes Latin America expert Nikolas Kozloff author of Revolution!: South America and the Rise of the New Left, in a July commentary onthe affair: “At the time, Micheletti favored privatizing the firm. Micheletti later went on to become president of Honduras’ National Congress. In that capacity, he was at odds with the Zelaya regime that opposed so-called ‘telecom reform’ that could open the door to outright privatization.”

Chimirri was arrested by the new regime on July 2, 2009. The Arcadia Foundation did not respond to repeated requests for a statement. In a July 9 Miami Herald op-ed titled, “I Did Not Orchestrate Coup in Honduras,” Reich denies being the “architect” of the coup—which he also denies was a coup, and defends as “legal and constitutional.” The website of Reich’s consulting firm, Otto Reich Associates, lists among its former clients AT&T and Bell Atlantic (now Verizon)—both of which would be possible purchasers of a privatized Hondutel.

US right squawks: “not a coup”
In defiance of world opinion, the US right is scrambling to build political support for the coup regime. The New York Times comments from a House Western Hemisphere Subcommittee hearing in Washington July 10, where several members of Congress criticized the OAS for suspending Honduras mere weeks after it lifted the suspension of Cuba. Rep. Connie Mack (R-FL) urged the US to cut its support for the OAS, which gets 60% of its financing from Washington. He said its response to the Honduras crisis proves it is a “dangerous organization,” siding with Hugo ChĂĄvez in undermining democracy in the region. “What has happened in Honduras was not a military coup,” Mack said. “If anyone is guilty here it is Mr. Zelaya himself for having turned his back on his people and his own Constitution.”

Sen. Jim DeMint (R-SC) has also made several comments in support of the coup, calling Zelaya “a ChĂĄvez-style dictator” who had flouted the authority of the Honduran congress and Supreme Court. He said President Obama’s call to reinstate Zelaya is “a slap in the face to the people of the Honduras.” On another occasion, he asked rhetorically: “On what basis does the [Obama] administration demand Zelaya’s reinstatement? His removal from office was no more a coup than was Gerald Ford’s ascendance to the Oval Office or our newest colleague Al Franken’s election to the Senate.”

Reich was also among those who testified on July 10, a transcript of Senate Foreign Affairs Committee hearings that same day reveals. “What happens in Honduras may one day be seen as either the high-water mark of Hugo Chavez’s attempt to undermine democracy in this hemisphere or as a green light to the continued spread of Chavista authoritarianism under the guise of democracy,” he said, adding that Zelaya’s removal constituted “legal and defensible measures” by the Honduran judicial and legislative branches against the executive.

Hans Bader of the Competitive Enterprise Institute told Voice of America that the Honduran Supreme Court and Congress believed Zelaya had put the country in peril. “I don’t think they needed to wait until he actually made himself into a dictator,” he said. “I think they were entitled to take action against a budding dictator. But even if they weren’t, it seems to me that it is not so clear that he is in the right that the United States should be meddling in Honduras’ affairs.”

Meanwhile, as every other country in the hemisphere (as well the European Union) have recalled their ambassadors from Honduras, the US has maintained diplomatic ties—while suspending aid projects, and encouraging a Costa Rica-brokered dialogue which has thus far failed top bear fruit. While most military cooperation has been officially suspended, Honduran officers are apparently still being trained at the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC), the former School of the Americas at Fort Benning.

Honduran military admits: We broke the law
In a turnaround, the Honduran army’s top lawyer in an interview with the Miami Herald July 3 admitted that the military broke the law by removing Zelaya—while insisting the move was necessary. Col. Herberth Bayardo Inestroza said: “We know there was a crime there. In the moment that we took him out of the country, in the way that he was taken out, there is a crime. Because of the circumstances of the moment this crime occurred, there is going to be a justification and cause for acquittal that will protect us.”

Bayardo proudly invoked the military repression that gripped Honduras in the 1980s: “We fought the subversive movements here and we were the only country that did not have a fratricidal war like the others. It would be difficult for us, with our training, to have a relationship with a leftist government. That’s impossible. I personally would have retired, because my thinking, my principles, would not have allowed me to participate in that.”

The Shadow of the 3-16 Battalion
The methods Bayardo nostalgically recalls were called horrific human rights abuses by international jurists. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights in 1988 ruled the Honduran government responsible for the “disappearance” of four individuals (two Hondurans and two Costa Ricans). The ruling found that the Honduran state “conducted or tolerated the systematic practice of disappearance” in the 1980s, naming a clandestine military death squad, the 3-16 Battalion.

From 1980-1982, when the repression was at its worst, the Honduran military was headed by Gen. Policarpo Paz GarcĂ­a, a graduate of the US Army’s School of the Americas. There was a massive US military presence in Honduras at this time, and the US ambassador was John Negroponte—later George W. Bush’s UN ambassador, Iraq envoy and first Director of National Intelligence. At the time, US State Department reports, prepared under Negroponte’s supervision, found that “there are no political prisoners in Honduras.” In 1994, after a public reckoning with the abuses of the previous decade, the Honduran Human Rights Commission charged Negroponte personally with complicity in several human rights violations.

One hopes the methods of the 1980s will not be revived if the coup regime in Honduras persists. Gen. Romeo Vasquez, the head of the armed forces who led the coup, was also trained at the SOA at least twice—in 1976 and 1984. Billy Joya, a self-confessed veteran of the 3-16 Battalion (although a denier of its human rights abuses) has been appointed an advisor to Micheletti.

“Kafka in Honduras”
Those who argue that the coup was not a coup invariably cite Article 239 of the Honduran constitution, which states that any president who even proposes a constitutional amendment to allow re-election “shall cease forthwith” in his duties. They do not mention that this constitution was crafted by a military-dominated state in 1982, and this measure was aimed precisely at keeping elected civilian leaders subordinate to the generals.

Zelaya was removed on the very day his non-binding referendum on whether to open a constitutional convention was to take place. He had pledged to go ahead with the vote despite a Supreme Court ruling barring it. Hours after his removal, the National Congress read an obviously forged “resignation letter” from Zelaya, then passed a resolution giving legal imprimatur to the removal and making congress leader Micheletti president. The move has been portrayed as necessary to prevent Zelaya from setting himself up as president-for-life.

Actually, given that the binding vote establishing the constitutional convention (following the non-binding one scheduled for June 28, to establish a popular mandate for the referendum) was to take place in November, simultaneous with the presidential election, it was impossible for Zelaya to extend his term through the constitutional reform—at best, to be able to run again in four years. And the issues Zelaya touted concerned beefing up the labor code and enshrining public control of the telecom system and power plants—not abolishing term limits.

Grahame Russell of the solidarity organization Rights Action, responding to claims that the ouster of Zelaya was legal, calls it “Kafka in Honduras.” He notes a case filed in the Honduran courts earlier this year by the Honduran Committee for the Defense of Human Rights (CODEH), charging that a military coup was in the works and calling on judicial authorities to intervene. Other such cases were also filed in the months leading up to Zelaya’s removal—but were all apparently allowed to languish.

Then, in the days before the coup, the Supreme Court received the accusation against President Zelaya. This was evidently rushed through the legal process—without Zelaya ever being able to see or respond to the charges. Writes Russell: “The Honduran Armed Forces (HAF) have no authority whatsoever—none, ever—to carry out detention orders of the Supreme Court. If there were a valid detention order (there was not), it would be the police forces that would have to be authorized by the court to carry it out. Having said that, no detention order was even presented when the HAF broke violently into the President’s residence…”

Whatever constitutional violations Zelaya may have committed, the military circumvented the legal process by having the president summarily deported. Given this admission by the military itself, why should any subsequent acts by the Honduran state be considered legitimate? If Zelaya had been arrested (and this also would have been of dubious legality), he would have had a chance to face his accusers in court, and put his case before the Honduran people. The congressional vote removing him would have had at least arguable validity. As it is, the democratic process has been abrogated entirely.

The political right throughout the hemisphere is assembling a barrage of legalistic sophistries in defense of the Honduran coup. If they prevail and the coup is allowed to become a fait accompli, it will be a grave step backwards for democracy in the Americas and worldwide—and all the more insidious because this time around (in contrast to the Cold War coups d’etat) it is being done under a veneer, however transparent, of propriety.

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A shorter version of this article ran July 29 in In These Times.

RESOURCES

Arcadia Foundation
http://www.arcadiafoundation.org

Rights Action
http://www.rightsaction.org/

Nikolas Kozloff’s Señor Chichero blog

From our Daily Report:

Honduras: generals plead case on TV; deadly repression grows
World War 4 Report, Aug. 8, 2009

Honduras: Micheletti appoints death squad veteran
World War 4 Report, July 24, 2009

Honduras: talks break down again; Otto Reich denies involvement
World War 4 Report, July 23, 2009

See also:

HONDURAS: IT’S NOT ABOUT ZELAYA
by David L. Wilson, MRZine
World War 4 Report, July 2009

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Special to World War 4 Report, August 1, 2009
Reprinting permissible with attribution

Continue ReadingOTTO REICH’S FINGERPRINTS ON HONDURAS COUP? 

HONDURAS: IT’S NOT ABOUT ZELAYA

by David L. Wilson, MRZine

Manuel “Mel” Zelaya is a rancher and business owner who wears large cowboy hats and, in November 2005, was elected president of Honduras, an impoverished Central American country with a population of 7.5 million. On June 28 of this year the Honduran military, backed by the country’s elite, removed Zelaya from power. He instantly became a focus of attention for the US media—his statements were examined, and his appearances at the United Nations and regional meetings were dutifully covered. Most media depicted him as a major “leftist strongman” seeking to extend his term of office in the style of Venezuelan president Hugo ChĂĄvez.

US journalists generally present world events as the actions of a few important individuals, a sort of Greek drama without the chorus. Latin American politics especially are viewed as a parade of good guys and bad guys—Fidel Castro, Augusto Pinochet, Hugo Chávez, Alvaro Uribe. Which is good and which is bad depends on your perspective.

The current Honduras coverage is no exception. Most working people in this country, pressed by the worst economic crisis of their lifetime, understandably change the channel or click on another website. If you want celebrity news, the death of Michael Jackson is far more gripping than the overthrow of Mel Zelaya.

“No Revolutionary”
But was this coup really about a leftist strongman?

“What Zelaya has done has just been little reforms,” Rafael AlegrĂ­a, the leader of the local branch of the international group VĂ­a Campesina (“Campesino Way”), explained to the Mexican daily La Jornada on June 29. “He isn’t a socialist or a revolutionary, but these reforms, which didn’t harm the oligarchy at all, have been enough for them to attack him furiously.”

The local elite and the US media insist that the non-binding referendum Zelaya wanted to hold on June 28 was a power grab. In reality Hondurans would simply have been asked whether they wanted to vote in the November general elections on a constituent assembly to rewrite the 1982 Constitution. If this actually came about, the new Constitution might well allow presidential reelection, but it’s not easy to see how any constituent assembly could finish its work in time to keep Zelaya in office after his term expires on January 27, 2010.

A more likely motive for the coup lies in the Honduran oligarchy’s fear of what would happen if the people got a chance to write their own Constitution.

Not many people in the United States are aware that over the past few decades Hondurans have created, under very adverse circumstances, a vibrant grassroots movement: campesino organizations like VĂ­a Campesina; three labor confederations, often competing, sometimes cooperating; a strong indigenous movement; Afro-Honduran groups like the Honduran Black Fraternal Organization (OFRANEH); human rights monitoring groups like the Committee of Relatives of Disappeared Detainees in Honduras (COFADEH); environmental groups; community radio stations; an anti-militarization movement; women’s groups; student groups; and a nascent LGBT movement.

Early this year, Honduran teachers went on strike for back pay and held a sit-in at the education ministry. In February the Civic Council of Grassroots and Indigenous Organizations of Honduras (COPINH) organized a 12-day mobilization to protest the destruction of forests. In April hundreds of indigenous ChortĂ­ blocked access to the CopĂĄn archeological park, Honduras’ most important ancient Mayan site, to press demands for land.

None of these were one-time protests—they continued long-term struggles, some going back for years. And these same groups, which frequently support each other and coordinate their actions, are the ones that have confronted the coup and the subsequent repression with massive and spirited protests throughout the country.

The Chorus Takes the Stage
The growth of social movements in Honduras reflects a pattern. Everywhere you look in the hemisphere, the protagonists of the drama are increasingly “the people from below”—los de abajo, as Mariano Azuela called the subjects of his novel of the 1910 Mexican Revolution.

In the first months of 2009, general strikes by virtually the whole population of the French overseas departments of Guadeloupe and Martinique forced President Nicolas Sarkozy to agree to an increase in the minimum wage—and inspired workers’ struggles in European France. Starting in April, militant protests by indigenous Peruvians in the Amazon region, backed by urban unionists, shook the pro-US government of President Alan GarcĂ­a. In June students battled United Nations troops in Haiti, the only country in the Americas more impoverished than Honduras, in support of workers’ demands for a higher minimum wage.

These struggles get little media attention here, but they have a direct bearing on los de abajo of our own country. Working people in the United States understand the effects of outsourcing industrial work to other countries, and they know about the pressure undocumented workers put on the wages of the native born. What they don’t know is how these phenomena are linked to US foreign policy.

Some 100,000 Hondurans now work in their country’s maquiladora sector, which assembles apparel and automotive parts largely for the US market. About 300,000 Hondurans live and work in the United States itself, according to the 2000 census. Hondurans don’t actually want to do backbreaking labor for minuscule pay in maquilas in San Pedro Sula, much less risk their lives crossing the border to work in the sweatshops of Los Angeles and New York. It is repression by the US-backed military and oligarchy and the hardships resulting from US-promoted economic policies and US-dominated trade deals like the Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) that have forced Hondurans into these jobs.

It doesn’t do US workers any good to rail against foreign countries and “illegal” immigrants. If people here are serious about defending their standard of living, they have no choice but to oppose their government’s foreign policies and to support their counterparts in countries like Honduras. Unions like United Electrical Workers (UE) and organizations like the National Labor Committee, US LEAP, Students Against Sweatshops, and the Maquila Solidarity Network are already active in this work. We need to back them—and maybe learn some lessons from Latin America about how to fight for our rights.

—-

This article first ran July 4 in MRZine.

RESOURCES

Comité de Familiares de Detenidos Desaparecidos en Honduras (COFADEH)
http://www.cofadeh.org

Consejo CĂ­vico de Organizaciones Populares e IndĂ­genas de Honduras (COPINH)
http://copinh.org

Interview with Organización Fraternal Negra Hondureña (OFRANEH), Adital, June 29, 2009

Via Campesina
http://viacampesina.org

UE International Solidarity page
http://www.ueinternational.org

National Labor Committee
http://www.nlcnet.org

United Students Against Sweatshops
http://www.studentsagainstsweatshops.org

Maquila Solidarity Network
http://en.maquilasolidarity.org

“Zelayistas desafĂ­an el toque de queda,” La Jornada, June 30, 2009

From our Daily Report:

Honduran golpista: Obama a “little black man who knows nothing”
World War 4 Report, July 5, 2009

See also:

HONDURAS: THE RESISTANCE SO FAR
from Weekly News Update on the Americas
World War 4 Report, July 2009

——————-

Reprinted by World War 4 Report, July 1, 2009
Reprinting permissible with attribution

Continue ReadingHONDURAS: IT’S NOT ABOUT ZELAYA 

HONDURAS: THE RESISTANCE SO FAR

from Weekly News Update on the Americas

Just two weeks after Iran exploded into protests over contested elections, scenes of angry demonstrators clashing with security forces were repeated in the Central American republic of Honduras. The National Congress accuses President Manuel Zelaya of violating the constitution by defying a Supreme Court ruling that barred him from holding a referendum on constitutional reform. The military removed him from power and deported him from the country on June 28—the day the vote was scheduled. He has pledged to return to Honduras this week—and the new regime of de facto President Roberto Micheletti has pledged to arrest him if he does. Meanwhile, street clashes continue. Media coverage has suggested the central issue in the proposed constitutional reform was a bid by Zelaya to eliminate term limits and thereby remain in office—but a close reading reveals social justice demands of the Honduran popular movements to be far more relevant. Weekly News Update on the Americas provides the following overview of the resistance so far—and examines the truth behind the constitutional question.—World War 4 Report

Resistance on Day 2 of the Coup
Despite a 9 PM to 6 AM curfew, Hondurans protesting a June 28 military coup against President JosĂ© Manuel (“Mel”) Zelaya Rosales remained outside the Presidential House in Tegucigalpa the night of June 28-29. In the afternoon of June 29 heavily armed soldiers using shields dispersed most of the demonstrators in a few minutes; some youths remained and some threw stones, but they fled after the soldiers began firing in the air. Protesters a few blocks away weren’t “so peaceful,” according to a local leader. Youths there had erected barricades and were burning tires; they hurled rocks and bottles at the soldiers, who used tear gas and rubber bullets on the crowd but were forced to retreat at least three times. The military said 15 soldiers and 15 officers were injured in the Tegucigalpa confrontations, which lasted about two hours; protest organizers reported 276 injured on their side. (La Jornada, Mexico, June 30; BBC, June 29; AFP, June 30)

A student at the protests told the Mexican daily La Jornada that more people would have been out in the streets except that “the majority think President Zelaya resigned. The media have been kidnapped, and we, the people, have been too,” she added. The de facto government had taken independent radio stations off the air, along with television networks like the US-based CNN and the Venezuela-based TeleSUR. Radio AmĂ©rica, one of the remaining local stations, didn’t report the protests—it simply advised motorists to avoid certain roads, without explaining that they were blocked by protesters. “I’m not interested in having communism here,” the student added. “I’m a student, I love peace and I’m a Christian. But I can’t be complicitous in this robbery.”

With the news blacked out nationwide and electricity interrupted in different areas, it was difficult for reporters to determine what was happening outside the capital. Grassroots organizations said protesters were marching and blocking roads in ColĂłn and AtlĂĄntida departments. Some 10,000 campesinos were reportedly trying to get to Tegucigalpa from Olancho, Zelaya’s home region, but were stopped at military roadblocks. There were also unconfirmed reports of military battalions that were refusing to support the coup. (LJ, June 29; Milenio, Mexico, Aug. 29 from Notimex)

Labor activists driving in the middle of the day on June 29 near San Pedro Sula, the country’s second largest city, said there were protests against the coup in every town they passed, and that that progressive forces had captured the Puente de la Democracia in the city of El Progreso and had liberated the independent station Radio Progreso. Another activist reported that 15,000 people demonstrated in San Pedro Sula and that there were protests in El Progreso and La Lima. (Personal communications to the Update)

Resistance Grows on Day 3
The French wire service AFP reported that the protests grew on June 30 as all three of the country’s labor federations joined with organizations of campesinos, youth, the unemployed, street vendors, lesbians and gays, and other sectors in an open-ended general strike that the groups said they would maintain until Zelaya was returned to power. (The teachers’ unions had started the strike on June 29). Organizers said at least 10,000 people were taking part in pro-Zelaya protests in the capital, as well as in other protests around the country; AFP put the number of demonstrators in Tegucigalpa at 2,000. A legislative deputy from the lefitist Democratic Unification of Honduras (UPH), Marvin Ponde, said thousands of anti-coup protesters trying to come to the capital by bus had been stopped at military roadblocks. They had set out from Santa BĂĄrbara in the northwest; DanlĂ­, Juticalpa and Catacamas in the east; and Choluteca in the south.

Violent clashes clashes were reported outside the Presidential House and in other parts of Tegucigalpa, where protesters erected barricades and battled security forces with rocks and bottles; the number of injuries was unknown. Similar actions reportedly took place in other cities.

Supporters of the de facto government held their own demonstration in the capital’s Parque Central, with an attendance of 10,000, according to organizers. (AFP, June 30; Diario Colatino, El Salvador, June 30; El Universal, Mexico, June 30)

Zelaya, the Referendum and the Social Movements
Zelaya is a business owner who was elected president in November 2005 as the candidate of the centrist Liberal Party of Honduras (PLH), which along with the National Party of Honduras (PNH) has led the coup against him. Despite his conservative background, “[t]he grassroots movement has been Zelaya’s fundamental ally and has remained firm in its rejection of the coup,” members of the Honduran Black Fraternal Organization (OFRANEH) told the Brazil-based Adital grassroots news service.

“You have to understand that Honduras’ political class is extremely backwards,” Rafael AlegrĂ­a, the local leader of the international group VĂ­a Campesina (“Campesino Way”) explained to La Jornada on June 29. “What Zelaya has done has just been little reforms. He isn’t a socialist or a revolutionary, but these reforms, which didn’t harm the oligarchy at all, have been enough for them to attack him furiously.” Another reason for grassroots opposition to the coup, according to the OFRANEH members, is “a tremendous aversion to the armed forces in Honduras. Not many people forget that 20 years ago the soldiers controlled things from cement factories to food production to their own bank. For many, their return to power implies an historic step back that will have incalculable consequences for the country.” (Adital, June 29; LJ, June 29)

The military and the de facto government say the coup was necessary to keep Zelaya from holding a nonbinding referendum on June 28 about rewriting the Constitution. US media have generally repeated without qualification the claim that the referendum would clear the way for Zelaya to extend his term, which ends Jan. 27, 2010, by eliminating the 1982 Constitution’s provision that presidents can only serve one four-year term.

The referendum would in fact have simply asked voters whether the Nov. 29 general elections—for the president, three vice presidents, 128 legislative deputies and 298 municipal governments—should also include a “fourth ballot box” to elect a Constituent Assembly to write a new Constitution. For Zelaya to extend his term, the Constituent Assembly would have to meet, approve a Constitution and have it ratified by the voters before the president turns over power to his successor on Jan. 27. Zelaya has denied that he would seek to stay in office past January, although he said he might try to run again in the future if the Constitution was changed to permit reelection. His government claimed that 400,000 people signed the petitions to initiate the referendum. (The Nation, New York, June 30; El Nuevo Herald, Miami, June 25; EFE, June 27) (Honduras’ total population is about 7.5 million.)

According to the Honduras correspondent of the Argentine daily ClarĂ­n, the coup supporters say that if the referendum had passed, Zelaya was going to cancel the presidential elections, extend his term, close down the Congress and seize power “in the best style of [Venezuelan president Hugo] ChĂĄvez.” “None of this [scenario] could be confirmed,” the correspondent remarked. (ClarĂ­n, June 30)

The Chicago-based People’s Weekly World reported on its website that Zelaya “had been building relationships with the [Democratic Unification of Honduras—UDH], the only left-wing party registered to participate in Honduran national elections. Most observers expected Zelaya to swing his support to Democratic Unification candidate CĂ©sar Ham [Peña]” in the November elections. (PWW, June 29)

The National Police told the Mexican wire service Notimex on June 28 that Ham was killed that morning when he resisted arrest. The report was false. He fled the country, saying there was an arrest order for him and Marcos Burgos, head of the government’s Permanent Commission on Contingencies (COPECO). On the evening of June 29 the two men landed at El Salvador’s Comalapa airport for a connecting flight to Nicaragua. They thanked El Salvador’s leftist Farabundo MartĂ­ Front for National Liberation (FMLN) and Salvadoran president Mauricio Funes for their help. (Prensa GrĂĄfica, El Salvador, June 29)

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This report first ran June 30 in Weekly News Update on the Americas.

From our Daily Report:

Honduras: countdown to confrontation?
World War 4 Report, June 30, 2009

Honduras: resistance and repression follow coup
World War 4 Report, June 29, 2009

See also:

HONDURAS: INDIGENOUS OPPOSITION TO PUEBLA-PANAMA PLAN FACES REPRESSION
by Bill Weinberg, World War 4 Report
World War 4 Report, August 2003

——————-

Reprinted by World War 4 Report, July 1, 2009
Reprinting permissible with attribution

Continue ReadingHONDURAS: THE RESISTANCE SO FAR 

NEW BOOK SURVEYS OAXACA UPRISING TO TEACH REBELLION

Book Review:
TEACHING REBELLION
Stories from the Grassroots Mobilization in Oaxaca
by Diana Denham and the CASA Collective
PM Press, 2009

by Hans Bennett

“I am 77 years old. I have two children, eight grandchildren, and six great-grandchildren… My children are scared for me. It’s just that they love me. Everyone loves the little old granny, the mother hen of all those eggs. They say ‘They’re going to send someone to kill you. They’ll put a bullet through you.’ But I tell them, ‘I don’t care if it’s two bullets.’ I’ve become fearless like that. God gave me life and He will take it away when it is His will. If I get killed, I’ll be remembered as the old lady who fought the good fight, a heroine, even, who worked for peace… Hasta la victoria siempre. That’s what I believe.” So says Marinita, a lifetime resident of Oaxaca, Mexico. Marinita was one of the many participants in the 2006 Oaxaca rebellion, whose first-hand account is featured in the new book released by PM Press, Teaching Rebellion: Stories from the Grassroots Mobilization in Oaxaca.

Teaching Rebellion does just that: It teaches us why the 2006 rebellion in Oaxaca, Mexico, was so impressive, and is something we can all learn from. Edited by Diana Denham and the CASA Collective, Teaching Rebellion provides an overview of the Oaxaca rebellion. It also gives numerous first-hand interviews from participants, including longtime organizers, teachers, students, housewives, religious leaders, union members, schoolchildren, indigenous community activists, artists and journalists. The diverse interviews allow some of those who led themselves in rebellion to also speak for themselves. Political art is featured throughout the book alongside excellent photographs from the uprising.

The introduction, by Diana Denham, Patrick Lincoln, and Chris Thomas, summarizes the rebellion to contextualize the participants’ accounts. The story of the uprising begins with a teachers’ strike and sit-in that occupied over fifty blocks in the center of Oaxaca City, initiated on May 22, 2006, by the historically active Section 22 of the National Education Workers Union. When the government failed to respond to the teachers’ demands for more educational resources and better working conditions, thousands took to the streets demanding a trial for the hated state Governor Ulises Ruiz Ortiz, of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), believed to have gained office in 2004 through electoral fraud. Five days later, 120,000-200,000 marched and held a popular trial for Gov. Ruiz. Yet the major rebellion was still to come.

On June 14, the police used teargas, firearms, and helicopters to attack both the teachers’ sit-in at the city’s center and the union’s radio station—destroying their equipment and brutalizing the radio operators. This violent attack, meant to stifle the people’s resistance, backfired when the city rose in defense of the teachers. Transmission was taken up by Radio Universidad (at Universidad AutĂłnoma Benito JuĂĄrez de Oaxaca) and thousands of supporters helped the union retake the city center that day. Two days later, 500,000 people marched through the city demanding that the federal government remove Governor Ruiz from office.

The next day, the Popular Assembly of the Peoples of Oaxaca (APPO) was formed, eventually comprising over 300 unions, social organizations, indigenous communities, collectives, neighborhoods and student groups. The APPO’s autonomous, non-hierarchical approach in Oaxaca was “a new and original approach to political organizing,” Teaching Rebellion explains, but “it also drew from forms of indigenous self-governance, known as usos and costumbres. The APPO, an assembly by name, emphasizes the input of a diverse body of people who discuss issues and make decisions collectively; similarly, in many indigenous communities in Oaxaca, the assembly is the basis for communal governance. The customs of guelaguetza (which actually refers to reciprocity or “the gift of giving”) and tequio (collective, unpaid work for the benefit of the community) are the two traditions most deeply engrained in Oaxacan culture that literally fed the movement.”

With the June 14 police attack, the Oaxaca rebellion had begun. Teaching Rebellion continues, “in addition to responding to a police attack on striking teachers or a particularly repressive governor, the movement that surfaced in Oaxaca took over and ran an entire city for six months starting in June 2006. Government officials fled, police weren’t present to maintain even the semblance of responding to social harm, and many of the government institutions and services that we depend on daily were shut down. Without relying on centralized organization, neighborhoods managed everything from public safety (crime rates actually went down dramatically during the course of the six months) to food distribution and transportation. People across the state began to question the established line of western thinking that says communities can’t survive, much less thrive, without the intervention of a separate hierarchy caring for its needs. Oaxaca sent a compelling message to the world in 2006: the power we need is in our hands.”

The book’s introduction elaborates that after the June uprising, “no uniformed police were seen for months in the city of Oaxaca, but paramilitary forces terrorized public spaces occupied by protesters. These death squads, including many plainclothes police officers, sped through the city in unmarked vehicles, shooting at neighbors gathered at the barricades,” which were constructed around the city in defense against death squads and state repression. State repression began to escalate while negotiations were taking place between the APPO and the government, which only made the community more distrustful of the government. On October 28, 2006, over 4,500 federal police troops were sent to Oaxaca, attacking the barricades and retaking the historic city center where they set up a base that was maintained until mid-December.

On November 2, the police attacked the university campus, home to Radio Universidad, but “in what turned into a seven-hour battle, neighbors, parents, students, and other civilians took to the streets to defend the campus with stones and firecrackers, eventually managing to surround the police and force their retreat.” In another major conflict that month, on November 25, “thousands of protesters marched into the city center and formed a ring around the occupying federal police forces. After a well-planned police attack, several hours of chaos and violence ensued, leaving nearly forty buildings ablaze. Hundreds were beaten, tortured, and arrested that day, and many movement activists and sympathizers not arrested were forced underground.”

This final repression essentially ended the community’s occupation and control of Oaxaca City, but, Teaching Rebellion reports that the struggle is not over: “While a Supreme Court Commission has been named to investigate the human rights abuses, Oaxacans have little faith that a real difference will trickle down. Despite the dead-end government redress the air stirs with the force of a familiar slogan: ‘We will never be the same again.’ The city walls seem to share this sentiment, planted in the post-repression graffiti: ‘Esta semilla germinarĂĄ,’ from this seed we will grow.”

The First-Hand Accounts
The many featured interviews illustrate the spirits of spontaneity, anti-authoritarianism, and self-defense that were fundamental to the uprising. There is Jenny’s account of accompanying the family of slain US independent journalist Brad Will. The family had traveled to Oaxaca to demand justice for Brad and for all victims of government repression. Cuautli recounts his experience working in the community topiles (basically a people’s police force), formed during the occupation of Oaxaca City, as community defense groups protecting people from government repression as well as “common criminals” who preyed upon other poor people.

Tonia, recalls the women’s “Pots and Pans March” of August 1, 2006, which sparked the spontaneous takeover of the Channel 9 television and radio station by thousands of women. “When we got to the Channel 9 offices, the security guard didn’t want to let us in… The women in the front were asking permission for an hour or two to broadcast, but the employees of Channel 9 said it was impossible. Maybe if they would have given us that one hour and cooperated, then it wouldn’t have gone any further. But with them seeing the number of women present, and still saying no, we decided, ‘Okay then, we’ll take over the whole station…’ Everyone was taken by the spontaneity of it all. Since no one had foreseen what would happen and no one was trained in advance, everything was born in the spur of the moment… One thing I liked is that there were no individual leaders. For each task, there was a group of several women in charge.”

In the middle of the night, August 21, 2006, paramilitary forces destroyed the antennas at the occupied Channel 9. The social movement took immediate action in support of the women, fighting off the police and paramilitary attackers at the antennas, and spontaneously deciding to occupy all eleven of the city’s commercial radio stations. Francisco, an engineering student and radio technician who first got involved with the movement when Radio Universidad was vandalized by apparent police infiltrators, describes these actions from the frontlines. He was working the night of August 21 at Radio Universidad when word went out that occupied Channel 9’s Radio Cacerola was down, and people were being attacked at the antennas at FortĂ­n Hill. Francisco recounts, “we got up from our seats and left immediately… We grabbed whatever was available: Molotov cocktails, sticks, machetes, fireworks, stones, and other improvised weapons. But what could we do with our ‘arms’ against Ulises Ruiz’s thugs, who carried AK-47s, high caliber pistols, and so much hatred? Still, we had a lot of courage, the group of us, and in that moment the only important thing was getting to the place where our compañeros were under attack… We made it thanks to our skilled but funny-looking driver, Red Beard, who wore round-framed carpenter goggles covering half of his face, a yellow fireman’s helmet, and red beard. In truth, we all looked pretty funny in our protective gear: leather gloves and layered t-shirts. But [what] wasn’t funny at all was the sound of bullets and screams that we heard on the other side of the hill as we continued onward.”

The busload from Radio Universidad arrived on the tail end of the government attack, and when they met up with their compañeros, they were told that police had shot and injured several people and destroyed the antennas. They searched for any injured compañeros who remained, then left to go help elsewhere. After visiting Radio La Ley, which had just been occupied, they were inspired to take over another station themselves and went to Radio ORO: “When we got there, we knocked on the door of the station and announced with a megaphone: ‘This is a peaceful takeover. Open Up. We are occupying this radio because they’ve taken away our last remaining means of free expression. This is a peaceful takeover. Open Up!’ The security guard opened the door and we entered, without anyone being hit, without insults—we just walked in.” Francisco concludes, “after the takeover, I read an article that said that intellectual and material authors of the takeovers of the radios weren’t Oaxacan, that they came from somewhere else, and that they received very specialized support. The article claimed that it would have been impossible for anyone without previous training to operate the radios in such a short amount of time because the equipment is too sophisticated for just anyone to use. They were wrong.”

Another account comes from former political prisoner David Venegas Reyes, who co-found VOCAL (Oaxacan Voices Constructing Autonomy and Liberty) in February 2007, for the purposes of challenging the more mainstream and hierarchical elements within the APPO. David, who in October 2006 was named representative of the barricades to the APPO council, recounts defending the barricades formed after the August 21 radio occupations: “We asked ourselves, ‘how can we defend these takeovers and defend the people inside?’… That’s when my participation, along with the participation of hundreds of thousands of others, began to make a more substantial difference. Because the movement stopped being defined by the announcements of events and calls for support made by the teachers’ union and began to be about the physical, territorial control of communities by those communities, by way of the barricades.”

David recounts, “We originally formed the barricade to protect the antennas of Radio Oro, but the barricade took on a life of its own. You could describe it like a party, a celebration of self-governance where we were starting to make emancipation through self-determination a reality. The barricades were about struggle, confrontation, and organization. We eventually started discussing agreements and decisions made by the APPO Council and the teachers’ union. There were a number of occasions where the barricade chose actions that went against those agreements, which in my view, only strengthened our capacity for organized resistance.”

David says VOCAL “stemmed from an APPO Statewide Assembly when it became evident that there were divergent perspectives with regard to the upcoming elections.” One side felt that the APPO movement “in all its plurality and diversity,” had purposefully excluded “political parties and any corrupt institution,” so getting involved with elections would “attack the unity constructed from diversity of thought and visions that exist within the movement.” The other side wanted to “act pragmatically and participate in the elections with our own candidates.” Those not wanting to participate in elections “that serve to legitimate repressive governments,” and who were distrustful of organizations that did, formed VOCAL. Consequently, VOCAL “turned into a diverse organization where a lot of anti-authoritarian visions and ways of thinking coexist—some rooted in indigenous tradition, like magonĂ­smo, and some more connected to European ideologies. A lot of compañeros who have no particular ideological doctrine are also active in the organization… What we all have in common is our idea of autonomy as a founding principle. We defend the diverse ways of organizing of pueblos and the rights of people to self-govern in all realms of life… Unlike other hegemonic ideologies, we don’t believe that to promote our own line of thought it’s necessary to exclude anyone else’s.”

In April 2007, David was arrested, “with no arrest warrant or explanation. They drove me to an unknown place, where they planted drugs on me, then tried to force me to hold the drugs so that they could take photos. When I refused, they beat me… Finally they presented me with the arrest warrant that accused me of being involved in the social movement and the acts of November 25th. The warrant accused me of sedition, organized crime, and arson. Even as the government fabricated the idea of accusing me of drug possession in an attempt to criminalize and discredit me, they already intended to present the arrest warrant of a political nature once I was in jail.”

On March 5, 2008, after nearly a year in prison, David was released, after he was judged not-guilty by the court on all political charges. However, the CASA Collective’s website reports that since drug charges were still pending, “he was released on bail and forced to report to the court every week for over a year, severely limiting his ability to travel.” On April 21, 2009, Oaxacan judge Amado Chiñas Fuentes found him not guilty on “charges of possession with intent to distribute cocaine and heroin.” Following this verdict, David said, “This innocent verdict, far from demonstrating the health or rectitude of the Mexican legal system, was pulled off thanks to the strength of the popular movement and with the solidarity of compañeros and compañeras from Mexico and various parts of the world. The legal system in Mexico is corrupt to the core and is a despicable tool used by the authorities to subjugate and repress those who struggle for justice and freedom.”

Oaxaca: Three Years Later
Three years since the Oaxaca uprising that was sparked by the June 14, 2006 police assault on the striking teachers, the issues behind the rebellion have not been resolved, Gov. Ulises Ruiz Ortiz is still in office. A 2007 article, “The Lights of Xanica,” reported on the continuing struggle of the Zapotec community of Santiago Xanica in the Sierra Sur of Oaxaca. In 2009, a controversial US military-funded mapping project in Oaxaca has met local resistance. In May, El Enemigo ComĂșn website reported that state and federal police forcibly evicted “community members who had been blocking the entrance to the mining project CuzctalĂĄn in the municipality of San JosĂ© del Progreso since March 16.” Recently, Narco News reported on heated negotiations between the government and Section 22 of the National Education Workers Union (initiators of the 2006 strike), as well as a robbery and murder committed by State Agency of Investigation agents at a bus terminal in Oaxaca City.

On June 8, 2009 the Committee in Defense of the Rights of the People (CODEP) reported the assassination of Sergio MartĂ­nez VĂĄsquez, member of the State Council of CODEP, arguing that the “way in which it was done and due to some information gathered, everything points to the fact that the material actors of this assassination were paramilitary groups that Ulises Ruiz has operating in the region.”

On June 14, a march in Oaxaca City commemorated the three-year anniversary of the 2006 uprising, and on June 17, a protest encampment in the Zocalo of Oaxaca City was attacked by paramilitaries.

The future in Oaxaca is unclear, but it is certain that the people will continue to resist, and international solidarity with help to strengthen the local resistance.

—-

Hans Bennett is an independent multi-media journalist whose website is Insubordination Photo-Journalism.

This review first appeared June 23 on Upside Down World.

RESOURCES

CASA Collective
http://casacollective.org/

El Enemigo ComĂșn
http://elenemigocomun.net/

PM Press page on Teaching Rebellion
https://secure.pmpress.org/index.php?l=product_detail&p=47

See also:

MAPPING CONTROVERSY IN OAXACA
by Ramor Ryan, Upside Down World
World War 4 Report, April 2009

From our Daily Report:

Mexico: indigenous protests in Oaxaca
World War 4 Report, March 24, 2009

Oaxaca: APPO activist freed from prison
World War 4 Report, March 10, 2008

——————-

Reprinted by World War 4 Report, July 1, 2009
Reprinting permissible with attribution

Continue ReadingNEW BOOK SURVEYS OAXACA UPRISING TO TEACH REBELLION 

“OPERATION CHIHUAHUA PLUS”

A Textbook Case in Drug War Failure

from Frontera NorteSur

More than one year after Mexican soldiers were deployed in Ciudad JuĂĄrez to combat organized crime and drug trafficking, the CalderĂłn administration’s military strategy is in crisis. Killings continue at the same or worse rate as last year, and drugs continue circulating on both sides of the border.

Alarmed by infringements on civil liberties and human rights abuses, growing numbers of Mexican citizens are demanding the modification or curtailment of military operations on the streets. And day by day, the gulf widens between sectors of Mexican society and the Obama administration and US Congress, which are enthusiastically backing the Mexican government’s approach to the organized crime and drug problems.

On June 8, the legislative group of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) in the Chihuahua state legislature approved a resolution requesting that Gen. Felipe de Jesus Espitia HernĂĄndez, commander of the anti-drug campaign Operation Chihuahua Together, instruct his troops to not enter private residences without a legal warrant. The PRI is the governing party in both Ciudad JuĂĄrez and the state of Chihuahua.

Citizen complaints against soldiers in Ciudad JuĂĄrez and other parts of Chihuahua have multiplied since last year. Numerous allegations of torture, murder, forced disappearance, robbery, and general mayhem have been documented by different agencies and the local press. The official Chihuahua State Human Rights Commission is reportedly looking into 2,500 alleged torture cases involving military personnel and federal police assigned to Operation Chihuahua Together.

The National Human Rights Commission (CNDH) recently issued its first recommendations from Ciudad Juárez complaints presented in 2008. The first case involved 22 state police officers who were detained, while the second one concerned three residents of a subdivision who alleged they were robbed and treated badly by soldiers. In both instance, the CNDH recommended that victims be compensated for damages, that legal investigations be initiated, that administrative sanctions be levied against responsible parties, and that a memo be sent to military personnel reminding them to respect human rights. The CNDH’s recommendations can be accepted or rejected by recipient institutions.

Signs exist the army is beginning to hear the critics—at least partially. Quoting the Mexican Defense Ministry, the Mexico City-based Center for Journalism and Public Ethics (CEPET) reported this week that the armed forces have sanctioned five enlisted men and one officer for a June 5 incident in which El Diario photographer JosĂ© Luis GonzĂĄlez was pushed and hit by soldiers following a traffic accident GonzĂĄlez was attempting to cover. Soldiers and federal police have been blamed for numerous accidents in recent months. A second photographer, Ernesto RodrĂ­guez of the PM newspaper, had his equipment taken by soldiers. According to CEPET, the five responsible soldiers are serving 15 days of in-house military arrest; the officer got a lighter sentence of 8 days.

Nonetheless, there is still no public word from the military hierarchy about two subsequent incidents, one on June 11 and the other last weekend, in which reporters and videographers for the Channel 44 and Channel 2 television stations, respectively, were physically prevented by soldiers and federal police from filming the scenes of a multiple homicide at the Las Palmas Motel and the excavation of a residential property where bodies were supposedly buried.

Commenting on the recent incidents pitting soldiers against reporters, Ciudad JuĂĄrez columnist Don Mirone contended that the latest obstructions to practicing journalism follow a long series of attacks on press freedom in the borderland.

“The situation is grave,” Don Mirone wrote. “For many years, the exercise of journalism on this border has been the object of aggression by part of organized crime and by part of the same municipal and state authorities.”

The army has its defenders in Ciudad JuĂĄrez. Juan VelĂĄzquez, a prominent criminal attorney with a military background, told the local press no crime fighting alternative existed at the moment.

“Who else could be entrusted with fighting an out-of-control and ferocious delinquency like the one we have?” VelĂĄzquez responded to an interviewer.

Nationally, the Mexican army’s drug war deployment continues enjoying public support, according to the latest poll announced by the non-governmental group Mexico United Against Delinquency. The group reported that 80% of respondents supported the use of the army against organized crime. Paradoxically, 76% of respondents said the overall public safety situation is worse today than one year ago, while only 48% considered anti-drug operations a success.

In Ciudad JuĂĄrez, soldiers are everywhere. Accompanying transit officers, who are notorious for skimming bribes from hapless drivers, heavily-armed soldiers now even act as traffic cops. Drivers and walkers entering Ciudad JuĂĄrez from neighboring El Paso, Texas, are subject to searches by Mexican soldiers stationed at international bridges, and pedestrians returning to El Paso could be forced to endure a bag search by more Mexican soldiers who, for all intents and purposes, are now acting as US border guards.

On the US side, the Mexican military campaign is complemented by new Department of Homeland Security operations that ultimately imply questioning and searching millions of people. For example, travelers headed into Mexico on one of the international bridges could be requested to produce identification and asked questions about carrying cash and weapons In the opposite direction, travelers headed north or west might run into a phalanx of curious US Border Patrol agents at El Paso’s Greyhound Bus Station, as well as more questioning and even dog-sniffing at checkpoints in New Mexico.

A day visitor to Ciudad JuĂĄrez could be forced to endure as many as five revisions from Mexican and US government agents before returning home. Perhaps not surprisingly, long lines await returning pedestrians at the Paso del Norte (Santa Fe) Bridge, which just celebrated a 900-day, $26 million renovation. On two recent weekend days, however, 45-minute waits were the rule even outside peak crossing times, and the number of visible inspectors, two to seven at a time, was pretty much the same number employed during much of the Bush era when crossings grew more cumbersome. On June 14, an older woman fainted in line as temperatures outside nudged 100 degrees.

A dynamic of criminalization and militarization could be costing the border economy dearly. On a recent Sunday afternoon, formerly a popular time for visitors from the US, a mere handful of tables were occupied at the main tourist market, many shops on Avenida JuĂĄrez stood empty and a group of barmen was the only visible life inside a once-hopping tourist bar.

Mexico City and Washington decided to tighten the vise on border travel at the very same time tens of thousands of people were without work in Ciudad JuĂĄrez’s maquiladora industry and the economy sputtered and crashed.

Until now, there is little evidence the security measures implemented by the CalderĂłn and Obama administrations are seriously undermining their stated targets: gangland violence and drug trafficking.

With nearly 800 murders tallied this year so far, the violence in Ciudad JuĂĄrez matches and will possibly even surpass the record blood-letting last year. Perhaps more posters than ever of disappeared young women (and a growing number of men, too) plaster the downtown section of the city, while a message scrawled on an exterior fence of the Autonomous University of Ciudad JuĂĄrez campus, “Todos Somos Manuel”—We are all Manuel—cries for justice in the killing of university professor Manuel Arroyo, whose unsolved murder last month became another entry in the Hall of Impunity.

A recent story in El Diario de El Paso newspaper reported that drugs are widely available in a section of the US city known for its seedy bars and used car dealerships. According to the newspaper, $2 marijuana cigarettes and $10 cocaine hits are easily obtainable, despite notable drug seizures on the border.

“Buying and selling continue without problems,” said one purported drug retailer.

Elsewhere, drug traffickers continue to display the innovation that has characterized the business for decades. Capable of carrying 200 pounds of marijuana or cocaine, ultra-light planes that can fly low and avoid radar detection are reportedly in vogue, as are frozen shark carcasses, including the ones confiscated this week by the Mexican navy that contained nearly a ton of coke.

Interestingly, the current drug war paradigm was the object of criticism in a monograph posted last month on the website of the US Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute. Criticizing the focus on supply-side, law-enforcement strategies promulgated by the US and Mexican governments, author Hal Brands contended that the anti-drug MĂ©rida Initiative launched by the two nations was unfolding at the expense of drug abuse prevention and treatment programs. While still supporting prohibition, Brands underscored the absence of effective anti-corruption and anti-money laundering initiatives.

Citing the failure of drug crop eradication programs in Colombia, Brands noted the persistence of poverty in Mexico, the gutting of social programs, the lack of economic and social development alternatives, and the uncontrolled rise in the cost of living south of the border as other important factors needing consideration. The drug dilemma is a complex one, Brands concluded, and a problem that requires comprehensive solutions.

—-

This story first appeared June 18 on Frontera NorteSur.

See also:

THE “COLOMBIANIZATION” OF CHIHUAHUA
from Frontera NorteSur
World War 4 Report, June 2007

From our Daily Report:

Mexico: CalderĂłn sees “historic crossroads” in narco war
World War 4 Report, June 27, 2009

——————-

Reprinted by World War 4 Report, July 1, 2009
Reprinting permissible with attribution

Continue Reading“OPERATION CHIHUAHUA PLUS” 

RISE OF THE CZECH FAR RIGHT

Neo-Nazis Exploit Growing Anti-Roma Racism

by Gwendolyn Albert, World War 4 Report

In one sense, the recent elections to the European Parliament were a reason to celebrate in the Czech Republic. Unlike other countries in Europe—such as Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Hungary, the Netherlands, Romania or the UK—no Czech MEPs from far-right extremist parties will be representing the country at the EP in Brussels and Strasbourg. In another sense, however, there is a great deal to be concerned about. The neo-Nazi Worker’s Party (DelnickĂĄ strana), responsible for the recent rise in public neo-Nazi violence here during the past nine months, did win more than 1% of the vote, as a result of which it now qualifies to receive almost one million Czech crowns from the state election fund. This infusion of cash means the party will be able to carry on its activities, which include specifically targeting the Roma minority, and they have great motivation to do so, as early elections are just around the corner this fall.

The current interim technocratic cabinet of Czech Prime Minister Jan Fischer has received a vote of confidence from parliament and will work until October. Cracking down on right-wing extremists is a clear part of their program, and last week saw a police raid on homes across the country, rounding up 10 key neo-Nazi organizers and charging them with “promoting a movement aimed at suppressing human rights and freedoms,” as the letter of Czech law has it. Five remain in custody, and in retaliation neo-Nazis have been protesting across the country. A recent news item reported that the children of Czech PM Fischer (a recent convert to Judaism) and Interior Minister Pecina are now being given police protection as a preventive measure in case the neo-Nazis make good on their threats of retaliation for the police raids.

As those following events in the Czech Republic are aware, this crackdown has been long overdue. Neo-Nazi demonstrations and attempted pogroms on the Roma in the Czech Republic cost taxpayers millions during the run-up to the recent EP elections. The November 2008 neo-Nazi riots in LitvĂ­nov required the presence of 1,000 police and were the largest police action in the country since the anti-IMF/World Bank demonstrations in Prague in the year 2000. They have since been followed by other attempted pogroms, many of which have met with peaceful but firm resistance from the Roma community.

In the early morning hours of April 19, perpetrators who still remain at large threw three Molotov cocktails into the home of a Roma family in the village of VĂ­tkov, Czech Republic. The ensuing blaze injured three people, including a two-year-old girl who is still fighting for her life in the Ostrava Teaching Hospital, where she is being treated for second and third-degree burns over 80 % of her body. The grandmother of the family saw a car in front of the house and heard a man yelling “Hey, Gypsies, burn!” before it drove away. The water mains to the house had been shut off prior to the attack and the house was completely destroyed.

Police say they have identified the vehicle and even the passengers, but have charged no one for lack of evidence. Despite the fact that police clearly classified the attack as arson committed by people from outside the house, irrational local rumors persist that the family set the fire themselves. Since the attack, they have been housed in a temporary shelter, an eight-meter-square flat in back of a veterinary clinic. While almost a million Czech crowns in donations have been collected by the town on their behalf for the purchase of a new home, no one wants the family to move in next to them, and the few offers of real estate they have received have been followed by groups of neighbors visiting the town hall to protest against the family moving in there. Meanwhile, Czech internet chat rooms visited by neo-Nazis threaten to “finish the job.” Just like two-year-old NatĂĄlka, the family remains in a state of limbo, with no clear way out of their situation.

This particular arson attack was followed by yet another on a Roma family, fortunately unsuccessful, during May in the village of Zdiby, not far from Prague. These attacks, the rise in neo-Nazi activity across the country during the past year, and the impunity with which the perpetrators operate are one reason so many Czech Roma are once again fleeing to Canada, mirroring a similar exodus during the mid-1990s that caused Canada to institute a visa requirement for all Czech citizens (lifted in 2007).

Recent Roma asylum seekers from the Czech Republic have included Anna PolĂĄkovĂĄ, a well-known Roma programming editor at Czech Radio who has fled the country for fear of her family’s safety. Her experience of the Czech justice system is quite instructive: Skinheads beat her son unconscious and were fortunately apprehended by police during the act; civil and criminal courts found the perpetrators guilty, with the civil court awarding the victim compensation for his rights having been violated. However, when two of the perpetrators failed to pay up and the family sued for their sentencing to be enforced, the family then became subjected to persecution. Their addresses were revealed to the perpetrators and their associates, who began following PolĂĄkovĂĄ’s husband around, threatening and then assaulting him in an effort to extort the return of the compensation already paid to the family. Police were unable to protect them, so the family is now living with other asylum-seekers in the town of Hamilton, just outside Toronto.

Canadian Immigration Minister Jason Kenney recently made the mistake of telling the media he found it hard to believe the Czech Republic is “an island of persecution” in Europe, but that is only because he must be receiving poor intelligence. There are worse places, indeed—in Hungary more than seven Roma people have been shot in or near their homes during the past year—but there is no doubt the Czech Republic has allowed an atmosphere of impunity for neo-Nazis.

While a great deal of the reporting on this issue from Central and Eastern Europe has generated the assumption that the rise in extremist activity can be blamed on the financial crisis, in the case of the Czech Republic such suggestions are facile. A great deal of racist activity targeting the Roma was well underway in this country long before the global financial crisis was officially announced in the fall of 2008.

Indeed, the argument might even be made that racism gets worse here the better times are: Last year the Czech crown was performing so strongly against both the dollar and the euro that Czech exporters were beginning to worry their products might become too expensive. Even after the crisis became full-blown, Czech authorities hastened to soothe taxpayers by letting them know that Czech banks had not been involved in the hedge funds and other financial instruments that had wreaked such havoc elsewhere. As Hungary, Iceland and Ireland have imploded, the Czech Republic has remained relatively extremely stable. Predictions issued by the European Commission expect Czech GDP to shrink by only 2.7 % this year, one of the mildest forecasts in the EU.

One market economy mechanism that has been steadily at work in the country for quite some time is considered a normal component of the development of commercial real estate markets in capitalist economies and is largely to blame for the rise in the number of Roma “ghettos” here during the past decade, recently documented by the Czech Labor and Social Affairs Ministry in 2006. That mechanism is gentrification.

The average Czech citizen has been finding their local “Roma ghetto” expanding recently with indigent and unhappy residents—not due to official planning, as happened under communism, but due to real estate agents randomly redistributing the underclass as gentrification requires. In this scenario, the only ones satisfied are the property developers, whose owners usually do not have to live day-to-day with the actual impact of their commercial activity. Given that there is no definition of social or low-income housing enshrined in Czech law, towns are also free to invent their own approaches to this problem, with the result that many poor Roma end up paying exorbitant rents to live in undignified accommodation with communal facilities for which they are not eligible to receive any state support.

The political genius of the Workers’ Party during the past year and a half has been to capitalize on the sense of unease felt by those who have watched the populations of their local Roma ghettos grow due to circumstances seemingly beyond anyone’s control (except that of the “invisible hand”). For members of the Roma community in the Czech Republic, 2008 and 2009 have been a nightmare. Neo-Nazi marches have increased in frequency, with municipal authorities unwilling or unable to stop them, and the number of followers of this ideology willing to take part in them has risen as well. Those attending the marches are not teenaged thugs, but middle-aged, clean-cut, average-seeming men and women. Again, it would be facile to suggest that the promoters of this hatred are motivated by any objective worsening of the country’s living standard. In August 2008, the Czech Statistical Office reported that unemployment, as calculated by the International Labor Organization, had fallen during the second quarter of 2008 to 4.3%, the lowest level since 1996—which, incidentally, is when the last effort by the extreme right to participate in government was underway.

During the last year and a half, the Workers’ Party has perfected a formula: It sends its “patrols” to towns with large Roma ghettos to “monitor” the situation, which usually means meeting with local residents to ask them about their grievances with respect to their “inadaptable” (=Roma) neighbors. The party then claims it has been “invited” to “address the situation”; an individual related to the party then convenes a public demonstration in the town, usually involving a march through the Roma quarter. Members of hard-core neo-Nazi organizations, usually National Resistance and the Autonomous Nationalists, then show up in support, armed with blades and other weapons (so far, not firearms). The intention is to provoke the Roma community to violence; delighted onlookers in various towns have been captured on video urging these pogroms on.

Czech Human Rights and Minorities Minister Michael KocĂĄb recently called these neo-Nazi marches “terrorism.” The party trademark is to return repeatedly and relentlessly every few weeks to the same community, hoping to provoke the violent catharsis its followers evidently crave.

In the aftermath of the November LitvĂ­nov riots, the Czech government succumbed to pressure from civil rights groups and made an historic first attempt to request that the Supreme Administrative Court dissolve a registered political party (for other than technical reasons). The Workers’ Party website alone and the many speeches in which its leaders have railed against the democratic order should be ample reason to disband it, but the evidence submitted in the government brief was so weak as to prompt various speculations among civil society observers that it had essentially been just for show. For now, therefore, the Workers’ Party is continuing its activities with the additional legitimacy of having defeated the government in court, but the new cabinet has vowed to do the job right a second time, and not only with respect to the WP, but to their less-successful kindred spirits, the National Party (NĂĄrodnĂ­ strana).

Only the October elections will really prove whether these neo-Nazi groups are merely a flash in the pan or whether their tactics will succeed with the Czech electorate. Certainly the average citizen has expressed support for the increasingly harsh language and tactics taken by some center-right politicians toward the Roma minority; in this sense, the extremists have been “punching above their weight” for some time here. They do not have to ever actually sit in any parliament to pose a threat to the country, and we can only hope Fischer and Pecina will achieve their stated aim of breaking up this movement before it does more damage.

—-

Gwendolyn Albert is a human rights activist in Prague.

See also:

CZECH REPUBLIC FROM VELVET TO VIOLENT
Neo-Nazis Prepare Pogroms Ten Years After Revolution
by Gwendolyn Albert, World War 4 Report
World War 4 Report, January 2009

From our Daily Report:

Czech Republic: crackdown on neo-Nazis in wake of attacks
World War 4 Report, May 4, 2009

——————-

Reprinted by World War 4 Report, July 1, 2009
Reprinting permissible with attribution

Continue ReadingRISE OF THE CZECH FAR RIGHT 

SELLING IRAN

Ahmadinejad, Privatization and a Bus Driver Who Said No

by Billy Wharton, Dissident Voice

A creeping assumption lies just beneath the surface of arguments concerning the disputed election in Iran. Incumbent Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is cast as an anti-US populist crusader resisting the materialistic advances of the West. His opponent, Mir-Hossein Mousavi, as his foil—a Western-backed liberal intent on implementing free-market policies. Violent street battles have been presented as a re-enforcement of the Western disposition to see the two idealized positions as the limit of what is politically imaginable. Such arguments conveniently avoid a third force—the people of Iran, whose street politics threaten to move well beyond the confines of the electoral campaigns. Questions remain. Is Ahmadinejad really a populist—the only force preventing a wave of pro-market policies in Iran? Does Mousavi’s campaign mark the limits of the reform movement?

Since his election in 2005, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, under the guidance of the Supreme Leader of Iran, Ali Khamenei, has overseen a regime dedicated to the privatization of state-controlled industries. The intention of the regime, as stated by the newly appointed governor of the Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Seyyed Shams Al-din Hosseini, is to privatize 80% of state-owned industries by 2010. This mandate was made real just prior to the disputed elections as a state-owned bank, Saderat, announced it would offer 6% of its shares to private investors (Press TV, June 8, 2009). Other significant privatizations during Ahmadinejad’s reign include the postal service; two other state-run banks, Tejerat and Mellat; and, in February 2008, a 5% bloc of shares in the publicly owned steel maker, Foulad-e Mobarakeh, was sold out in eight minutes. (Iran Daily, Fen. 14, 2008). In total, since 2005, 247 enterprises have been processed by the Iran Privatization Organization, the state-ministry specifically charged with overseeing privatizations (Iranian Privatization Organization website).

Khamenei has propelled the process forward. While Ahmadinejad crafted just enough populist rhetoric to provide headlines, the Supreme Leader issued a letter in 2006 ordering the sell-off of banking, mining, industrial, and transport companies—80% across the board. Ahmadinejad’s ministers have aggressively followed suit. In September 2008, Labor Minister Mohammad Jahromi described the fact that so many of the country’s resources are located in the public sector as an “obstacle” to growth (Iran Daily, Sept. 29, 2008). Heidari Kord-Zangeneh, Ahmadinejad’s deputy finance minister and head of the Iran Privatization Organization, drew pro-market policies together with the myth of anti-imperialism. “We are going to activate our private sector and our private banks,” he exclaimed, “in order to fight against these [US] sanctions.” He punctuated this with a pre-election promise, “I promise that if I am here for the next two years, between 80 and 90 percent of the government will be sold.” (Iran Daily, Feb. 12, 2008)

Ahmadinejad’s supposed anti-Western approach stops short when it comes to allowing foreign investors to penetrate Iran’s economy. His Minister of Economic Affairs and Finance Davoud Danesh-Jafari boasted at a 2008 meeting of the Islamic Development Bank that foreign direct investment in Iran had increased by 138% since 2007. (Iran Daily, Feb. 17, 2008) Some 80 projects had been initiated during that period. Key to this capital penetration was the 2004 acceptance of the International Monetary Fund’s Article VIII Obligations (IMF press release, Sept. 14, 2004). Under this provision, Iran agreed to refrain from imposing restrictions on currency transactions and other elements essential to capital flow.

While Ahmadinejad has been the implementer of privatization policies, the reform camp was its architects. Central to this process was the creative violation of Article 44 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran. This article mandates that key sectors of the economy remain in public hands. It represented the radical-populist edge of the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Parliamentary legislation in 2004, near the end of the term of reformer Mohammad Khatami, created the first breech in Article 44. The legislation called for a “change in the role of government from direct ownership and management of enterprises to policymaking, guidance and overseeing” (Iranian Privatization Organization website). The one consistent voice pushing this process forward is Khamenei, whose tenure as Supreme Leader encompasses both reformer and populist presidential regimes.

The IMF has hailed this process, describing Iran in a 2007 position paper as, “Managing the Transition to a Market Economy.” The Fund has had a constant presence in the country since 1945, surviving even the turbulent 1979 Islamic Revolution. IMF officials have employed the usual equation of debt and technical assistance to enforce their pro-market agenda. The next phase, according to IMF planners, of market transition is to “curb the growth of internal demand” through the reduction of state subsidies. Ahmadinejad’s Central Bank appointee, Al-din Hosseini, indicated a shared sentiment, stating: “The government plans to implement a strategy that involves significant reforms, the most important of which is the reform aimed at better subsidy system.” (IMF meeting, Washington DC, Oct. 13, 2008).

Pro-market privatizations have been combined with harsh restrictions on workers’ ability to organize, in order to advance Ahmadinejad’s neo-liberal restructuring of Iran. Although Iran is technically a member of the International Labor Organization, and thereby mandated to allow free trade unions, workers are restricted from forming independent unions. Under the constitution, they are only allowed to join ideologically-centered Islamic Workers’ Councils, which hold no right to deal with worksite issues or collectively bargain. Despite these legal restrictions, privatization and soaring inflation have resulted in a series of escalating confrontations between workers and security forces.

In March 2007, thousands of schoolteachers spilled out into the streets in front of Parliament, demanding that their collective grievances be heard and their salaries increased. They were attacked by security forces and their leaders received prison sentences of up to five years. Such repression did not deter Mahmoud Salehi, a baker, from making his annual demand to celebrate May Day. Salehi was found guilty of “acting against national security” and imprisoned. This year, in a small preview of the post-election street protests, Ahmadinejad’s security apparatus was used to repress 2,000 workers who attempted to organize a May Day celebration.

But the real foil to Ahmadinejad’s pro-market policies is a middle-aged bus driver from Tehran. Mansour Osanloo, acting as the president of the 17,000 worker-strong Syndicate of Workers of Tehran and Suburbs Bus Company, led a 2005 strike in which drivers refused to accept fares in protest of working conditions and rising fares. The strike was immediately criminalized with Osanloo and fellow leaders placed under arrest. Undeterred, Osanloo led another strike attempt in 2006. He was again arrested and today sits in a cell in Iran’s notorious Evin prison—a living testament to both the courage of Iranian workers and the repressive nature of the regime.

Soon to be joining Osanloo in Evin are thousands of protesters who have also been criminalized by Ahmadinejad and Khamenei’s regime because of their protests over the stolen election. While it is difficult to describe a candidate with as many establishment credentials as Mousavi as a reformer, it is easy to see how the demonstrations on the street have rapidly progressed beyond his campaign. Slogans have moved from “Mousavi get our votes back” to “Death to the Dictator.” With this shift come possibilities for more radical measures. Automotive workers at Khodro Automobile Company have pledged resistance, university students are conducting sit-ins, and the Bus Drivers Union has issued a call for international solidarity.

Meanwhile, somewhere deep inside Evin prison, clandestine communications may be being initiated between a jailed bus driver and a newly minted student radical or an ailing baker and young rock-throwing worker. These actors need little help in understanding that Ahmadinejad’s regime, despite all his populist rhetoric, has worked hand-in-hand with IMF privatizers. After failing to deliver on his populist rhetoric, Ahmadinejad has stolen the election. Now, his only recourse is state repression. On the streets, something far more brilliant is underway—an open-ended emancipation project demanding nothing less than political freedom.

—-

Billy Wharton is the editor of The Socialist magazine and the Socialist WebZine. His articles have recently appeared in the Washington Post, Common Dreams, Monthly Review Zine, NYC Indypendent and the Links Journal.

This story first appeared June 28 on Dissident Voice.

RESOURCES

Iranian Privatization Organization
http://www.ipo.ir/

International Alliance in Support of Workers in Iran (IASWI)
http://www.workers-iran.org/

From our Daily Report:

Iran: ayatollah calls for death penalty for “rioters”
World War 4 Report, June 27, 2009

Iran: many beaten, arrested at May Day rallies
World War 4 Report, May 2, 2009

See also:

AGAINST U.S. AGGRESSION; AGAINST THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC
Iranian Left-Opposition Activist Azar Majedi Says No to Both
from Riposte Laique
World War 4 Report, December 2007

IRAN: THE ANTI-IMPERIALIST CASE AGAINST NUCLEAR POWER
by Reza Fiyouzat, Dissident Voice
World War 4 Report, August 2007

IRAN: THE LEFT OPPOSITION SPEAKS
An Interview with Bina Darabzand of Salam Democrat:
Against Bush, Against Ahmadinejad, For Oaxaca
by Bill Weinberg, World War 4 Report
World War 4 Report, March 2007

——————-

Reprinted by World War 4 Report, July 1, 2009
Reprinting permissible with attribution

Continue ReadingSELLING IRAN 

SUFIS AND NEOCONS

The Global War on Terrorism’s Strangest of Bedfellows

by Sarkis Pogossian, World War 4 Report

It was none other than neocon whiz kid and former undersecretary of defense Douglas J. Feith (along with Justin Polin, a sidekick from the Hudson Institute) who favorably invoked the Sufis in a New York Times op-ed about Pakistan this March 30. The attack on sufism by Pakistan’s neo-Taliban receives practically no coverage in the international media—until war propagandists seize on it for their own cynical purposes.

The piece, entitled “Radio-Free Swat Valley,” noted that earlier that month presumed Taliban forces bombed the shrine of revered Pashtun poet Rahman Baba (born c. 1650). The writers noted: “The bombers took aim at the poet’s shrine because it represented Sufism, the mystical form of Islam that has long been predominant in India and Pakistan. They praised Sufism’s legacy of “tolerance, devotion and love” that the “extremists are determined to destroy.” It closed with a verse of Rahman Baba’s “Sow Flowers”:

Sow flowers to make a garden bloom around you,

The thorns you sow will prick your own feet.

Arrows shot at others

Will return to hit you as they fall.

You yourself will come to teeter on the lip

Of a well dug to undermine another.

The writers called for the US to fund a Pashtun radio network akin to Radio Free Europe, to promote this kind of Islam as an alternative to Taliban orthodoxy.

Of course, the very last thing that Rahman Baba and his contemporary adherents need is for his voice to be co-opted as an instrument of US propaganda. Pakistan’s Sufis are doubtless astute enough to grasp the surreal irony of Feith—a key architect of the Iraq adventure, and advocate of spreading the war to Iran—quoting the pacifistic verse of an 18th century Sufi poet.

Nearly a year earlier, on February 16, 2008, the New York Times ran a guardedly optimistic op-ed, “In Pakistan, Islam Needs Democracy,” by Waleed Ziad of the Truman National Security Project, a think-tank that “unites Americans who believe equally in strong liberal values, and the need for strong national security.” He noted a ceremony commemorating of the death of a Sufi saint at Pakpattan village in the Punjab—”a feast of dance, poetry, music and prayer attended by more than a million people.”

This more indigenous Islam is standing up to the fundamentalist tyranny, we are told. Ziad takes heart that “in the tribal areas, many local village councils, called jirgas, have summoned the Pakistani Army or conducted independent operations against extremists. Virtually all effective negotiations between the army and militants have involved local councils; in 2006, a jirga in the town of Bara expelled two rival clerics who used their town as a battleground.”

Yet in his strategic prescriptions, Ziad finds: “Pakistan’s military will continue to manage the war against the Taliban and its Qaeda allies, while President Pervez Musharraf will remain America’s primary partner.”

And herein lies Ziad’s betrayal of those he invokes. Apologias for Musharraf and US imperialism will not serve the cause of decoupling the jirgas from the Taliban/al-Qaeda. Nothing will discredit the jirgas and Sufis faster than making them collaborators with the US and Musharraf’s brutal military—legitimizing the Wahhabi types as the “resistance.” But more and more neo-conservative are calling for this unlikely alliance.

Pakistan: Laboratory of the Sufi Strategy

Pakistan’s government announced this June that it is establishing a Sufi Advisory Council, with an aim of combating extremism by promoting Sufism and its pacifistic vision of Islam. Reuters’ coverage of the development noted that such stateside establishmentarian voices as RAND and the Heritage Foundation have recently advocated such a strategy.

The 2003 RAND report, Civil Democratic Islam: Partners, Resources, Strategies, includes the following policy recommendation: “Encourage the popularity and acceptance of Sufism.” The 2009 Heritage Foundation report, Reviving Pakistan’s Pluralist Traditions to Fight Extremism notes the growing schism between the the more indigenous and Sufi-tolerant Barelvi school with the orthodox Deobandi favored by the Pashtun Taliban.

“What these militants were doing was un-Islamic,” Reuters quoted Sahibzada Fazal Karim, a leader of the moderate Islamist party Jamiat-e-ulema-e-Pakistan, who organized anti-Taliban protests. Beheading innocent people and kidnapping are in no way condoned in Islam,” said

Also quoted was anti-Taliban cleric Sarfraz Ahmed Naeemi—who was killed by a suicide bomber at his Lahore mosque earlier in June. In May, he said of the Taliban: “They want people to fight one another, that’s why we have kept silent and endured their oppression. We don’t want civil war… But God forbid, if the government fails to stop them, then we will confront them ourselves.”

Naeemi was ultra-conservative by any standard short of the Taliban’s. He advocated sharia enforcement, and lost a government post and was briefly arrested after protesting Pakistani collaboration in the US War on Terror. He was arrested again for protesting the Danish cartoons of Prophet Mohammad.

He was killed five days after the government announced creation of the Sufi council.

Somalia: Imperialism and the Sufi Survival Struggle

Christian Science Monitor blogger David Montero found in June that “as in Pakistan, many are looking to armed tribes in Somalia who adhere to Sufism—a mystical, moderate interpretation of Islam—as the best chance for peace.” The post, entitled “Is promoting Sufi Islam the best chance for peace in Somalia?”, quoted a Somali writer—identifying himself only as Muthuma—who writes on the Bartamaha news portal that a “new axis” of conflict is emerging in Somalia, in which fighters are battling one another along religious lines:

Moderate Sufi scholars, whose tolerant beliefs have come under attack, have decided to fight back against al-Shabaab for destroying their shrines and murdering their imams….

It is an Islamist versus Islamist war, and the Sufi scholars are part of a broader moderate movement that Western nations are counting on to repel Somalia’s increasingly powerful extremists.

Whether Somalia becomes a terrorist haven and a genuine regional threat – which is already beginning to happen, with hundreds of heavily armed foreign jihadists flocking here to fight for Al Shabab – or whether this country steadies itself and ends the years of bloodshed, may hinge on who wins these ideological, sectarian battles.

But caveats are raised by Ali Eteraz, writing in Foreign Policy that month:

The usual response by supporters of the Sufi solution is that thanks to the extremists, Islam has already been politicized, and therefore propagandist measures promoting Sufism are the only way to fight back. But that’s precisely the problem: Propaganda is inherently discrediting. Besides, state-sponsored Sufism … gets everything backward: In an environment where demagogues are using religion to conceal their true political and material ambitions, establishing another official, “preferred” theological ideology won’t roll back their influence. Minimizing the role of all religion in government would be a better idea. Only then could people begin to speak about rights and liberty.

Eteraz again overlooks the most obvious reason an imperialist Sufi strategy could backfire—making Sufis the pawns and proxies of the West will delegitimize them in the eyes of precisely those the strategists would seek to win over.

US-backed Ethiopia began pulling its military forces out of Somalia at the beginning of the year, having pledged to withdraw from the country by the end of 2008. But the Ethiopians left behind chaos. The “official” Transitional Federal Government they were backing up controls little more than a few blocks of downtown Mogadishu. A peace deal that brought into the transitional government many conservative clerics who had been exiled to Eritrea during the Ethiopian occupaiton has failed to win peace. Al-Shabab (youth) militia is the foremost of several jihadi insurgent groups.

Factional violence has been reported between al-Shabab and Ahl A-Sunna wal-Jama’a, a Sufi militia that has armed to resist the jihadis. Heavy fighting erupted in central Somalia in the closing days of 2008. Two religious militias seeking control of the town of Guri El in Galgadud region, local Radio Garowe reported. Sufi gunmen reportedly took control of strategic locations inside Guri El, ousting al-Shabaab guerillas who had seized the town weeks earlier.

Sheikh Abdirahman Abu-Qadi, a spokesman for the sufi militia, told reporters that al-Shabaab was responsible for destroying the graves of revered sheikhs. “The bones of Sheikh Nur Hussein have been sold to Italians and Jews and we do not know why,” Abu-Qadi said. Al-Shabaab fighters last week reportedly destroyed graves in Jilib and Kismayo districts, in the Middle Jubba and Lower Jubba regions respectively.

The day before the fighting, Sheikh Abdulkadir Somow, a leader of the Sufi group, held a press conference in Mogadishu to protest the desecration of the graves by al-Shabaab fighters. “It is prohibited to bother a Muslim person, living or dead, in Islam,” Sheikh Somow said, adding that the graves of Sheikh Nur and his two sons were destroyed. He urged restraint on the part of Sufi followers, while appealing to al-Shabaab to “stop destroying graves and mosques.” He also asserted that foreign fighters were involved in the desecrations.

Radio Garowe quoted an unidentified Shabaab fighter who confirmed the report, adding: “We believe people were worshipping the dead…and so we destroyed the graves.” The veneration of the graves of saints is centuries-old local tradition, but is rejected as heresy by the fundamentalist al-Shabaab.

Islamist al-Shabaab insurgents seized two districts in central Somalia without violence Dec. 7, including the stronghold of a Sufi group that traditionally abjures violence. Residents in Galgadud region reported that fighters aboard armed trucks peacefully entered the provincial capital Dhusamareb. “The local clan militias withdrew before they came,” one resident told the independent Radio Garowe. Shabaab fighters also took control of Mataban district to the south, with clan militias similarly offering no resistance. The Shabaab faction already controls key regions in southern Somalia, including the port towns of Kismayo and Marka.

Speaking in Mogadishu, Sheikh Somow appealed for peace: “The fighting in Guri El [in Galgadud] was between brothers, and Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jamee’a was not involved.” He called on Somalis to “stop fighting each other,” and on feuding warlords to “resolve differences.” He praised Djibouti for supporting the peace process.

Despite Sufi appeals for peace, Somalia is starkly divided between indigenous Islamic traditions and jihadist orthodoxy. This June, sharia court in a Shabab-controlled section of Mogadishu sentenced four teenagers to each have a hand and a leg amputated as punishment for stealing cellphones. Last October, it made at least brief world headlines when a woman was stoned to death for adultery following a sentence by a sharia court in the insurgent-controlled southern town of Kismayo.

In a lesser known case in July 2008, militants loyal to the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) assaulted at “cultural boogie” at El-Ghelle village, Balad district, some 30 kilometers north of Mogadishu. The fighters reportedly opened fire on a circle where drummers, singers and musicians were playing for a traditional dance. A man and women were wounded, while other participants fled barefooted to bush. In their six months in power before being ousted by the US-backed Ethiopian intervention of December 2006, the ICU banned music and repeatedly raided wedding parties in Mogadishu.

Iran: Sufis Under the Aytaollahs

The Sufis have, needless to say, fared poorly under the Ayatollah regime that may now face destabilization. Long before Iran exploded into massive protests following the contested June elections, Sufis were—by no choice of their own—often on the frontlines of resisting the orthodox Shi’ite theocracy.

The harshest incident came in November 2007, in the town of Boroujerd, Luristan province, with the destruction of a hosseinieh or monastery belonging to the Gonabadi Sufi order by the police and Basij paramilitary forces. According to Mohsen Yahyavi, the conservative parliamentary representative for Boroujerd, the trouble began when Sufis abducted and beat several youths affiliated with a nearby mosque. The Sufis, however, tell a different story. One young female follower of the order told IPS: “Religious vigilantes had once before tried to bulldoze the hosseinieh and succeeded in destroying parts of its walls. This time on the night before the hosseinieh was completely destroyed, the Basij militia and the vigilantes staged a bogus attack on a nearby mosque where there was a gathering to criticize Sufi beliefs. The attack was then blamed on the Sufis to justify the attack on the hosseinieh.”

The militiamen then turned on the hosseinieh. The Sufis refused to evacuate the building, and called the police. But after midnight the police abandoned the scene and there was a blackout. More clashes followed at the hosseinieh. The Sufis trapped inside were left at the mercy of vigilantes armed with tear gas. They torched and then bulldozed the building. The next day, the remains of the building were razed to the ground by the “official” authorities. No trace was left of the hosseinieh.”

More than 180 followers of the order were arrested, and 80 people were wounded during the incident, the Fars news agency reported the deputy governor of Luristan province as saying.

Some wire reports said the Sufis “traded fire” with police and paramilitary forces. Local journalist Morteza Bourbour told AP the violence began when Sufis attacked a nearby mosque, injuring several Shi’ite clerics who had urged their followers to shut down the Sufi lodge because it was “illegitimate.” Iranian state radio briefly mentioned “clashes between people and Sufis ended in Boroujerd after police intervention.”

The independent AdvarNews said some 100 Sufis were injured and another 500 arrested “after an unidentified group captured the lodge, setting fire to it and flattening it by bulldozer.”

AP identified the Sufi order as “Nematollahi-Gonabadi,” and reported that conservative clerics such as Grand Ayatollahs Safi Golpaigani, Makarem Shirazi, Fazel Lankarani and Nouri Hamadani have issued fatwas against Sufis. The Sufis have been defended by other clerics who uphold their right to free worship—including Grand Ayatollah Montazeri, who issued a statement following the attack on the hosseinieh of the dervishes in Qom in February 2006.

Mehdi Karrubi, former parliament speaker and leader of the Etemad Melli reformist party, a Shiite cleric himself, has written letters to ayatollahs and state officials in defense of the Sufis’ right to free worship. 07

In November 2008, Iran’s judiciary sentenced a Sufi leader to five years in prison, flogging and exile on charges of spreading lies, the moderate Kargozaran newspaper reported. The report identified the man as Amir Ali Mohammad Labaf, of the Nematollahis or Gonabadi Dervishes order based in the northeastern province of Khorassan Razavi. Labaf was convicted by a court in Iran’s clerical center of Qom, finding that his holding of traditional Sufi prayers constituted “a case of spreading lies,” the report said, without elaborating. In addition to the five-year prison term, Labaf was sentenced to 74 lashes and internal exile to the southeastern town of Babak.

Followers of Iran’s indigenous Baha’i faith, which has roots in Shi’ite Sufism, have also faced persecution—and were especially targeted by the regime in the crackdown on dissidents that immediately preceded the contested 2009 elections. Seven Baha’is were arrested on highly dubious charges of spying for Israel in February. Jinous Sobhani, secretary of the independent Defenders of Human Rights Center in Tehran and a follower of the Baha’i faith, was detained by authorities in January. The Defenders of Human Rights Center, founded by prominent dissident and Nobel Peace Prize laureate Shirin Ebadi, was ordered closed by the authorities in December, and Ebadi’s private office was also raided, with computers and files confiscated.

Ebadi, to her great credit, has spoken out publicly against the exploitation of the issue of human rights in Iran in advance of imperial agendas. On February 8, 2005, she had an op-ed in the New Yor Times, co-authored with Hadi Ghaem of Human Rights Watch, entitled “The Human Rights Case Against Attacking Iran”. Ebadi and Ghaem wrote: “American policy toward the Middle East, and Iran in particular, is often couched in the language of human rights… But for human rights defenders in Iran, the possibility of a foreign military attack on their country represents an utter disaster for their cause.”

Iraq: Towards a Sufi Insurgency?

In August 2006, the Washington Post invoked an incipient Sufi insurgency in Iraq. British forces were abandoning Camp Abu Naji at Amarah, in southern Iraq, and not only Moktada al-Sadr but also the official Maysan provincial authorites proclaimed it as a victory against the occupier. The British commander Maj. Charlie Burbridge asserted Iraqi army forces maintained “full control” of the base—even as it was being sacked by looters armed with AK-47s! Burbridge crowed about how disciplined the Iraqi army maintaining (precarious) control of the base is—while a local brigade mutinies, apparently well-infiltrated by the Sadr forces! The British forces were evacuating the Amarah base to carry out “guerilla tactics” in the marshlands—an implicit acknowledgement that the insurgents are in control there! Finally, it was noted that even the pacifistic Sufis had declared a jihad against the Anglo-American occupation (and the fundamentalist Shi’ites like al-Sadr who would like to exterminate them):

In other developments, the head of a major Iraqi sect of Sufism, a mystical branch of Islam that had previously rejected violence against U.S.-led coalition forces, declared holy war on American troops. The leader, Sheik Mohammed al-Qadiri, said his sect would form a new group, the Battalions of Shikh Abdul Qadir al-Gaillani, and join the insurgency.

“We will not wait for the Mahdi Army and the Badr Brigade to enter our houses and kill us,” said Ahmed al-Soffi, a Sufi leader in the western city of Fallujah, referring to the country’s major Shiite militias. “We will fight the Americans and the Shiites who are against us.”

Now, as the US prepares to depart from Iraq’s cities, the sectarian war is escalating horribly—after a still-bloody “lull” of several months. Perhaps the Qadiri Sufis will re-appear in the news. For their sake—hopefully not.

Kosova: Sufis in the West’s “Model Muslim” State

Neocons have frankly pinned their hopes on newly independent Kosova—now recognized by some 60 countries around the world, and still under a thousands-strong US/NATO occupation. The Serb minority and largely Muslim Albanian majority are as divided as ever—with a rebel Serb council refusing to recognize the declaration of independence.

Michael Totten wrote in a March 2008 piece for Commentary: “Kosovo doesn’t belong to the Iranian-Syrian-Hezbollah-Hamas axis. On the contrary, Kosovo has thrown in its lot with the West, and especially with the United States. Serbia’s breakaway province is perhaps the most pro-American country in all of Europe. Bill Clinton is lionized there as a liberator—a main boulevard through the capital Prishtina is named after him—just as George H. W. Bush and his son George W. Bush are hailed as saviors in Iraqi Kurdistan….”

In other words, the Kosovars are domesticated good Muslims, who view the US as protector rather than hegemon. Someone forgot to tell the folks at the pro-Serbian American Council on Kosovo and the GWOT hardliner Jihad Watch websites. Bent on portraying Kosova as al-Qaeda’s new European beachhead, these sites are awash with such lurid titles as “Wahhabism Tightening Grip Over Kosovo” and “The Clinton-Bush-Islamic Axis in Israel and Kosovo.”

The reality may be more complicated—and interesting—than either side will acknowledge. A March 2008 article in the Tehran Times mentions some deep-rooted elements in the region which appear to exist outside the spectacularized jihad-vs-GWOT duality. It notes that the Albania-based Sadi Cultural Foundation is establishing libraries and tekiyas—sufi gathering places— in Kosova and Macedonia “with the assistance of the Bektashi Order and is planning to set up more in the future.”

The story renders tekiya with the less orthodox spelling of tekyeh—and defines it as a “place where ritual Shia Islamic ceremonies are practiced.” But this may be a ploy to get past Tehran’s censors. Tekiyas—especially in the Balkans—are generally associated with sufi orders which, even when Shi’ite, fall well outside the mainstream of Shia Islam. In fact, the Balkans appear to have been a refuge for heretical traditions which were persecuted in Turkey when the Ottoman Empire was shaken by paroxysms of orthodoxy or—with Sultan Mahmud II’s modernization drive in 1826—militant secularism.

Writes historian Anthony Weir on the website of the Bektashi Order of Sufi Dervishes:

Many early leaders of Albanian nationalism were Bektashi, and the Order formed the “left” end of the Islamic spectrum in the Balkans. Following the destruction of the Janissary Corps and the banning of the tariqat [sufi orders] in 1826, many Bektashi babas and dervishes fled to the remote areas of the Balkans far from the reach of the Ottoman government. During this period (especially after the order outlawing of the Bektashis was rescinded in the 1860s), the tariqat had gained a sizeable presence in southern Albania. Their toleration and ability to absorb local custom provided the population with a “folk” Islam that they could easily relate to—and this allowed Bektashism to spread throughout Greece and modern Macedonia

He notes that among those who established colonies in the Balkans at this time (especially Bulgaria) were the Kizilbashi, a sufi military caste from central Anatolia—where they are generally associated with the (nominally Shi’ite) Alevi Order.

The Alevis of central Anatolia are said to harbor indigenous Turkic traditions (including traces of shamanism) purged from the Arabized culture of the Ottoman court. Balkan sufism similarly seems to harbor traces of indigenous pre-Islamic and even pre-Christian traditions. In “A Glimpse at Sufism in the Balkans,” scholar Huseyin Abiva writes on the Alevi-Bektashi website:

In rural areas…the orders that were the widest spread tended to have had heterodox and syncretistic teachings. Here, in order to facilitate an easy transition from Christianity to Islam, the people often kept elements of their old ways (which were often of pre-Christian in origin themselves). For instance, the Hamzevis found considerable appeal along the…Drina River valley [Bosnia] in the 16th century… The 14th century religio-political movement of Shaykh Beddruddin Simavi (if it can be defined as a Sufi tariqat) was confined to the wilds of the Bulgarian backcountry. Both of these movements were crushed by the Ottoman government, but many of their ideas are believed to have filtered into the Bektashi Order…

An April 4, 2006 AFP report picked up by the website Sufi News & World Report noted (in an account not for the squeamish):

At the end of March the 5,000 Dervishes of Prizen in southern Kosovo celebrate the Spring equinox festival of “Sultan Nevruz,” the moment when the sun begins to favor the Northern Hemisphere and day become longer than night… “La-illaha-illallah” (“There is no god but God”) the Dervishes intone in a subdued prayer… “Allah Hu” (he is God), they chant in perfect unison.

That is when the skewers and knives appear.

The Shejh [Adrihusejn, leader of the order] leads the way, coating 15-centimetre (six inch) long needles with his saliva and then piercing his two young sons. He does the same to three other children.

Miraculously, there is no blood, and the children show no sign of fear or pain, swaying silently as they hold the needles pierced through one side of their mouths.

Next come the blades: Shejh slowly eases 40-centimetre ( 1.3-foot) knives with rounded, pearl-coated stems through both cheeks of the Dervishes, one-by-one.

Driven by the rhythm of kettledrums and tambourines, the entranced worshipers sway in a semi-conscious state, repeating their calls to “Allah” over and over.

Next they begin piercing their necks with knives, proudly displaying the wounds. “The knives symbolize the healing of all wounds. This is the blessing of God and the power of the order,” says an elderly, high-ranking Dervish after the ceremony.

This is clearly Nowruz, the Persian new year festival—perhaps brought to the Balkans in the 1820s by the Kizilbashi, or perhaps by Zoroastrian-influenced Gnostics 2,000 years ago.

It is practically axiomatic that these cultures are threatened. In a 2000 study, “Destruction of cultural heritage in Kosovo: a postwar report,” undertaken by Harvard scholars Andrew Herscher and Andras J. Riedlmayer for the prosecution at The Hague tribunal for the ex-Yugoslavia:

Another category of historical architecture in urgent need of protection in Kosovo is Muslim houses of worship. This part of Europe is home to an indigenous Islamic tradition going back more than 600 years, with its own rich architectural heritage—mosques, tekkes (lodges of the Sufi lay brotherhoods), medreses (theological schools), Islamic libraries, hamams (Turkish baths), and bazaars built to support charitable foundations. This heritage suffered massive destruction during the recent conflict… mosques burned out from within… minarets that had been blown up with explosives… visible signs of vandalism (Koran manuscripts…burned or defaced with human excrement…)… [T]his destruction was not the result of military activities. These were not buildings that had been caught in the crossfire as Serbian forces fought Albanian rebels, or hit by NATO’s bombs and missiles.

Of course, if you want to be regaled by the corresponding accounts of Albanian vandalism of Serbian Orthodox churches, monasteries and artifacts, just go to the American Council on Kosovo. The point is that maybe—just maybe—there are autochthonous forces that have not been drawn into the pathological polarization, if only due to their own endemic weirdness.

The Bektashi do pop up in the Turkish press from time to time. They have weighed in publicly in favor of the lifting of Turkey’s head-scarf ban:

The leader of the Hasandede Turkmen-Bektashi Association, Özdemir Özdemir…claimed that the greater part of society is against the headscarf ban and argued that the ban has nothing to do with secularism. “People with and without veils are living together in peace. We should respect individual preferences. We should always act hand in hand for the development of our country,” said Özdemir.

Secularists might disagree with this position—but it is still a very far cry from Wahhabism. And, despite the dreams of the neocons, the dervish ceremony described above is also (thank goodness) a very far cry from American globalism…

Tellingly both Totten and left-wing Israeli dissident Uri Avnery have noted Israeli reluctance to recognize Kosova lest it give some ideas to the Palestinians (and, worse yet, Israeli Arabs)

With Friends Like These…

Sufis are already in the cross-hairs of the jihadis.

At least two people were killed and nearly 20 injured when a bomb exploded inside the revered Sufi shrine of Khwaja Moinuddin Chishti at Ajmer in India’s western state of Rajasthan in October 2007. The attack came when the shrine was packed with hundreds of worshipers during evening Eid al-Fitr prayers. A day after the attack, a second explosive device was found in the shrine and defused by police. Six people were detained for interrogation, including two pilgrims of Bangladeshi origin. No group claimed responsibility for the blast.

The bombing was the third in a series of attacks on Muslim religious institutions after the 2006 bombing of a Sufi shrine in Malegaon and this summer’s strike at the Mecca Masjid in Hyderabad. A revealing commentary was provided by Praveen Swami for The Hindu, entitled “The War Against Popular Islam.” Swami recalls that Chishti wrote that the highest form of worship is “to redress the misery of those in distress, to fulfil the needs of the helpless and to feed the hungry.” Note ironic use of the term “neoconservative” to describe the Salafists:

The bombings…have been characterised as attempts to provoke a pan-India communal war. But the bombings also reflect another less-understood project: the war of Islamist neoconservatives against the syncretic traditions and beliefs that characterise popular Islam in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh.

Khwaja Moinuddin Chishti is, almost without dispute, the most venerated Sufi saint of South Asia. Born in 1141 CE, Chishti is believed to have studied at the great seminaries of Samarkand and Bukhara before travelling to India. Ajmer emerged as an important centre of pilgrimage during the sixteenth century, after Emperor Akbar undertook a pilgrimage on foot to the saint’s grave…

Islamist critics of Sufism have made no secret of their loathing for shrines like that at Ajmer, which they claim propagate the heresy of “shirk”—an Arabic term commonly translated to mean polytheism, but which is also used to refer to the veneration of saints and even atheism.

South Asian terror groups associated with recent attacks on Muslim shrines—notably the Lashkar-e-Taiba—draw theological inspiration from the Salafi sect, a neoconservative tradition also sometimes referred to as Wahabbism. Salafi theologians are intensely hostile to Sufi orders like that founded by Chishti, characterising them as apostasy.

In The General Precepts of the Ahlus-Sunnah wal-Jamaah, a pamphlet which propounds the Salafi doctrine, theologian Shaykh Naasir al’Aql, sharply criticises religious practices “where the dead are taken as intermediaries between a person and Allah, supplicating them and seeking the fulfilment of one’s needs through them, seeking their assistance and other similar acts.”

This is an obvious reference to the revered tombs of Sufi saints,

It is theoretically possible that Hindu militants rather than Salafists were behind this attack. But in June 2007, assailants tossed a grenade at the house of a holy man in Sopore, in India-controlled Kashmir, killing two of his devotees and injuring 15, even as the saint escaped unhurt.

This was the second attack on the darvaish Abdul Ahad, alias Ahad Bab. The Times of India wrote: “The ascetic lives a simple life and sits in an iron cage, clad in rags, while his devotees, who belong to different faiths, sit around him.”

The Hindu reported witnesses had identified the attacker as local Lashkar-e-Taiba militant. The report also noted widespread attacks on Sufi targets in Kashmir:

Islamists here have long opposed the influence of Ahad Sa’ab Sopore, a one-time policeman who left his job and became a mystic after undergoing what he describes as a spiritual experience three decades ago. As early as 1991, the Hizb ul-Mujahideen carried out a near-successful assassination attempt on the mystic. However, he escaped unhurt.

While mystics like Ahad Sa’ab Sopore have enormous religious and temporal power—their followers include several prominent politicians, bureaucrats and police and military officers—Islamists have repeatedly attacked their authority. Ahad Sa’ab Sopore, notably, has been criticised for appearing naked in public, a practice the mystic defends by asserting that the world, not he, needs to feel ashamed for its behaviour.

As early as June 1994, Lashkar stormed the historic Baba Reshi shrine at Tangmarg and fired on pilgrims. Dozens of similar attacks took place through the Kashmir valley as part of an Islamist campaign to stamp out folk Islam. The most prominent attack was the October 1995 siege of the Hazratbal shrine in Srinagar, which houses a relic claimed to be a hair of Prophet Mohammad. The terrorists threatened to blow up the shrine unless besieging troops were withdrawn. A similar siege at Chrar-e-Sharif in May 1996 led to the destruction of the town’s famous 700-year-old shrine.

Attacks continue, if less spectacularly. In 2000, Lashkar terrorists destroyed sacramental tapestries Bafliaz residents had offered at the shrine of Sayyed Noor. In June 2007, a Lashkar operative threw a grenade at a Sufi congregation in Bijbehara, injuring several. Lashkar is also thought responsible for a May 2005 arson that led to the destruction of the 14th century shrine of saint Zainuddin Wali at Ashmuqam. Earlier Ashmuqam was subjected to several grenade attacks, leading to disruption of festive days there for several years.

The neocons face a grave moral responsibility in their Sufi strategy. Making Sufis the pawns and proxies of the West will delegitimize them in the eyes of precisely those the strategists would seek to win over. It will also make them more of a target—or at least give a propaganda boost to those who target them. Even Sufis who feel the need to take allies where they can find them are doubtless worldly enough to realize this.

Besieged Sufis (and other religious and ethnic minorities in the Muslim world) do indeed need solidarity from the West. But only those who oppose the interventions, drone strikes and torture policies of the Global War on Terrorism have got the moral credibility to offer this solidarity. It is necessary to oppose both of the two poles of terrorism assaulting the Muslim world—political Islam and imperialism.

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Sarkis Pogossian is an impoverished World War 4 Report researcher.

From our Daily Report:

Pakistan: Sufis make NYT op-ed page
World War 4 Report, Feb. 17, 2008

Neocons exploit Sufis on NYT op-ed page —again!
World War 4 Report, March 30, 2009

Pakistan plays Sufi card against jihadis
World War 4 Report, June 27, 2009

Somalia: West to groom Sufis as proxies?
World War 4 Report, June 24, 2009

Somalia: insurgent sharia court sentences youth to amputation
World War 4 Report, June 24, 2009

Ethiopia begins Somalia withdrawal —chaos or peace next?
World War 4 Report, Jan. 3, 2009

Somalia: Sufis resist al-Shabaab insurgents
World War 4 Report, Dec. 28, 2008

Somalia: insurgency spreads, Sufis appeal for peace
World War 4 Report, Dec. 9, 2008

Somalia: rape victim stoned to death
World War 4 Report, Oct. 30, 2008

Somalia: Islamists attack traditional dance ceremony
World War 4 Report, July 1, 2008

Marabout wars in West Africa?
World War 4 Report, Jan. 5, 2008

Senegal: million pilgrims honor Sufi saint
World War 4 Report, March 9, 2007

Iran condemns Sufi to prison, flogging, exile
World War 4 Report, Nov. 16, 2008

Iran: paramilitaries destroy Sufi monastery after clash
World War 4 Report, Nov. 23, 2007

Iran: Baha’is targeted in espionage trial
World War 4 Report, Feb. 14, 2009

Iran: human rights worker arrested in sweep of Baha’is
World War 4 Report, Jan. 16, 2009

Iran: police shut independent human rights office
World War 4 Report, Dec. 23, 2008

Iranian Nobel Laureate dissident blasts US intervention
World War 4 Report, Feb. 9, 2005

Brits go “guerilla” in Iraq marshlands; Sufis declare jihad
World War 4 Report, Aug. 26, 2006

Missing on Kosova: the sufi voice?
World War 4 Report, March 25, 2007

India: terror blast at Sufi shrine
World War 4 Report, Oct. 13, 2007

Sufis under attack in Kashmir
World War 4 Report, July 22, 2007

See also:

SUFISM: THE MIDWAY BETWEEN EXTREMISMS
Indigenous North Africa Between Jihad and Imperialism
by Toufik Amayas Mostefaou
World War 4 Report, March 2007

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Special to World War 4 Report, July 1, 2009
Reprinting permissible with attribution

Continue ReadingSUFIS AND NEOCONS 

MEGAPROJECTS AND MILITARIZATION

A Perfect Storm in Mexico

by Todd Miller, NACLA News

The 40-day blockade of the Trinidad mine in the Oaxacan community of San José del Progreso came to a sudden and violent halt on May 6. Mine representatives and municipal authorities called in a 700-strong police force that stormed into the community in anti-riot gear along with an arsenal of tear gas, dogs, assault rifles, and a helicopter.

The overwhelming show of force was in response to community residents’ demand that the Canadian company Fortuna Silver Mines immediately pack its bags and leave. The company is in the exploration phase of developing the Trinidad mine. The result was a brutal attack, with over 20 arrests and illegal searches of homes. Police seemed to be going after a heavily armed drug cartel, not a community protest.

This is one of the drug war’s dirty secrets: As Mexican security budgets inflate with US aid—to combat the rising power of drug trafficking and organized crime—rights groups say these funds are increasingly being used to protect the interests of multinational corporations. According to a national network of human rights organizations known as the Red TDT, security forces are engaged in the systematic repression of activists opposed to megaprojects financed by foreign firms such as Fortuna Silver Mines.

In Oaxaca and throughout southern Mexico these types of conflicts seem destined to increase. Defying the logic of the international financial crisis, Mexico remains the top destination in Latin America for foreign direct investment, particularly in extractive industries. In the last three years alone, multinational companies have received over 80 federal mining concessions in just Oaxaca, covering 1.5 million acres of land. Mining is only the tip of the iceberg: Other megaprojects include hydroelectric dam construction, tourism and infrastructure, energy generation projects, water privatization, and oil exploration.

In response to the influx of capital-intensive projects, Marcos Leyva, director of Services for an Alternative Education, a community group, says, “We saw it coming, but we didn’t realize the utter force with which it was coming at us.”

The warning signs were there. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) gave foreign investment free range in the country. NAFTA even forced changes to the constitution so that communal lands could be broken up and sold piecemeal—in a word, privatized. In 2000, Plan Puebla Panamá was unveiled; the Plan sought to link southern Mexico with Central America through a series of networked megaprojects. But a strong wave of community resistance pushed the plan into the corner. Many say the plan is back, moving ahead with all cylinders, under a new name: Plan Mesoamerica.

In April, dozens of grassroots groups came together in Oaxaca to discuss these developments at a forum titled, “Weaving Resistance in Defense of Our Territories.” The forum’s declaration, signed by participating communities and organizations, denounced, “A privatization of our territories and natural resources is clearly being pushed forward, and the majority of this is located in rural and indigenous communities.”

At the meeting, representatives of rural and indigenous communities all share similar experiences to those of their counterparts in San JosĂ© del Progreso. The common denominator is the everyday struggle of life in Oaxaca where endemic and structural poverty has left 76 percent of the state’s population in desperation. Those affected by the mine described it as a “virus” that was gnawing away at their land, leaving it infertile and taking away their only sources of livelihood—agriculture and cattle.

Residents also complained the mine would pose a health hazard through the poisoning of their clean water sources with chemicals such as cyanide and arsenic, which are used to extract precious metals from the ore. The mine would also drain scarce water sources. “A mine will use more water in one hour than an entire family uses in one year,” says Raymundo Sandoval from the Project for Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, a Mexico City-based organization.

“It is not right that foreigners come here and steal our natural wealth,” complains community resident Dominga RodrĂ­guez. And this wealth could be significant. Though the project is still in its exploration phase, Fortuna Silver Mines expects the mine to yield 50 million ounces of silver worth about $700 million.

The community says neither the government nor the company consulted it about the mine—that’s pretty much par for the course for these kind of projects. In March, municipal authorities ignored complaints from residents about dynamite blasts damaging their homes and cattle dying after drinking contaminated water. RodrĂ­guez believes the municipal officials had already “sold out to the mine company.”

After the community took over the mine in March, the army set up camp a mere 100 meters from its entrance. Though the soldiers said they were there to remove explosives from the mine, the foreboding message was clear: When it comes to the $35 million that the company has invested in the project so far, there is little room for dialogue.

The events of May 6 confirmed the army’s implicit threat. Agripina VĂĄsquez, one of the people arrested in the massive police raid, told the Oaxacan daily Noticias: “What we wanted was dialogue, but they didn’t give us the opportunity. The police simply surrounded and arrested us.” The magnitude and brutality of the police raid was an eerie reminder for locals of Oaxaca’s months-long social conflict in 2006; the uprising was met with brute force by police. The government’s response was a human rights disaster by any measure and has yet to be resolved.

In recent visits to Mexico, high-level US officials, including President Barack Obama, have failed to acknowledge the country’s deteriorating human rights situation. Washington has moved ahead with its $700 million military and police aid package—with another $470 million in the pipeline—for Mexico known as the MĂ©rida Initiative. As security forces use this aid to fight the drug cartels, it is at least indirectly supporting repressive police operations such as the one seen in San JosĂ© del Progreso that are literally shielding private companies from legitimate community grievances.

In an unguarded moment, Thomas Shannon, the Bush administration’s top diplomat for the Western Hemisphere, admitted last year that Washington was in the process of “armoring NAFTA.” Although Shannon was just replaced by the Obama administration, it does not look like the Democratic president is inclined to rollback this “armoring” of the trade agreement.

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This story first appeared May 19 on NACLA News.

Resources:

Red TDT
http://www.redtdt.org.mx

See also:

THE RETURN OF PLAN PUEBLA-PANAMA
The New Struggle for Central America
by Bill Weinberg, World War 4 Report
World War 4 Report, May 2007

MINING IN MEXICO: VIOLENCE MADE IN CANADA
by Mandeep Dhillon, Upside Down World
World War 4 Report, May 2007

From our Daily Report:

Mexico: peasant ecologist arrested in Chihuahua
World War 4 Report, May 27, 2009

Mexico: indigenous protests in Oaxaca
World War 4 Report, March 24, 2009

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Reprinted by World War 4 Report, June 1, 2009
Reprinting permissible with attribution

Continue ReadingMEGAPROJECTS AND MILITARIZATION 

MEXICO’S RESURGENT GUERILLAS

Washington’s Drug War and the Ghosts of 1910

from Frontera NorteSur

A new twist with unpredictable political consequences has emerged amid the shifting battle fronts of Mexico’s narco war. Sometime the weekend of May 9-10 and somewhere in the mountains of southern Guerrero state, a group of at least 20 armed men presenting themselves as a column of the Revolutionary Army of the Insurgent People (ERPI) appeared before Mexican reporters.

Uniformed and armed with AK-47 rifles, the group was led by Comandante Ramiro, or Omar Guerrero Solis, one of the most wanted men in Mexico and an almost folkloric figure who escaped from a prison outside Acapulco more than six years ago and wasn’t publicly seen again until the weekend’s secret press conference.

In comments to reporters, Comandante Ramiro accused the Felipe CalderĂłn administration of not only staging the fight against drug trafficking, but of also protecting the interests of alleged drug lord Joaquin “El Chapo” GuzmĂĄn. The masked guerrilla commander charged Guerrero Governor Zeferino Torreblanca, who was elected with the backing of the center-left Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) and social sectors sympathetic with the guerrilla movement, with also protecting Chapo GuzmĂĄn and an alleged associate, Rogaciano Alba.

A former head of the Guerrero Regional Cattlemen’s Association, Alba also served as the mayor of the Guerrero town of Petatlan for the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). Gunmen associated with Alba are responsible for about 60 murders in the conflictive Tierra Caliente and Costa Grande regions of Guerrero, Comandante Ramiro said.

“The strategy of combating the narco is phony,” Comandante Ramiro charged. “Here in Guerrero, for example, the narcos participate in meetings that the army and state government hold to strike at one cartel and protect another, but essentially they are the same, because they murder, kidnap and torture,” he asserted. “Here the cartel of Chapo GuzmĂĄn is serving the army, and vice-versa..”

The fugitive rebel leader likewise accused Erit MontĂșfar, director of the Guerrero state ministerial police, of involvement in criminal activities in the Tierra Caliente region of the state.

Comandante Ramiro said narco-fueled violence was inspiring young people to join the ERPI’s ranks, which had successfully expelled Alba’s men from some mountain zones. The ERPI, he said, is engaged in active armed self-defense, “striking” and “dismantling” paramilitary groups connected to Alba and the state government.

The guerrilla leader said his troops try to avoid confrontations with Mexican soldiers, whom he called “sons of the people” welcome to join the revolutionary movement.

The ERPI first emerged in 1998 as a splinter faction of the leftist Popular Democratic Revolutionary Party/Popular Revolutionary Army (PDPR-EPR). Two top ERPI leaders, Jacobo Silva and Gloria Arenas, were captured by the Mexican army in 1999, but the guerrilla group survived and reorganized.

The EPR, as well as other spin-offs, remains active. As the 15th anniversary of the founding of the organization’s armed wing neared this month, the PDPR-EPR issued a new communique.

In its message, the underground organization addressed the recent flu epidemic, deficiencies in the Mexican healthcare system, human rights, political scandals, labor movements, the suffering of the mothers of Ciudad Juarez femicide victims, and more.

The group also said its members were reviewing the next step to take in its campaign to force a clarification of the fate of two high-ranking leaders, Edmundo Reyes Amaya and Gabriel Alberto Cruz SĂĄnchez, who were allegedly disappeared by the Mexican government in May 2007.

Subsequently, the EPR waged a sabotage campaign against gas pipelines to force the appearance of its two leaders. The guerrillas later declared a truce, and a mediation commission was established between the EPR and CalderĂłn administration. The commission, however, recently broke down, with no word on the fates of Cruz and Amaya.

Now 33 years old, the ERPI’s Comandante Ramiro told Mexican media he first joined the Poor People’s Party, a predecessor group of the PDPR-EPR which was founded by the late legendary rebel leader Lucio Cabañas in the late 1960s, when he was fourteen years of age.

According to Comandante Ramiro, the ERPI is organized like Cabañas’ old Campesino Justice Brigade, with units going up and down in size. Claiming his organization enjoys broad popular support in the Guerrero countryside, Comandante Ramiro said he spent the last four years year in the mountains, adding with a half-smile, “without a vacation.” Addressing reporters, he personally challenged President CalderĂłn and Defense Secretary Guillermo GalvĂĄn to come fight against him if they had a beef and stop sending “innocents” to die.

Replies to Comandante Ramiro
Reaction to the rebel leader’s bravado was slow in coming from CalderĂłn administration officials and Governor Torreblanca, but other state officials and well-known political figures in Guerrero had quick words of response.

Dismissing Comandante Ramiro’s allegations, State Ministerial Police Director Montufar contended the fugitive was using the name of the ERPI to cover for crimes including cattle rustling, robbery and rape.

“How is it possible that someone who escaped from the Acapulco penitentiary, a delinquent of that level, assumes the mantle of defender of social causes?” MontĂșfar responded.

Armando ChavarrĂ­a, coordinator of the PRD group in the Guerrero State Congress and a former state interior minister under Torreblanca, urged the governor to initiate a dialogue with the ERPI.

“Personally, I don’t justify the armed struggle,” Chavarria said, “but I understand it.” The veteran politician said the ERPI’s public reemergence, arising from a grinding poverty trapping hundreds of thousands of people in the state, “makes the situation graver in Guerrero.”

After news of the EPRI’s reappearance hit the press, residents reported stepped-up Mexican military movements, especially in the Tierra Caliente.

While Mexican guerrillas engaged the media this past week, presumed narcos mounted their own publicity campaign by hanging more so-called “narco-banners” in Guerrero, Morelos, Tabasco, Sinaloa, and Chihuahua. Directed at President Felipe CalderĂłn, Federal Public Safety Secretary
Genaro GarcĂ­a Luna and other top law enforcement officials, the latest messages were strikingly frank, with the banner signers acknowledging they were not members of a Boy Scout troop but nevertheless protesting alleged CalderĂłn administration retaliations against family members of accused narcos. According the anonymous authors, the global code of conduct mandates that the family “should be respected.”

A New Game for Washington?
Locally, the EPRI column led by Comandante Ramiro adds another explosive element to a multi-faceted conflict underway in Guerrero involving several rival drug cartels, the Mexican armed forces and different police agencies, which often back different crime groups and battle one another. Last month, a fierce battle in the mountains between the army and suspected gunmen from the Beltran-Leyva cartel left at least 15 gunmen and one soldier dead. Along with large-caliber weapons and grenades, 13 suspects were seized by the army.

Politically, the persistence and even growth of the ERPI further signals the collapse of the broad-based political movement spearheaded by Zeferino Torreblanca that swept into power in early 2005 based on promises of change and end to decades of corruption and misrule by the PRI party.

The ERPI’s ability to attract young recruits shows how the guerrilla in Guerrero, like the narco, has become part of the trans-generational landscape. Comandante Ramiro’s column represents at least the third generation of Mexicans to take up arms since the late 1960s.

The existence of a guerrilla group in the heart of the narco conflict zone has national and international ramifications, especially at a time when the Democratic Party-controlled US Congress is considering a $470 million security funding request for the Mexican government, including money for more helicopters, advanced technology and training for the Mexican armed forces. The modern military equipment could used to fight guerrillas as well as narcos.

On May 7, the House Appropriations Committee approved the military assistance package and sent it on for further action. In an action bearing perhaps more than just passing political symbolism, the Mexico aid was approved as part of a larger security outlay for Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Now, even as the new Obama administration retunes its military strategy in Central Asia, Washington could be poised to become more deeply involved in a Mexican civil conflict that has centuries of deep political, social and historical roots.

On the eve of the House committee vote, scores of prominent Mexican human rights organizations wrote the US Congress opposing new military aid. The signatories of a May 6 letter noted that allegations of human rights abuses against Mexican soldiers mainly deployed in anti-drug operations soared 600% from 2006 to 2008, reaching 1,230 cases filed with the official National Human Rights Commission last year. In both Guerrero and neighboring MichoacĂĄn, complaints against soldiers are on the upswing in 2009.

Juan AlarcĂłn, longtime president of the official Guerrero State Human Rights Commission, said his agency saw an unprecedented 85 complaints against soldiers from last December to the first three weeks of April. The majority of accusations, encompassing alleged violations of search and seizure, arrest and other laws, “have nothing to do with drug trafficking or organized crime,” AlarcĂłn insisted.

Ghosts of 1910
In some respects, the situation in Guerrero and other parts of the Mexican countryside, both south and north, resembles the era before the 1910 Mexican Revolution when armed bands, heavy-handed government forces and insurgent political forces all rose to the occasion. Then, as now, foreign companies commanded key sectors of the economy.

Ironically, the huge copper mine in Cananea, Sonora, which witnessed one of the historic, runner-up battles to the 1910 revolt, has been the scene of a mounting conflict during the last two years between the mineworkers union led by exiled leader Napoleon GĂłmez on one side and the CalderĂłn administration and owners Grupo Mexico on the other. Internationally, GĂłmez’s group has received important backing from the United Steel Workers and other labor organizations.

The Cananea strike almost erupted into a bloody showdown just as US President Barack Obama was preparing to visit Mexico last month. Attempting to break the strike, Grupo Mexico announced the firing of more than 1,000 workers. Hundreds of federal police then began saturating the area around the mine defended by miners and a women’s defense force.

In solidarity with the Sonora strikers, mine and metal industry workers blockaded shipments of containers scheduled for export from the Pacific Coast port of Lazaro Cardenas, Michoacan, near the border with Guerrero.

Back in Sonora, miners took over a highway toll booth. At one demonstration, the Cananea strikers cried out: “If there is no solution, there will be revolution!”

As the Cananea strike approached its second anniversary, Sonora Governor Eduardo Bours appealed on the federal government to find a solution amicable to all parties.

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This story first appeared May 14 on Frontera NorteSur.

See also:

MEXICO’S SOUTHWESTERN FRONT
Low-Intensity War in MichoacĂĄn and Guerrero
from Frontera NorteSur
World War 4 Report, March 2009

From our Daily Report:

Mexican miners take action to protest mass firing at Cananea
World War 4 Report, April 30, 2009

Mexico: feds probe “forced disappearance” of leftist militants
World War 4 Report, Aug. 17, 2008

Mexico: guerilla convicts’ sentences reduced
World War 4 Report, March 10, 2008

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Reprinted by World War 4 Report, June 1, 2009
Reprinting permissible with attribution
 

Continue ReadingMEXICO’S RESURGENT GUERILLAS 

KIDNAP, NO RANSOM

by Peter Gorman, Fort Worth Weekly

The drug war raging along the US-Mexico border might seem distant to many in North Texas, but it landed squarely in one Fort Worth woman’s living room in late February, when her grown son, a US citizen, was kidnapped by armed gunman in the central Mexican state of Zacatecas.

Two months later, she still has not heard a word from the kidnappers regarding a ransom and believes that her 19-year-old son and two other relatives may have been taken to serve as slave labor in some drug boss’ operation. It’s a better outcome to imagine than believing her son has been killed.

Unfortunately, she’s not alone in her worries: A recent US State Department travel alert notes that “In recent years, dozens of U.S. citizens have been kidnapped in Mexico,” in crimes believed to be the work of drug gangs. Some have been heard from, and others haven’t. The travel alert noted that many of the cases remain unresolved. In fact, such kidnappings by drug gangs are epidemic in Mexico. Sylvia, who is being identified only by her first name, said other members of her own family in Mexico have already disappeared in similar incidents.

Names are withheld to protect Sylvia and her son from retaliation. Rather than give either of her son’s names, he is referred to in this story as Julio.

“In my heart I don’t believe my son is dead,” Sylvia said. “I believe he is being forced to work for the cartels. Those who are not dead must work to earn their food, and as no one has asked the family there or sent word to me for a ransom, that’s what I’m praying has happened.”

Julio, she said, was visiting relatives in the small village of Sombrerete when a caravan of late-model vehicles roared up to the ranch house. The armed men who emerged ordered everyone inside to get in the cars. In addition to Julio, two of his male cousins, ages 15 and 21, three women from the family, and one infant were taken.

The kidnappers are believed to be members of the Zetas, the US-trained Mexican drug war soldiers who years ago changed their allegiance, became notoriously violent enforcers for the Gulf Cartel, and now in some areas are believed to have broken off and formed their own cartel.

“The Zetas just move into the town, and they take whatever they want,” said Sylvia. “They just tell people to move out if they want a house or tell farmers to give them a cow if they want one. And no one will stand up to them, because if they do the men will come and kill them. It’s very bad there now.”

An official in an investigative agency of the Zacatecas government, who would not give his name, said that, until about a year ago, Sombrerete was out of the range of the drug war. But with Mexico’s push to clamp down on the cartels, the town, like many others in rural Mexico, was essentially invaded by young gang members looking for a place where the military and other gangs wouldn’t search for them. “The disruption caused by the drug war is causing all sorts of movement through the country,” said the official. “We’re seeing cartel members cropping up in places we never have before.”

The description of the kidnapping came from one of the women who were abducted. After driving through the hillsides for more than two hours, she said, she, the other women, and the baby were released. The woman told Sylvia that she counted 15 cars in the caravan. She said the men were dressed in military-looking uniforms and carrying automatic weapons.

It’s not the first time the Zetas have preyed on her family, Sylvia said. “Last summer the father of the family [in Sombrerete] was kidnapped, and his oldest son brought a ransom. Neither of them has been seen since. And now they’ve taken that family’s two other sons and my son as well. I don’t know how the word does not get out about what’s happening in Zacatecas, but maybe it’s because the people who write the news are afraid to report about it because they’ll be killed if they do.”

Sylvia said she begged Julio not to visit his cousins. “After he graduated high school last year in Oakland, California, I decided we should move here to Fort Worth. It’s just three of us: Julio, his eight-year-old brother, and me. And Julio found work building houses and saved money. But when they stopped building houses here, he got restless and wanted to go. I told him not to, that it wasn’t safe.”

She said Julio promised her that nothing would happen to him because he doesn’t do the things that would get him in trouble. “He doesn’t fight or even drink beer,” she said. “I told him if he had to go, then to make it a short visit. But then he found a girlfriend and decided to stay a little longer, and then this happened.”

After learning of her son’s abduction, Sylvia got in touch with a community activist on Fort Worth’s East Side. Together they contacted authorities in Mexico to report what had happened. Mexico responded by sending the equivalent of an assistant district attorney to Fort Worth to talk with them.

“The woman who came was very nice, but I don’t think she’ll do anything,” said the activist, who also asked not to be named. “The situation is so bad in some places that the government really can’t do anything.”

Andy Laney, a spokesman for the State Department, said his agency has known about the incident since shortly after it happened. “I am told that the FBI office in Dallas has been involved in the case, and the FBI takes the lead on cases involving kidnapping of American citizens in Mexico,” he said. But the Washington, DC-based official said he had no knowledge of what had happened to the young men in Sombrerete.

Typically, kidnappings are followed by ransom demands, often after the abductees have been tortured into telling their kidnappers about relatives in the United States who might be able to raise ransom money.

In other cases, however, no ransom demand is ever delivered, either because the victims have been killed or because they are being forced to work for the drug lords. The forced-labor movement is well known in Mexico but has not received much coverage in this country.

One kidnapping that did make the US news occurred on Nov. 10, 2008, when 27 farm workers were abducted in Sinaloa state just outside the capital of CuliacĂĄn. According to a New York Times report, the men were thought to have been taken to work under duress on marijuana plantations.

The anonymous Zacatecan investigative official acknowledged that forced labor is becoming more common throughout certain areas of Mexico. But he added, “We have had no confirmed cases of it happening here in Zacatecas.”

Author and freelance investigative journalist Bill Weinberg, whose specialty is Latin America, said that while it’s often difficult to prove, “There is strong reason to believe” that some people are being kidnapped to work in marijuana or opium fields. Others are used to move drugs for the cartels or as inductees into groups like the Zetas and others, he said.

“There is a history of forced labor in Mexico since colonial times,” he said. “Recently, where drugs are concerned, it’s mostly gone on in remote areas where the indigenous are held in semi-feudalism to the local bosses. But now, with Mexico spinning out of control and with drug-war kidnapping at epic proportions all over the country, it simply stands to reason that this is happening.”

A spokesperson for the FBI in Washington DC said that the kidnapping of US citizens in Mexico, particularly along the border, is a frequent problem, but she could not confirm any cases of US citizens kidnapped into forced labor in Mexico. She confirmed that the agency is investigating dozens of kidnap-for-ransom cases but said she had no statistics to show how many other cases might involve family squabbles or child custody, for instance, versus drug cartel activity.

“We cannot be under the illusion that the war in Mexico is not crossing the border,” said the Fort Worth activist who is helping Sylvia. “It is affecting the United States. This is just one case, but there are hundreds more around the country.”

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This story first appeared April 29 in the Fort Worth Weekly.

From our Daily Report:

Mexico: shake-up in wake of Zacatecas jailbreak
World War 4 Report, May 23, 2009

Mexico: gunmen kill reporter, kidnap farmworkers
World War 4 Report, Nov. 15, 2008

Marcos: forced labor camps in Sonora
World War 4 Report, Oct. 26, 2006

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Reprinted by World War 4 Report, June 1, 2009
Reprinting permissible with attribution

Continue ReadingKIDNAP, NO RANSOM