The takeover of the port came last month just days before a US Air Force C-40 business jet landed at Ushuaia, bringing in a delegation of US lawmakers from the House of Representatives’ Energy & Commerce Committee.

Milei, in power since December 2023, has already received two heads of the US Southern Command in Ushuaia: Laura Richardson in 2024 and Alvin Holsey last year. Both visited the Ushuaia Integrated Naval Base project, which Argentina has been building since 2022. While Milei insists the base will be under full Argentine control, in October he signed an executive order allowing US Naval troops to carry out joint exercises with Argentine forces at Ushuaia and two bases in in Buenos Aires province.

The country’s opposition press notes that the takeover of Ushuaia came just as Milei was attending the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland—the scene of much contestation over Trump’s annexationist designs on Greenland. The Argentine press is full of speculation that on the sidelines of the Davos summit, Milei offered the Integrated Naval Base and all of Ushuaia to the US in exchange for an invitation to join the “Board of Peace” being touted by Trump as an alternative to the United Nations. (BAT, BAH, BAH, MercoPress, MercoPress, La Jornada)

Photo: Wikipedia

On Jan. 15, union leaders and members of the Confédération Paysanne held protests in opposition to the EU-Mercosur Deal, signed in December 2024 but still pending ratification, which would reduce tariffs and more deeply link the European market with the bloc of South American nations. Participants unfurled banners in offices of the Agriculture Ministry in protest of the agreement.

Protesters included a large delegation from the French overseas departments and regions of Guadeloupe, Martinique, French Guiana, Réunion and Mayotte, who denounced unfair competition from imports that would be imposed under the agreement. Three key spokespersons were among those arrested.

The experts warned that arresting and charging peaceful protesters may violate thr freedoms of assembly, expression and association, enshrined in both the French Constitution and international law. According to farmer advocate groups, use of the BRAV-M—a special motorized anti-riot unit—to quell the protest signaled criminalization of peaceful assembly, raising concerns about proportionality and necessity of police force.

The EU-Mercosur Deal is a free-trade agreement between the European Union and Mercosur bloc nations of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. The agreement, which has been debated for 25 years, would connect South American farmers with millions of EU consumers. However, domestic producers in France fear the deal will undercut them and drive them out of the market.

The European Parliament voted on the agreement on Jan. 21, with 334 votes in favor and 324 against, although it still awaits ratification by EU member states. Many French  lawmakers have resisted ratifying the agreement unless it includes safeguards for European farmers, environmental protections, and regulatory parity.

Farmer and agricultural worker advocate groups like La Via Campesina, Serikat Petani Indonesia (Indonesian Peasants’ Union), the Kenyan Peasants League, European Coordination Via Campesina and the Latin American Coordination of Rural Organizations have condemned the detentions and called on French authorities to cease what they describe as “the criminalization of peasant movements.”

From JURIST, Jan. 27. Used with permission. Internal links added.

Photo: UN Human Rights Council via Twitter

Kast’s success largely stemmed from his ability to fuse the electorate’s top two concerns: crime and migration. While Chile remains one of the safest countries in Latin America, transnational criminal groups have played a role in an uptick in violent crime that, though far less extreme than popularly perceived, has captured public attention. Venezuela’s Tren de Aragua has taken advantage of the country’s porous northern border to traffic drugs and weapons that have been linked to a series of particularly high profile crimes, contributing to a backlash against migrants—especially Venezuelans—even though they are often among the primary victims of this violence. Kast has exploited these anxieties, painting a dark picture of a country where “criminals are free and citizens are living as if in a prison,” blaming migrants in sweeping terms, calling for walls and electric fences on the border with Peru, and vowing to begin mass deportations.

Kast’s ascent will affect far more than security and migration. A devout Catholic and father of nine, he opposes abortion, same-sex marriage, and what he calls “gender ideology.” A fan of neoliberal economic policies, he has promised sweeping spending cuts. Most troubling for Chilean progressives, however, is his open admiration for former dictator Augusto Pinochet. Writing for the New York Times, Ariel Dorfman argues that Kast’s support for Pinochet makes the country’s turn towards “nativist authoritarianism” unique in the post-dictatorship era. For Dorfman, his willingness to release former military officials convicted of heinous crimes and his nostalgia for a dictatorship that claimed thousands of lives constitute a “political and ethical earthquake” in a country where “many considered the long struggle for democracy to have been won.”

Xenophobia and fear of crime alone, however, do not explain Kast’s victory. Public disappointment with the left was crucial as well. Elected on promises of structural reform after the 2019 popular uprising, left-wing President Gabriel Boric struggled to live up to the immense expectations thrust upon him. A progressive new constitution was voted down, his deployment of the military against Mapuche communities incensed many of his supporters, and economic growth faltered. These issues overshadowed the administration’s concrete gains: a more just foreign policy, expanded healthcare access for the poor, protections for gig workers, pension reform, a rise in the minimum wage, and the introduction of a 40-hour work week. As labor minister, Jara played a key role in many of these accomplishments, but it was not enough to overcome the malaise and disillusionment that shaped the election.

Kast will not assume power until March, but the shockwaves are already being felt across the region. Following in the footsteps of other Latin American conservatives, his administration is expected to align closely with US foreign policy imperatives. During a visit to Argentina, he promised to support “any situation” aimed at removing Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro, whom he called a “narco-dictator.” Kast’s victory prompted various reactions from the region’s progressive leaders. Brazilian President Luiz Inácio “Lula” da Silva offered muted congratulations, while Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum denounced Pinochet’s legacy and called his victory a “moment of reflection” for progressives, and Colombia’s Gustavo Petro vowed to never “shake hands with a Nazi.”*

From NACLA Update, Dec. 19. Slightly edited. Internal links added.

*Kast’s German immigrant father had been a youthful member of the Nazi party in the 1940s. (The Guardian)

Image: Nicolas Raymond via Flickr

For two weeks, officers conducted border inspections, river patrols, and forest monitoring using helicopters and satellite technology. Their efforts were concentrated along key areas of the Paraná River, including regions near the Itaipu power plant, the International Friendship Bridge, the Integration Bridge and the mouth of the Monday River, as well as the Moisés Bertoni Natural Monument located south of Presidente Franco .

The Paraguayan government stated that the operation’s main goals were to reduce the impact of forestry crimes, strengthen control in the most vulnerable areas, and better protect the country’s natural resources. Authorities also prioritized strategic planning for future actions by mapping potentially vulnerable locations, ensuring more effective prevention of environmental crimes.

In the operation, Paraguayan authorities identified 28 distinct criminal offenses, resulting in the seizure of 1,000 logs and 250 posts of quebracho wood, a species known for its significant commercial value. INTERPOL facilitated extradition proceedings, successfully returning a fugitive wanted under an INTERPOL Red Notice for fraud to Brazil, while another individual was sent back to Brazil to serve a 15-year prison sentence for charges of drug and arms trafficking.

INTERPOL’s assistant director for environmental security, Kat Henn, stressed the need for multi-agency cooperation, stating:

Illegal deforestation, which ranges from document fraud to money laundering and corruption. We need continued cross-border cooperation and intelligence sharing to dismantle these criminal networks that profit by ravaging our environment.

The operation was carried out under the Law Enforcement Assistance Program (LEAP), a joint effort supported by Norway’s International Climate and Forests Initiative (NICFI) and the US Forest Service, demonstrating a strong international commitment to tackling environmental crimes that jeopardize biodiversity, harm communities, and threaten sustainable trade.

Deforestation in the Paraguayan Chaco, on the other side of the country, also remains a major concern. In 2019, it peaked with approximately 244,324 hectares lost, representing 78% of the forest at that time. This deforestation is driven by large-scale cattle ranching and soybean farming, threatening biodiversity, climate stability, and indigenous communities, such as the Ayoreo Totobiegosode. According to Global Witness, if current trends continue, the Chaco could disappear entirely by 2080, leading to severe environmental and social impacts.

From JURIST, Dec. 17. Used with permission.

See our last reports on the Tri-Border Region, the Chaco, and the Ayoreo.

Photo: Ilosuna via Wikimedia Commons

First, Chile challenges Israel’s claim that the ICJ lacks jurisdiction over Gaza, arguing that a dispute exists when “two sides…hold clearly opposite views concerning certain international obligations.” It also contends that the erga omnes partes character of the Convention allows any state party to hold another state party accountable for violations, making Israel’s argument about the lack of “bilateral interactions” with South Africa irrelevant.

Chile also asserts, which the ICJ’s provisional measures have similarly held, that Palestinians are a protected group under the Convention. Chile’s submission acknowledges that genocidal intent involves the specific aim to physically or biologically destroy such a group, and that such intent may be difficult to prove. However, it states that the “lack of direct evidence” of such intent “is not necessarily an impediment to a finding of genocide.”

On the duty to prevent genocide, Chile contends that Article I of the Convention imposes on Israel a “due diligence obligation” to prevent genocide, and that Israel should be held accountable if it fails to take effective measures, regardless of whether genocide has occurred. Chile also stated that Israel must be aware of the serious risk that genocidal acts might be committed from the provisional measures ordered by the ICJ.

Chile also maintains that the duty to punish genocide extends to the temporary holder of occupied territories. To hold otherwise would frustrate the purpose of the Convention and exempt Israel from fulfilling its obligations, as the occupying power of Gaza, as defined under the Fourth Geneva Convention.

Lastly, Chile calls on the ICJ to assess whether public statements made by several Israeli authorities amounted to direct and public incitement to genocide. The submission highlights the use of dehumanizing language by Israeli officials and the importance to assess them in the cultural context. Chile contends that failure to punish all individuals responsible for direct and public incitement to commit genocide breaches the state’s obligation under the Convention.

After Chile filed its declaration, the ICJ invited South Africa and Israel to submit observations on Chile’s declaration.

South Africa initiated the case in December 2023, accusing Israel of violating the Genocide Convention during military operations in Gaza. Since then, the ICJ has issued multiple provisional measures ordering Israel to prevent genocide in the Gaza Strip.

Several countries, including Nicaragua, Colombia, Libya, Mexico, Palestine, Spain and Turkey  have already filed their declarations of intervention. Egypt also announced its intention to intervene in May 2024.

From Jurist, Sept. 13. Used with permission.

See our last reports on genocide accusations against Israel, and genocidal rhetoric from Israeli officials.

Photo: ICJ

From Jurist, May 28. Used with permission.

Photo: pixundfertig/Pixabay via Jurist

“We have Hezbollah cells on the Triple Border. But it is on the Bolivian border where we see the highest level of alert and security in the country, because there has been a memorandum signed by Bolivia and Iran,” Bullrich said in comments to La Nación. “That pact allowed the presence of Iranian members of the Quds forces, which are combatant forces and are integrated into Iran’s armed branches, in the territory. We are investigating whether there are people who do not speak Spanish yet have Bolivian passports.” (Voz Media)

Following years of closer ties, including security cooperation, Bolivia and Iran signed a formal defense pact in July 2023. The deal was said to include an Iranian pledge to provide Bolivia with drones for narcotics enforcement, but the terms were secretive, with both Argentina and the Bolivian opposition demanding clarity on the details. (ToI)

The new border security measures follow a development in two long-languishing terrorism cases in Argentina. On April 4, Argentina’s Federal Criminal Court of Cassation formally affirmed that the deadly attacks on Buenos Aires’ AMIA Jewish community center in 1994 and the Israeli embassy in 1992 were carried out by Hezbollah, with  the complicity of the Iranian government. The ruling also declared that both episodes should be considered “crimes against humanity,” thus placing them beyond the statute of limitations despite the lack of progress in these cases. The ruling also labeled Iran a “terrorist state.”

The court recalled that there are Interpol arrest warrants in connection with these cases for former Iranian intelligence minister Ali Fallahian, former Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commander Mohsen Rezaee (also rendered Rezai), former IRGC Quds Force commander Ahmad Vadidi (also rendered Vahidi), former cultural affairs officer at the Iranian embassy in Argentina Moshen Rabbani, former diplomatic secretary Ahnmad Reza Ashgari, and alleged Hezbollah operatives Hussein Mounir Mouzannar, Salman Raouf Salman (AKA Samuel Salman El Reda), and Farouk Abdul Hay Omairi.

Tehran’s former foreign minister Ali Akbar Velayati and former Iranian ambassador Hadi Soleimpenpour are also suspected of involvement but have immunity from the issuance of Interpol warrants because they still hold public office. Three additional suspects are either dead or presumed dead—former Hezbollah foreign intelligence chief Imad Fayez Moughnieh (also rendered Mughniyeh), former Iranian president Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, and alleged Hezbollah operative Alí Hussein Abdallah. (BA Times, JP)

Photo: Khamenei.ir via Wikimedia Commons

The indictment outlines El Reda’s immigration to Buenos Aires in the late 1980s and his relationships with individuals with ties to Hezbollah in South America, including financier Assad Ahmad Baraka.

The US cited phone calls from El Reda in early July 1994, just days prior to the attack, to IJO members operating in the area to plan the bombing. In 2007, El Reda allegedly began recruiting and training new IJO operatives to carry out future terrorist attacks; he was further linked in 2015 to IJO operative Mohammed Ghaleb Hamdar, who had been arrested in Peru the previous year.

The indictment charges El Reda with conspiracy to provide material support to Hezbollah, under 18 USC § 2339A, which criminalizes the providing of support to a terrorist organization. The government alleges El Reda knowingly “agree[d] to provide Hezbollah with … tangible and intangible property, training services, expert advice and assistance, and personnel (including himself).”

He also faces counts involving aiding and abetting the provision of military-type training from Hezbollah (18 USC § 2339D), with the government claiming El Reda was responsible for “one or more IJO operatives to receive training in the use of weapons and military tactics from other members of Hizbollah.”

Hezbollah, or the “Party of God,” is a Lebanese militant group that formed after Israel invaded Lebanon in 1982. It is a designated “terrorist organization” in the US, UK, and Israel, among others. It is said to be backed by the Iranian government.

El Reda is currently said to be based in Lebanon, and remains at large.

From Jurist, Dec. 21. Used with permission.

Photo: LoboEstepario

Production by Chris Rywalt

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Anarcho-capitalist flag via Wikimedia Commons, defaced by CounterVortex

Chile is currently in the process of drafting a new constitution to replace that instated under Pinochet.

Photo via BBC News