After five weeks of war, the US and Iran on April 8 agreed to a two-week ceasefire brokered by Pakistan. Its basic details, however, and to what extent it will be implemented, are surrounded by uncertainty. A main sticking point is the question of whether Lebanon was included in the deal. Iranian and Pakistani officials are insisting it was, but the US and Israel say that it wasn’t. Meanwhile, Israel has continued to carry out devastating attacks on Beirut and other parts of Lebanon.

The shaky ceasefire is based on a 10-point plan to end the war sent by Iran to Washington in the final hours before a deadline set by US President Donald Trump. If Iran did not reopen the Strait of Hormuz, Trump threatened on April 7 that a “whole civilization will die tonight.” Since the ceasefire began, some vessels have begun to trickle through the strait, but Iran is maintaining its chokehold on passage. The fate of the ceasefire could be decided in the coming days as US and Iranian officials head to Pakistan’s capital, Islamabad, for peace talks.

Israel’s position on the question of whether Lebanon was part of the US-Iran ceasefire was made painfully clear on April 8, as Israel unleashed a massive series of attacks on Beirut and throughout the country. Many of the strikes targeted densely-populated civilian neighborhoods, killing at least 303 people, by the latest count. Hospitals now struggling to deal with the influx of casualties were already working on power supplied by emergency generators, with supplies dwindling.

On April 9, Israel issued an evacuation order for the Beirut neighbourhood of Jnah, which includes two hospitals, Rafik Hariri University Hospital and al-Zahraa, that are treating the injured. WHO director-general Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus has said there is nowhere to evacuate patients to, and urged Israel to reverse the order. While various aid groups and leaders urge for the inclusion of Lebanon in the truce, and issue conflicting statements, Lebanese civilians are once again left to wait, search for survivors, and mourn the dead.

From The New Humanitarian, April 10

Image: Pixabay

From The New Humanitarian, Feb. 27. Internal links added.

Map: Google

But before the region came under the shadow of the recent violence, public attention was focused on the abduction of a young Baloch student, a case that has reignited simmering anger over enforced disappearances. For more than 6,000 days, activists have maintained a protest camp outside the press club in Quetta, the capital of Balochistan province, demanding answers for hundreds of missing Baloch citizens who have been allegedly abducted, tortured, and killed by Pakistani security forces.

The history of these abductions, enforced disappearances, and extrajudicial executions targeting political activists, journalists, lawyers, and students dates back to the 1970s, but the July disappearance of a 24-year-old university student in Islamabad brought the longstanding issue back to the fore.

On July 8, Saeed Baloch, a defense and strategic studies student at Quaid-i-Azam University (QAU) was dragged off a bus in broad daylight. Saeed’s case moved to the center of the national conversation after a second wave of student-led demonstrations at QAU in late November. The protesters are demanding an end to the ethnic profiling of Baloch students, and to have the university conduct a transparent investigation into Saeed’s disappearance.

Since the accession of Balochistan in 1948—an event Baloch nationalists describe as annexation but Islamabad regards as legal integration—what became Pakistan’s largest and most sparsely populated province has experienced a decades-long insurgency, driven by grievances over political autonomy, resource exploitation, and human rights abuses.

Relations between the Baloch and the Pakistani state have been marked by cycles of conflict and accusations of disenfranchisement. Activists in Balochistan have repeatedly demanded a greater share of the province’s oil and gas revenues, which they say disproportionately benefit other regions. This has led to a series of conflicts, with each wave of armed resistance met by military suppression.

The current phase of the insurgency—starting in the 2000s and led largely by educated, middle-class youth rather than traditional tribal leaders—has been marked by widespread enforced disappearances.

According to activists, around 7,000 people have been forcibly disappeared in Balochistan in the past 12 years. Victims are first identified as being Baloch, then targeted as a result of a specific social or political stance within their community.

One of the earliest known cases involved Asad Mengal, son of former Balochistan Chief Minister Attaullah Mengal, who was abducted in Karachi. More than four decades later, his fate remains unknown. During the 2000s, the practice continued. Thousands were abductedunder the guise of counter-insurgency and national security. Bodies of the disappeared would later resurface in far-off locations, bearing signs of severe torture, a period Baloch activists describe as the “kill and dump” policy.

Prominent activists such as Ghulam Muhammad, Qambar Chakar, Ilyas Nizar, and Sangat Sana were killed. Others, including Zakir Majeed, Deen Muhammad, and Zahid Baloch, remain missing.

“The very existence of the Baloch is perceived as a threat to the state,” said Sabiha Baloch, head of the Baloch Yakjehti Committee (BYC), a women-led organization fighting rights abuses in Balochistan. “The more educated, conscious, and politically aware the Baloch become, the more threatened the state feels.”

The BYC itself came under state scrutiny following a 2023 march led by former head Mahrang Baloch, which went from Turbat to Islamabad to protest what organizers described as genocide. Upon reaching the capital, protesters faced police batons, water cannon, arrests, and accusations of being foreign-funded “extremists.” Last March, Mahrang Baloch was arrested during a protest in Quetta and is now facing charges of terrorism, violence, and anti-state activities.

“Pakistan’s economy remains deeply tied to the exploitation of Balochistan,” Sabiha added. “As long as Baloch and Balochistan exist, this threat perception would translate into increasingly violent responses, which range from the abduction of men and women to the killing of Baloch people.”

— Amir Naeem for The New Humanitarian, Feb. 3, condensed. Read full article here.

Image: BYC

Relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan have been fraught with tension, especially around the disputed Durand Line border. Established in 1893 between British India and Afghanistan, this border has never been officially recognized by any Afghan government since the partition of India in 1947, leading to a persistent territorial dispute. (Jurist)

The fighting came just as the Taliban regime’s Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi was in New Delhi at the invitation of India’s government. After Muttaqi met with his Indian counterpart Subrahmanyam Jaishankar on Oct. 10, New Delhi said it will reopen its embassy in Kabul. This would make India the second nation to recognize the restored Taliban regime after Russia. (Al Jazeera)

This rapprochement comes as the Taliban regime faces growing international censure. UN human rights experts on Oct. 10 condemned the Taliban’s internet and social media restrictions in Afghanistan, calling them violations of fundamental rights. The social media restrictions, which began on Oct. 7, target major platforms including Facebook, Instagram and Snapchat. They follow a two-day nationwide internet blackout from Sept. 29 to Oct. 1. The experts warned that restricting net and telecommunications services worsens Afghanistan’s humanitarian and economic crisis, increasing poverty, unemployment and food insecurity. These measures also hinder the delivery of critical humanitarian aid to vulnerable communities, including those affected by natural disasters and individuals forcibly returned from neighboring countries. (Jurist)

UN human rights experts on Aug. 14 issued a forceful appeal to the international community to reject Taliban rule in Afghanistan, denouncing it as violent, illegitimate and fundamentally oppressive. The appeal especially cited the regime’s systematic discrimination against women. (Jurist)

The US on Sept. 15 decertified Afghanistan as a reliable partner in the War on Drugs (despite a Taliban edict banning opium cultivation), automatically imposing sanctions. However, this has little practical effect, as Washington has no diplomatic relations with the Taliban government.

* These appear to be propaganda terms employed by the Pakistani state. Fitna basically means “destructive factionalism”; Khawarij refers to an early Islamic heresy. Hence Fitna-e-Khawarij can be translated as “heretical faction.” Hindustan of course means India, implying that Delhi is backing the insurgents.

Map: Google

Protests led by the Jammu Kashmir Joint Awami Action Committee (JKJAAC) turned violent, rocking cities across AJK, from capital Muzaffarabad to the district seats of Kotli, Rawalakot and Mirpur. News outlets have reported at least nine people killed, including police officers and civilians, with more than 200 injured in clashes between protesters and law enforcement. These demonstrations paralyzed daily life, raising serious concerns about the governance and the rule of law in the disputed territory.

The unrest began with by a 38-point charter of demands issued by the JKJAAC, a coalition of traders, civil society members, student groups, and political activists. Among their key demands were the restoration of subsidies on electricity and wheat; a reduction in electricity tariffs, which they say are far higher than in other parts of Pakistan despite the region being a major source of hydropower; improved health and education services; downsizing the oversized ministerial cabinet; removal of legislative seats reserved for Kashmiri refugees, which locals argue distort electoral representation; and accountability for police violence during protests.

The movement accuses the AJK government of corruption, inefficiency and subservience to the federal authorities in Islamabad. Protesters have emphasized the apparent disparity between the region’s wealth of natural resources—particularly water and hydropower—and its ongoing struggles with poverty and perceived government neglect.

While the AJK government initially sought to suppress the protests through excessive police force and mass communication blackouts, it eventually—under pressure from Islamabad—agreed to negotiate with the JKJAAC. The talks were strained, stalling in early October, but were later revived following intervention by the federal government.

Eventually, the parties reached a peace agreement that included a rollback of rising electricity costs, continued subsidies for essential items such as wheat, the creation of a judicial commission to investigate injuries and deaths resulting from the protests, and a commitment to reduce government spending, including cuts to the ministerial cabinet.

While the agreement has led to a de-escalation, many activists remain skeptical about its implementation, fearing that the government’s promises may not translate into real change.

Amid the turmoil, legal challenges and constitutional debates have emerged regarding the right to protest and the state’s response. In a notable legal development, the High Court of AJK ruled that citizens have a constitutionally protected right to peaceful protest. This was seen as a significant verdict, given the government’s frequent use of Section 144 to restrict assemblies and communications. According to Dawn newspaper, the court stressed that civil liberties cannot be arbitrarily suspended.

Another major legal issue was the demand to reform or abolish the reserved legislative seats for refugees from Indian-administered Kashmir. These seats are widely viewed as artificially boosting Islamabad’s influence in AJK politics, with critics arguing that they disenfranchize local voters. Modifying this arrangement would require constitutional amendments and is likely to face strong resistance.

The AJK region has also seen an uptick in media censorship and repression of free speech. In early 2025, the AJK government filed criminal cases against journalists under recently amended sections of the penal code for allegedly spreading “fake news.” As reported by the International Federation of Journalists, these amendments criminalize criticism of government officials and impose penalties of up to seven years’ imprisonment. Legal experts warn that such laws risk undermining AJK’s fragile democratic space and may violate Pakistan’s own constitutional protections as well as international human rights obligations.

The current wave of protests is not an isolated occurrence. AJK has long been plagued by grievances related to economic marginalization, lack of autonomy, and what many perceive as neocolonial governance by Islamabad. Although AJK has its own president, prime minister and legislative assembly, many key decisions—from budget allocations to foreign affairs—are effectively controlled by Pakistan’s federal government and military establishment.

This disconnect has fueled deep frustration across the region, where many residents feel they are treated as second-class citizens. The recent protests have reignited debates over AJK’s ambiguous constitutional status and whether genuine self-governance is possible under the current framework.

The unrest in AJK comes at a time when India-Pakistan relations remain strained over the Kashmir issue. India continues to assert that AJK is an integral part of its territory, while Pakistan accuses India of human rights violations in Indian-administered Jammu & Kashmir. The protests in AJK, however, have complicated Islamabad’s narrative of being a responsible caretaker of Kashmiri interests.

International media and observers have taken note that the violent suppression of protests and censorship in AJK have drawn comparisons to conditions in Indian-administered Kashmir, potentially weakening Pakistan’s moral stance on the Kashmir dispute.

As calm returns to the streets of Muzaffarabad and other cities, the question remains: will this peace last? The implementation of the peace agreement will likely determine the movement’s legacy. Protest leaders have warned that if the government fails to follow through, they will resume their agitation, this time with even greater public backing.

— Syeda Aamna Hasan for JURIST, Oct. 10. Used with permission.

Note: Spikes in the price of food and fuel since the start of the Ukraine war in 2022 have contributed to popular privation and unrest worldwide.

Photo of Muzaffarabad via Wikimedia Commons

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Cambodia now becomes the third country to nominate the bellicose Trump for the Peace Prize after Israel and Pakistan. Islamabad’s nomination followed Trump’s supposed involvement in the ceasefire deal with India that ended several days of mutual missile strikes in May. The problem is that India denies that the US or any other foreign power had a hand in its decision to accept a truce. (Hindustan Times)

The Thai-Cambodia truce, agreed to at July 29 talks in Malaysia, was jointly mediated by the US and China. So Xi Jinping deserves as much credit as Trump—whose main role was threatening to withhold trade deals from the two countries as long as the fighting continued.

Fighting erupted along the Thai-Cambodian border on July 24, ultimately killing at least 40 people, and displacing over 250,000. Both sides typically said the other took the first shot. Things quickly escalated as Bangkok sent F-16 fighter jets to launch air-strikes on Cambodian territory, and Thailand’s acting prime minister, Phumtham Wechayachai, warned: “If the situation escalates it could develop into war.” Cambodia accused Thailand of violating international law by using cluster munitions for attacks on its territory, while Bangkok accused Cambodia of an “inhumane attack” on a hospital in Surin province. (TNH, AP)

Thailand and Cambodia have had an almost century-long dispute over Preah Vihear, an 11th century Hindu temple, which sits along the nations’ shared border. The temple has triggered numerous border skirmishes over the years, the latest occurring when a Cambodian soldier was killed on the border in May. The new fighting followed Thailand’s prime minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra being suspended after a leaked phone call with Cambodian leader Hun Sen was deemed a national security threat. (Jurist)

Hun Manet is the son of current Cambodian senate president (and longtime strongman) Hun Sen, and we suspect that this perverse Nobel nomination actually emerges from the elder Hun. Under Hun Sen’s leadership, Cambodia has long been under China’s effective suzerainty, and repression has been unleashed against peasants protesting land-grabs by Chinese agbiz interests. Xi is well-assured of the stability of this relationship, and does not need buttering up. Trump, in contrast, needs to have his ego appeased to keep textiles and other export goods produced in Cambodia’s sweatshops flowing to the US without prohibitive tariffs. That’s why it’s called a Great Game.

The game is a dangerous one for the general world political climate and propaganda environment, however. Giving the Nobel Prize to Obama in 2009 was Orwellian enough. But that pales before the perversity of giving it to Trump. And indeed, Trump craves the Nobel prize precisely because Obama got it. So Cambodia is not merely appeasing Trump’s ego, but (whether intentionally or not) lubricating his dictatorial ambitions and the racist backlash that has been the motor of his entire political project.

We submit that if the Nobel committee wishes to weigh a Peace Prize in regard to this conflict, it should consider the citizen anti-war activists who have been mobilizing on either side of the border in repudiation of their own governments, under the hashtag #PeaceForCambodiaAndThailand.

Image of the contested Preah Vihear archeological site via Wikipedia

Isabelle Lassée, Amnesty International’s deputy regional director for South Asia, stated that the residents of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa are suffering due to the escalating number of drone strikes, which disregard civilian safety, hitting homes and even, in one case, a volleyball game. She emphasized that the use of drones in attacks that lead to unlawful civilian casualties violates international law, and called on Pakistani authorities to conduct independent and effective investigations into these attacks and prosecute anyone found responsible.

Furthermore, Lassée asserted that the government must provide victims and their families with effective remedies, including compensation.

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Pakistan’s northwestern province, has seen an ongoing series of drone strikes this year, with the latest occurring on June 20. These strikes have repeatedly killed civilians, including children. Amnesty International reported that while Pakistani authorities acknowledged the civilian casualties, they have attributed them to attacks by the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), also known as the Pakistan Taliban.

The TTP is an armed group formed in 2007 from various militant factions opposing the Pakistani military’s operations against al-Qaeda militants in the northwest border region then known as the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). This group has since been involved in an armed conflict with the Pakistani military and carried out numerous terrorist attacks. The United Nations Security Council Committee listed the TTP on its Sanctions List in 2011 and linked it with al-Qaeda.

Although Pakistani military forces successfully pushed back the TTP following a series of offensives in 2014, the armed group regained strength after the Taliban captured Kabul, Afghanistan’s capital, in 2021. According to the UN, Pakistan’s initial military offensives led to the displacement of over 400,000 citizens who fled combat zones in search of refuge in different areas within Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province.

From JURIST, June 24. Used with permission.

See our last reports on Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the TTP and the drone terror.

Note: The FATA was merged with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in 2018.

Map: Google

From The New Humanitarian, May 23

Map via Atheer

India stated that the treaty would remain in abeyance until Pakistan takes visible action against what it called cross-border terrorism. Pakistan has rejected the allegations, and condemned the move as a breach of international law. Islamabad’s National Security Committee termed the suspension unacceptable, and Pakistan responded by expelling Indian military liaisons, closing its airspace to Indian craft, and stating its intention to raise the issue at international forums including the United Nations and the International Court of Justice.

The Indus treaty allocates the use of six rivers shared by the two countries. Under the pact, India has exclusive rights over the eastern tributaries of the Indus—the Ravi, Beas and Sutlej—while Pakistan controls the western tributaries—the Jhelum and Chenab—as well as the Indus itself. India is permitted limited non-consumptive use of the western rivers in territories it controls but cannot alter their flow. The treaty, under Article VIII, also created a Permanent Indus Commission for joint oversight and dispute resolution.

Despite the turbulent relationship between India and Pakistan, the treaty has survived multiple conflicts. It continued to function even during the wars of 1965, 1971, and the Kargil conflict in 1999. This resilience is one reason why the treaty has often been held up as an example of successful cooperation between two adversarial nuclear neighbors.

The treaty includes no provision for unilateral suspension or termination. In fact, the agreement clearly states that the treaty shall remain in force until modified or terminated by mutual agreement between both parties. Any such suspension, especially in response to a political or military incident, raises serious legal questions. The legal gravity of India’s suspension are made clear by the treaty’s provisions. Article XII states that the treaty “shall continue in force until terminated by a duly ratified treaty concluded for that purpose between the two Governments,” while Annexure F and G state that disputes not resolved by the Permanent Indus Commission must be referred to a Neutral Expert or Court of Arbitration. Bypassing these mechanisms contradicts not only the text of the treaty but also international legal norms on dispute resolution.

From the perspective of customary international law, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides further clarity. Article 26 of the Vienna Convention codifies the principle ofpacta sunt servanda, requiring that every treaty in force must be adhered to in good faith. Article 60, which deals with termination or suspension due to breach, limits such remedies to cases of material violation—typically adjudicated through international forums. Neither process has been followed in this instance.

Following India’s announcement, diplomatic tensions escalated. India, citing national security grounds, implemented restrictions on visas and cross-border access for Pakistani nationals. Pakistan responded by halting trade, closing the Wagah border crossing, and suspending overflight rights. Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar publicly challenged India to provide evidence for its allegations, and described the Indus Treaty as an international legal instrument that cannot be set aside through executive action.

While these measures reflect diplomatic reciprocity, they also reveal how quickly the situation has escalated beyond a legal dispute into a full-blown diplomatic standoff. Pakistan has announced its intention to pursue the matter through international forums, including the UN and the International Court of Justice.

India’s move raises concerns about treaty obligations and compliance with the principles of international law. Unilateral suspension could undermine confidence in trans-boundary water agreements globally. India’s position as an upper riparian in other river basins—such as the Brahmaputra shared with China and Bangladesh—may also come under scrutiny if such actions become precedent.

The implications extend to water security within Pakistan. The western rivers are essential for agriculture, power generation, and public use. Disruption—whether in data sharing, flow predictability, or legal cooperation—introduces risks to resource planning and may intensify domestic inter-provincial tensions over water sharing.

The Indus Waters Treaty was designed to ensure cooperation through clear legal rules, outside mediation, and a shared understanding of water as a common resource. The present situation is one of the most serious challenges the treaty has faced. Since it does not allow for suspension by one side alone, any changes to its status should be made through mutual agreement or legal process.

Furthermore, the treaty’s survival clause under Article IX establishes that in the event of a dispute, parties are obligated to maintain normal implementation of the treaty provisions unless and until a binding resolution is reached. India’s unilateral action could thus be interpreted as a procedural as well as substantive breach, potentially triggering international review depending on how Pakistan frames its case at the ICJ or other legal platforms.

As both sides maintain hardened positions and diplomatic communications remain strained, the role of third-party facilitators, including the World Bank, may prove critical. Whether the treaty can continue to function as a stabilizing force will depend on adherence to legal mechanisms and the willingness of both countries to re-engage through peaceful channels.

—Abu Bakar Khan for JURIST, April 25. Used with permission.

See our last reports on the Pahalgam attack and struggle for the Indus.

Photo: Heartography/Pixabay via Jurist