Human Rights Watch (HRW) urged Magyar’s incoming government to take immediate steps to restore democratic norms in Hungary. The organization called for the swift dissolution of the Sovereignty Protection Office, a body established in 2023 with broad powers to investigate journalists, civil organizations, and academics that receive foreign funding. HRW also pressed for an end to emergency decree powers that have allowed Orbán’s executive to bypass the parliamentary process since 2020.

HRW urged the incoming government to drop criminal charges against Budapest Mayor Gergely Karácsony, who is being prosecuted for holding the city’s Pride March last June in defiance of a ban imposed by Orbán’s government, and against Géza Buzás-Hábel, organizer of the Pride march in Pécs.

Orbán’s measures against dissent of course mirror those of Vladimir Putin, and indeed his defeat diminishes an emerging pro-Russian bloc on the continent, also including Slovakia and (outside the EU) Serbia and Belarus. The fall of Orbán is expected to free up a €17 billion loan to Ukraine that his government had effecitvely blocked.

However, Péter Magyar is a creature of the center-right, and a former Orbán ally. His Respect & Freedom (Tisza) party broke from Fidesz in 2020, in response to Orbán’s growing authoritarianism. His proclivities are fundamentally conservative, and he may not mean a full de-Orbánification. In a bad sign, Magyar on April 15 held what the Israeli Foreign Ministry called a “warm introductory phone call” with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, pointing to a continuity in ties. Orbán’s Hungary and Donald Trump’s United States are the only two countries Netanyahu has been able to safely visit since the International Criminal Court issued a warrant for his arrest to face war crimes charges in November 2024.

Nonetheless, among those around the world taking courage in the fall of Orbán are the Israeli protesters who have mounted a campaign of militant demonstrations against Netanyahu and his wars. (Jurist, JP, PRI, EuroNews)

Sidelined by the world media spotlight, a more stark struggle with stakes just as high for the survival of democratic norms is emerging in the South American nation of Peru. As Hungarians voted, so did Peruvians, in a crowded field of 35 candidates following years of political chaos that have seen 10 presidents in as many years. Leading the field was Keiko Fujimori, perennial candidate of the hard-right Fuerza Popular.

Keiko is the daughter of ex-dictator Alberto Fujimori, who shamefully died a free man in December 2024, having been released from prison after 17 years following a pardon for his convictions for corruption and human rights abuses. The younger Fujimori remained an unabashed supporter of the elder to the very end, and her potential election promises a reversal of the process of de-Fujimorification that Peru has undergone since the fall of his eight-year period of strongman rule in 2000.

A decision on who Keiko Fujimori would face in a run-off was delayed by several days after the National Office of Electoral Process (ONPE) found that a private contractor failed to deliver ballots to dozens of polling stations across the province of Lima, preventing more than 52,000 citizens from voting on time. One of her two leading contenders, former Lima mayor Rafael López Aliaga, alleged widespread fraud and called for the vote to be annulled. The EU election observer mission reported that it had found no evidence of fraud. But tension mounted as López Aliaga’s supporters mobilized to the street.

López Aliaga, known by his appropriate nickname “Porky,” is also a figure of the hard right, although of a more Catholic bent than Fujimori, and has similarly run on pledges of a harsh crackdown on soaring crime and the narco economy. In an echo of Trump’s Alligator Alcatraz, he has proposed building penal colonies in the Amazon rainforest, surrounded by moats filled with vipers.

López Aliaga has not dropped his demands for annullment, but it now emerges that Fujimori will face a contender from the left in the June 7 run-off. This is Roberto Sánchez Palomino of Juntos por el Perú. Sánchez is the political heir of imprisoned ex-president Pedro Castillo, a political outsider of campesino origins whose 2021 election shook up Peru’s establishment. Castillo’s ouster and detention by order of Congress the following year ended his contentious rule and sparked weeks of protests that were met with massive deadly repression. Sánchez, who had served in Castillo’s cabinet, similarly ran with strong support from rural Andean regions, traditionally excluded from Peruvian politics, and similarly wears a traditional campesino sombrero.

There is a sense of deju vu here, as Keiko Fujimori has made it as far as a presidential run-off in 2011, 2016 and 2021. During the first run, she brought in Rudolph Giuliani as “national security advisor.” In the second run (taking place five months before Trump was first elected here in Gringolandia), she was defeated by the center-right Pedro Pablo Kuczynski after Verónika Mendoza, the left-wing candidate who was bumped out of the race in the first round, threw her support behind him to avoid a re-Fujimorification of the country. As persident, it was Kuczynski who pardoned Alberto Fujimori, in a betrayal of the progressive-minded Peruvians who had helped elect him.

With the center now having effectively collapsed in Peruvian politics, this kind of outcome, at least, is excluded from possibility. However, a win by Keiko Fujimori on her fourth try for the presidency portends a far worse outcome. (Americas Quarterly, Jurist, France24, France24, AFP, Reuters)

Peru may seem far removed from the world stage compared to Hungary, but the Great Powers are definitely playing their chess game here as well. Florida Rep. Maria Elvira Salazar has called on Peru’s next government to “take back” the Chinese-controlled port of Chancay, portraying the deep-water facility as a military threat to the hemisphere. Salazar, chair of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, said during a hearing on April 16 that Washington must help Peru wrest the megaport from Chinese hands. “The new Peruvian government, which will be elected next June, must take it back, that port, take it back, and the United States will help them,” Salazar said.

She argued that the port, just up the coast from Lima, has “dual usage” potential, meaning it could shift from commercial to military operations, allowing Chinese submarines, warships and aircraft carriers to operate from Peru’s territory. (SCMP)

Even a new President Fujimori would be unlikely to take this bait from Washington, as China, like the US, is a free-trade partner of Peru and top investor in its lucrative mineral sector. But there’s much contention about Chinese versus North American influence in the country. The last interim president, José Jerí, who had faced a wave of Gen Z protests last year, was finally removed by Congress this February following unregistered meetings with two Chinese businessmen. The incumbent interim president José María Balcázar is of the left, and popular anger at Peru’s traditional political class is palpable.

Whether it is the populist left of Sánchez or the populist right of Fujimori that prevails in June, the Great Power pressures on Peru will remain. The implications for Peru internally, however, will be very different—and this also has regional implications, as the right has made recent electoral gains throughout Latin America: just over the past months, in Chile, Bolivia and Costa Rica. A new right-authoritarian bloc is emerging, just as the Trump regime is launching new adventures in gunboat diplomacy.

Hopefully, Peru will not be the next addition to this bloc. But a Fujimori victory could mean a fatal blow to Peru’s deeply troubled democracy. A Sánchez victory, on the other hand, would heighten the social contradictions in Peru—with both opportunities for a more meaningful democracy, and dangers of a backlash from the conservative establishment.

Photo: Wikipedia

Colombia has experienced a decades-long armed conflict that began with the formation of guerrilla groups, notably the FARC and the ELN. Paramilitary groups later emerged to fight the guerrillas. Following a landmark peace agreement with the FARC in 2016 and ongoing negotiations with the ELN that began in 2018, violence levels have been reduced. But the protracted conflict has led to a profusion of armed actors and fueled the growth of private military and security companies (PMSCs).

In a September 2025 report, the UN Working Group on the use of mercenaries raised the alarm over the role of mercenaries and PMSCs in exploiting natural resources at the expense of human rights in multiple conflict zones around the world. The Working Group detailed how these entities, often colluding with governments, corporations and criminal syndicates, commit grave rights abuses to secure access to valuable resources such as minerals, oil, timber and agricultural land.

According to the report, these abuses include arbitrary detention, torture, sexual violence and forced displacement, as well as severe environmental destruction. The experts highlighted the disproportionate impact of these activities on indigenous populations and rural communities: “These communities often face violations of their rights to land, culture, and livelihood, further compounded by the lack of access to justice and remedies.”

While experts in the new statement acknowledged the legitimacy of some overseas employment in military and security roles for Colombians, they reiterated that the use of mercenaries is prohibited under international law. The experts concluded: “Effectively tackling mercenary recruitment is not just a national issue; it requires robust regional and global cooperation given its transnational nature.”

From JURIST, March 28. Used with permission. Internal links added.

Photo: Contagio Radio

The RDF have reportedly provided direct operational support to the M23 and its affiliates by introducing advanced military equipment to eastern DRC, including GPS jamming systems, air defense equipment, and drones. According to US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, the US seeks the immediate withdrawal of RDF troops, weapons and equipment.

Rwanda government officials expressly rejected the sanctions as “unjust and one-sided,” stating:

The sanctions issued today by the United States unjustly targeting only one party to the peace process misrepresent the reality and distort the facts of the conflict in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. Consistent and indiscriminate drone attacks and ground offensives constitute clear violations of ceasefire agreements by the DRC, and continue to cost many lives. Protecting our country is a badge of honour which the Rwanda Defense Force carries very proudly.

The sanctions come two months after the International Contact Group for the Great Lakes (ICG) issued a joint statement on the escalation of violence in eastern DRC and the new M23 offensive, which Rwanda is charged with having supported. The ICG urged all parties to honor their obligations to protect civilians, uphold commitments under last year’s Washington Accords, and immediately de-escalate the situation.

Armed group M23 has operated in the DRC for well over a decade and has allegedly committed numerous war crimes, including mass rape, during its occupation of Goma in eastern DRC in late 2012. The group is also documented to have forcibly recruited at least 146 young men and boys in the Rutshuru territory of the eastern DRC alone since July 2012, some as young as 15 years old. The actual number of forcibly recruited youth is believed to be far higher.

The UN Security Council has condemned M23 actions and imposed sanctions on parties violating arms, transport and finance rules, as well as political and military leaders of Congolese militias receiving support from outside the DRC.

The RDF actions come despite a joint declaration between the DRC and Rwanda signed late last year as part of a US-backed Regional Economic Integration Framework, to chart a future of mutually beneficial partnerships, greater connectivity with international development initiatives, and investment opportunities across sectors, including in mining, infrastructure, industrial development, and national park management.

From JURIST, March 3. Used with permission. Internal links added.

Photo: US Air Force via Wikimedia Commons

In his speech, President Ramaphosa stated that organized crime is a major threat to South Africa’s economic growth and security, justifying the deployment of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) to assist police in combating gang violence and illegal mining in the Western Cape and Gauteng, two provinces that have experienced mass shootings and violence linked to illegal mining. The Defense Ministry indicated that preparations were underway to finalize the troops deployment plan in priority areas within the next few days, pending parliamentary approval.

The president also announced that his country will implement a whole strategy focused on the use of technology, intelligence, and integrated law enforcement to address organized criminal activity and its root causes. The new measures include streamlining regulations on firearm possession and trade, increasing police officer recruitment, and eradicating corruption within government institutions, including police departments. The aim of these measures is not only to tackle organized crime but also to fight corruption and illicit firearms trading, which are fueling ongoing gang wars and illegal mining activities.

South Africa has for years struggled with gang violence and illegal mining, which threaten the country’s stability and are impeding economic growth. The government has intensified efforts to combat the surge in violence by implementing targeted strategies and measures, such as creating specialized police units.

While many individuals engage in illegal mining due to unemployment, the mining is closely tied to organized crime, involving international criminal syndicates that employ illegal artisanal miners known as zama zama. These illegal miners are often heavily armed, conduct attacks against rival miners and security forces, and usually sell extracted minerals to local dealers or exporters. The South African government has employed several measures to combat this activity, such as the criminalization of illegal mining under the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act 28. Controversy surrounded last year’s deadly Operation Vala Umgodi, a security initiative that included cutting off food and water supplies to workers illegally occupying an abandoned mine to resurface so they could be arrested.

From JURIST, Feb. 13. Used with permission

Photo: Wesley Nitsckie via Wikipedia

In the statement, the Law Society stressed that interpreting legislation is a constitutional function of courts. While the provincial executive may disagree with the courts’ statutory interpretation, the statement urged politicians to respect judicial powers and independence. The statement concluded by urging the government to reconsider the proposed amendment of the DRIPA. The Canadian Bar Association issued a similar appeal on Jan. 21.

The statement follows remarks by David Eby, premier of British Columbia, at the provincial Natural Resources Forum on Jan. 20. In his remarks, he accused the courts of creating “real confusion about what DRIPA is about and what reconciliation means in practice.” He added that reconciliation—a relationship between the Canadian, provincial and First Nations governments by which shared sovereignty is negotiated—is not for the courts to appropriate. He signaled the government’s intention to amend DRIPA to reflect “legislative intent” and protect private property rights by limiting the role of the courts in reconciliation efforts.

In 2025, the province witnessed two landmark rulings relating to Aboriginal rights and title. The BC Supreme Court held in August that the Cowichan Tribes have established Aboriginal title in the city of Richmond. It follows that the fee simple interests—a freehold interest in land—on the Cowichan Title Lands are unjustified infringements on Aboriginal title and therefore defective. While the court held that Aboriginal title and fee simple interests can coexist on the same piece of land, the government is required to negotiate an arrangement with the Cowichan Tribes over these lands. The court ordered that such arrangements be reached within 18 months.

In December, the BC Court of Appeal held that the provincial mineral tenure system—allowing registration of mineral rights online without notifying or consulting the Gitxaała and Ehattesaht nations—is impermissible under DRIPA, which commits the province to upholding principles of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.

Conservative BC lawmaker Scott McInnis issued a call to repeal DRIPA after the rulings.

Premier Eby rejected outright repeal, stating that DRIPA has allowed development projects to move forward without prolonged litigation. He added that repealing DRIPA would not accelerate such projects or attract investment. He reaffirmed that reconciliation with the First Nations and the recognition of Aboriginal title are the province’s constitutional obligations under Article 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, and the unanimous consensus of the provincial legislature in 2019.

First Nations, however, objected to the possible DRIPA amendment. Marilyn Slett, chief councillor of the Heiltsuk Tribal Council, told the CBC that DRIPA, co-developed by the provincial government and First Nations, provides for trust, stability and economic certainty. The BC Assembly of First Nations similarly warned that amending DRIPA and appealing the court rulings could harm the relationship between the First Nations and the government.

From JURIST, Feb. 3. Used with permission.

See our last reports on Aboriginal title cases in British Columbia.

Similar mining laws are also at issue in Saskatchewan and Ontario.

Photo: Wikipedia

Backed by Interpol, the European Union through EL PACCTO 2.0, and a Dutch police unit specializing in environmental crime, “Operation Guyana Shield” involved over 24,500 checks on people and vehicles across remote border areas, and resulted in 198 arrests. Officers seized large quantities of cash, unprocessed gold, and mercury, as well as firearms, drugs and mining equipment. Authorities said organized crime networks behind these operations are linked to a major Guyanese gold exporting firm. The operation signals a new enforcement posture, marked by deeper cross-border collaboration to disrupt transnational networks that evade jurisdictional boundaries and exploit enforcement gaps across the Amazon border region.

“The surge in international gold prices in recent years has resulted in increased gold mining, making it the fastest-growing revenue stream for organized crime groups,” Interpol Secretary General Valdecy Urquiza said. Commenting on the collaborative nature of the operation, he continued: “At Interpol, we are committed to working with our partners to disrupt those networks and prevent more damage to this remote and environmentally fragile region.”

Authorities also seized over $60,000 worth of cylinders of mercury, which is commonly used in illegal gold mining to separate gold ore. It is extremely toxic and harmful to both the environment and human health, and can have devastating consequences for both when improperly transported and stored. Officers working on the border between Brazil and Guyana also intercepted a bus carrying undocumented migrants, including minors, who they believe to have been exploited for child labor or sexual abuse.

The Operation Guyana Shield task force was based out of Brazil’s International Police Cooperation Center (CCPI) for Amazonia in Manaus, and was comprised of officials from all four participating jurisdictions. The operation represented a single, coordinated push to disrupt organized crime networks in the Guyana Shield region, which is routinely plagued by illegal gold mining, cross-border smuggling, and related crimes that exploit remote borders and weak or uneven enforcement capacities.

With enforcement actions increasingly shaped by shared intelligence and coordinated deployments, officials framed Operation Guyana Shield as a test case for sustained regional cooperation against organized crime.

From JURIST, Jan. 23. Used with permission.

Photo: IBAMA via Flickr

Listen on SoundCloud or via Patreon.

Production by Chris Rywalt

We ask listeners to support us at one of our three tiers via Patreon: Become a Basic Supporter for just $1.25 per weekly podcast ($5 per month), or a Special Supporter for $2.50 per podcast ($10 per month), or a Major Rant Enabler for $6.25 per podcast ($25 per month). We now have 61 paid subscribers. If you appreciate our work, please become Number 62!

Image: TruthSocial

Greenland is also home to around 31.4 billion barrels of oil, which the territory gave up trying to extract in 2021, citing the global climate crisis. Potentially even more significant are large volumes of untapped critical minerals—necessary to power the technology needed for the transition away from fossil fuels. China currently controls most of the global market, and a White House document released this week explicitly framed critical minerals as vital to US national security.

From The New Humanitarian, Jan. 16. Slightly editied. Internal links added.

Photo: Pixabay

The government’s Unidad de Análisis Financiero y Económico (UAFE) cited secret intelligence reports to justify the freezing of the funds. Among the groups affected was the indigenous organization Alianza Ceibo, representing the Waorani, Siekopai, A’i Cofán and Siona peoples, which has defended the economic, social, cultural and collective rights of these peoples for 10 years.

The groups were not notified of the decision beforehand. Furthermore, authorities did not disclose reasons for the freezes. UAFE officials cited the June 2025 Intelligence Law to argue that this information was confidential. After the cases were challenged in court, judges liftedsome of the freezes, finding that the agency did not provide sufficient substantial evidence for the bans.

In freezing the accounts, the UAFE applied a provision in Ecuador’s new Social Transparency Law. The law, passed in August, enables the agency to freeze accounts without a court order when it claims to have “objective, serious, and verifiable evidence” of suspicious activity, with any review only coming post factum. The law only limits the measure by stating its application should be “exceptional,” “proportionate to risk,” and “limited exclusively to the amount of the [suspicious] transaction.”

Both the Intelligence Law and the Social Transparency Law are incompatible with the Ecuadoran constitution, rights groups say, and have challenged them both in court. They say the actions by the agency interfere manifestly with the right to property, codified in the International Convention on Civil & Political Rights. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has ruled that limitations to the right to property must be necessary and proportionate to reach a legitimate goal.

Ecuadoran President Daniel Noboa defended the measures publicly, saying that the funds were intended to “destabilize” his administration with demonstrations. The financial measures were implemented over the past two months, as indigenous groups protested against the government’s decision to cut diesel subsidies. Environmental groups meanwhile protested the decision to approve a mining project in the southern province of Azuay, which threatens the fragile ecosystems in the region. To curb the protests in October, authorities used what rights groups assailed as massive and indiscriminate force, resulting in injuries and deaths.

From JURIST, Dec. 11. Used with permission. Internal links added.

See our last reports on the crackdown in Ecuador, and the October protests.

Photo: Alianza Ceibo

Listen on SoundCloud or via Patreon.

Production by Chris Rywalt

We ask listeners to support us at one of our three tiers via Patreon: Become a Basic Supporter for just $1 per weekly podcast ($5 per month), or a Special Supporter for $2 per podcast ($10 per month), or a Major Rant Enabler for $5 per podcast ($25 per month). We now have 60 paid subscribers. If you appreciate our work, please become Number 61!

Image: White House