Human Rights Watch (HRW) urged Magyar’s incoming government to take immediate steps to restore democratic norms in Hungary. The organization called for the swift dissolution of the Sovereignty Protection Office, a body established in 2023 with broad powers to investigate journalists, civil organizations, and academics that receive foreign funding. HRW also pressed for an end to emergency decree powers that have allowed Orbán’s executive to bypass the parliamentary process since 2020.

HRW urged the incoming government to drop criminal charges against Budapest Mayor Gergely Karácsony, who is being prosecuted for holding the city’s Pride March last June in defiance of a ban imposed by Orbán’s government, and against Géza Buzás-Hábel, organizer of the Pride march in Pécs.

Orbán’s measures against dissent of course mirror those of Vladimir Putin, and indeed his defeat diminishes an emerging pro-Russian bloc on the continent, also including Slovakia and (outside the EU) Serbia and Belarus. The fall of Orbán is expected to free up a €17 billion loan to Ukraine that his government had effecitvely blocked.

However, Péter Magyar is a creature of the center-right, and a former Orbán ally. His Respect & Freedom (Tisza) party broke from Fidesz in 2020, in response to Orbán’s growing authoritarianism. His proclivities are fundamentally conservative, and he may not mean a full de-Orbánification. In a bad sign, Magyar on April 15 held what the Israeli Foreign Ministry called a “warm introductory phone call” with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, pointing to a continuity in ties. Orbán’s Hungary and Donald Trump’s United States are the only two countries Netanyahu has been able to safely visit since the International Criminal Court issued a warrant for his arrest to face war crimes charges in November 2024.

Nonetheless, among those around the world taking courage in the fall of Orbán are the Israeli protesters who have mounted a campaign of militant demonstrations against Netanyahu and his wars. (Jurist, JP, PRI, EuroNews)

Sidelined by the world media spotlight, a more stark struggle with stakes just as high for the survival of democratic norms is emerging in the South American nation of Peru. As Hungarians voted, so did Peruvians, in a crowded field of 35 candidates following years of political chaos that have seen 10 presidents in as many years. Leading the field was Keiko Fujimori, perennial candidate of the hard-right Fuerza Popular.

Keiko is the daughter of ex-dictator Alberto Fujimori, who shamefully died a free man in December 2024, having been released from prison after 17 years following a pardon for his convictions for corruption and human rights abuses. The younger Fujimori remained an unabashed supporter of the elder to the very end, and her potential election promises a reversal of the process of de-Fujimorification that Peru has undergone since the fall of his eight-year period of strongman rule in 2000.

A decision on who Keiko Fujimori would face in a run-off was delayed by several days after the National Office of Electoral Process (ONPE) found that a private contractor failed to deliver ballots to dozens of polling stations across the province of Lima, preventing more than 52,000 citizens from voting on time. One of her two leading contenders, former Lima mayor Rafael López Aliaga, alleged widespread fraud and called for the vote to be annulled. The EU election observer mission reported that it had found no evidence of fraud. But tension mounted as López Aliaga’s supporters mobilized to the street.

López Aliaga, known by his appropriate nickname “Porky,” is also a figure of the hard right, although of a more Catholic bent than Fujimori, and has similarly run on pledges of a harsh crackdown on soaring crime and the narco economy. In an echo of Trump’s Alligator Alcatraz, he has proposed building penal colonies in the Amazon rainforest, surrounded by moats filled with vipers.

López Aliaga has not dropped his demands for annullment, but it now emerges that Fujimori will face a contender from the left in the June 7 run-off. This is Roberto Sánchez Palomino of Juntos por el Perú. Sánchez is the political heir of imprisoned ex-president Pedro Castillo, a political outsider of campesino origins whose 2021 election shook up Peru’s establishment. Castillo’s ouster and detention by order of Congress the following year ended his contentious rule and sparked weeks of protests that were met with massive deadly repression. Sánchez, who had served in Castillo’s cabinet, similarly ran with strong support from rural Andean regions, traditionally excluded from Peruvian politics, and similarly wears a traditional campesino sombrero.

There is a sense of deju vu here, as Keiko Fujimori has made it as far as a presidential run-off in 2011, 2016 and 2021. During the first run, she brought in Rudolph Giuliani as “national security advisor.” In the second run (taking place five months before Trump was first elected here in Gringolandia), she was defeated by the center-right Pedro Pablo Kuczynski after Verónika Mendoza, the left-wing candidate who was bumped out of the race in the first round, threw her support behind him to avoid a re-Fujimorification of the country. As persident, it was Kuczynski who pardoned Alberto Fujimori, in a betrayal of the progressive-minded Peruvians who had helped elect him.

With the center now having effectively collapsed in Peruvian politics, this kind of outcome, at least, is excluded from possibility. However, a win by Keiko Fujimori on her fourth try for the presidency portends a far worse outcome. (Americas Quarterly, Jurist, France24, France24, AFP, Reuters)

Peru may seem far removed from the world stage compared to Hungary, but the Great Powers are definitely playing their chess game here as well. Florida Rep. Maria Elvira Salazar has called on Peru’s next government to “take back” the Chinese-controlled port of Chancay, portraying the deep-water facility as a military threat to the hemisphere. Salazar, chair of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, said during a hearing on April 16 that Washington must help Peru wrest the megaport from Chinese hands. “The new Peruvian government, which will be elected next June, must take it back, that port, take it back, and the United States will help them,” Salazar said.

She argued that the port, just up the coast from Lima, has “dual usage” potential, meaning it could shift from commercial to military operations, allowing Chinese submarines, warships and aircraft carriers to operate from Peru’s territory. (SCMP)

Even a new President Fujimori would be unlikely to take this bait from Washington, as China, like the US, is a free-trade partner of Peru and top investor in its lucrative mineral sector. But there’s much contention about Chinese versus North American influence in the country. The last interim president, José Jerí, who had faced a wave of Gen Z protests last year, was finally removed by Congress this February following unregistered meetings with two Chinese businessmen. The incumbent interim president José María Balcázar is of the left, and popular anger at Peru’s traditional political class is palpable.

Whether it is the populist left of Sánchez or the populist right of Fujimori that prevails in June, the Great Power pressures on Peru will remain. The implications for Peru internally, however, will be very different—and this also has regional implications, as the right has made recent electoral gains throughout Latin America: just over the past months, in Chile, Bolivia and Costa Rica. A new right-authoritarian bloc is emerging, just as the Trump regime is launching new adventures in gunboat diplomacy.

Hopefully, Peru will not be the next addition to this bloc. But a Fujimori victory could mean a fatal blow to Peru’s deeply troubled democracy. A Sánchez victory, on the other hand, would heighten the social contradictions in Peru—with both opportunities for a more meaningful democracy, and dangers of a backlash from the conservative establishment.

Photo: Wikipedia

Marie Struthers, Amnesty International’s Eastern Europe director, stated: “Releasing a prisoner of conscience after he has suffered a stroke is not justice, it is the sign of its profound absence. Belarusian authorities must end the practice of imprisoning activists, journalists, and other government critics for peacefully exercising their rights to freedom of expression, association, and assembly.” She also highlighted the cases of imprisoned rights defenders Nasta Loika, Marfa Rabkova, Valiantsin Stefanovich and Vital Chopik.

Statkevich was one of 52 Belarusian prisoners released in September 2025 following a deal with the US. Upon their release, Belarusian authorities attempted to deport the 52 former prisoners. While they were being brought to the Lithuanian border, Statkevich forced his way out of the bus, declaring, “I will keep fighting.” Statkevich was then reportedly detained by masked men and transported to a penal colony.

Statkevich was serving a 14-year sentence following his arrest in 2020 on charges of “organization of mass unrest,” under Article 293(1) of the Criminal Code. In his latest imprisonment since 2020, he was held in isolation for long weeks before suffering a stroke on Jan. 21. The stroke precipitated his release, but Amnesty stressed that being released due to failing health does not constitute justice.

The Belarusian Human Rights Centre Viasna reports that 1,142 political prisoners remain incarcerated in Belarus.

From JURIST, Feb. 22. Used with permission. Internal links added.

Image: Monument to Belarusian political prisoners in Bydgoszcz, Poland. Source: Паўлюк Шапецька via Wikimedia Commons

My Office monitored an alarming increase in the use of the capital punishment in 2025, especially for offences not meeting the “most serious crimes” threshold required under international law, the continued execution of people convicted of crimes committed as children, as well as persistent secrecy around executions.

This threshold is established by Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil & Political Rights. The increase primarily came from executions for drug-related offenses in a small number of retentionist states. These are countries that continue to retain capital punishment, as opposed to the growing number of abolitionist states. which do not employ the death penalty.

Türk stressed that the death penalty does not function as an effective crime prevention tool, and can kill innocent people. He further emphasized the serious implications for marginalized groups: “In practice, the death penalty is also often applied arbitrarily and discriminatorily, in violation of fundamental principles of equality before the law.”

The report specifically addressed the conduct of several countries, including Iran. The UN estimated that at least 1,500 individuals were executed in Iran in 2025—at least 47% for drug offenses. Türk said this figure suggests a “systemic use of capital punishment as a tool of State intimidation.” Iran Human Rights Monitor reported similar concerns in December, stating that “political death sentences” have especially targeted ethnic minorities, including Kurds and Baloch.

Saudi Arabia also had a high figure, with at least 356 executions—78% for drug-related offenses. At least two of those executed were killed for offenses committed as minors, which raises concerns over the rights of children under international law.

Joey Shea, Saudi Arabia researcher at Human Rights Watch, described a “record surge” in executions in the country, and called for an international response. “Governments should immediately press Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s authorities to halt all executions,” she said.

Forty-seven executions occurred in the US in 2025—the highest number in 16 years. Experts have continued to express concerns about “torture or cruel punishment” implications of the expanding use of gas asphyxiation, introduced by some states in 2024.

Türk also discussed Afghanistan, Somalia, Singapore, China, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, and Belarus.

The report did note some “encouraging steps” taken last year. For example, the Constitutional Court in Kyrgyzstan upheld a prohibition on the death penalty, ruling that an attempt to reintroduce it was unconstitutional. Temur Shakirow, director of the International Court of Justice Europe & Central Asia Programme, praised the measure, saying:

Justice systems in all countries are vulnerable to error or abuse, and the death penalty makes any such failure irreversible. Maintaining the abolition of capital punishment therefore remains essential to the effective protection of the right to life.

Türk called on all retentionist states to cease executions, downgrade all current death sentences, and begin to take steps towards abolition.

From JURIST, Jan. 19. Used with permission.

Photo: ICHRI

But the freed Belarusian prisoners are protesting that they were expelled to Lithuania in the US-brokered deal and not given the choice to remain in their own country. Additionally, many have noted that they were almost due to be freed anyway. Veteran dissident and one-time Belarusian presidential candidate Mikola Statkevich, released from prison on Sept. 11 as part of the deal, has been returned to a penal colony at Hlybokaye after refusing to accept exile to Lithuania. (The Guardian, The Insider)

The military maneuvers follow an alarming rise in brinkmanship on NATO’s eastern flank.

Poland requested an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council and invoked Article 4 of the NATO treaty—mandating urgent talks among alliance members—after an incursion of at least 19 Russian drones into the country’s airspace on Sept. 10. The drones were intercepted by Polish and Dutch fighter jets, but not before a private home was struck and damaged in Lublin province. Russia denied targeting Poland, while Belarus, where some of the drones entered from, said they had “lost their course” because they were jammed. Poland is calling for NATO to impose a no-fly zone over its territory. (AP, CNN, Politico, TVP World)

“Russia’s war is escalating, not ending,” European Union foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas told reporters in Brussels after the drone incursion. “What Putin wants to do is to test us. What happened in Poland is a game changer.” (AP)

Three days later, Romania scrambled two F-16 fighter jets after detecting a drone that had breached its airspace during a Russian attack on Ukraine. The jets followed the drone until it returned to Ukrainian airspace. (France24)

This, in turn, followed new outbursts of Russian threats to use nuclear weapons.

Photo of Russian T-14 Armata tank via National Security Journal

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Secretary General of the Council of Europe Alain Berset on June 25 agreed to establish a Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine. The agreement, supported by all 46 Council of Europe member states, will establish a tribunal to address crimes of aggression in response to Russia’s ongoing invasion. The crime of aggression refers to the decision by a state leader to wage a war that violates Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, which prohibits the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. The tribunal’s jurisdiction may also extend to Russian allies participating in the conflict.

The Council of Europe emphasized that the tribunal will uphold international legal standards, including rule of law, due process rights, and judicial independence. Additionally, the Council said that the tribunal will adopt a general legal framework in adherence to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which guarantees the right to a fair trial, protection against retroactive punishment, and access to an impartial venue. The inclusion of crimes of aggression in the Rome Statute, which established the International Criminal Court (ICC) framework, further supports a commitment to prosecution.

Currently, the ICC addresses war crimes and crimes against humanity, but has limited jurisdiction over crimes of aggression. This leaves a gap in which political and military leaders who commit crimes of aggression may escape prosecution. The new tribunal is intended to complement the ICC by providing a mechanism to hold political and military leaders accountable for the decision to wage an unlawful war. The tribunal will also support Ukraine’s efforts to document harm caused by the invasion, with a view toward potential reparations

A challenge the tribunal faces is securing the physical custody of individuals accused of crimes of aggression. Previous efforts to arrest Russian President Vladimir Putin, who remains subject to a 2023 ICC arrest warrant for alleged war crimes, have been unsuccessful. Still, the ICC and Council of Europe maintain that international legal efforts serve to reinforce the rule of law and deter future violations through increased visibility and accountability. President Zelensky stated: “It will take strong political and legal co-operation to make sure every Russian war criminal faces justice—including Putin. This is the path we must walk—all the way to real charges and real verdicts.”

From JURIST, June 26. Used with permission.

Note: The US withdrew from the international investigation of Russian aggression in Ukraine earlier this year. Russia was expelled from the Council of Europe in March 2022.

See our last report on war crimes accusations against Russia.

Photo: Wikimedia Commons

The European Commission seeks to establish standardized procedures so that returns of migrants can be more efficient while still respecting fundamental human rights. The proposed rule provides mandatory forced return if the undocumented migrant does not cooperate with an EU member state in the return procedure. Additionally, individuals deemed security risks could be detained for more than 24 months with judicial authorization.

The standardized procedures are also intended to address the EU’s low return rates and the fragmentation of different national systems. According to the data of the European Parliament, the rate of returns enforced on third-country nationals (TCNs) found to be irregularly present on EU territory was 23% in 2023. The proposed rules seek to unify the system with common procedures for all EU member states and allow for mutual recognition of return decisions by July 2027.

However, HRW argued that imposing harsher obligations on migrants does not address the issue, as the principal obstacle to enforcing return decisions is uncooperative countries of origin. According to the Migration Policy Institute, the origin states may reject returnees simply by non-response or prolonged bureaucratic procedures. In other words, neither origin states nor EU member states would recognize their legal status if the proposal is implemented.

This exacerbates the group’s concern that the revised detention rules could allow the prolonged detention of vulnerable individuals, including unaccompanied children. HRW also argued that the third-country “return hubs,” which would serve to transfer migrants, fail to guarantee safe and sustainable shelter.

The proposal follows the Pact on Migration & Asylum, a 2024 reform introducing new migration rules to create a comprehensive approach. The next step for the proposed regulation is approval by the European Parliament. HRW has urged the EuropParliament to reject the proposal, arguing that it would weaken and undermine EU standards.

Asylum has been a heated topic among the EU member states. On Jan. 7, the European Court of Human Rights found that Greek authorities engaged in illegal “pushbacks,” forcing asylum seekers to return to their country of origin without due process, violating the 1951 Refugee Convention. Poland is being urged by HRW to drop a bill that would suspend asylum rights at its border with Belarus.

Earlier in March, the EU Agency for Asylum reported that asylum applications across the EU, Norway and Switzerland decreased by 11% in 2024.

From JURIST, March 14. Used with permission.

Photo: Sara Creta/TNH

In the past, the US has been a co-sponsor to the Emergency Special Session 11 (ES-11) series of resolutions, including the ES-11/6, which marked two years of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The General Assembly invoked the “Uniting for Peace” mechanism (Resolution 377A(V)) on Feb. 28, 2022, which allows the body to take action after Russia’s veto power prevented the UN Security Council from acting. (Moscow Times, Kyiv Independent, Axios, Jurist)

Tensions between the US and Ukraine escalated on Feb. 19 when Trump on social media called President Volodymyr Zelensky a “dictator without elections” and accused him of starting the war with Russia three years ago. Zelensky retorted that Trump lives in a “web of disinformation.” The insults came a day after senior US and Russian officials discussed ending the war during a meeting in Riyadh, to which Ukraine was not invited. Zelensky said the meeting served only as a gift to Russian President Vladimir Putin, effectively bringing him back from his diplomatic isolation. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio said after the meeting that peace would require concessions from both sides. Russian officials have not publicly offered any concessions but reportedly demanded that Ukraine commit to neutrality and not be allowed to join the NATO military alliance.

Also Feb. 20, Zelensky met in Kyiv with Trump’s Ukraine and Russia envoy, Keith Kellogg, and said the meeting gave him hope. But a joint press conference afterwards was cancelled, at the request of the US. China has come out in support of Trump’s negotiations with Russia, while European leaders have said they are considering sending peacekeepers to Ukraine. (TNH)

Map: PCL

That same day, Russian lawmaker Maria Butina told Reuters: “Biden’s administration is trying to escalate the situation to the maximum while they still have power and are still in office. I have a great hope that Trump will overcome this decision if this has been made because they are seriously risking the start of World War III, which is not in anybody’s interest.”

The sentiment was echoed by Donald Trump Jr., who tweeted Nov. 17: “The Military Industrial Complex seems to want to make sure they get World War 3 going before my father has a chance to create peace and save lives… Imbeciles!” (BBC News, WaPo, Express, DW)

As Russian nuclear threats escalate, so do air-strikes on Ukrainian cities.  On the same day Markov and Butina spoke, Russian missiles struck residential buildings in Odessa, killing at least 10 people and injuring 18. (Kyiv Post)

Photo of ATACMS being launched: Ukraine Ministry of Defense via Forces News

Tusk justified this move on X (formerly Twitter) as necessary in light of Belarus’ mass transfers of migrants across the border, which he called an act of “hybrid warfare” to threaten Polish national security. According to Tusk, his proposal has precedent by a Finnish law earlier this year, which temporarily blocked asylum seekers entering from Russia. The measure would, however, not apply to refugees fleeing Ukraine.

A response from the European Commission was delivered by spokesperson Anitta Hipper, who also reminded Poland of its obligations under international law. She stated at a press conference that the commission would “stay in touch” with Poland over the measures. The commission refrained from pointing toward the EU’s recently adopted New Pact on Migration & Asylum, which contains an explicit instrument for situations of “instrumentalization” of migrants for poitical pressure, the Crisis & Force Majeure Regulation. Tusk was quoted by Le Monde as stating: “We are not going to respect or apply any European idea that… hinders our security. I’m thinking here of the EU migration pact.”

Poland’s proposal comes after the Netherlands and Hungary requested to opt out from EU asylum regulations under the New Pact, and Germany introduced temporary border controls to limit irregular migration, which Tusk had criticized as a breach of EU law.

From Jurist, Oct. 16. Used with permission.

See our last report on the Poland-Belarus border crisis.

Photo: Visegrad24

The referral, submitted by Minister of Justice Ewelina Dobrowolska, invokes Articles 13(a) and 14 of the Rome Statute, establishing a legal basis for the ICC’s jurisdiction over the grave violations reported since May 1, 2020. Lithuania asserts that there are reasonable grounds to believe that senior Belarusian political, law enforcement, and military officials have engaged in serious crimes, including deportation, persecution, and other inhumane acts against the civilian population. The referral emphasizes that some of these crimes have also occurred within Lithuanian territory, reinforcing the ICC’s jurisdiction under the principle of territoriality, as delineated in the Rome Statute.

Under Article 13(a), the ICC is authorized to exercise its jurisdiction when a State Party refers a situation to the Prosecutor, thereby enabling the Court to investigate and prosecute core crimes outlined in Article 5. The provision highlights the necessity for an independent investigation into serious allegations of systematic abuses. Furthermore, Article 14 outlines the procedure for a State Party to request an investigation into crimes that appear to fall within the Court’s jurisdiction. Lithuania’s initiative not only seeks accountability for these alleged transgressions but also aims to galvanize the international community’s response to the systemic repression faced by dissenters in Belarus.

Exiled head of the United Transitional Cabinet of Belarus, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, underscored the severe conditions faced by the Belarusian people under Lukashenko’s regime, noting:

Today, approximately 300,000 Belarusians have been forced to flee, with every thirtieth resident of Belarus now living in exile. But the regime did not stop there—Belarusians abroad continue to face persecution, as the dictator extends his policies beyond our borders, attacking us through intimidation, judicial harassment, and even criminal prosecution in absentia.

The referral marks a historic moment in the ICC’s history as it is the first instance of a State Party referring a situation in a non-state party based on the jurisdictional principle established in the Myanmar/Bangladesh precedent, in which part of the unlawful conduct occurred on the territory of a State Party.

Lithuanian Justice Minister Dobrowolska further emphasized the significance of the action to the ICC, stating:

Lithuania has been the first State to refer to the ICC concerning the situation in Ukraine, and eventually an arrest warrant for Putin has been issued. Now, we make a move requesting the ICC to investigate the situation in Belarus, and we do expect an arrest warrant for Lukashenko.

The ICC’s Chief Prosecutor Office has confirmed the receipt of the referral and will conduct a preliminary examination to evaluate its admissibility and determine if there are sufficient grounds to initiate a full investigation.

From Jurist, Oct. 1. Used with permission.

See our last reports on charges of crimes against humanity in Belarus since the contested elections of 2020.

Map: PCL