The Sudan team at the Human Rights Office found that upwards of 80% of all civilian deaths from January to April—numbering at least 880—can be attributed to drone attacks. These include attacks on May 8 that killed 26 civilians in Al Quz, South Kordofan, and near El Obeid, North Kordofan.

Türk stated:

This increasing reliance on drones allows hostilities to continue unabated in the approaching rainy season, which in the past has brought about a lull in ground operations. An intensification of hostilities in the coming weeks, as the parties seek to gain or consolidate control of territory amid shifting conflict dynamics, risks hostilities expanding even further to central and eastern states, with lethal consequences for civilians across enormous areas.

Targets struck by drones include healthcare facilities, rendering hospitals inoperable, and a May 4 attack on the Khartoum International Airport that led to the disruption of all flights. The Sudanese government has accused Ethiopia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) of being behind the drone strike on the Khartoum airport, and others. Military spokesperson Brig. Gen. Asim Awad Abdelwahab claims to have intelligence of four drone attacks since March 1 having originated from Ethiopia’s Bahir Dar using drones provided by the UAE.

The UAE has come under fire for supporting the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in their war against the Sudanese government. The conflict in Sudan erupted in April 2023 between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the RSF. The conflict has been described as one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises, with the RSF facing accusations of war crimes and genocide by the UN.

From JURIST, May 11. Used with permission.

AI-generated image of various drones used in Sudan, via Sudan Tribune

The alarming reports that Nigeria has established “concentration camps” for the Fulani ethnic minority cast an ironic light on Nigeria’s tension with the Sahel states of Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso to the north. These three regimes have broken from the Western imperial camp (to embrace the nascent Russian imperial camp)—but are likewise subjecting their Fulani minorities to persecution and massacre. With the recent shock rebel offensive in Mali, the “terrorist” stigma that attaches to the Fulani and Tuareg peoples across the imperial camps makes their position more precarious than ever. Meanwhile, prominent voices on the both the right and the (supposed) “left” are spreading propaganda about the struggle in West Africa that is alarmingly wrong, because it exclusively views the crisis through a campist lens. In Episode 327 of the CounterVortex podcast, Bill Weinberg tries to provide some clarity on these fast-escalating and grossly under-reported conflicts.

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Presiding Judge Kimberly Prost, in ICC’s Trial Chamber X, delivered the Reparations Order in the presence of Al Hassan and his defense team. Prost stated that the estimated number of victims amounted to 65,202. The Chamber ruled that “collective community-based reparations” were “appropriate to address the…type of harm suffered by the victims.” Prost outlined that this mode of reparations would “reach large numbers of victims in a less resource-intensive manner.” Al Hassan will “bear financial liability” for the reparations.

The Chamber emphasized the impact of Al Hassan’s crimes on girls and women in particular. Prost stated: “Women and girls suffered particular moral and material harm… This should be reflected in the planning, design, and implementation of all socio-economic rehabilitation projects and initiatives.”

In outlining costs, the Chamber ordered an estimated total of €4 million towards socio-economic and educational support programs, €1.2 million towards collective community-based psychological rehabilitation measures, €1.5 million for a limited individualized component, and €550,000 towards symbolic and satisfaction measures. The total liability for the harm caused to victims amounted to €7,250,000.

Al Hassan was convicted in June 2024 for crimes against humanity, including “torture, persecution, and other inhumane acts,” and the war crimes of “torture, outrages upon personal dignity, mutilation, cruel treatment and passing sentences without previous judgement pronounced by a regularly constituted court.” The ICC sentenced Al Hassan to 10 years of imprisonment on November 2024.

Crimes against humanity are prohibited under Article 7 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, and are considered by the ICC as “among the most serious of crimes of concern to the international community as a whole.” War crimes are prohibited under Article 8 of the Rome Statute.

From JURIST, April 30. Used with permission.

Note: Al Hassan is among 13 ICC convictions. Another militant, Ahmad al-Faqi al-Mahdi, pleaded guilty to cultural crimes in the destruction of Sufi shrines in Timbuktu.

Photo: WikiMedia Commons

Map: PCL

HRW reported that following some evacuation orders, the government launched indiscriminate aerial bombings of the cleared areas, harming numerous civilians left behind.

The government has additionally imposed “no-flight” zones that effectively limit humanitarian-worker access to opposition-held areas. Opposition forces have taken similar action, stating that humanitarian agencies accessing certain government-controlled areas would be considered government-aligned.

Article 52 of Section IV of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions holds that all civilian objects—any property or infrastructure that is not a military objective, such as homes, schools, hospitals, or places of worship—shall not be the target of any direct attack, or of reprisals.

UN experts, in an April 2 press release, called for all parties to the South Sudan conflict to immediately stop the violence and engage in meaningful dialogue to ensure that all citizens receive protection, and to avoid any further escalation of the conflict.

Condensed from JURIST, April 14. Used with permission.

Photo: Wikimedia Commons

From The New Humanitarian, April 17

Photo: Jesuit Historical Institute in Africa

Sudan’s paramilitary-turned-rebel Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have repeatedly attacked the Darfur border town of Tina, with more than 123 injured people arriving at a hospital supported by Médecins Sans Frontières near the Chad frontier last week. A drone strike—with responsibility still unclear—also killed 17 people on the Chadian side of the border. Tina has been hosting large numbers of displaced Darfuris fleeing RSF attacks elsewhere. (TNH)

Davignon, who was a junior diplomatic intern at the time of the assassination, is the first person to be prosecuted in the case. He is the last living suspect among 10 Belgian diplomats who allegedly assisted in the unlawful abduction and transfer of Lumumba that ultimately led to his death. The Belgian federal prosecutor’s office charged Davignon with “participation in war crimes,” and has also investigated him for involvement in the murders of two of Lumumba’s political allies, Maurice Mpolo and Joseph Okito. A cabinet minister and senator, respectively, Mpolo and Okito were killed alongside Lumumba.

Before becoming the first prime minister of what was initially known as the Republic of Congo, Lumumba led the struggle for independence from Belgium and was hailed by the public as an anti-colonial icon. He served for three months in 1960 before he was forced out and killed early the following year.

While Lumumba’s killers were Congolese rebels, a Belgian Parliamentary Committee concluded in 2002 that “certain members of the Belgian government and other Belgian participants were morally responsible for the circumstances leading to the death of Lumumba.” It also noted that the United States acted behind the scenes to organize active opposition to Lumumba, creating “the first plans of physical elimination.”

The push for a criminal case began in 2011, when Lumumba’s children demanded justice for their father in light of mounting evidence of Belgium’s involvement in the assassination. This January, 10 grandchildren of Lumumba brought both civil proceedings and criminal charges, marking one of the first instances of prosecution for crimes committed in colonial-era Africa.

The Belgian system is one of a few criminal justice systems that combine criminal and civil procedures. It allows parties to join criminal proceedings as civil parties and allows judges to rule on both the criminal and civil aspects of a proceeding in a single decision. The trial is expected to begin in 2027.

From JURIST, March 19. Used with permission.

Photo: Harry Pot/ANEFO via Wikimedia Commons

The World Food Programme (WFP) warned March 17 that the escalating hostilities in the Middle East could lead to record levels of food insecurity, and the largest disruption in the global economy and humanitarian efforts since the COVID-19 pandemic.

WFP deputy executive director and chief operating officer Carl Skau said: “If this conflict continues, it will send shockwaves across the globe, and families who already cannot afford their next meal will be hit the hardest.” Skau urged the international community to mount an adequately funded humanitarian response.

Since the United States and Israel launched airstrikes on Iran in late February, the conflict has spread to encompass much of the region, causing thousands of civilian casualties and forcibly displacing over 3 million people. The WFP predicts 45 million people may slide into acute hunger (a level known as IPC Phase 3+) if the conflict continues. Due to the heavy reliance of food and aid distribution on energy, the skyrocketing price of oil has placed heightened strain on already over-stretched aid supply lines. The disruption of shipping through the Strait of Hormuz has also increased fertilizer costs, posing a more long-term threat to food security.

In 2025, an estimated 318 million people across 68 countries were already experiencing acute food insecurity, with 41.1 million under “Emergency” conditions or worse (IPC Phase 4+). The number of people facing catastrophic hunger (Phase 5) remained alarmingly high in 2025, exceeding 1 million.

Import-reliant countries, predominantly in sub-Saharan Africa and Asia, face the greatest risk. Humanitarian organizations are already spread thin by tightening budgets, as well as the proliferation and exacerbation of global crises. Global funding for foreign aid has contracted exponentially in recent years, with a sharp decline following President Trump’s signing of Executive Order 14169, which effectively suspended most operations of USAID. Together, these developments place extraordinary pressure on humanitarian organizations, leaving millions at risk of famine. Sudan and Somalia were named as particularly vulnerable.

From JURIST, March 19. Used with permission.

Note: Hunger in the Global South has already been exacerbated by Trump’s trade tariffs regime, while spikes in the price of oil and grain since the start of the Ukraine war in 2022 have contributed to popular privation and unrest worldwide.

Photo: Alex Blokha via Wikimedia Commons

Photo via TNH